




SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS UNIVERSITY- SKOPJE



INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH



INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY, FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

**Proceedings from
the International scientific conference**

**IDENTITY
IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
AND EUROPEANIZATION**

**3-4 November 2011, Skopje
Republic of Macedonia**

Skopje, 2012

Proceedings from the International scientific conference
IDENTITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION
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Foreword

On 3 and 4 November 2011, The Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research and the Institute of Sociology – Faculty of Philosophy of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, organized an international conference on the topic *Identity in the Era of Globalization and Europeanization*. Researchers from Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Romania, United Kingdom, France, Poland, Switzerland and Australia, from various scientific disciplines participated at the conference, so the conference gained a truly international and multidisciplinary character. The authors of the papers in this collection aimed to contribute not only for understanding the many significant questions of the Identity in the Era of Globalization and Europeanization, but also the identity in the Balkans. Specifically, the attention is aimed towards the implication of globalization on the economic and social policies, the changes of identity, the national identity in Europe and the Balkans, political identity, and religion, culture, language and identity. According to the thematic content, the papers included in this collection point to the importance and the effects of globalization and Europeanization on the economic, political, national and cultural identity.

These 62 papers are far from having included all relevant aspects of identity. The Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical research and the Institute for Sociology – Faculty of Philosophy are expecting this publication to encourage the interest of the scientific community for further research and critical assessment of results, the problems and the perspectives of identity. By publication of this collection, the science will gain important works which reflect the Identity in the Era of Globalization and Europeanization. We think that these papers with their diversity, actuality and scientific foundations will have an important influence on the further development of social sciences in the region and in Europe.

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GLOBALIZATION – A PROCESS OR PROJECT FOR HOMOGENIZATION OF THE WORLD

*“Globalization is a process for standardization
and homogenization of the world”*

Abstract

In the first years of the new millennium the domination of societies and economies based on the grounds of knowledge, which participate in the global markets is more and more common, as a consequence of the tendency of the organization and mobility of the business activities, knowledge and capital, as well as the liberalization and simplification of the foreign trade relations among countries. The globalization allows the economic subjects appearance on the global market, by usage of local as well as other available resources. Information systems and telecommunications give new physiomy of the world market, enabling the organizations to identify the specific needs of the consumers from different geographical regions in the world and to react quickly by diversification of products and services. Thus, the traditional advantage of the producers which are geographically closer to consumers is significantly reduced. Telecommunications also allow designing of the world electronic markets, where consumers and suppliers come in direct contact. Thus, the need of presence of classical intermediaries is lost, but of course there is the need for new ones. However, there is the question of whether the global market creates irresponsibility, because it presents interpersonal institutional infrastructure which does not take responsibility not even for itself. The global market risk allows to determine which, if there are any, to prosper, and which to suffer.

Key words: globalization, modern age, deregulation, logic of market, global localizing

Before we can creatively formulate and discuss globalization, we should take a stand regarding whether this term implies a real historical process, or it is an ideological construction of the thought i.e. a project developed by powerful social groups intended to divert the attention away from the real social problems. This question is important because it determines our overall attitude towards the idea of globalization and affirms or brings into question the purpose of our efforts to study this phenomenon.

Authors who are of the opinion that globalization is a real social process disagree on many issues related to this process, and it should also be mentioned that that they are the majority.

What is important for us are the differences and attitudes of authors who see globalization as a project. It should be mentioned that the basic difference between them is the issue whether globalization is just a myth, an empty or superfluous construction of the thought (Wallenstein, Hirst), or it is an ideological project with a real content. According

to Wallenstein who belongs to the first group, the globalization discourse is a huge misunderstanding of contemporary reality - which has been imposed by powerful authors. According to him the globalization discourse leads to ignoring real issues as well as misunderstanding the actual crisis in the world today. Thus, the world is the era of transition, but not a transition intended only for undeveloped societies that should join globalization, but transformation of the entire capitalist system into something different.

The future is far from being certain, says Wallenstein, it is uncertain. According to him the key question is not whether to obey the globalization or not, but what to do when this process begins to erode (Wallenstein, 1979)?

Such a position approaches the other group of authors who consider globalization as a project. It is about authors who see globalization as neoliberal project of influential groups that comes true and leaves painful consequences on the whole society especially on the processes of state welfare. The key authors that should be mentioned are Noam Chomsky and Susan George. For them, globalization is a powerful idea which justifies global capital movements, founded on gaining profits at the expense of marginalized individuals and groups. According to these authors the consequences of neoliberalism are devastating and evident in various areas of social life. First of all, neoliberalism leads to dehumanization, different types of alienation and exploitation of human and natural resources. The capital movement is out of social and state control.

On the other hand, as we already mentioned, a significant number of authors consider globalization as a process - historical process.

Discussing globalization consequences means or at least it could be understood to a certain extent as an assessment or evaluation of realized and expected effects of a comprehensive and long-term process. In other words, it is a kind of taking certain moral and valuable attitude towards the phenomenon. But, the problem arises at the moment when we face different assessments.

Questions: Is it good or bad when national states have less and less sovereignty or autonomy? Scientific objectivity implies neutrality on values, at least for those who accept such a possibility. There are some difficulties there because the affirmation of one value could mean degradation of the other at the same time. Furthermore, there are also difficulties because the globalization process hasn't been completed yet, and it could be hardly said that the recent effects were final and that in future they might be eventually transformed into something else or even in its own contradiction.

The next question is, whether the global expansion of the democratic regime consecutively leads to degradation of genuine democracy at the same time. There is also the problem that the process of globalization leaves opposing consequences as seen from the standpoint of a value. Namely, does the expansion of freedom in the economic activities mean a lack of opportunity in order to achieve the same freedom in other spheres?

Also, when starting from the same standpoint of values or when following only one dimension, there remains the problem of different understanding of short and long term effects. Namely, is capitalism entering a phase of expansion or is it cutting off the branch it is sitting on? Although there are confirmed empirical data, how could you explain the fact that globalization increases the gap between the rich and the poor, where the poor

statesmen actually queue and desperately try to attract capital that “relatively speaking” could make them even poorer.

Hyper globalists’ thesis

For the hyperglobalists, globalization is a new era in the history of mankind, where **“the traditional national-states become unnatural, even unsustainable economic units in the global economy”**(Ohmae, 1995: 5). Economic globalization affects the denationalization of the economy by creating a transnational network of production, trade and finances. In these economies without borders, national governments became something more than transmission belts for the global capital, or simple transferring institutions, sandwiched between powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of governance. According to hyperglobalists, the economic globalization creates new forms of social organizations that suppress the traditional – national states as primary economic and political units of the society.

The global expansion of consumerist ideology also imposes a new meaning of identity to the marginalized, distorting, traditional culture and way of life. The global expansion of liberal democracy further strengthens the sense of global civilization, which is defined by universal standards of the economic and political organizations. Since the institutions of global and regional authorities have even more significant role, the sovereignty and autonomy of the state erodes more and more. According to the hyperglobalists, the economic and political power becomes denationalized and scattered, thus the national state becomes more than a kind of transnational organization for economy management.

Skeptics’ thesis

Sceptics argue that the governments are not passive victims of internationalization, but on the contrary they are its main actors. They say that the disappearance of inequality between the north and the south has nothing in common with internationalization and that the increasing economic marginalization happens in most societies in the Third World, since the market and the investments circulate within the boards of the rich world, which increases the exclusion of a significant part of the rest of the world. Thus, sceptics generally reject the term internationalization as well as existence of a deep-rooted inequality and hierarchy in the global economy. According to many sceptics, this inequality creates opportunities for development of fundamentalism and aggressive nationalism, so the world becomes fragmented into civilization blocks, cultural and ethnic enclaves. The emergence of cultural homogenization and global culture are myths.

Transformationalists’ thesis

According to transformationalists in the new millennium, globalization is a central driving force standing behind the rapid economic and political changes that transform modern societies and the world order. In the transformationalists’ explanations it is in-

creasingly emphasized that globalization is a long historical process pervaded with contradictions and significantly shaped by conjuncture facts. First of all, regarding future globalization, this precaution is conditioned by the contemporary patterns of unpredictable global economic, military, technological, environmental, political, cultural and historical migration flows. Basically, views of the transformationalists represent a belief that contemporary globalization makes a reconstruction or creates power, functions and authorities out of national governments, although it isn't opposed that the state still has pretensions for the highest executive authority of those inside the territory. Namely, along with the expansion of jurisdiction and compulsion of law enforced by the institutions of the international authorities, are also the obligations under by international laws. This is especially present in the EU and in the activities of the World Trade Organization where the sovereign power is divided among the international, national and local authorities. But, in situations where the sovereignty is untouched, the states will not be able to keep it like that for a longer period of time, although somewhere the exclusive jurisdiction over the run of events within their territorial borders might be preserved. Global systems, from financial to environmental, connect the fate of local communities with the fate of communities through out the world. Global communication and shipping infrastructure also encourages new forms of economic and social organizations that exceed the national boundaries without any impact on the performances and the control. Some states deplete absolute sovereignty within its territorial borders which could be witnessed by the practice of diplomatic immunity.

Thus, sovereignty today cannot be understood as a defined territorial border, but it could be understood more as a political bargain for the resources within the complex transnational networks (Held, 1991).

Supported by the revolution of information, the global market risk allows determining who, if there are any, will be prosperous and who will suffer. Namely, if there isn't global governance, the global market risk cannot be regulated by the model of the national markets, and also not a single national market could resist it.

A major problem in the process of overcoming the global market force is the creation, a process of interacting and incorporating the matrix of national and international public policy. Ohmae (Ohmae 1990, 1993, 1995) argued that corporations "without leaders" are the main drivers in the inter-linked economy concentrated in the US, Europe and Japan. He said that the macroeconomic and industrial state interventions made by national governments, can only distort and stop the rational processes of resource allocation with global corporate decisions and consumer choices. According to him, these corporations should follow the strategy "Global localization" worldwide, respectively in specific regional markets, and when positioned, effectively meet various specific needs of local consumer groups. This implies that trans-national corporations should primarily rely on direct foreign investments and entire domestic production in order to meet such specific market needs.

Globalization trends divided the world into two zones: a zone of stagnation and a zone of development, which has crucial impact on the position of each individual country. The countries that fail to articulate the development resources in the development

of modern technologies inevitably remain in stagnation, failing to join the trends of the developed world.

The linking process of the economies of various countries is not new. From the beginning of the capitalist way of production, internationalization of the economy and the society itself has been a way for existence and survival of individual national economies. However, a complete internationalization and transnationalization of the economy is evident, so some aspects of normal way of living are opened to doubt. The benefits of globalization mostly belong to the private sector i.e. to the global entrepreneurs, traders in the form of multinational companies. Using the underdevelopment of the existing and the absence of some other necessary economic institutions, multinational companies organize the production at locations where their production costs are the lowest, while they book their profits in those countries where taxes are also the lowest that enables achieving the highest possible price for their products. Certainly, even the most powerful multinational companies expect help from their “own” countries. All global changes reduce and even tend to suspend the power of the influence of national states, so even in case when they are willing, these states are unable to offer the necessary protection for the citizens.

The **supranational capital** has no mercy towards the social policy, the equal care for all classes of people, especially for those who are unable to generate profits and most of all require help from the state. There is an increasing resentment and anger that these dissatisfied masses take out on their governments. So, it is urgently necessary to create a new international legal order that would regulate those relations, powers and privileges, otherwise ordinary people would be under pressure of intensive terror and merciless exploitation.

Global competition with its massive movement of capital towards recently underdeveloped countries creates a new economic phenomenon that increasingly becomes a foundation of the “new economy”. The consequences are high in developed countries characterized by old developed economies. The movement of capital towards underdeveloped countries creates new competitors and competition with such sizes as no one has expected until now. Large quantities of cheap goods are being produced in unimaginable proportions. Exports are allowed from the developed countries because of the opened markets. This “export offensive” today is called an “attack” of markets and economies from the developed countries. Domestic production is threatened, so certain ways and possibilities are initiated in order to protect it. The proclaimed worldwide liberalization is falling into crisis more and more.

Taking all that into consideration we can say that this situation looks like unfair competition, where small businesses especially suffer, being unable to cope with the enormous quantities of extremely cheap imported products.

These multinational companies make huge profits by using cheap labour and by exploitation of the population in underdeveloped countries.

Globalization affects the labour market and demographic rearrangement of labour, changes the flows of labour supply and demands. A great many of the working age population in the developing or underdeveloped countries mostly move towards western, capitalist countries, searching for better living conditions, better earnings and better social protection. The young people also leave their own country and mostly go to developed

countries in search of a better life (better conditions for learning, studying, building a career, etc.).

But, negative consequences appear in poorer countries - as a result of brain drain and labour deficit, a gap occurs between the rich countries that attract educated and skilled personnel and the poor countries that fail to keep those highly skilled professionals, where the state invested for their professional status.

It becomes increasingly clear that poor societies, the countries of the so-called Third World, cannot withstand the race with rich countries, they simply have no chances in such an unfair competition that started with a tremendous advantage of the richest countries.

Someone should ask the question: Could such a globalization survive all the shocks which it undoubtedly entails?

A serious problem facing globalization is its selectivity. Namely, the globalization phenomenon is selective: it works in favour of some countries and does damage to others. Measured by "TERMS OF TRADE" (the ratio between export and import prices) and direct investments, the integration was quite uneven; some countries have managed to collect a huge part of the foreign capital, while other remained on the side. Those other countries have over two billion of population and unfortunately in those countries the only expanding process is poverty.

Briefly explained, globalization is not and has never been global. We can understand the Ulrich Beck's thought who said that we couldn't talk about globalization, since it is just internationalization. A great part of the world (one third of the total world population) has never participated, has never been a part of the positive consequences of globalization, while in the meantime, there is a threat of even greater marginalization of the undeveloped.

Although the globalization acts selectively, its effects are non-selective. Globalizing the ways of production, technological innovation, cultural patterns of living, environmental impact etc., strengthens the entropic processes (Rifkin.1986) - political, cultural and ecological entropy that standardize matrices of production, style of living etc., including them in a new sociality dimension - global society. Market globalization, technologies and information, basically allow the communities to have equal access to that communication level of the society.

However, having in mind the constant asymmetrical development of the world and the asymmetric information (Stieglitz, 2002) that assumes inequality, then this is a new opportunity for total expansion of the new model - a pole in the asymmetry - its increase and a new division of the world.

It is a fact that the fundamental importance for the current economic globalization in this new system of the created global world, unequally prepared various nations and states differ in their economic, military-strategic and informational potential (Mazur and Chumakov, 2003: 183).

As implemented by institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the globalization in practice is just a momentary economic integration of rich and poor countries, regarding the market and the investment as well (Reipert, 2006: 57). Concerning this fact and the understanding that the rise of the standard of living in the history of human society depended on the growing market, it should be considered whether

the result of globalization is an increased living standard in proportion to the market growth; in case of an increased standard, whether this growth is globally uniform for all states, and it is equal or not for all the citizens within a single state, as an expression of the growth of the total wealth in the globalized world society. The answer to this question should be sought in the theory of globalization.

Analyses show that the global market and transnational companies don't work on the principle of labour mobility, but work on the principle of capital mobility that requires a location that offers the best qualification structure and lowest cost of labour. Companies that look for high qualified and productive workforce have better opportunities to locate themselves in developed countries with all their conveniences, but instead, they locate capacities in countries with cheap labour, because these countries have the most flexible labour and low social expenses.

Thus, globalization as a process transforms i.e. reconstructs the power and authority of national governments, so the hyper globalization thesis "the end of sovereign national states" as well as the thesis of the sceptics "nothing has changed" should be rejected. Modern problems cannot be solved at the level of national states, but global processes must be taken into account in order to bring adequate solution of these issues. In this era of globalization, the global cultural approach should be focused on the cultural homogenization problem as well as on the influence of the culture and mass media on the situation of individual or national identity. According to Held: In a situation when the mankind has the capacity for self-destruction by means of wars and environmental disasters, the creation of a global democratic and humane society is the best long term guarantee for the survival of the mankind, although it may seem like an utopia (Held, 1995). And finally, I'd like to finish with the words of the Swedish anthropologist Friedman: Ethnic and cultural fragmentation and the modernistic homogenization do not represent two different arguments, two conflicted views about what happens in the contemporary world, but they represent two constituent trends of the global reality.

Globalization is a process of standardization and homogenization i.e. globalization is a source of hybridization and creation of complex social relations.

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GLOBALIZATION AND HYBRIDIZATION OF CULTURE

Abstract

In this paper, we give a detailed analysis of the concepts of globalization and cultural hybridization, as well as the concept of creolization, and their relevance for understanding the contemporary culture. Despite criticism and skepticism concerning the value of the concept of globalization that have appeared as a result of a “post-global turn” that were provoked by 9/11 events, most authors argue that globalization is essential to understanding the contemporary epoch.

As for globalization of culture, it is argued that globalizing forces did not inevitably lead to uniform global culture. They brought local cultural patterns closer to the “imagined” global culture but at the same time. They have promoted greater cultural heterogeneity. The process of hybridization further contributes to continuing cultural heterogeneity. In the paper, we discuss in more detail the concepts of cultural hybridization as well as of creolization.

Key words: globalization, cultural globalization, cultural hybridization

Today many authors speak of globalization as an “unavoidable problem of contemporary world” (Robertson, 1992). For many it appears as a main source of uncertainty and something that is a source of danger and hope. Others point out that globalization undermines the very bases of community, destroying the established borders – economic, political cultural – and in that way it destabilizes spatial and temporal bases of national identity. On the other side, it is pointed out that the processes of global restructuring of the world also leads to new configurations of identities and makes possible the imagination of new communities.

There is no doubt that these opposite views on globalization are partly due to the fact that globalization is a profoundly contradictory process that leads to new forms of integration, but at the same time it leads to cultural fragmentation and particularization. It is a process, which, on one side involves constant strengthening of interconnectedness of nations, societies and people, and on the other side, it involves the promotion or facilitation of local difference and diversity – the rise of local heterogenization. It also encourages the claims of diverse ethno-cultural groups for a more equitable participation in various areas of socio-cultural life and thus globalization contributes to further multiculturalization of many countries.

However, these more sceptical views, as David Deld and Antony McGrew noted, were result of a “post-global turn” provoked by 9/11 events. Critics claim that since then

globalization has encountered “hard times”. This can be seen in development of different kinds of epitaphs related to globalization. Some wrote about “sinking of globalization”, that “the era of globalization, or that “the age of globalization is unexpectedly over”. As a consequence, numerous doubts in the explanatory power of the very concept of globalization appeared (Held and McGrew, 2007: 3). Rosenberg argues that the concept provides no convincing “guide to the interpretation of empirical events” and therefore it must in some meaningful sense be analytically redundant. (quoted in Held and McGrew, 2007: 3). However, despite these criticism and scepticism concerning the value of the concept of globalization most authors argue that globalization remains “absolutely central to any account of the current human condition: as an idea and discourse that provides social meaning by framing and by legitimating social and political change” (Held and McGrew, 2007: 3). Therefore, it is not surprising that, being essential to understanding the contemporary epoch, as an idea it has central importance in theoretical thinking in many social sciences that seek to understand the most fundamental and most dramatic changes that occurred in the world in the last fifty years.

Roland Robertson in his book *Globalization* offered a classic discussion on the process of globalization. He views globalization both as an objective process of compression of the entire world and a subjective process of intensification of the consciousness of the world. According to him, globalization means an increase in both global interdependence and consciousness of that interdependence. Its essential character is actually the rise and expansion of the individual consciousness of the global situation and of the world as an arena in which we all participate (1992: 9). Robertson’s multidimensional and culturally sensitive perspective has encouraged the sociologists to elaborate further on the notion of cultural globalization and contributed to becoming a legitimate field for research on cultural globalization (Hsiao, 2002: 49-50). In this regard of great importance is the work of Waters (1995), Berger (1997), Held (1999) and Tomlison (1999).

Peter L. Berger, for example, has formulated four distinctive processes and phenomena of cultural globalization. These processes occur simultaneously, are related to each other, and interact with the indigenous cultures on which they have impinged: Davos culture, or international business culture; McWorld culture, or global popular culture; faculty club international, or world intellectual culture; new religious movements, or popular religious culture.

Berger has also formulated a typology with four possible consequences for the intersection of globalizing forces and indigenous culture: replacement of the local culture by the globalized culture; coexistence of the global and local cultures without any significant merging of the two; synthesis of the global universal culture with the particular indigenous culture; rejection of the global culture by powerful local reaction (Berger, 1997: 24).

However, these globalizing forces, which were prevalent in many cultures did not inevitably lead to a uniform global culture. Although they brought local cultural patterns closer to the “imagined” global culture, they have not eliminated cultural diversity; in fact, they have promoted greater cultural heterogeneity (Hsiao, 2002: 51).

Many scholars of globalization agree that one aspect of the contemporary processes of globalization is the tendency for people to become more culturally mixed at the same time when ethnic identities are being solidified (Lewellen, 2002: 99). In the past, the

process of cultural mixing was encompassed in such words as diffused, acculturated, bicultural, and syncretic. Today, one is more likely to encounter hybrid, creole, mestizaje, intercultural, transcultural, or intermixed.

The dominant term in globalization studies is the term “hybrid”, which is borrowed from biology, referring to the offspring of dissimilar parents, either plants or animals. At first, there was resistance in using this term in social sciences because first of all it had a negative connotation since it was related to racism. Second, animal hybrids tend to be sterile and that is not at all what this metaphorical usage is designed to impart. Third, hybrid has passive connotations, a hybrid being the predictable result of deliberate breeding, whereas the process of cultural intermixing is active, creative, and unpredictable; hybridity denotes only fusion of traits whereas the reality is that compartmentalization is also common in this process, that is, individuals can absorb bits and pieces of different cultures that can be selectively used in different settings (Ibidem, 99).

Hybridization like globalization as a term refers to the process as old as history but its thematization as discourse and perspective is fairly new. Partly it is due to the accelerated pace of cultural mixing and widening of its scope “in the wake of major structural changes, such as new technologies that enable new phases of intercultural contact” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 99). However, the term gained popularity in social sciences in the final decade of the XX century, mainly because it had been thoroughly popularized in the title of the book *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* by Nestor Garcia Canclini first published in 1995. Inspired in his study by the critical contributions of various disciplines like anthropology, sociology, art history and communication, each of which approaches the study in its own way, Garcia Canclini in this book focuses on how studies of hybridization have altered the manner of speaking of identity, culture, difference, inequality, multiculturalism, and about conceptual pairings used to organize conflict in the social sciences: tradition/ modernity, north/south, local/global. He also points out that that in the final decade of the twentieth century analysis of hybridization becomes most extensive in the broad range of cultural processes (Garcia Canclini, 2005: xxiv).

Garcia Canclini formulates his definition of hybridization in the following way: “I understand for hybridization socio-cultural processes in which discrete structures or practices previously existing in separate form are combined to generate new structures, objects and practices” (Canclini, 2005: xxv).

Garcia Canclini chooses hybridization over mestizaje and syncretism because the term is not limited to racial mixtures, or religious fusion, or the combination of traditional symbolic movements (Ibid, 2). It is the emergence of new communication technologies, reorganization of the public and the private in metropolitan areas, and the “deterritorialization” of symbolic processes that have generated hybrid cultures (Ibid, 10). The strategies he refers to in the title of his book are not hegemonic strategies of the cultural elites; they are also found among rural people migrating to the city, and workers faced with new technology, who reconvert their skills and their knowledge to their new environment.

However, it should be mentioned that the way Garcia Canclini and most anthropologists use the term hybrid is much more specific: it is intermixture of cultures *at different levels of traditionalism and modernism* (Lewellen, 2002: 99-100). Garcia Canclini had in mind, first of all, the case of Mexico and other Latin America countries. As Sabine

Mabardi points out “unlike other theorizations of hybrid as interstitial and liminal, Garcia Canclini grounds, his notion of the Latin American hybrid in social systems and rituals which always give it determinacy and regulates the fragmentation”(Mabardi, 2010: 252). Nonetheless, the concept has relevance for other Third World countries in which new cultural mixtures emerge as a result of combination of new technologies and existing social practices and cultural values. The Turkish sociologist Nilufer Göle, for example, discusses changes in Islam in Turkey in terms of “hybridization between Islamists and modernity” (quoted in Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 99). It is interesting that Garcia Canclini’s conception of hybridization has not proved very useful in other intellectual traditions. For example, within the United States and Europe the dominant forms of cultural contact were better theorized in terms of assimilation and transnationalism (Lewellen, 2002: 100).

The concept of hybridization is also used to describe processes of interethnic contact and decolonization (Bhabha, 1994), globalizing processes (Nederveen Pieterse 2009; Hannerz, 1996), travel and border crossing (Cliford, 1997) and artistic, and mass communicational fusions. Before that, it was used by Michail Bachtin in his linguistic studies where he uses the term hybridization to denote the coexistence since the early modernity of elite and popular languages (Garcia Canclini, 2005: xxiii).

We will focus our attention to those authors who considered processes of hybridization or mixing of cultures as result of “globalization and the production out of integration of the global and the local of new and unique hybrid cultures that are not reducible to either local or global culture” (Ritzer, 2007: 12; 2010: 255). From this perspective, as Ritzer noted, the focus is on integration of global processes with various local realities to produce new and distinctive hybrid forms that indicate continued heterogenization rather than homogenization. Here hybridization is understood as a profoundly creative process out of which new cultural realities emerge, and continuing heterogeneity, in many different fields.

The concept of glocalization, according to Ritzer (2010: 255), gets to the heart of cultural hybridization. The concept was introduced by Roland Roberston and those who emphasized the idea that the world is growing more pluralistic actually were inspired by his work. With respect to cultural forms, Row and Scheling define hybridization as “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices” (quoted in Nederveen Pieterse, 2009: 70).

Nederveen Pieterse is a contemporary sociologist who devoted great attention to the processes of hybridization. In his book *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange* he points out that “globalization or the trend of growing worldwide interconnectedness has been accompanied by several clashing notions of cultural difference” (Nederveen Pieterse (2009: 43). He discusses the claims of three perspectives on cultural difference: cultural differentialism or lasting difference, cultural convergence or growing sameness and cultural hybridization or ongoing mixing, their wider theoretical assumptions and the kind of future they invoke. Nederveen Pieterse also argues that each of these positions involves particular theoretical precepts and each represents a politics of difference – as lasting and immutable, as erasable and being erased, and as mixing and in the process generating new translocal forms of difference. Each involves different subjectivities and

larger perspectives. He thinks that the first two perspectives are narrow assessments of globalization and instead argues for viewing globalization as a process of hybridization that give rise to global *mélange*. According to the principle of mixing result of the process of globalization is open and today's globalization is at the same time process of easternization and westernization as well as many other influences.

According to Nederveen Pieterse hybridization is a perspective that is meaningful as a "counterweight to introverted notions of culture" and as a "critique of essentialism". He also makes a difference between structural hybridization, or the emergence of new practices of social cooperation and competition, and cultural hybridization, or new transcultural expressions. These two kinds of hybridization are interdependent because "new forms of cooperation require and evoke new cultural imaginaries" (Ibidem, 89).

One of the terms offered to describe the mixing of cultures is creolization of global culture. Creolization itself is an odd, hybrid term. In the Caribbean and North America it stands for mixture of African and European, while in Latin America *criollo* originally denotes those of European descent born on the continent. It is often used merely as synonym for mixing or hybridity but some authors, especially the anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen, because of "historical origins of the term and its contemporary usage in societies containing self-designating creoles" think that "a more restricted use of the term might be both necessary and analytically helpful" (Eriksen, 2007: 155).

On the other side, the anthropologist Ulf Hannerz (1992; 1996; 2010) is, "the leading advocate of a wider use of the term creolization". He maintains that the creole metaphor can be applied to the study of cultural mixture not just in a colonial context but also in the global society (Cohen and Toninato 2010: 11). He thinks that "creole cultures may be turned into a more generic term of wider applicability" (Hannerz, 1996: 66). For Hannerz the "creole metaphor" is able to encapsulate the increasing complexity and fluidity of the world system. More specifically, as Cohen and Toninato pointed out, "Hannerz usefully deploys the idea of a creole continuum to illustrate the multiple interconnections characterizing global center-periphery relations" (Cohen and Toninato, 2010: 11-12).

Ulf Hannerz (1989; 1992; 1996; 1997) developed a theory of "global ecumene" in which he theorized the processes of the unification and homogenization of culture on global scale, which has come about mostly through mass media with TV as its most potent carrier. The unprecedented intensiveness of travel and tourism has a similar effect. Travellers and tourists spread the cultural patterns of the industrial societies from which they come to the other geographical regions of the world that are their destination.

Hannerz defines the concept of "ecumene" as a region of persistent cultural interaction and exchange. The gradual expansion of the ecumene achieves in our times truly global dimensions. Modern cultures cross any concrete spatial and temporal location: through modern technologies of communication and transportation they "unbind space and time". The global ecumene has an asymmetric structure of the centre-and-periphery type, that is, a clear distinction between the centre, where cultural messages originate, and the peripheries where they are merely adopted. The cultural transfers from the periphery to the centre are highly limited (Hannerz, 1989).

Hannerz (1997) draws four possible scenarios of cultural unification in the future. The first, "the scenario of global homogenization of culture" of which he thinks as "a

master scenario against which every alternative scenario has to be measured“, envisages complete domination by western culture and the whole world becoming, more or less, a successful replica of western lifestyles, consumer patterns, norms and values, ideas and beliefs. The second is labelled the “saturation scenario”. As the periphery slowly absorbs the cultural patterns of the centre, it becomes saturated with them and over several generations local meanings, cultural forms and sensibilities are eliminated. The third one, the “peripheral corruption scenario”, signifies a decay and distortion of the western culture in the course of adoption by the peripheral countries. The fourth scenario, one preferred by Hannerz, is called “maturation scenario”. It implies more equal dialogue and exchange, rather than one-sided blind reception.

The ultimate result of cultural interrelatedness is creolization of culture. According to Hannerz (1992; 2010) we live in creolizing world. Cultures are no longer as bounded or autonomous as they once were. All over the world cultures display mixed origins, present complex synthesis, lose purity and homogeneity. This is result of an ongoing, historically cumulative interrelatedness between the centre and the peripheries, the multidirectional flow between the transnational and the indigenous. As the author puts it, instead of incorporation into a single global culture, conversation among cultures goes on.

In the end, it should be noted that despite some criticism levelled at the use of the terms globalization and hybridization, as well as creolization, which refers to cultural mixing, they so far proved to be very useful conceptual tools to address the complex social and cultural dynamics set off by global processes of cross-cultural interaction. It is our opinion that they will have relevance for social and cultural analysis for long time.

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THE EXTERNAL IDENTITY OF THE EU AS A 'DEMOCRACY PROMOTER': MYTH OR REALITY?¹

Abstract

Like all political actors, the European Union (EU) presents its identity to the outside world in as positive a light as possible: a successful example of peaceful, democratic integration and cooperation between nation states. References to its birth from the destruction of the European continent and its role in ensuring peace and stability between Member States are commonly expressed features of the EU's external identity. At the heart of this external identity lies the belief that the EU embodies democratic principles which are reflective of its internal structure and development. The EU's own treaty arrangements state that EU action on the international scene shall be guided by a set of principles which are central to its own existence – and the first of these is 'democracy'. This chapter will consider, first, the complex nature of how the promotion of democracy is carried out in the EU's relations with the world beyond its borders. The chapter adopts a wide conception of democracy promotion, which can be expressly or impliedly perceived. By casting a wide net, the extent of democracy promotion can be seen to be wider than previously thought which helps to broaden the debate about how the EU puts in place its Treaty obligations to promote democracy. The chapter will finally consider the extent to which the emphasis on democracy promotion within the EU's external activities can justify characterising the EU's identity as one of a 'democracy promoter' or whether its actions do not fully match up to its words.

Key words: European Union, democracy promotion, external identity

Introduction

Like all political actors, the European Union (EU) presents itself to the outside world in a positive light as possible. In a wide variety of context where the EU acts beyond its borders, it presents itself as a successful example of peaceful, democratic integration which has benefitted its Member States. References to its birth from the destruction of the European continent and the role of EU integration in ensuring peace and stability are commonly expressed features of the EU's external identity.

¹ The author wishes to thank the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research of the University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, for organising the conference 'Identity in the Era of Globalization and Europeanization' at which this chapter was presented. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Chevening Fellowship course for overseas professionals, 'Using Democracy for Peace', February 2010 and a workshop on 'Ethics, Moral Responsibility and Politics of Democracy Promotion: Political Choices for International Actors', School of Law, University of Sheffield, January 2010. The research in this chapter draws on findings published in the *European Foreign Affairs Review* (Cardwell, 2011).

EU enlargement has long-since been characterised as a process of welcoming states which have made the transition to democracy. The almost immediate expressions of desire to join the EU by countries of Central and Eastern Europe post-1989 underlines the ‘pull’ factor of the EU and a certain idea of democratic ‘European-ness’. Hence, the enlargement process has provided the impetus to the EU’s belief that its model of liberal democracy fosters peace through both economic and political development. The EU’s confidence in presenting its external identity as a peaceful entity concerned with using its power and influence for the benefit of humankind, whether expressed through humanitarian and development aid, environmental protection or otherwise is grounded in its Treaty provisions which expressly call for the EU to share its values in the wider world. Two recent developments – the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the adoption of an EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations (Council, 2009a) - purport to assert the central place of democracy promotion in the EU’s external relations. In the words of the Commission, the EU ‘is well placed to promote democracy and human rights’ since it is ‘continually seeking to improve its own democratic governance’ (Commission, 2001). Its commitment was made even more express at Lisbon via the new Article 21 TEU: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement’. It almost appears that the mission to establish and ensure democracy in the world is the *raison d’être* of the EU’s external policies, and by association, its identity. Nevertheless, there is little evidence of a clear or working definition of how ‘democracy’ applies to different areas of the world.

Identifying the ‘Democracy’ in EU Democracy Promotion

The Union is ‘founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ (Article 2 TEU). This translates to a commitment to ‘uphold and promote its values’ in relations with the wider world (Article 3 (5) TEU) and, within the section on the Union’s external action: ‘The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement ... democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’ (Article 21 (1) TEU).

The same Treaty article also requires the EU to ‘safeguard its values’, to ‘consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law’ (with no distinction as to whether this applies in or outside the EU) and to ‘promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’. A link is made between the particular relationship with neighbouring countries and the EU’s values since the Treaty aims to establish ‘an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union’ (Article 8 (1) TEU).

‘Democracy’ itself is given no further definition in the Treaties. The EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations notes that democratic sys-

tems 'may vary in forms and shape' but that 'democracy has evolved into a universal value' (Council, 2009a, 3). The term 'democracy support' is preferred to 'promotion' which gives less of an impression of a one-size-fits-all or country-specific approach, taking into account the differing levels of democratic development in third states. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established on a legal basis for development cooperation – the aims of which included 'the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Articles 177(2) EC and 179(1) EC). These aims have now been amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, which prioritises the reduction and eradication of poverty in developing countries (Article 208(1) TFEU), but which also refers to the general principles and objectives of the EU's external action (Article 21(1) TEU). Democracy promotion is, as far as the Treaty is concerned, not solely envisaged for developing countries only.

Frequent references are made in external relations documentation to emphasising 'common' and 'shared' values between the EU and third states. This vagueness represents recognition of a differentiation of values which may be helpful in avoiding strict parameters in the process of dialogue as to what is required from the EU before cooperation with a third state can be enhanced. 'Shared' values can be varied according to the EU's own interests but the risk associated with a differentiated approach is that the EU's reiteration of its strong commitment to promoting democracy across the globe includes an in-built downgrading of the importance of democracy when other interests are at stake. 'Common' or 'shared' values are stressed if the aim is to demonstrate that cooperation, rather than criticism, is sought with a particular third state.

The Council's eight thematic guidelines on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (Council, 2009b) do not concern democracy *per se*, though the importance of democracy/democratisation is stressed. For the Commission, its most recent paper on 'Furthering Human Rights and Democracy Across the Globe' (Commission, 2007) places democracy promotion as almost interchangeable with human rights. Neither the Commission nor the Council therefore assert what kind of democratic model the EU is, or should be, seeking to promote. Rather, the emphasis is often placed on fundamental human rights as a pre-cursor to democratisation – and frequent references are made standards defined in international law, through human rights treaties and instruments to which most third states are parties. The EU's comprehension of democracy is thus capable of having a multi-layered and malleable quality which makes mapping the instances of express and implied democracy promotion a challenging, but illuminating task.

It is logical to focus attention on actions taken with the express purpose of influencing the democratisation/democratic development of a third state/group of states. This can be undertaken in either a positive or a negative way and can be part of a democracy promotion *strategy* on the part of the EU (Youngs, 2001). A positive way implies that the dominant logic relates to an inducement to improve some aspect of the third state's level of democracy or improvement in some aspect of human rights (often termed 'conditionality'). Negative express democracy promotion appears to be a contradiction in terms but it operates within the same logic: unless the third state improves or rectifies a situation, then a benefit or advantage will be taken away, or the EU will seek to impose other meas-

ures (e.g. sanctions). The wider conceptualisation of democracy promotion covered in this chapter also includes *implied* means in both the positive and negative aspects.

There are, however, three notes of caution. Even the most obvious examples of democracy promotion are unlikely to exist in isolation and are often balanced with security and economic issues. Further, measuring the effects of any of these initiatives (particularly those which are implied) is difficult to trace – especially when democracy promotion measures are part of a wider set of measures. For this reason, the classification into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ does not suggest which might be the most effective within the EU’s external relations toolkit, or even if they have any effect at all. Finally, discussion of the ‘EU’ is taken to mean a general combination of actors involved in institutional outputs, except where specific institutions (principally the Commission and Council) are identified.

‘Positive’ EU Democracy Promotion

These measures may be embedded within a wider framework of relations with a third state(s). A legal basis relating to the promotion of democracy is found in Regulation 1889/2006 which established the financing instrument used for democracy promotion (EIDHR). It points to other aspects encompassing a wider understanding of democracy and the promotion of human rights issues ‘of particular importance to the EU’, such as the death penalty, prevention of torture and rehabilitation of torture victims, and work towards ‘an effective system of global justice for human rights violators’ (Commission, 2007, 19).

The development competences were used for the EIDHR but a link through its financing is made with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The preamble to the Regulation also notes that this measure is designed to help achieve the objectives of the CFSP allowing us to see the link between the EU’s internal and external objectives in democracy promotion. The aims are wide: consolidating democracy and democratic reform in third countries, supporting civil society organisations and on the international and regional levels (Articles 2a and 2b). The annual of budget of 140 million euros is, according to the EIDHR Strategy 2007-2010 divided both geographically and thematically (Commission, 2006). The largest proportion is destined to strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform (208.4 million euros, 2007-2010), followed by EU Election Observation Missions, with 56 million euros devoted to enhancing respect for human rights in countries/regions most at risk.²

Within this category, one should also include the enlargement and neighbourhood policies. The Copenhagen Criteria (1993) formed the template for the reforms needed to be undertaken by prospective Member States. The first point of the criteria requires ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy’ and cooperation agreements concluded with accession states were notable in that the democratic credentials required of each were more extensive than had been in the past.³ Full membership has occurred even

² Most recently, in Nicaragua: Commission (2011b).

³ For example, political conditions relating to the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, the Roma in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe or, looking to a future enlargement, Kurdish minority rights in

when there have remained questions on the institutional stability of certain candidate states.⁴ Although understood as a positive and express democracy promotion exercise, the main goal of the EU has been the 'fostering of economic and political regimes committed to the adoption of a liberal-democratic, free market system' (Williams, 2004, 61). This strong use of conditionality is measurable in terms of the list of criteria to be satisfied with the end goal of final acceptance in the Union as the 'benchmark' of reaching the expected democratic standards (Ethier, 2003).

The 'Wider Europe' initiative, which eventually became the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, drew on the enlargement experience. The ENP is designed to spread prosperity and democracy with the EU's new neighbours by using similar modes of political conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008). EU accession is not promised, but the EU was prepared to offer advantages (e.g. visa facilitation) in return for progress made according to a mutually-agreed Action Plan. Action Plans (which can be characterised as examples of 'soft law' (Van Vooren, 2009)) covered some democratic improvements, undertaken on the basis of the stated 'shared values such as liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Commission, 2007, 13).

In terms of democracy promotion, enlargement and ENP can be seen as belonging to the same category since they employ similar methodology, though the latter is supposed to be the product of joint ownership between the EU and the partner state (Cremona and Hillion, 2006). The strong use of conditionality in both does not prevent variable standards being applied – particularly in the latter.

There are also instances of positive, but implied, instances of democracy promotion by the EU. The first are human rights dialogues. These exist either as part of bilateral trade, cooperation or partnership agreements with third states, or where there was no human rights clauses in the framework agreement providing the basis of relations. The Human Rights Dialogue with China is the one example of the latter.

Beyond the bilateral dialogues, this type of democracy promotion is implied in multi-lateral frames too. The first is cooperation with regionally-based groups of states, and the second is the promotion of (economic) regional integration beyond the EU (Article 21(1) and 2(h) TEU). Both can be positive, implied instances of democracy promotion. Their common point is the attempt by the EU to replicate elements of its system of governance, which is strongly linked to both its economic and political dimensions – the latter of which implies the EU's emphasis on democratic governance. The EU's desire to replicate its mode of governance is well-documented and it is at the institutional level that the implied nature of democracy promotion here can be seen since this sits most closely to the core notion of 'representative' democracy identified as key to the EU's vision of democracy as identified earlier in this article.

The best examples are relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states under the Lomé and Cotonou agreements and, more recently the Barcelona Process (1995) which created a partnership between the EU and partner states around the Mediterranean – now the Union for the Mediterranean (2008). What makes these frameworks

Turkey (Rose, 2008, 256).

4 This has become known as 'post-accession conditionality' and was applied in particular to Romania and Bulgaria upon their accession in 2007 (Pridham 2008).

come within the ambit of positive, implied instances of democracy promotion is that these frameworks are not merely at the governmental level. Rather, they include fora for Parliamentary dialogue and civil society groups. Nevertheless, one can critically assess the attempts to foster regional integration not as a mean to promote democracy as a goal in itself but rather to pave the way for the economic side to liberalism, which would be of substantial benefit to the EU (Farrell, 2005, 278).

‘Negative’ EU Democracy Promotion

A promotion measure which is negatively expressed may appear as a contradiction. However, the EU may withdraw a benefit offered to a third state, in order to prompt a rectification of a human rights/democracy situation. If the positive measures outlined in the previous section form the ‘carrot’, then the express negative measures detailed here are the ‘stick’.

The most common means by which this type of democracy promotion can be seen is related to the EU’s ability to conclude international agreements. As a powerful economic actor, with a substantial budget for overseas development aid, the EU is in a strong position to insist on the inclusion of certain clauses within its trade and cooperation agreements. Since the 1990s, the EU has insisted on incorporating human rights clauses as essential elements in its agreements with third states.⁵ The inclusion of human rights/democracy clauses provides a link with the democracy assistance provisions (such as those covered by the EIDHR) which effectively allows the EU to engage in positive, express democracy promotion in a third state without the permission of the host government (Youngs, 2001, 31). The clauses are typically worded to cover ‘substantial violations’ for which procedures of ‘special urgency’ may be engaged. These clauses foresee the suspension of the agreement. In reality, this is rare and even the Commission admits that ‘the principal rationale for the clause is to form a positive basis for advancing human rights in third countries through dialogue and persuasion. In other words, the preference is to use positive action rather than penalties’ (Commission, 2007, 14).

Their inclusion in this category is because of what *potentially* may be done. Agreements have been suspended on occasion. Restrictive measures were taken against countries which included the suspension of bilateral meetings (Uzbekistan in 2005) and limitations on assets, sale of goods and visa rights on members of the government (Zimbabwe in 2002). Restrictive measures put in place at the EU level can, of course, be imposed unilaterally, such as in the case of Burma/Myanmar in 2006. These measures are in themselves further examples of negative, express democracy promotion since they follow the same logic and operate independently of an existing bilateral or multilateral agreement between the third state and the EU. However, since agreements exist between the EU and almost all states around the world, these two measures are likely to go hand-in-hand.

Beyond the actual or potential use of negative means, there are instances where the negative dimension to democracy promotion is indirectly used. This includes where the

⁵ ‘Respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and international policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’

EU has attempted to export its model of democracy or values, but in a way which is both masked by other aims and which purports to take away some perceived benefit to the third state in question. It could be said that the existence of the human rights suspension clauses could fit within this category, since they generally rely on the perception of a threat, rather than actual suspension, which is rare.

Many CFSP declarations could fit within this category, since they are worded in a way which does not expressly discuss a sanction or negative measure, but implies as much by underlining what the EU considers to be essential in terms of democracy or the protection of fundamental human rights. To take one example, the Declaration in April 2010 by the High Representative for the CFSP on the decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court to investigate the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya (Council, 2010) does not threaten any particular measure but underlines commitments made by the Kenyan government in respect to cooperation with the ICC and that 'the EU is a staunch supporter of the ICC'. The Declaration also points to the EU's desire to see 'locally-based judicial mechanisms to complement the ICC investigation' and a 'national witness protection programme'. This can be understood as an example of implied democracy promotion, since there is a suggestion to live up to democracy-related commitments with no suggestion of a positive measure to be gained from doing so on the part of the EU. Rather, when coupled with the country-specific approach towards each third state as well as the underlining of the importance of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement (the suspension clause) in the EU's democracy promotion strategy (Commission, 2006, 20) it appears that the nature of the Declaration suggests that the EU is capable of using negative measures against the state in case of non-compliance – but without this being expressly stated as such. The other way in which this type of democracy promotion operates does so largely in conjunction with other measures. In essence, the EU uses influence to suggest that unless a country improves its democratic credentials, then it is missing out on access to what the EU has to offer. However, in order to it to be implied, rather than express, the EU does so in relation to (typically) the third country's neighbouring states. This will often involve the EU's external frameworks, including the ACP framework, Union for the Mediterranean or ENP. Hence, the reason why this is negative democracy promotion is that the EU's discourse suggests that a state will lose a potential benefit on offer. This is certainly the case of Ukraine, which was the subject of a CFSP statement on 11 October 2011 following the trial of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (Council, 2011). In the High Representative's statement, it is noted that 'justice is being applied selectively in politically motivated prosecutions of the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government' and that as a consequence, the veiled threat that '[T]he EU will reflect on its policies towards Ukraine'.

Conclusion

The 2009 Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External Relations suggests that (at least at the rhetorical level) democracy promotion continues to sit at the heart of the EU's drive to forge an international role for itself. Even so, EU external relations have been criticised for adopting, at best, an 'ambiguous approach to democracy promotion because of familiar rival concerns such as security, economic interests, and strategic diplomacy' (Pridham, 2007, 465). This would appear to undermine the 'reality' of EU democracy promotion and push it more towards the realm of 'myth'. The recent moves in the Treaty of Lisbon and Stockholm Programme place increasing emphasis on the EU's role in 'securing' Europe for its citizens, which incorporates an ever strong external role for the EU in terms of security – an approach often seen as the antithesis to the image it has tried to project as a benevolent force for democratisation and the associated benefits it is supposed to bring.

This chapter has attempted to move the scope of analysis much wider than the express forms of democracy promotion the EU has been engaged in since the beginning of the 1990s. Taken on their own, the positive measures for democracy promotion are insufficient in themselves to understand what the EU does and how. Casting the net wider can capture what the EU is doing in many different aspects and dimensions to its external relations and foreign policy. On the one hand, this does support a view that the 'reality' of EU democracy promotion is wider than even the EU institutions would suggest. However, it is important not to be too optimistic about the EU only being about democracy promotion. The way in which country specific approaches work means that other EU interests (e.g. economic, security-focussed) are likely also to be involved and the lack of democracy in a particular country may not be a complete barrier to cooperation in fields such as trade, migration or security. By identifying instances where the EU has attempted to exert some influence on the democratisation of third states, even in an implied manner, it can be seen that the EU's commitment to spreading its values across the globe are translated across a variety of policy instruments. Thus, a deeper and more complete evaluation of democracy promotion by the EU can take place which helps us better reflect on the 'reality' of the EU's external identity as a 'democracy promoter'.

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NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

In this paper the author poses several questions which profoundly tackle the essence of the EU functioning in the circumstances of multitude of national identities which are of exclusive nature. In such case of exclusive identities the question of feasibility of Europe is implied. Furthermore, is the search for the European identity oriented towards something which at one point, long ago existed and which has disappeared and has been forgotten, but is to be discovered today, similarly to the way it has been done or is done in the formation of the distinctive national identities?

To which degree can the European identity be founded on the diversity of the European nations' cultures, an issue that eurosceptics deem impossible? Is there an existence of European culture, and by that, an existence of European cultural identity? Can the culture be considered as the "glue" for the European Integration? What is more, can there be a European identity if the same is only "on civil basis" relying on a social agreement, and not on "cultural basis rested on common tradition"?

This paper gives an analysis of several aspects which approach the phenomenon of national identity within EU and the possibilities for founding one common European identity from different perspectives.

Key words: identity, nation, European Union, culture, euroscepticism.

Introduction: Culture, Identity, Religion

The course of the identity analysis considered in a European context imposes the need to point out, even if very briefly, what the national and cultural identity imply, in the context of the matter which is subject of discussion: national and cultural identity in the processes of globalization, more specifically, the processes of Europeanisation, which is globalization in regional settings. The analysis of the processes and characteristics of globalization largely intertwines with and relates to the processes of Europeanisation as well. (Scholte, 2008, Held D. and McGrew A. 1999.; Beck, 2003.)

It seems that the term identity is completely understandable although its meaning encompasses different things. Mostly it is identified with the term ethnic identity, which to a greater extent narrows its meaning and relates it to "the interests imposed on the culture". The term cultural identity incorporates everything that is connected to the formation of a group of people, the condition being they hold the same or similar ideas, affinities and aspirations. It is based on the awareness and knowledge of certain characteristics, such

as language, ethnos, race, territory etc, which are the basis for identification. (Kokovic, 2000; Stojkovic B., 2002; 1993; Hainard F, 1989.)

Francois Enaire concisely and with clarity defines the basic characteristics of the term identity. Namely, the identity is both individual and collective phenomenon which implies openness to new elements, as well as, retaining the old ones, in a manner that always enables psycho-social differentiation. Furthermore, it is determined not only by the act of belonging, but also by holding certain traits that can be territorial and/ or socio-cultural and form its foundation. It is both a process and a system, having in mind that by its nature it is dynamic and at the same time strives towards a balance. The process of creation of the identity is paradoxical because it is embodied in the ability for self-representation which is continually directed and adjusted to the others, which implies that not only it changes its constituents, but it also persists solely because of that ability. (according to: Stojkovic B., 2002:24).

The identity always encompasses two elements: the individual-unique identity and the collective-common identity. The societies differ among themselves not only because of the specificities of the culture and the character of the behavior, but also because of the specific content, the interpretation of the meanings given to that particular community by its members.

The collective identity is comprised of the intertwining of history, the past and the future; furthermore, the tradition and the rituals practiced during times of festivities and celebrations are deeply embodied in it as well. This virtually forms the objective model of the common lifestyle, thinking and experience on the basis of which are formed the forms and contents of the knowledge. The collective identity can be likewise understood as referential framework which indicates to the individuals what is desirable and what is not from the aspect of the culture to which they are belonging to.

In this sense should be understood the perception of Durkheim for the collective entity which is expressed in the religious beliefs and moral practice, as well as, of Jenkins according to whom the future is reflected individually as memory, and collectively as history. The cultural identity is specific expression of the social identity, since the culture is essential part of the social system. (Jenkins R., 2001.)

The cultural identity is formed through a complex process in which, on the one hand there is direct confrontation of the needs for universalization of the separate cultures, and on the other, the unavoidability for a respect of the particularities. Nevertheless, it likewise signifies being conscious of owning certain cultural traits which are innate for the group one is part of. Nowadays, the cultural identity is mostly related to the cultural relativism, and also to the unpleasant processes which neglect the autochthonism, the authenticity and the customs that are characteristic for the particular group. Jacques Derrida defines the cultural identity as: “unimaginable record of the universal over the particular, a unique testimony of the human entity and something which is typical for an individual. It is always a discourse for responsibility: me has a single meaning ME which has the responsibility to bear witness in favor of the universality.... Just take a look at the paradox: our particularity is a sense of universality”. (according to: Kokovic D., 2000: 206).

Stuart Hall (Hall S., 1992) has an interesting point of view about the identity in the age of globalization. In the pre-modern societies, identities were mainly formed upon the

traditional beliefs and structures, mostly related to religion. In such a situation, the individual identity in a larger part derives from the existing position at the time of birth, and is not based on any kind of individual traits or qualities of the individual.

In the period between 16th and 18th centuries, a new concept of identity arises: each human being/ individual owns one particular identity which was thought to be integral and exclusive. It, as Hall terms it enlighten identity/ subject, was based on the understanding about the personality of the human being as completely centered, unique individual, endowed with common sense and conscience, whose core is composed of inner essence which is constant and forms the human identity.

The life of people becomes complicated with the development of industrialization and urbanization. The relations between individuals become more often mediated by different forms of organization, group interests and collective norms. Processes of globalization create conditions for forming different forms of identities. Nationality is gaining importance in the process of the identity formation.

In the societies with “simple division of labor and distribution of knowledge”, the identities are, subjectively and objectively, easily recognizable. Each individual is familiar with the rest of the individuals, and with himself/herself as well, and thus in such a situation there is no problem with the identity. In these circumstances, socialization creates identities which are previously socially defined and profiled to a great extent. Such identities can be analyzed only as products of “meta social stratification principles”, which produce the consequences of greater group introversion, little possibility for social mobility and consequently, forming of closed and exclusive types of social identities (Berger P., Luckman TH, 1992).

In postmodern “status-conventional societies”, which are hyper-differentiated and heterogeneous societies according to all the elements that form their structure, identity formation is based on completely different foundations and possibilities. There are no unified principles of differentiation and division in them, only mixture of intertwined and intercrossed elements, a set of categories, not mutually connected, of participation in different social forms of functioning and living, in which individuals play various roles that are mostly not related with each other, and none of the roles is of dominant importance to the individual. In these circumstances of the postmodern society, where individuals participate in different statuses and imitate various roles, is formed a variety of potential social sub-identities which are related in a hybrid manner in one versatile integrity. The changes in the position of the individual, whether it is the status, or changes from one to another reality or social category, are largely culturally and symbolically determined. “The door of transition” is opened depending on the changed conditions, life habits, the way the free time is used etc. Social identity in these circumstances is not firmly fixed; it easily crosses over from one condition to another, and there is a real possibility of simultaneously expressing several identities.

According to Hall, three things are important for the relationship between globalization and nationality: reaffirmation of national identity as defensive mechanism, in a situation where there is an impression that the nation is jeopardized by, for example, inflow of foreigners. What is more, as a reaction to the defensive mechanism of the majority group, a similar defensive mechanism arises in minority migrating groups, with an ac-

cent on their own origin, by display of symbols, through an identification of that which is characteristic for their groups. And finally, new identities are formed as a reaction to the globalization, such as the example of Afro-Caribbean migrants to Great Britain, in the “formation” of new black identity. Globalization influences the identity pluralistically, it opens various possibilities and new positions, and identity in such circumstances is less fixated, less exclusive and closed (Fossum. John Erik, 2003; Sassarelli M., 2002).

The idea that the cultural differences would disappear or fade away as a result of the increasing cultural mixing, the exchange of information and the expenditure of cultural goods, and general trade with goods, more often than not has been shown to be a problem, rather than some kind of a solution to the problems. Contrary to the expectations, the promoted universalism and globalization in many cases have reinforced the old barriers and traditions and formed new ones between the religious and ethnic groups. While many considered these serious socio-cultural consequences from the globalization as a surprise, the close connection between the increasing universalism and its opposite, the increased “ethnicization” or “balkanization” on local level has become indubitable reality” (Routh J., 1998:92).

It is indisputable that the processes of globalization have caused a new type of relationships, new quality and quantity of cultural diversity in the everyday life of people. This is very well illustrated by the publicist Dunhoff: “no matter where you look, the old traditions, national characteristics, local idioms have disappeared; a kind of a unified civilization is being created, which has spread throughout the globe. Nevertheless, it leads to a fantasy, pursue for the local, the familiar, which by its own, leads to a restoration of the national, as a kind of a correlative of globalization.” (Routh, 1998: 92).

The establishment of global market, where the boundaries are disappearing to Llosa signifies deadly attack on regional and national cultures, traditions, customs, myths and national behavior, elements that form the national identity of each country and region. The countries do not have the chance to confront the pressure from the powerful forces, such as the USA, which soon will impose the north-American culture. There is no culture on the planet Earth which is not subject to radical changes and where there is no process of disappearing of the traditional ways of life, but at the same time, this produces new possibilities and is an important step forward for the humankind as a whole. Thus, when nations are offered with the possibility for free choice, they decide in favor of modernization. Globalization according to Llosa, radically widens and places at all citizens’ disposal the possibility for each individual to create his/ her own identity, which is why it is welcomed, as well as, because of the fact that it notably widens the horizons of individual freedom (Mario Vargas Llosa, 2001).

The nation is tyrannical and ineffective fiction; It will serve as an alibi for the most dreadful events in 20th century. Having in mind how much blood was shed for it throughout the history, furthermore, the manner it contributed to boost these preconceptions, the racism, the xenophobia, “the alibi provided by it to the authoritarianism, totalitarianism, colonialism, and religious and ethnic genocides, the nation seems to me like an unique example of one malignant imagination.” (Schnapper, 2002: 36)

However, would the globalization destroy local cultures? No, many things will survive, the thing to survive will be the one that is truly worthwhile and it will find new oppor-

tunities and conditions for development. Nowadays, thanks to the weakening of national state, we are witnesses of the return of the forgotten, marginalized and silenced local cultures which show signals in the great concert of the global planet-optimistically concludes Llosa as to the consequences of the globalization on the world.

No doubt, the influence of globalization on the identity operates in a contradictory manner. It corrupts the bases of the local community by destruction of the established cultural, economic and political boundaries, which destabilizes the foundation of national identity.

A process of formation of hybrid identities takes place, which according to Friedman (J. Friedman, 2003) should be understood as “cultural conclusion of economic globalization”. Globalization in this context is not understood as general evolutionary process, but as a phase of decay of hegemony, which is a characteristic of modernization. According to Kellner (Kellner, 1992) even though in the late modernization a process of destabilization of traditional identity strongholds begins, it still remains dominant model of life and basis for forming of values. At the beginning of modernization the changes in the tradition are not very much visible, the spatial and temporal bases are being preserved to a greater extent, contrary to this, in the age of globalization occurs a radical cessation of the past phases of modernization and a beginning of postmodern and post-traditional society (Sussatelli M., 2002). The question asked nowadays is concerning the character of these changes: is it a matter of “new colonialism” or does something else lie behind it. The answers, as it can be seen from our analysis, are different, with one remark on the increasing number of those who underline the dominant attitude of Western civilization and culture in general and in every aspect, which is especially evident concerning the economy and culture. (Keating M., 2004). The process of globalization forms an environment of intense interaction of various cultures. This, on its own, has raised the awareness of the importance of culture in the functioning of one community, and has sharpen the sensitivity towards cultural differences, at the same time increasing the awareness about the uniqueness of one’s own culture compared to other cultures, and by that it has caused a process of consolidation of ethnic self-awareness.

The Collective Identity-European Prospect

Some authors considered collective identities as marginal phenomenon in both cultural and ethnic sense in the age of global processes and modernization in general. Contrary to this point of view, which supported the belief that identities would be lowered in number and dissolved on the way toward modernity and globalization, “collective identities, organized around the primeval central points, essentially became the core of social movements which collaborate between themselves and coexist together with new global identities, organized in international organizations and other manifestations of virtual identities.” (Bokser-Liwwerant Judit, 2002: 254).

However, what kind of situation is there within the European Union, in which there is existence of various national and cultural identities? This is especially prevalent concern-

ing the newly accepted countries from Eastern Europe. For example, the research conducted in 2004 as part of the Eurobarometer, has indicated that the respondents express greater sense of belonging to certain nation, than a sense of being a European. What is more concerning is the fact that the term "European" is drastically reduced in use by the older member-countries with the Union entrance of the countries from the East. The increase of the number of eurosceptics after 2004 is very much evident. In the sphere of the media, although many of the written media is in the hands of the international companies, national televisions are under strict control of national governments, which act more as promoters of cultural differences, than for cultural unification.

The emergence and materialization of different worlds of identities is a result of several reasons, among which mostly the most important are the following: opening of the borders; new interaction between global, regional and local territories; transformation of the states, especially the loss of monopoly in the governance and the loss of a part of the sovereignty, as well as the processes of secularization; but at the same time there is another revival of religiousness and formation of new religious movements which emerge on the surface, and a great number of them emerge on global level. In this context, the important thing is the fact that in the heart of secularizing trends, the religion has assumed increasing public role and recognizability. This was characterized by some sociologists as "deprivatization" of religion. Religious traditions have gained new public importance as a result of their interaction with social movements and public representations, and by their demand of a new kind of interaction between the individual and public morality (Cassanova, 1994, in Bokser-Liwwerant Judit, 2002: 254).

One important issue in the context of religious pluralism and its realizations in the processes of globalization is the interaction between religion and ethnos, which has led to revival of ethnic identities, which on its part, is encouraged by the return to religion and mythology.

Religion is very often considered as outdated and not appropriate for analysis, nevertheless, modernization induces secularism as well, which is imbalanced because of many factors, such as the belonging to a certain religion. The authority of great religions arises from the belief, as well as, from the pressure enforced from the religious organizations on the authorities and the politics in general. Today there are many examples of perfectly organized religious groups, Catholic and Islamic, which operate within the same territory and political conditions. In the international politics, the Islam can demonstrate striking politics that might have influence over other structures. Islam could be a factor on the global political stage despite the internal differences and different centers of power (Walby S, 2003:536).

Modern Catholicism is politicized although maybe not to such extent as Islam, yet its presence and influence on the global stage is felt nevertheless. Its attitude towards the state is complex, even though there is a formal separation of the church as an institution within the country.

The essence of the cultural conflict and disagreement is interpreted as a conflict between the secular West and the religiousness of the Islamic world. In Western societies there is a separation between the privacy of the religious belief and the public sphere: religious belief is an issue of individual choice of a person, as opposed to the Islamic world

where “religion insists on regulating every aspect of human life, public as well as private, including the field of politics.”

There is no doubt that immigrants to European Union, from non-Christian countries, accept the lifestyle of the new environment with more difficulty. Mostly it applies to immigrants from rural regions, simple people with low level of education. In general, they immigrate and live in ghettos in the suburbs of the big cities, most often employed in low paid working activities. “The new immigrants”, compared to the previous ones who could be related to a symbolic connection with their destination, many times simultaneously with their socialization with the language and the culture of the country to which they immigrate seem as if they do not have a connection with their destination to one of the Western states. “The issue concerning multiculturalism or the conflict between the ethnic groups that were closer to the former colonial powers, such as Great Britain and France, now are on the agenda of the states in Western Europe, but also increasingly more in Eastern Europe. Similarly to the majority of these new immigrants from the countries which are dominantly Islamic, the Islamic dimension of this immigration has become a part of the matter on the defining of the European “identity” of the 21st century, which is mainly related to the present day immigration.” (CHECKEL J.T. and KATZENSTEIN P.J., 2009:174).

Europe is increasingly turning into a continent of immigration and of Islam. The problem is connected to the manner by which these “new” immigrants should integrate in the communities where the dominant population is different in cultural and religious sense. The immigration becomes dominant problem because of the problems concerning integration. European economies are beginning to resemble more and more to the American economy concerning their structure and demand, the migration has met the need for a secondary sector on the labor market. Seen from this aspect, according to Favell, the immigration builds the new Europe in a structural sense-although the host population doesn't seem to appreciate much the very obvious neoliberal Europe build through these processes. European society is very much divided: on the one hand are those who migrated and have different religion and nationality, “the Others”, “They” and “We”- who are native-born and have other understandings of the world, as well as, other customs and we believe in different God. In such a division, the European (administration, citizens) relates all of them automatically to the religious tradition from which they originate and all the nuances of this identity are deduced to only one identity-a belonging to the tradition from which they originate.

According to Sen (Sen, 2006), the conflict and violence nowadays are embraced in the same manner as in the past through the illusions for the single identity. The world is increasingly viewed as a federation of: “the religion” and “the culture” or “the civilization”, and the importance of other ways in which people view themselves- class, gender, language, profession, science, ethics, politics- is neglected. The goals of European Integration which face the EU today are concerning the creation of a supranational state model-the civil state. The constituting of the European Community of nations cannot be done on national basis as this is greatly contradictory with the idea of united Europe. The issue related to the factor that unites is the key issue with which Europe is facing today. Which is the cohesion factor, what is the thing that unites?

The strengthening of religion is imposed as necessary consequence of global processes. However, Europe compared to the other parts of the globe can still be considered as most secular. The secularism is reaching its maximum on Europe's territory, since the age of Enlightenment, which emerges as a step forward from the religious view of the world, as a reaction to religious dogmas. Nevertheless, although the religion is separated from the state and becomes "private" matter of the individual, the domination of the liberalism concerning politics does not mean complete exemption of religion from public life. The example with the USA indicates that even though they have established complete separation of the church from the state, the national parole still is "In God we trust." The term God comprehends the Christian God. According to Fukuyama, not only the processes of secularization in the last two decades are not stopped, but also a process of "de-secularization" takes place: the biblical myths and tales, the Christian festivals, the musical and other heritage, as well as, the ethic code which is to a greater extent based on the Christian code, have continued to exist and to be reproduced.

The questions, such as what are the possible ideological directions, i.e. what would be the thing that would relate the groups and individuals in a community, the thing that would be the relating element in one diverse collective, what does EU represent, have several answers. One of them is by all means the retrieval of the foundations of the religious identity as a common value and homogenizing substance. If the national component loses this or by definition cannot be the element that relates, and instead separates, then the religion/ Christianity, relating through the religious principles, the thing that is common for the majority, is imposed as an objective possibility. The second possibility is contained in the redefining of secularism, or as Hantington terms it "the cosmopolite alternative" which is imposed above all due to demographic and economic reasons. Namely, because of the fact that Europe is aging more and more and due to the increasing need for new workforce in the future, in order to retain the competitive role against the other developed countries and regions, she would have to import workforce from the underdeveloped non-European countries and regions. This, for the sake of the functioning of the community, would imply rules of behavior which would exclude every possibility for discrimination, including the religion, or so to say, the belonging to Christianity.

To which extent would the immigration to Europe change the structure of the population and in what manner would that affect the European identity are matters which have been analyzed for a long time by the scientific circles and are subject of intense political arguments. The inflow of migrants mainly comes from the North-African countries (migration termed as "ethnic" immigration of non-Europeans) and from the countries from Eastern Europe (migration which mainly occurs with their accession to the EU). Europe, as a world region, in the sense of its economic and territorial identity can be compared to the USA, however it implies differently structured regional and migration area (Checkel J.T. and Katzenstein P.J. 2009; Maleshevic M., 2006).

In such circumstances, EU must be defined as secular community, multiracial and multiethnic, i.e. civil by definition. Indeed, the secularity does not denote loss of ethnic and religious characteristics of individuals and groups, but it would remain related to the privacy, part of the religious institutions and different forms of association of individuals who share the same religious confession or belong to the same national or ethnic group.

According to Huntington (Huntington, 1993: 18) the fundamental source of conflicts in future would not be primarily ideological or economic, but cultural, which means, in accordance with the Constitutional Law, which heralds conflicts of opposing rights of a culture in the future, expressed in different constitutions.

Identity and Modernity

The ideas upon which Europe is found-economic relations, dissolving of national borders, individualism, are contradictory to the ideas for national state- exclusive tradition, language, cultural independence, territorial expansion and domination.

According to Castells, "in the world preoccupied with global trends concerning wealth and power, the search for the identity, collective or individual, attributed or constructed, is becoming the basic source of social purpose. The specificity of the 20th century can be seen related to the identity as well: it has become the main, and for some the only source of purpose of the historical period which is characterized by presence of destructive organizations, delegitimized institutions, weakening of main social movements and ephemeral cultural occurrences." (Castells, 1997: 3). Castells does not understand the term identity as something fixed, which is given as such once and for all, but as a process: "through which social actors identify themselves and constitute the meaning primarily to the foundations of the given cultural attribute or set of attributes, until the exclusion of wider references of other social structures." In this context, culture is crucial defensive resource, maybe even the only effective instrument in the articulation of the identity. Unlike Giddens, who places the accent on the individual identity, Castells puts the accent on the collective identities, at the same time taking into consideration above all the social movements, which he understands as "deliberate collective action whose outcome, no matter whether it is a victory or a defeat, transforms the values of the society."

The identity in the modernity is transformed in a concept which enables connection. In the past ages, before the advent of globalization, tradition has permitted the individuals clearly defined roles and was considered as basis of the social life. According to Giddens, postindustrial modernization strengthens the process of individualization and pluralisation of identity, in circumstances in which the nature of the social life is radically changed to the extent that people are not what they actually are, or they think they are anymore, instead they become that which they have managed to create of themselves. Their identity is not a completed project; it simply shapes itself through time, space and society. On the one hand, modernity threatens identity, and on the other hand, it opens possibilities for its development which was not possible in the past. It has radically changed the nature of our everyday life (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1986; Bauman, 2001).

The global "attack" of modernity is especially visible in the reorganization of time and space, and in increasingly expressed mobility: it radicalizes and globalizes the role of institutions which create conditions for forming new identities. People in small, traditional communities are powerless because the traditional system is constant and unchangeable, and the initiative of the individual is excluded.

Modernity breaks the protective framework of small community and tradition, replacing them with much bigger basic organizations. In such conditions, the individual is feeling abandoned and alone in a world in which he/ she lacks psychological support and sense of safety, which is provided by the traditional surroundings (Giddens, 2001:56; Giddens, 2003:34; Giddens, 1998)

Changes that are happening in a person's everyday life are directly related to the establishment of social relationships in a wider perspective. For the first time in the history of the human kind "the self" and "the society" are mutually related in the global reality.

To what extent is the modernity a result of the Western civilization? When it comes to modernity, this is a matter of institutional transformation whose origin is from the West. Namely, for Giddens, two particularly organizational complexes have special significance to the development of modernity: the national state and the serial capitalist production. The roots of both are found in the West, and they are not found anywhere else in the world before they emerge in Europe; nevertheless, they rapidly expand throughout the world, and not one traditional system can oppose them.

Giddens poses the question of the power of national states, whether they become irrelevant to the forces that shape the world? They are indeed still powerful, but are radically reshaping. National and economic policies cannot be achievable anymore as they used to be in the past, and, what is more important, nations have to reconsider their identities in a situation when the old forms of geopolitics become obsolete...

Giddens explains about the possibilities for forming a cosmopolitical nation. Contrary to the past, when nations were created as a result of antagonism towards other nations, today "national identities have to be retained within the cooperative milieu." The old forms of national identity should be reconstructed.

When it comes to the possibilities for forming of identity in a situation of Europeanization and globalization, Castells' analysis deserves attention because of several reasons. One of them is included in the awareness that the most important possibilities for all those excluded from the contemporary global network society are articulated by the cultural communities build on the foundations of religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnic and territorial belonging. These communities, which are related to each other through some common trait, in order to preserve their own identity under the rush of contemporary trends brought by the globalization, oppose with the one thing they have, and that is the autonomy, the uniqueness on ethnic, and above all, on religious level. What is important to underline in Castells' analysis is that he tries to perceive the possibility for forming new identities within the civil society. Namely, in its framework, from the various groups, no matter the character of their identity, can be developed new collective actors of social transformation (for example, the feminism) and these would be capable of building a new meaning of the projected identities, the ones that are constructed by the social actors, as opposed to the identities shaped through resistance, those devalued and destroyed by the logic of dominance (Castells, 1997; 8-10).

According to Castells, it cannot be determined on principles, but through abstract terms, how and who creates the different types of identity and what is their direction: that is a matter of the social context, more precisely, in the network society. In that direction Castells mentions Giddens' characterization of the identity of society in "the time of late

youth” where “the self” is manifested through its own reflexive self-understanding in the sense of one’s own/ its biography. To be a human being “means to be....even that what a man/ person is doing and the reason he/she does that. In the context of the more traditional system, “the self” becomes reflexive delineation. Castells starts from the hypothesis, which is in the focus of the processes of social changes and proceeds to a different direction from the one that is familiar to us from the course of the modern times and the late modernity, i.e., “the subjects, if they are created and when they are going to be created, are not established based on the civil society which is in the process of disintegration, but on the intensifying of the common resistance.” (Castells, 2002:21)

In the network society, the project identity, which is created by the social actors and it creates subjects itself (to be an individual, to create personal history, to give meaning to the entire welfare of experiences of the individual life), arises from the mutual resistance.

“While in modern times (early or later) project identity was constructed from the civil society (as in the case of socialism based on the workers movement), in the network society project identity, if it ever develops, arises from the common resistance” (Castells, 2002:21).

Europeanization and globalization in the countries of SEE and the Balkans

During the socialistic times, the East-West relations were defined by the antagonisms of the political systems: after the fall of Berlin wall the cultural differences emerge on the surface. Namely, the conditions in Eastern Europe, in the processes of globalization show that their consequences are by far more serious than those on the West, because the beginning of globalization of these states coincided with the fall of socialism and the beginnings of transition, i.e., processes of political and economic transformation, there was a renewal of pre-socialist context of the dichotomy East-West. Experiencing globalization is leveled up with the dominating role of the West over the rest of the world, as well as the East, which induces a new type of barriers because of the formation of new identities and in all other aspects: the more the former legal, economic and political borders are raised, the stronger is the western penetration in the Eastern European countries through economic and political models, information, images, ideas, and at the same time, the desire for safety and protection behind a new wall raised from the national and local identities is increased (Routh, 1998: 94).

The extent of the effect of the negative consequences from the globalization in the countries in Eastern Europe is a matter that deserves full attention. Routh analyses the mental barriers between Western Europeans and those that have emerged from the breakdown of the socialism: the concept of “others” as a central “cultural matter” and as crucial concept for understanding the intercultural encounters, offers the most promising theoretical framework for investigation of these barriers. Namely, “the foreigner” or “the other” and “the self” are closely related, the existence of “self” helps in the identification of “the other”. Based on this understanding of the different, Routh is trying to defend the thesis

for an appearance of a new, as he names it post-cold war, emergence of new barriers between the East and the West and within these countries. That is to say, Routh demonstrates that in the post-socialistic dichotomy “we” versus “they”, i.e., the distinction between “in and out”, “our” and “their”, obtains a new meaning in the formation of local autonomous worlds. The conclusion that he makes is contained in the following: notwithstanding the undeniable process of globalization, Eastern Europe demonstrates the opposite tendency, returns to the regional, putting an accent on the formation of the local cultural identities and producing effects of localization and usually in the form of ethnification. It is a fact that “localization” and “globalization” cannot be observed separately. They are evidently two sides of one and the same coin.

The case with Europe is not unique at all: the affirmation of the local in order to manage the identity and as compensation for the pressure from the global homogenization can be observed on different levels. What is becoming characteristic for Eastern Europe is the fact that the increasing ethnification is transformed into East-Western antagonism. The people from Eastern Europe hold an opinion that globalization to a greater extent is equivalent to Westernization and loss of one’s own identity.

The analysis of the situation of democratization of the countries from Eastern Europe that became members of EU indicates that the membership makes the democratic governance more complex. The complex European system of governance might be more effective in the management of the pressures from the modernization and globalization, but the majority of the citizens from Central and Eastern Europe have the impression that the decisions which have importance for their lives are brought outside of their borders by a great number of unidentified actors and institutions. Furthermore, the membership has greatly weakened the positions of national parliaments. People live with the feeling that the influence on the political decisions is unequal in regard to the Western Countries. It is very important to strengthen the communication and solidarity on European level, citizens should be given the chance to familiarize with the different cultures. The Union should create more institutional channels for exchanging of ideas between the different professional, religious and ethnic groups. If the formation of common interest is very hard to obtain, the creation of conditions for understanding of the different and the others is a necessity. This will very much lessen the feeling that the decisions are nevertheless brought by the powerful and that the interests of new members are better understood and perceived.

Europe is one great mottle of “densely” inherent cultures divided according to all the lines of division, linguistic, religious, social customs, which form one continent of firmly deep-rooted peoples with strong national and local identities, which are not greatly affected by the processes of globalization so as to force them to think differently. Europe is likewise viewed as a continent which has unfriendly attitude towards the new immigrants, making efforts to integrate the various ethnic and racial minorities which succeed to enter within its boundaries. According to Favell (in: Checkel J.T. and Katzenstein P.J., 2009) the immigrants, the new driving force which comes from Eastern Europe, are the most dubious of all other that enter within its boundaries. Are they similar to the traditional “ethnic” migrants and would they be treated as such? “They create a new European region of movement and fulfillment of one new idea for European citizenship..... The opening

towards East can lead to more efficient closing of Europe towards South..... (172). The attitude toward these migrants is not yet defined; they are still treating them traditionally and with distrust. What kind of future do these immigrations have and what is their importance to the emigration countries? How do they blend in the new environment? Do they practice their cultural rights without obstructions, and does it provoke intolerance in the domiciliary population? It can be expected that the migrations of the population would increase from East to West on this concentric European region and “that those who move inside that region would demand new rights as de facto free European citizens which are better than those of non-European immigrants”, concludes Favell.

Concluding perceptions

It seems that there is not possible answer to the question of the possibility and understandability of the nature of European identity in a cultural and national sense. Europe is a great mottle of national, ethnic and religious identities, and it is hard to present something that can connect them and be common for and understandable to everyone. In this analysis the attention was paid to those elements which mainly originate from the cultural, national and religious differences. Can the culture be considered as a binding material of the collective life of European peoples? This is a question that has an answer which might contain more negative than positive elements. Not considering the economic and legally-political aspects of Europeanization, the sphere of different cultures and national identities would generate conflicts and differences in the functioning of EU for much longer.

If there can be made generally acceptable rules of behavior and action for the economic and legally-political aspects of the functioning of EU, the sphere of cultural and religious differences would be, for much longer in the future, a sphere of oppositions and conflicts. For example, the integration of migrants who arrive in great numbers from other regions outside Europe, as well as from the East-European countries which become EU members.

It seems that at the moment there is no possible and satisfying answer to the question: How does the globalization (as Europeanization is one type of regional globalization) influence on the formation of a common identity?

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POLITICAL IDENTITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Abstract

Political identities in one society are undoubtedly related to political parties, the social cleavages that these parties are structured on, i.e. their ideological (political) profiling. Can we talk about political identities when depolitization, departization and floating voters have become the most significant characteristic of contemporary political life? If these tendencies can be recognized in established democracies, do they and how do they pour into or are recognized in the so-called postcommunist societies, one of which is Republic of Macedonia itself? The additional challenge for the research team was to examine this issue in the specific political environment in Macedonia, which is represented by strong political confrontations on the political scene, confrontations that oftentimes interfered with normal political dialogue.

The main goal of the research project was to determine the different political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, to see on which social cleavages they are differentiated on and where are their positions on an imagined ideological spectrum. Or to put it differently, whether the strictly distinguished political confrontations represent one dichotomous, i.e. segmented political structure, soundly founded on the social cleavages of the Macedonian society. We've tried to do that by: analysis of the social affiliation of citizens, analysis of their party affiliation and analysis of a certain number of political attitudes and values that they've accepted. We started from the basic assumption that if these three elements are related then we can say that the party-political divisions are founded on social divisions and that the high political polarization in Macedonia is based on the existence of differentiated social profiles of citizens, who belong to different and strongly confronted cultures/poles.

Key words: identity, political identities, party identities, R. Macedonia, political parties

Introduction

Researching political identities in one society is undoubtedly related to political parties, the social cleavages that these parties are structured on, the positions and policies of those parties, i.e. their ideological political profiling. If ideas give sense to political organization and ideology defines the personality and identity of the political parties, making them recognizable on the political scene, which is something all politicologists agree on, then what is their identity based on and what differentiates them from other political parties? In a time of the end of history and ideology can we at all talk about political identities when depolitization, departization and floating voters have become the most significant characteristic of contemporary political life? Is the New as opposed to

the Old policy, marked by postmaterialistic values and liberal individualism capable of producing solidarity and homogeneity, i.e. political identities that are very much needed for political action? And ultimately, if these processes and tendencies can be recognized in established democracies, do they and how do they pour into or are recognized in the so-called postcommunist societies, one of which is Republic of Macedonia itself?

There's quite an extensive politicological literature that deals with these issues and many authors, by means of theoretical debates or research studies (comparative, longitudinal, case studies) offer new arguments and information in defense of their theses (Diamond, L. and R, Gunther 2001, von Beume, K. 2002. Vahudova M. A. 2008, Kitschel H. 1992, 1995, Merkel 1997, Klingeman 1994, Kaldor M. and Vejvoda I.: 2002, De Waele J. M (ed), 2002). There are few analyses of this type in Macedonia though. If one of the challenges of the research team was to try and give if only a small contribution to the theoretical and empirical elaboration of the problem, the other challenge came as a result of the specific political environment in Macedonia, represented by strong political confrontations on the political scene, confrontations that oftentimes interfered with normal political dialogue or confrontations that presented all elections as historical and referendum elections when as a rule they were accompanied by violence and irregularities, giving room to disputing the legitimacy of the winner. The political conflict based on the idea Traitors – Patriots pushed the citizens of Macedonia into one continuous political battle *in which one Macedonia needed to conquer some other Macedonia – completely...* On the other hand, there are no anti-system parties in Macedonia; the strategic goal of all of the political parties is our accession to EU and NATO, all of them accept the concept of liberal democracy and strive to establish it in the Republic of Macedonia etc.

The study entitled *Political Identities in the Republic of Macedonia* presents the results from a scientific research project of the same name, conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in the period from 2006 to 2009.

The main goal of the research team¹ was to determine the different political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, to see on which social cleavages they are differentiated on and where are their positions on an imagined ideological spectrum. Or to put it differently, whether the strictly distinguished political confrontations represent one dichotomous, i.e. segmented political structure, soundly founded on the social cleavages of the Macedonian society. We've tried to do that by: analysis of the social affiliation of citizens, analysis of their party affiliation and analysis of a certain number of political attitudes and values that they've accepted. We started from the basic assumption that if these three elements are related then we can say that the party-political divisions are founded on social divisions or if we see this through the prism of the Macedonian highly polarized political environment, that such political polarization is based on the existence of differentiated social profiles of citizens, who according to their perceptions of the world and some aspects of the personal dimension belong to different cultures/poles.

Such a defined research task set the subject, goal and the methodological approach to our research. Within the subject of the research we identified the political parties and citizen/voters in terms of their ideological-political profiles. The political parties were

1 The research team consisted of: Lidija Hristova (ISPJR), Head of the project, Anica Dragovic (Faculty of Philosophy- Skopje), Eleonora Serafimovska (ISPJR), Bekim Kadriu and Aneta Cekik (ISPJR).

perceived as monolithic units and the research was aimed towards their self-identification (through their name, the statements of their party leaders), towards the analysis of their primary document – the political program of the party and corresponding analysis of their political profile or image in the public (meaning what is the public or the citizens' perception of the party in terms of its ideological-political profile), what is its identity or the way it portrays itself in public communication (or what is the others' perception of that particular party). The researchers had no intention of confirming nor denying the established image/stereotype of the party, but to only point out the distinctions of that particular "product" offered on the political market.²

The second level of analysis was aimed towards the citizens/voters. The survey of the citizens consisted of a complex questionnaire that covered several segments: questions regarding the conservative-liberal values, questions concerning the linear spectrum of the left and right, questions in terms of the dimension of social conformism – personal autonomy (SC – A) and the usual questions related to election behavior and the election preferences of the citizens. Such a designed questionnaire was meant to allow us to gain more knowledge into the basic political and value orientations of the voters in the Republic of Macedonia and the dependence of these divisions from the party preferences.

The research had to be in line with the complex structure of the Macedonian segmented society, which is we also analyzed the Macedonian political bloc as opposed to the Albanian political bloc.

Political Pluralism in the Republic of Macedonia

Almost all of the analysts of transition agree that pluralization in Macedonia developed in a conservative environment and rather slowly (Mircev, 1991, Mojanoski, 2000, Milosavljevski, 1993, Jovevska 1999, Spasov, 1993). It was in such a political environment that the pluralistic explosion of the 1990s in Macedonia occurred and a highly segmented party system that remained as such throughout the entire transition period. If the number of the political parties was the first characteristic, then the second was the instability of the political offer (the establishment of new political parties, the division of the old ones, their merger, the transition of certain MPs from one to another political party, all of this brought about a change in the political menu from one to another election).

However, the analysis of the election results in this 20-year period showed that only several political entities stood apart from the others by leaving a special mark on the development of the Macedonian democracy. Those were the parties in whose programs, leaders, views and policies, the majority of the voters recognized their own interests, those that they identified themselves with and for which they manifested either their loyalty or distance.

2 For this reason we didn't only analyze the party programs, but the media as well (print and electronic media) and especially in the time of the pre-election campaign for the early parliamentary elections of 2008, there were interviews with politicians conducted, essays analyzed on the topic of ideology of the political parties in the Republic of Macedonia of three generations of students at postgraduate studies in Political Science at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research in Skopje. And in the end, we also analyzed the social 'rooting' of the parties by using a mass-survey on a national sample.

Dominant Social Cleavages as Basis for Party Pluralism

Right at the beginning of the transition period the ethnicity of citizens became (the most) significant determinant of their political behavior, which is why all ethnic communities formed their own parties which they used to express and protect their own interests. An array of social circumstances (economic, cultural and political) further emphasized these divisions and the way they were perceived, which means that also in the future this cleavage will remain an important factor in the election behavior of voters.

If we take into consideration the ethnic structure of the Macedonian society, the political parties of the ethnic Macedonians and those of the ethnic Albanians are of special importance to the political stability of the country and the development of democracy. However, those political conflicts that appear within the ethnic political blocs point to the fact that they are not monolithic and that some other cross-cutting cleavages or circumstances have shaped the political life within them.

Albanian political bloc. In the past period, there were three important political entities differentiated in the Albanian political bloc: the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA) and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI).

If we analyze the political dynamics of the parties in this ethnic bloc we will distinguish the following characteristics: firstly, all of the political parties have their focus (exclusively) on the Albanian *national cause*, which after 2001 was rationalized with the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Secondly, they differ only in the radicality of their views regarding the rights of the Albanians and the radicality depends on the fact whether that particular party is the governing or the opposing party; thirdly, the intra-ethnic conflict is so strongly expressed that not only do these parties oftentimes use quite rough and at times militant rhetoric, but they even do not refrain themselves from attacking the party headquarters which sometimes includes physical assaults, too. This animosity, especially evident in pre-election campaigns, gets passed down from the élites to the members which makes it hard to identify a particular cleavage as a cause for the confrontation; and fourthly, the instability of the party system is even more expressed than in the rest of the political parties in Macedonia: from the beginning of the transition period up till now there haven't been any political parties with a differentiated and stable voter's body, but voters just go from one party to another.

Macedonian political bloc. For the whole transition period there were two dominant political parties in the Macedonian political bloc – SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, with a numerous and stable voter's body which made the political system function as a result of their complete alternation of power. They in fact expressed the second division or confrontation in the Macedonian society. Some refer to it as *left wing - right wing* and some as *communism - anticommunism*. Further down, we will give an overview of the profiles or the identities of these two poles, the same way they were presented in the public and perceived by the majority of the voter's body.

As a result of the political structures of the former socialist state, SDSM had made full use of the advantages of the old-new party and up until 1998 had been continu-

ously in power (and later from 2002 to 2006). Its critics emphasize the fact that this party had never really fully transformed and by recognizing in it the old communist spirit, they blamed the party for further continuous attempts to maintain its monopoly position in society. By being referred to as *Yugo-nostalgic*, *'komunjar'* - *sympathizers of communism* and *serbophiles* who are opposed to all projects that aim to disassemble communism, the social democrats were blamed not only for being too attached to the traditions of the People's Liberation War (regarded above all as a communist revolution, but also as a certain type of antimacedonianism) on the account of other historic traditions of the Macedonian people, but also for slowing down economic reform.

Understandably, SDSM never admitted to this criticism and defended itself by saying that they were the ones who democratized the Macedonian society and established the Republic of Macedonia as an independent country in one very famous expression: *SDSM – nation-building party*, as a guarantee and the future for the country.

VMRO-DPMNE is one of the newly created political parties with nationalist orientation, which has integrated into its name the name of the most famous Macedonian revolutionary organization from the beginning of the twentieth century, an organization that the majority of the Macedonian population is emotionally attached to. This sentiment in the Macedonian people, related to the ideal of creating an independent state was particularly nurtured in some families, so one can assume that the core of this party (at least in the first years of its creation) was extracted precisely from this environment. Having been criticized as an unserious party, extremely nationalistic and with bulgarophilic baggage, VMRO-DPMNE was accused that in the case they do come to power they would divide the country, make way for terror and would be incapable of balancing out interethnic relations. Of recently though, (with the party's win on the Parliamentary elections of 2006) it was also accused for obstructing EU and NATO integrations. By denying these accusations, VMRO-DPMNE reminded the public that it was only owing to their self-awareness and the pressure they imposed at the beginning of the transition period that Macedonia was able to establish itself as an independent state (referring here to the serbophilia and the yugoslavianism of SDSM) and emphasized its capacity for reforms (especially in the field of economy) as realistically the only political force that could pull the country out of what seemed an everlasting transition process.

In these divisions we can easily recognize above all, the cultural and symbolic aspect of political confrontation (different holidays are celebrated, different heroes glorified, different historic traditions are relied upon) and two worlds are being offered, one that personifies good, and the other evil.

But this is not the complete political identification of SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE. By identifying themselves as left, i.e. right wings, both parties have strived, especially in the last 4-5 years, to reinforce this dimension in their activities so that they could become more recognizable to the voter's body. The need for such a differentiation level most probably comes as a result of the fact that the voter's body can not be held much longer in a state of high political mobilization merely with *long narratives* and that specific and efficient policy needs to be offered to solve the accumulated problems. Should the linear ideological spectrum prove inefficient for the differentiation of policies, we would have to look for that differentiation line in the liberal-conservative division based on social

values and national identity – a field in which this differentiation is all the more visible even among the Macedonian political parties.

In this way, VMRO-DPMNE is promoting more and more the family, religion, tradition, is trying to establish law and order and adherence to laws by prescribing severe punishments for the offenders, while at the same time not showing enough tolerance towards differences. Also the party is promoting itself even more as a kind of modern technomanagerial structure which is relentless in the improvement of the economic prosperity of the country for joining the EU and NATO.

The need to establish the ideological profile of SDSM has been an ever-present topic in the public since 2006, when the party lost the parliamentary elections and was faced with a crisis. This has been emphasized by SDSM's party leaders as well, but also by the general public and political analysts, who voiced their concern that the Macedonian left wing is impersonal, lacking in ideas and utterly defensive – has no platform that citizens might recognize. The need for having a *story of their own* that would be aimed at the target groups of the electorate was the main topic of discussion on the Tenth SDSM Congress back in May of 2009.

Are there any Similarities?

The objective transitional environment as well as due to the globalization processes (with special emphasis on the Eurointegration processes), while when it comes to the socioeconomic sphere the arrangements with the World Bank and the IMF also had a major influence, practically contributing to the convergence of their program documents and practical policies. If we add the way in which these parties exercised their power (corruption, authoritarianism, violation of many principles of democracy) the conclusion of many was that *'they are all the same and Macedonia has basically no choice!'*

Parallel to these convergence processes, the division of the Macedonian society did not lose its intensity. The division of the political camps into the two of the biggest Macedonian parties and two of the biggest Albanian parties became a source of constant conflict fueled by intense hatred. And this was not only political. Knowing that someone is only a member of the opposite political camp was a reason enough to hate that person, to want to harm them. As one political analyst noted: 'with such violent hatred and strong political revanchism, the only way we'll go is down.'

This division and strong negative emotions towards the Other had also a pragmatic component. In a country where the unemployment rate is over 30% throughout the whole period of transition, where over 20% of the population lives in poverty and where the state is the No. 1 employer, the victory of the Ours was related to people's expectations for employment in the state administration and public enterprises, for job promotions, private business prosperity etc.

If we come to the conclusion that the motive for political mobilization of these two worlds is symbolically cultural and ideological, but also more and more pragmatic, we ask ourselves the question: to what extent do the citizens or voters belong to these two different worlds, if we take into account their views, life orientation and value judgments.

This dimension was further researched through a survey conducted on a national representative sample of 1,599 respondents (mass survey).

Political and Value Orientations of the Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia

The legitimacy of the aforementioned opposing political identities comes as a result of the voting behavior of the loyal voters, whose attitudes, opinions and value criteria create the differentiated profiles of voters. The three scales of values – one of them related to the division left – right, the other one to the division liberalism – conservatism and the third one to the specific issues regarding the Macedonian political environment were supposed to reflect the ideological-political profiles/differences.³

When it comes to the dichotomy left – right, a big majority of the respondents (around 70%) share the so-called left values (they prefer small social differences, a broad package of social services, social security only under the jurisdiction of the country, favoring a type of co-decision in companies etc.). The loyal voters of both the left and the right do not deviate much from the general distribution and that this information refers to both the voters from the so-called Macedonian and Albanian political bloc. When it comes to assessing the value of socialism, a big proportion (over 75%) feel that socialism was in no way a repressive system and that this system took care of everyone. But in the case of the voters of the parties from the Albanian political bloc the criticism towards socialism is very strong (for example, 65% of voters stated that socialism was a repressive system). This criticism in the Albanian political bloc is the result of the perception that the ethnic Albanians were repressed and strongly marginalized during the socialism.

When it comes to the dichotomy liberalism – conservatism, the survey showed a widely distributed conservative awareness among the respondents, which makes unnecessary the analysis on the differences between the left and the right (over 80% of the respondents strive for harsher punishments, strong leaders, respect of tradition, that we need to fight for our own people regardless if they're right or not..., against the rights of homosexuals etc.) We see a wide distribution of conservative views in the voters from the Albanian political bloc, too.

Concerning the social rooting of political parties the results from the survey suggest that there's no clear or specific social profiling of the political parties. These claims have been confirmed with both the bi-variant analysis (contingency table and contingency coefficient) and the factor analysis. Based on the data collected, the social background of the party is in most part strongly established in the ethnicity of the respondents. The rest of the factors are combinations that can have an influence on the choice of the party, i.e. to be elements (factors or clusters) that would help identify parties in the future. The ethnic heterogeneous environment that converges not only with religious and cultural division, but social as well, points to a segmented socio-cultural society, but only from one aspect – the ethnic one.

3 The survey showed that there are around 60% of loyal voters in the Republic of Macedonia (this percentage is slightly on the rise compared to previous research, which is evidence to the validity of the model of party identification in voting, combined with the sociological model in its ethnic variant.

Evidently the survey results do not give us the right to differentiate between the various value profiles of voters at the Macedonian political scene, where party affiliation would count as a powerful selective factor in the creation of such profiles.

Dimension of Social Conformism – Autonomy

The research, whose purpose was to analyze the political identities in the Republic of Macedonia, also analyzed the personal dimension of *social conformism – autonomy*, a dimension oftentimes analyzed in context of a basis for building ideologies, democratic behavior and in general, proper functioning of the system of political culture.

A higher score in the SC-A dimension, which is evidence to the preference of social conformism in the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, **is most commonly related to women, more senior respondents, members of the majority in the country and members of the low social class**, which (social class) was actually defined by the respondents themselves. This data in fact confirmed the already constructed hypothesis (confirmed in numerous other studies besides this one) that envisaged women (mostly due to the still prevailing traditional values in society) and the more senior individuals (mostly due to the developmental changes) preferring social conformism over autonomy, compared to men and younger respondents. Social conformism, associated with the majority of the country, speaks in favor of the realistically existing endeavors of the country's minorities to not adapt completely to the bigger proportion of citizens (the majority), to the set rules that should apply to everyone, as well as demands for rights to free expression and changing the prescribed rules.

A higher score of the SC-A dimension is also related to the conservative values (an anticipated and envisaged trend), but also with the socialist, left values.

One thing the SC-A dimension was unrelated with was the choice of a specific political party/option, more precisely supporting a certain political ideology in terms of left and right. Apparently, even though in their programs and public appearances the parties propagate certain politically-ideological values, they still fail to manage to profile themselves clearly and to impose themselves with their ideological values onto the voter's body, thus rendering them unrecognizable to the voters. This process does in no way go in favor with building and developing specific, distinctive and recognizable political identities.

Conclusions

What is the conclusion here? In general, the research results do not reveal a more significant mutual relatedness between the social affiliation of the citizens and their perceptions of the world (the researched dimensions of their political awareness). Maybe the only exception is the social 'rooting' of the parties in the ethnicity. If our research showed that the profile of the average Macedonian voter in the Republic of Macedonia is a citizen with left orientations, with conservative and conformist views, we cannot say that there are two or more differentiated profiles of voters, as a "natural background" of the opposing political identities. At the same time, this was not a hindrance for these

political identities to have at their disposal a continuous and strong legitimacy, confirmed above all through elections. If this is so, in the case of Macedonia, we can say that there are two political arenas which (co)exist simultaneously: one at a level of political parties and political competition and the other at a level of the citizen/voter. Where do we seek for the mediation factors or in other words what is the basis of loyalty?

If party identification is not based on structure and interests, does that mean that it is more of a reflection of the superficial preferences based on the charisma of the political leaders and/or the successfully designed image of the party? Do the insufficiently developed and poor societies, with poor civic traditions, provide fertile soil for party competition in which the political projects and interests of political elites dominate? Or is this a general trend of the contemporary democracies in which professionalization, political marketing and the reliance on the media are the principal traits of the parties? The affirmative answer to this question reminds us of the authors that have emphasized the immense influence parties have on the psychology of the voters, illustrated by the syntagm *changed votes – unchanged voters*. This also reminds us of the competitive approach that Ware A. spoke of, which focuses on the party leaders, who as successful entrepreneurs strive to politicize above all the differences that earn them the most profit or election votes. And finally, what does this mean for democracy in the Macedonian plural society, with poor civic traditions and visible elements of authoritarian and subject consciousness?

These and many other questions were also raised before the research team of the project, who aimed at analyzing the political identities of the Republic of Macedonia. Fully aware that the information and conclusions that came out as a result of the analysis of the data obtained from the implementation of this project do not completely solve the problem (they in fact only point to some of its dimensions) we remain hopeful that they continue to be a challenge for new research projects of the academic community in the Republic of Macedonia.

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POLITICAL IDENTITY AND RESPECT OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

Abstract

Political tolerance is regarded as a part of the concept of recognition that allows the existence of differences between people who are careerists/creators of policy/policy makers. It is these differences and their recognition that are the main source of tolerance. Consequently, there is no tolerance without recognizing the right of these differences. But, on the other hand, the recognition itself of the right of differences between people opens numerous questions and difficulties about the functioning of tolerance. Do functional or populist politics dominate? Are common cultural values to be nurtured and preserved in the state exactly/accurately defined?

With regret we can conclude that within the official, politicized and party culture, we build an authoritarian culture that creates an environment to make/making citizens live in fear of identity preservation, rather than promoting projects that will help them live with the political reality. Today, educational system and ethics-related education must become a necessary conception as an essential concept of ethical virtue. More should be invested in young people's lives in order to create ethical and tolerant beings.

If we are supporters of democracy and more specifically the values of liberal democracy, we should accept the fact that every citizen has the right to defend its system of national, religious and all other values. This often creates relations of conflict, complicating or generating implications on the existing values as a result of conflicts. In such circumstances, it seems that misunderstandings occur as a result of different ideas and preconceptions about myths or mythology, rise of national myths of the past, when people make attempts to expose their ideas in a way that leaves the impression that they conform to part of the historians or politicians, but without any significance for the present and future. If they insist/intend to build the future of a nation in present time, relying purely on mythology, one can suspect that there is something wrong in that nation and its political elites. It might be regarded as an indicator of their attempts relating to the intended method of how to build the future or, more accurately, national, cultural, political, economic prospects of the country. To avoid building the idea of myths, in fact, it is better to follow a different direction. Namely, it would be more sensible to explore the values and gain a deeper insight, thereby trying to identify their implications for the present situation. The attempt to find space for hope in the current time is a kind of intellectual challenge for an individual, and in view of this we will seek to build/develop a policy and diplomacy that includes historical events, but at the same time we should have in mind the words of the winner of Nobel prize in literature Camilo Jose Cela: "We should not be on the side of those who make history but on the side of those who suffer in it."

Key words: political tolerance, differences, recognition, political culture, identities.

It can be concluded that within the search for political identity, politicized culture creates authoritarian environment where citizens live in fear of preserving their nation-

al identity.¹ In the past twenty years of pluralism in the era of globalism,² from almost the same political figures (and those who move from one to another party) among the Albanians and Macedonians, we have heard statements about Macedonia being an oasis of peace, statements of destabilization of Macedonia or creation of a political crisis. This may change the course of political action, for the friends of Albanians and Macedonians. I believe in positive changes over time that can bring people closer, by a change of ideas in the party concepts and on individual/personal levels, which are welcome, given the fact that in many European societies it resulted in successful reconciliation of reformed individuals from politics, science, etc...

In addition, political explanation may be provided as a support to this belief (Shonesi, 1994). If these policies are built without a clear background, and with elements of political or populist frustration, then within a very short period regression might be expected and policy without influence, furthermore leaders who will be (not be?) trusted or failed citizens with new expectations/requirements from them, resulting in general apathy. Berkovik Lonard said: "People often feel frustration and persistent general apathy." In this respect, it is of vital importance/it is essential for politicians to accept the fact that they have a degree of responsibility for the preservation of human conscience as well in order to protect their activities from uncontrolled and controversial political statements in public appearances. The political tolerance and statesmanship... require responsibility (Patric, 1980).

In order not to be apathetic, it is worth mentioning Lerner, who besides empathy, emphasizes the importance of rationality in politics, and that the future can be influenced by its own labour. "Modern man considers the world changeable and believes that his/her activities can change something that his/her opinion deserves/ is worth". The activities of politicians who are able to stimulate positive processes and their ability to tell the most important qualities that can be encouraging are expected to create space for political factors and party functional coalitions. In Macedonia, the political structures from the government and the opposition should create real conditions for harmonization of political activities and building of civic trust/confidence in all these integration activities within the country to promote forms of real dialogue in order to preserve the values of common interest regarding the EU integration.

1 **Legitimacy** / Legitimation (lat. legitimus = rightful): Is the legality of state power. The structure and exercising of state power is legitimate, if the idea of law and justice, including the ethical values and standards that underlie these, coincide with those present in the society, over which the state exercises power, and are generally recognized by this society as being universal. All forms of state power require legitimacy/legitimizing. (www.dadalos.org)

Identity: Being distinct from others and the same only with itself in some feature that serve to recognize without difficulty as such, being the same. Human identity (Dictionary of Modern Albanian Language, Renaissance, Pristina, 1981)

2 Giddens (2002): "It is an interesting history of unwanted term globalization. Only about ten years ago the word has rarely been used in academic papers and popular press. From nowhere, now the term is everywhere, not a political speech is complete, nor is a working manual acceptable without its reference. Pg. 32

Political loyalty and disloyalty

The notion of Loyalty as a civil obligation is challenging and important phenomenon. Thonnberry Patrick offers an interesting explanation when he says: “There is no doubt that loyalty is directly linked to equality and non - discrimination before the law, but even more it should be provided by reducing the factors that create sense of actual discrimination and insecurity” (Patric, 1980). Regarding loyalty to the state and non loyalty, a great significance has been attributed to the state/public function which is managed officially by a person/an individual. Possible disagreements of this kind or concerns should be explained, because building the policies relating to the functioning of the political institutions is directly related to the functioning of the party coalition, because they constitute the structure of the government. The dilemma for non loyalty to the state on the one hand and loyalty to the party on the other hand with which the pie of responsibility for managing the state is shared, is an issue that should be analyzed among the leaderships of the political parties in question.

Pre – Macedonian - Albanian coalition

If we analyse in detail the election programmes of the political parties in Macedonia, from 2002 to 2011³ it can be noted that almost all of them contain the major campaign issues that our country faces, and they include:

- the character of the political order of the state/ the nature of the political system of the country;
- the functioning of the state law/the rule of law and protection of fundamental values;
- the Euro - Atlantic processes and the entry of Macedonia in NATO and EU;
- the economic system and policy development;
- the social and residential policy;
- international relations;
- Relations between Europe and the Balkans and Macedonia’s place in those relationships etc.

Nowadays it is hard to think that politicians who were part of the government, thought about managing and building policy in view of dichotomies and measures such as the essential and non essential, primary and extra, irrelevant and declined. Even fewer knew how to precisely define what is higher priority and major national interest in order to receive common political values. We have seen building of serious policy movements with disappointing results, patriotic collusion to stage political actors. If we analyse the political chronology or iconography of the unsaid religious patriotism, we can start as an illustration with the iconography patterns of the (church) hall for ple-

³ Election platforms for parliamentary elections in Macedonia elections 2002 **SDSM**, there is hope for Macedonia, **DUI** winners along with you, **VMRO DPMNE**, Macedonia is a reality, **DPA** wish west, Skopje, August-September 2002

nary sessions of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. This happened during the term of VMRO - DPMNE and DPA. These partners of the same government coalition continued the iconography and the political behaviour resulting with the construction of the cross on the top of Vodno, above Skopje. The “Millennium Cross” with unreasonable height is built with partial support from the budget of the Government.

The question arising from the above phenomena is whether there was teamwork as part of the democratic political culture at that time, as a basis for the coalition government policy “democratic plural societies” (Lijphart, 1994). Or was this a construction of an ideological – religious party concept only of the then Prime Minister Georgievski Lupcho or the then Minister Nikola Gruevski, and therefore the politicians of DPA and DA would not, or must not to be criticized. If ideological projects are accepted of other disguises of false mutual respect – with a false moderate policy (with strategic political partners) that creates a lot of potential dangers for the functional policy. The sense of political identity is lost, especially when it comes to themes and projects of interethnic and inter-religious character. It continues with projects where it is not sufficiently clear whether they have an ethnic value as the political project “Skopje 2014”, which hurts and offends the national feelings of the citizens. When a project of this nature is analysed in detail, the dilemma that follows refers to the issue of which elements predominate in interethnic and inter-religious communication, if the government find themselves as gamblers of reality and of national and religious diversity, cultural pluralism and features that fostered the centuries long population in Skopje. Preservation and affirmation of the material and spiritual heritage, encouragement and affirmation of ethnic diversity and diversity in culture, encouraging youth creativity, continuity of traditional cultural - artistic events should be promoted. Multiculturalism, according to Habermas, cannot be reduced to separate existence of cultural ghettos, closed and sufficient to themselves.

In fact, the aim of linguistic, ethnic, and religious, cultural, political tolerance is to realize the creative person’s resources without hurting anybody. Tolerance is a supreme model of human ethical behaviour, the affirmation of love, understanding, generosity and dialogue. It is not denying the other, nor bullying, it is denial of moral norms.⁴ Today there is worldwide interest in religion - Gulen says “I think the representation of the religion with its true values is even more important than before (Gulen, 2004: 73).

In this context I would like to remind the ideologists if they are true architects of the project “Skopje 2014” that the architect does not lead a battle against time, but he collaborates with time. The best defence for their project would be when they would admit that they were wrong and that political directive for such construction does not reflect the true past of the centre of Skopje. My idea is a recommendation that they learn something about Peter Hofsheter, summarising the thoughts of Le Bon, when he says “to be raped, by leaders, heads of advertising, propagandists and deceivers - It seems is the

4 M. Fethullah Gulen explains the altruism and help of each other in the world as an expression of its essence and general love. All things have a tendency to help. Almost all of the things help the man – the breath, the water, the fire, the earth, the sun and the sky, like the cells, the part and the system of human body that help to realize his life. The things help the plant life and the other live beings as well. That magic and ordained life cooperates and help each other (Gulen, 2005: 8).

main desire of the table, and, where they do not rape, wants to be sleeping in apathetic slumber, by offering banal superficiality.”

This can be supported by the analysis of the political scientist Arend Lijphart relating to democracy and access to the instruments of power. In the case of Macedonia, from 1992 and before that, in the Assembly and the Government there were Albanians and other national/ethnic communities. It is another question to what extent and at what coalition platform the party actors determined and adjusted the policies for division of the state functions.

Party coalition partners, present and future, should seriously discuss this issue. From a political perspective it is possible for the democratic states to be successful in providing a relaxed situation if there is a stable coalition between the leading parties in all segments of the pluralistic society, and consequently in the division of the managerial positions in (the public/state-owned) institutions.

Political browsing analysis should provide clarification for current coalitions among Macedonian and Albanian parties whose aim is primarily forming/establishing a government and therefore the need to achieve the required majority of votes (Hristova, 1996: 51-71). Such practice proved unsuccessful and a basis for potential conflicts without proper functional policy. Therefore, in future, VMRO - DPMNE, DUI, SDSM, DPA and other parties, relying on the constitutional provisions, should start thinking about pre-election coalitions with political platforms. So, future winners of the elections would have the election platform as a government project. Such government program would be more transparent and more feasible because it would have accepted both the Macedonian and the Albanian voters. This is my thought so far based on a political argument. Albanian voters - in the last parliamentary elections did not vote for DUI for it to be enforcer/an implementer of party projects of VMRO - DPMNE. PDP and DPA were in a similar situation in the past. They could not represent the interests of their electorate/constituency. Building such coalitions should focus on intellectual labour, rather than on patriotic campaigns. Tolerance in politics is achieved if it is democratic, then depending on the extent to which it represented the interests of citizens and how credible the election platform is. For the violence and the lack of tolerance, Vaclav Havel, writer and former president of the Czech Republic, highlights: “Violence is injustice for a human being. Intellectuals have the right to think of the future, to imagine what it would look like. But their task, their main priority, I think, is to understand the present and to understand its crises and grant them a name. This is how true awareness about the perspectives was conceived ...” (Malichi, 2003).

In Macedonia, it seems, people are prone to being easily influenced in terms of creation of their political opinion and acceptance of the the popular dance of political populism, while the unpredictable game / objective is to maintain “national populist balance”. For that purpose there is an excessive reliance on the historical past. In that direction in our country a more prominent phenomenon is the party individualism among the ruling structures and the opposition with the absence of incentives that will develop consensual spirit. They might be real, while some estimates from diplomatic circles indicate that it might be a diplomatic tension where party games can serve as a good scenario for political acting.

What would be the implications of the possible pre-election coalition between VMRO - DPMNE, DUI, SDSM or DPA, ND or any other party of Albanians and other national communities? Will these election coalitions impose another perception on the political careers of politicians who would accept such pre-building policy? Perhaps this kind of thinking among the political actors will mean termination of offering populist policies and the failure of campaign promises will stop conflicting governmental coalitions. That is, the Albanian party leaders will show political motive to stop the practice Albanians in the Macedonian Government to represent just a number, not the weight in deciding about the appointment of the state authorities. Those same politicians or leaders of parties that have so far proved to be good negotiators to form government coalitions need to overcome themselves and become actors for making pre - election coalition platforms. We should not forget that the electoral coalition programs should contribute to overcoming interethnic polarizing and politicizing. It should be emphasised that politicians have a level of responsibility in terms of preservation of human conscience and therefore they should protect their activities from uncontrolled political statements during elections and other public appearances. Pre interethnic party coalitions would reduce the euphoric actions of politicians, whose performances are often without reasonable background/explanation.

Political communication and the search for political identity

The impression from the many factors in the information contained in the news relating to our Balkan and Albanian - Macedonian occasions; negativity represents a complicated sequence of priorities. Media are used to promote inter-party communication and political, economic, social and cultural priorities. However, it still remains as an issue to identify the values that will distinguish and define the framework of the ethics of responsibility. We had and we still have moving policy priorities in inter party political arena and in the current situation as part of party elites, which seem to wish to confirm the journalistic factor of informing when he says that "The more negative an event is, the better/the more attractive it becomes as subject for the news reports."⁵

To understand this, we should accept the rule for real framework in information. "Comments are free but facts are sacred", so reads the journalistic maxim often promoted by Klaus Shonbah. Unfortunately, inadequate performances with diplomatic contradictions are inherited from partisan diplomatic arena. But one thing is certain - political behaviour is an art and a skill that adds a style of diplomatic communication. Diplomatic communication is a value. Therefore, I would use the thought/quotation of Hartmann saying "A person does not constitute values, but values constitute the personality of an individual."

⁵ More details about this, in Kunchik M and Cipfel A (1998) *Introduction in the science of publishment and communication*. Skopje, p. 67-74

It is time for civil action by the parties

In building a common political value and respect for the state and its fundamental values, citizens are in anticipation of having more prospects. In building public policy, change is expected in the intentions and actions of political leaders. Citizens cherish their hopes having confidence in the political elite and the emergence of new individuals with new messages and standards that will bring freshness and new reality in the political behaviour. A new way of political communication, not burdened with the current and often manipulative politics that causes mistrust, poor perceptions of personal safety, poor perceptions of politicians that disrupt the relationship: politics - values - ethics, rights and obligations (Maleska, 2003: 249). The idea of institutional tool of obligation (responsibility/accountability) should be understood as a roadmap for strengthening a political project capacity for compliance with the laws, whilst the politician and politics should mean trust and confidence among citizens. The key question is how among the party, particularly among government officials public accountability can be operational.

Chronology indicates that significant amount of time has been wasted on conflicting partisan majorities with Albanian parties to form coalition governments applying the manipulation of numbers. Therefore, a political analysis for building a political statement with clear and firm arguments/position can reveal a political thought regarding the issue of which Albanian politicians should be involved in the further actions of one political party and grouped into an early or late majority. Otherwise, if combinations are made of, relatively speaking, Macedonian and Albanian block parties political alternatives tend to become obscure.

Today's politicians act in time that does not allow modification or confusion of values. EU remains consistent in the strong/strict message regarding the independence of the judiciary, improving the efficiency of public administration, guaranteeing freedom of expression/speech and the necessity of full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Therefore, in view of this, it is worth mentioning the former director of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, who said: "Today we know that we live in a transparent world, and we can no longer justify that or we were naïve."

Conclusion

If one insists on building a political identity, relying predominantly on mythology, then it can be viewed as an indication that there are constant attempts to build a future of national, cultural, political, economic prospects of the country. To avoid building the idea of myths the values should be explored, because they are part of the actual/visible and current setting, while myths are non-existent or imaginary.

The need for creation of civil initiatives is essential in order to promote political engagement/involvement and help overcome the state of apathy. It is expected that this will cause increased preparedness/improvement in the willingness for participation on the part of the population, primarily of people with higher education degrees, so that they can find their place in the increased number of civil initiatives at local and regional levels.

Consequently, it will lead to respect for the democratic values and the values of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, the continuity of the integration values and democratic standards, as well as promotion of the concepts of tolerance as well as human rights and freedoms.

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BUSINESS PRACTICES AND IDENTITY

Abstract

Globalization is stimulating research in the field of cultural adaptivity and tolerance, behavioural models that broaden the range of cultural diversity, overcoming stereotypes, and changes in identity. Cultural identification and its projections in individual behaviour on the one hand, and the effect of the application and adaptation of other people's experience and business models on the other, shape the adjustments and the strategies of the social participants. An important role is played here by the systems of behaviour and mutual relations, cultural rules and symbolic codes. In this sense, culture and what has been inherited are transformed into an important instrument for social dynamics and are oriented towards the search for new resources for development. The aim of the paper is to discuss aspects of this thesis, providing specific examples and also to present an analysis of behavioural adaptations, motivations and models shared by the economic participants in two areas of business practices – a) practices in the “grey” economy and b) the practices of agricultural producers in the use of land.

Key words: identity, cultural models, entrepreneurial activity, role of the state.

The Conceptual Frame of Reference

Globalization is a process of cultural, institutional and technological expansion that has two contradictory dimensions – homogenization and differentiation. Besides global interaction, the world is becoming ever more obviously divided and is also re-grouping along the lines of tradition, cultural heritage and religion in the endeavour to preserve its acquired identities. Individual societies, though engaged in this process to various degrees, on different scales and at varying speeds of transformation, are objectively changing and adapting to the demands of globalization. The changes, besides being structural and institutional in nature, definitely affect the individual in terms of values, motivation, and behaviour, as well as in his/her social and interpersonal relationships. The combination of growing interdependence and uniformity of public life in different countries on the one hand, and variety of cultural identities and adhering to traditions and local stereotypes of behaviour on the other, provokes new conditions on the level of the personality, group and society.

In this context we can see the significance of the problem of the co-existence and adaptation/reconciliation between already acquired identities and those newly constructed

around significances and cultural attributes (Castells, 2006: 20), arriving as messages (norms and regulators) and a code of values from new symbolic centres – the European Union, the global market, international institutions.

According to Giddens one of the distinct characteristics of modernity is the strengthened interrelationship between globalizing influences on the one hand, and personal dispositions on the other. The more traditions lose their influence and the more everyday life reconstructs itself from the point of view of the dialectical interdependence of the local and the global, the more individuals are compelled to negotiate lifestyle choices from among the great variety of possibilities ... Reflectively organized life planning ... becomes a central characteristic of the structuring of the I-identity (Giddens, 1991, cited in Castells, 2006: 22).

Every social activity imbues people with culturally coded roles or identities (Herzfeld, 2007: 50). In the field of economic activities cultural identity as a projection of acquired significances, roles and ways of taking action is subject to constant pressure for (re)construction under the influence of globalization and integration processes. Membership in the EU is a field of extensive business and at the same time intercultural exchange, where cultural encounters between the East and the West result in the appearance of certain new hybrid forms of economic culture exceeding “the oversimplified schema in which “the powerful western” culture overwhelms “the weak eastern» one” (Kovacs, 2004: 9-11; Chavdarova, 2007: 68).

Democracy and the market economy are a source of cultural significances and values for independent choices and personal management of the circumstances of life. Achievement of autonomy and control to a considerable degree pose the question of identity as a process of self-attainment (Alexandrov, 2005) and source of significance and experience for people (Castells, 2006: 19). The cultures with established liberal traditions encourage the autonomy and self-perfection of the individual, whereas cultures with patriarchal traditions value survival and self-confidence highly and rely on decisions coming from centres outside the individual and his/her immediate environment.

In this context, cultural identification and its implications for the behaviour of the individual are a factor of crucial importance in the perspective of existence. Becoming aware of and overcoming certain features of the traditional mentality and culture at personal level is a guarantee of economic and social prosperity.

Several surveys conducted in recent years on the topic of “culture and business”¹ offer cogent support for the thesis that there is a connection between the economic conditions and the culture of thinking and behaviour.

By applying the theoretical schemas of Hofstede, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner and Münch in the mentioned studies and the basic dimensions used in them for interpreting cross-cultural differences, traditional Bulgarian economic culture can be briefly characterized as follows:

1 We have in mind the following projects, carried out in Bulgaria in applying the theoretical schemas of Hofstede, Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, widely used in cross-cultural studies in the economic sphere: “After the Accession ... The Socio-Economic Culture of Eastern Europe in the Enlarged Union: An Asset or a Liability?” – a comparative project, directed by J. Kovacs, and BG-coordinated by P. Kabakchieva; a representative survey of motivation for entrepreneurial activity in Bulgaria, headed by Y. Genov (Genov, 2004).

- Bulgarian society tends to be collectivistic, in the public awareness there are collectivistic attitudes such as, for example, that success is not achieved with professional skills and efforts, but thanks to good luck or knowing the right person. People relatively seldom display a sense of responsibility and personal guilt.
- A big “power distance” is a characteristic feature of Bulgarian culture. This great power distance presumes a fear of a position high up in the hierarchy and at the same time a need for it or for someone who will take the responsibility (for us). Studies show that the highest degree of acceptance of power inequality is in the workplace.
- Bulgarian economic culture is “feminine”. According to the predominant value orientations, societies that assume that individuals are “masculine” when they are “go-ahead”, oriented towards material success and career development; they are “feminine” when harmony, solidarity and sympathy for those who are unsuccessful predominate (Hofstede, 1984, 2001).
- Bulgarian culture is diffuse: “human relations” predominate over “instrumentalized relations”. In the Bulgarian economic environment, working relations are closely incorporated into human relations. The human aspect is of key importance in professional relations.
- Particularism is a typical way of thinking and acting in the Bulgarian business environment. This presumes “flexibility of values” depending on the case in question, a low respect for the established order and a lack of respect for the norms.

In practice, the basic features of Bulgarian economic culture described above distinguish them from the western characteristics which, according to cross-cultural studies, are individualistic, “masculine”, with little power distance, instrumental and rational (Chavdarova, 2004).

What I want to show here are specific examples of interactions between cultural signs and economic behaviour. I am basing the following on information from interviews with economic actors (participants) in two areas of business practices: a) the practices of employers in the grey economy and b) the practices of agricultural producers in the use of land.

Reasons and motivation for participation in the informal (grey) economy

Within the scope of the ongoing project “Restriction and Prevention of the Informal Economy”² various research tools are used to study its occurrence and attitudes towards it. A part of these consist of 281 internal company audits conducted among members of

² The project (2008-2013) is being carried out by the Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association (BICA) with the financial support of Operational Program “Development of Human Resources” 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund of the EU and the Republic of Bulgaria as agreed under BG051PO001-2.1.05

BICA and about 440 in-depth interviews with employers from various branches of business.

The informal economy is a widespread phenomenon. Its specific character in Bulgaria is to be found in the degree and the scale of its occurrence; in occupying the territories of all lines of business (some of these are “dependent” on the informal economy); in the absence of effective mechanisms and the will on the part of the government and the institutions for neutralizing the spread of grey practices; in strengthening the “cooperation” between the state and the administration on the one hand, and business on the other, from the viewpoint of the mutual advantage of the existence of the informal economy.

The subjective assessment of the employers is that the grey economy comprises around 42% in Bulgaria, whereas the assessment of the general public as a whole is almost 56%.

The employers participating in the survey have an objective, real and down-to-earth picture of the informal economy. The majority of them show understanding for the reasons for the existence of the informal economy as a means of survival and adaptation of the firms in the present social and economic environment. The most commonly expressed opinion is that the informal economy is an implicit response on the part of business to the existing conditions and parameters of the business environment in Bulgaria (“*a lot of administrative hindrances and regulations, and corruption*”), further complicated by the economic crisis, and also by the national culture and mentality.

The predominant reasons given for working in the informal economy:

- a poor economic and business environment: loopholes in the legislation, constant changes in the laws, an administrative framework that works badly or not at all and that engenders distrust in the institutions, and also uncertainty and lack of prospects for the future;
- excessive state regulation, bureaucracy and administration (“*simulated regulatory obstacles*”, “*negative state attitudes towards business*”, “*an administrative framework that works badly or doesn’t work at all*”);
- the quality of the administration – corruption, misuse of power, incompetence;
- hindrances for business – high insurance rates and taxes;
- the lack of resources for firms – problems with financing, funds for achieving turnover, new technologies, low purchasing power;
- culture and mentality.

It is clear to the employers that working in the informal economy provides “bonuses” in the short term; that the lack of stability and advance calculability of the environment for doing business in Bulgaria encourages the temptation to “*profit by the situation*” in order to “*make more money faster and more easily*” by means of activities in the informal economy. In this context the motives for an orientation towards the informal economy are to be found in the dichotomy “compulsion – own choice”, where objective factors and subjective attitudes and decisions intersect. The most frequently expressed motives for an orientation towards practices and activities in the informal economy are: economic

compulsion on account of the crisis and the difficult conditions for business; the lack of any alternative and distrust of the institutions; the absence of clear rules and guaranteed stability for the business environment that “*the same rules will hold good tomorrow as we have today*”; the withdrawal of the state from its control functions and management of the financial and taxation processes; the corruption and grey administration of justice. Ultimately, the business person’s own choice is the decisive factor and, in this aspect of the assessment, it is entwined with the characteristic nature of the national culture and mentality, more specifically: the lack of trust in the state and the institutions, the lack of respect for their authority; searching for all sorts of loopholes in the legislation; taking advantage of the imperfection of the administrative and regulatory environment; making use of the reduced controls as a way of outsmarting/overtrumping others.

The employer’s personal choice of working within the informal economy relies on an adopted identity as part of the economic (entrepreneurial) culture. Identity, which is like a matrix of ideas, ways and standards for taking decisions and making a choice, for the assessment of the role of the state and the institutions in carrying out business activities and for the attitude towards them regarding the limits of socially permissible economic behaviour and the risks of breaking the rules for doing business.

The “watering down” of personal responsibility into collective responsibility (*If it’s OK for others, it’s OK for me too*); the lack of respect for and trust in the state and the laws; disregarding the rules and professional code are projections of this identity in the assessment of and the motivation for business practices in the informal economy.

Use of the Land as a Resource – What Influences the Choice

Restoring the right to actual possession, disposal and use of the land by its owners (in legal terms, agricultural land in Bulgaria had always remained private property) was expected to play the role of a pull factor for the expansion of individual private agricultural production and for the market orientation of farms, for the use of the land as a resource for enrichment, employment and labour realization, for social inclusion and community integration. The expectation that restoring ownership rights over the land will turn a considerable part of the owners into market-oriented agrarian producers and turn the land into an effective market resource has not yet materialized. Non-market and semi-market oriented farms are predominant, and over half of the farms are not specialized.

Why is it that – despite the presence of an unused (unemployed) labour resource and owned agricultural land – most farms are still predominantly part of the “supportive economy”, i.e. subsistence rather than market-oriented structures? In seeking possible answers to this question, an American-Bulgarian team carried out the project “What Makes a Farmer?”³

The researchers are confronted with a puzzle of orientations, attitudes and behavioural acts related to the use of the land. Market-economic logic with respect to the land

3 American-Bulgarian project “What Makes a Farmer?” headed by M. Meurs, American University Washington and the Bulgarian team from the Institute of Sociology (Sofia) including: V. Kozuharova, S. Dobreva, G. Koleva (coordinator of the Bulgarian participation); S. Anachkova; 60 interviews with owners of agrarian land in three different areas in Bulgaria (Vratsa, Yambol, and Pazardzhik) were carried out in the summer of 2009.

as a traditional factor in production and a potential capital resource for its owner, ambiguously articulates answers to questions such as: Why is the land withdrawn from the cooperatives and subsequently only a relatively small part of it used for production with a market orientation? How can the recorded fact⁴ be explained that in not less than 10% of the households where there is at least one unemployed person and also land that is not in use, there is no production for the market, thus preventing the possibility of earning income (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998; Meurs, 2001).

A possible direction for the interpretation is the hypothesis concerning the bringing together of non-economic factors (traditions, social norms, mentality, family-community relations) with the economic parameters (means of production, labour, expenses for supplies and realization and so on) and with the policies implemented in the decisions taken by the household as to how to use their own land.

The close bond of the Bulgarian villager with the land has been described and interpreted by a number of researchers⁵. The traditional identity of the farmer is formed by the relationship to the land as the basis of country life, as a means of livelihood, prosperity and the work horizon of the household; as a marker of community identity manifesting itself in the traditional rituals, cultural practices and interpersonal contacts.

Alienation from the land as a reaction to the broken link between ownership and disposal of the land, and also other negative processes during the Socialist period such as neglect of the village and the devaluation of agrarian labour, resulted in the diminished importance of the land as a household asset for income and employment, in the loss of motivation and the relationship with the land as a resource for entrepreneurial activity. Excluded from market turnover, the land (the farmyard, the garden around the village house) remained a resource for supporting the household, for survival and village affiliations and in this capacity it is an important marker of the traditional village identity: an identity that is maintained and made conceivable by the Bulgarian's world view, in the traditional culture, the ceremonial-ritual system, the practices of home life, and in work activities (Draganov, 1974: 115-116). Land is a structurally defining element of the villagers' social world and their life strategies, behavioural models, personal and family prosperity are constructed in relation to this world.

The restoration of genuine rights to the land and the market reforms after 1989 creates a potential for the rediscovery of the land value as a market asset and resource for entrepreneurial initiative and employment.

What problems are the landowners faced with in their search for a decision as to how to use the land?

Farmers articulate them in different ways: as defects or shortcomings in the regulations; as problems related to the application itself of certain regulations; as unlawful deeds that are not penalized; and as objective differences related to the size and location of the farms.

Shortcomings in the laws, conflicting interpretations and oversights on the part of the responsible bodies and commissions at local level, and the lack of effective control, create

4 According to Census of Farms and Agricultural Enterprises (2003), conducted by the National Statistical Institute and the World Bank.

5 Ivan Hadzhiiski, Dimitar Marinov, Mincho Draganov, Veska Kozuharova, Stanka Dobreva et al.

new tensions and non-legitimate inequalities. This undermines the potential for encouraging policies towards entrepreneurial behaviour.

The restitution of the land within real boundaries combined with lack of adequate rules of land consolidation and land lease relationships, has led to a number of problematic cases; these are the result of the difficulties in decision-making and of discouraging the entrepreneurial orientation of farms.

In the three regions where interviews were conducted, there has been a very perceptible rupture of the tie between the various relationships relevant to land ownership: possession, disposal and use. Violation of legitimacy as regards ownership rights and relationships has proved to be normal current practice in land use in nearly all the villages observed in the project network.

The interviewees emphasize the problems and criticize the inadequacy of the measures described in the programmes as part of the administrative tools for achieving the set goals for the development of agriculture. They do not feel that the state is protecting the interests of small agricultural producers as regards purchasing prices, guaranteed realization and markets, protection against cheap imports; they also indicate the complex and incomprehensible documentation and formal requirements; the lack of support for obtaining credit and problems with the provision of information.

Farmers expect the geographical differences, reinforced by specific socio-economic characteristics of localities, to be taken into account by the promotion of programmes they turn to. When they find this is not the case, their feeling of being in an unequal position undermines their efforts and willingness to expand their activity, and limits their agricultural initiative to mere sustenance farming. They withdraw from the market.

The data supports the thesis that expectations as regards the state and reliance on state support is part of the acquired (traditional) identity of the Bulgarian villager.

The choice of becoming an entrepreneur is a function of the socio-cultural environment. At the same time, entrepreneurial activity is an important factor in the formation and transformation of this environment. The correlation with modern signs of development – the market economy, liberal laws and policies, encounters two types of identity and the corresponding cultural models regarding the use of the land: the traditional identity of a patriarchal-dependent culture where emphasis is on survival and the strategies regarding the land remain within the narrow limits of self-sufficiency and what is essential; on the other hand a market-oriented culture with the horizon of development strategies where the tendency is towards optimized use of the resources and maximization of the benefits. In this sense, the preferences and orientations in the choice of the forms of economic realization are characteristics of the identity and are oriented towards their preservation or transformation.

The households that use their land in order to produce exclusively for the market act as entrepreneurs – they take risks in the environment that they strive to “adopt”, in order to react to the changes and to the profit by the possibilities and instruments that it offers. They talk confidently about prices, markets, expenses, programmes and credit possibilities. They organize their activities carefully and responsibly with a view to optimize them. They accept the obstacles and hardships as part of the environment. Even farmers who suffer a failure can be viewed as optimizers – they experiment and arrive at the con-

clusion that the market orientation does not work for them and for the moment, they focus on production for their own needs.

Another important point is connected with the significance of tradition and social capital. Generational continuity and family-community integration are crucial factors for realizing strategies oriented towards development. The respondents mention tradition as a resource, as a favourable condition. All the interviewees owning farms with a clear market orientation value tradition highly (*"They do what others did before them"*) as a factor for market orientation in two directions: a) as a motivation for the activity; attachment to the land and the animals; b) as a source of knowledge – skills, practical knowledge and experience, know-how and a "good nose". The kinship-family memory, acquired behaviour patterns and the relationship to the environment are a powerful aspect of the identification system. Examples: a household of descendents of the Bulgarian gardeners who were well-known in Europe at the beginning of the last century; households preserved the experience from farming with the piecework system under Socialism and "informal market orientation" of the individual auxiliary farms; households oriented towards and attached to the land on the strength of family traditions, handed down from father to son.

The respondents of all market-oriented households from the municipality of Pazardzhik, engaged in intensive farming (the cultivation of vegetables and flowers under glass), and also those from the municipality of Strelcha (rose-growing) mention the traditions in the area and in the families as a key factor, "a self-evident motive" for the decision as to how to use the land.

In the non-market-oriented households tradition also sustains the commitment to the land. This is a condition for limiting land abandonment, even when there is little return for the efforts made (*"We can't abandon the land, it's ours. We will find a way of looking after it, of cultivating something. We will work it, whatever happens"*).

The search for identity by means of self-examination and self-cognition in contacts with the family and close family circle (the family social capital) is of the same crucial importance for the assimilation of values, skills, and social commitment. Joint participation in activities by the generations is a successful strategy for the use of the land as an entrepreneurial resource, as a sphere of labour employment, personal and social realization, and for integration of the community.

Conclusion

Bringing the cultural problems back into the economic discourse of globalization and European enlargement (Kovacs, 2004: 11) leads us to emphasize the significance of cultural identity (acquired significances, attitudes and values on the one hand, and their being subject to (re)construction on the other) for economic behaviour (choice of activity, acceptance of risk, motivation for economic decisions and so on).

I have attempted to interpret the interviewees' opinions, attitudes and assessments regarding situations for decision-taking with a view to economic behaviour, where the choice made is provoked not just by a rational appraisal of the parameters of the economic environment, but to a certain degree is influenced by acquired cultural patterns relating to the state, institutions, partners, and competitors. Certain characteristics of the national

economic culture are projected as inherited patterns of behaviour, forming the attitudes and assessments of the economic actors. For example, established attitudes of expectation regarding the supportive role of the state. These show that the state as a protector and centre, which sets the horizon plans and action in a person's life, remains an important value in the spectrum of our national identity. On the other hand, this reinforces the thesis regarding the significance of traditions, social norms and values (as generational continuity and family-communal integration) in the realization of strategies oriented towards development.

Culture signifies a union, not an opposition or exclusion. In this sense, cultural identities are not mutually exclusive but have different acquired characteristics. Globalization as an extensive field of cross-cultural exchange provides opportunities for an enrichment of the cultures, and not just worries about the erosion of people's own cultural traditions. The challenge is rather to overcome the negative features of our own culture that have taken root within ourselves. Achieving this would help us to adapt us more successfully to present-day realities.

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**CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY – NEW REALITY OF
CORPORATE IDENTITY OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES**

Abstract

Corporate social responsibility is defined with the European document of 2006 (Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on CSR), in which corporate social responsibility is a concept by which companies integrate care for the community and environment into their business activities and their interdependence with other stakeholders on a voluntary basis. This definition implies that in order for business entities to be socially responsible they have to act over the existing legal framework to meet certain social requirements. By embracing the principles of corporate social responsibility, it is expected that business entities together with the other stakeholders would have an agreement on economic, social and environmental objectives.

The aim of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs of the EU is to create a business environment that will maintain the sustainable development of society as a whole and to presents an opportunity for promotion of initiatives for development of civil society. Corporate social responsibility is a complex phenomenon whose far-reaching implications contribute to the development of such a business environment.

The text will make a comprehensive analysis of European policy, which encourages the practice of corporate social responsibility in terms of social expectations, the expectations of consumers, investors, community and NGOs.

For competitive functioning of Macedonian companies on the European market, making a series of bureaucratic, financial and legal settings will not be enough. There is a need for building a corporate identity, or more specifically, improvement of one aspect that has been largely neglected, and this is promoting the aspect of corporate social responsibility that should target the socio-economic challenges and integrate them into the business practice. Building a corporate identity that is perceived mainly through the corporate brand or brands should consider the corporate communication, corporate image and corporate reputation. Corporate identity actually represents the reality and uniqueness of a company.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, corporate identity, companies, European market

Introduction

The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as defined by the European Commission is the subject of the paper, as a new reality for companies and high-level priority goal for every country in the EU and worldwide as well. More specifically, the authors give a comparative analysis between Republic of Macedonia as native country and Sweden, identified as the best positive leading example in CSR, based on the European Policies and other important documents considering the CSR trends, legislatives, conditions, initiatives and statistics.

European Policies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The European Commission defines CSR as: “A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”¹ Such a definition indicates that business entities should act beyond the defined legislative frames in order to satisfy certain social needs/requirements and be considered socially responsible. CSR basically suggests that the investors, the employees, the NGO-s, the local authorities, the society and the consumers should be able to assess the present and the future achievements and effects of the business entities on the economic, ecological, social and/or social sphere. By accepting the principles of corporate social responsibility, business entities along with the other stakeholders are expected to reach agreement regarding the economic, social and ecological objectives in defining their business strategies.

On European level, it all started on 10 January 1995, when 20 business leaders and Jacques Delors adopted and announced the European Business Declaration against Social Exclusion². In this Declaration, business organizations express their willingness to take part in the joint efforts to prevent and combat social exclusion. The declaration has three parts. In the first part of Declaration titled: “For business involvement in a joint effort against social exclusion”, the extent of exclusion and poverty within the European Union has been described in figures, like the existence of 17 million unemployed, 53 million living below the poverty line and between 3 and 5 million in inadequate housing. Different areas of exclusion have been noted as follows: in the fields of employment, housing, health care and education and also in access to certain services and the law. Different forms of exclusion as well: the districts and urban areas in crisis; marginalization of the long-term unemployed; the helplessness of young people with few qualifications; the persistence of barriers to the integration of migrants and minorities; the slide into poverty of over-indebted households; the rise in the number of homeless people.

The second part described is “Principles on an Overall Strategy Against Social Exclusion”. The main principles can be summarised as partnership and cooperation between the public, semi-public and private institutions and organisations at all the relevant levels in a fight against exclusion. Close interaction between economic and social policies; the

1 Commission Green Paper “Promoting European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility”, COM (2001)366 Final, 2001.

2 <http://www.csreurope.org/pages/en/declaration.html>

promotion of economic and social integration of the socially excluded and restoration of social links; action to prevent and combat social exclusion is essential to respect for human dignity and associated rights and responsibilities.

The third part is about: Areas for action by businesses. The areas are: Promoting integration on the labour market; Helping to improve vocational training; Avoiding exclusion within the business and minimizing redundancies or providing for appropriate measures where they are inevitable (*Vademecum*); Promoting the creation of new jobs and businesses; Contributing to social integration in particularly deprived areas and of particularly marginalized groups. As an annex this document contains Guidelines and Examples for Action by Businesses. It describes guidelines and possible courses of action which business may like to pursue.

Under the umbrella of the King Baudouin Foundation and with the support of the European Commission, the initial group of company signatories of the Declaration appoints Ann Vandenhende and Jan Noterdaeme to set up and coordinate the European Business Network for Social Cohesion (renamed CSR Europe in 2000).

The European initiatives directed towards enhancement of CSR can be conceived through the work programmes and the results from the Lisbon Summit (2000) at which the leaders set out the goal of making Europe the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world. This was followed by the Communication from the Commission of July 2002 (COM 2002) (347) in which the Commission recommends a strategy focused on the following fields:

- Enhancing of knowledge about CSR among representatives of the business community and society both in Europe and beyond, particularly in the developing countries;
- Development of a practice of exchange of experience and good CSR practices among the business entities;
- Development and promotion of managing skills related to CSR;
- Enhancing CSR among small and medium size enterprises;
- Facilitation of convergence and transparency of CSR practices and tools;
- Establishment of a Multi Stakeholder Forum on CSR at a European level;
- Integration of CSR in social policies.

The Multi-Stakeholder Forum was established in October 2002 and it released its final report in July 2004.

The communication of 2002 was written on the basis of public consultations arising from the Green Paper of the European Commission (2001) entitled “Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility” which opened an extensive debate about the concept of CSR and modes of establishing partnerships for the development of a European approach to CSR.

The Commission for CSR Policies published the new Communication on CSR (22 March 2006) entitled “Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on CSR”³. In this Communication, the Commission supports

3 Implementing Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of Excellence on CSR” (COM

the European Alliance on CSR whose aim is further promotion and encouragement for implementation of CSR. The Alliance represents a political umbrella for CSR for both medium and small-size enterprises. It is not a legal document that has to be signed by enterprises but represents a guideline for the resources and the capacities of the European enterprises and their stakeholders towards enhancing the interest in sustainable development, economic growth and creation of new jobs. It is stated that the enterprises are the main actors of CSR and that the stakeholders in the sectors **other than business** also play an important role.

An emphasis is put on the CSR potential to participate in the **sustainable development of the European growth and strategy for creation of new jobs**.

The Commission identifies eight fields for future promotion of CSR:

1. Raising of the awareness and exchange of good practices;
2. Support to the Multi Stakeholder Forum;
3. Cooperation with the member countries;
4. Informing the consumers and transparency;
5. Research;
6. Education;
7. Small and medium size enterprises;
8. International dimension of CSR.

These conclusions mark the beginning of the new phase of development of CSR of the European policy.

So far, CSR has been embedded in EU's employment and social affair policy, enterprise policy, environmental policy, consumer policy, public procurement policy and external relations policy.⁴

On the 25th October 2011, the European Commission launched its new Communication on CSR for the period 2011-2014⁵. The renewed Communication aims to strengthen EU global leadership on CSR by implementing an intensive Agenda for Action with around 30 proposals for CSR commitments. In the context of the **EU's Europe 2020 strategy, Enterprise 2020**⁶ highlights the contribution that businesses can make to achieve the EU goals for building a **smart, sustainable and inclusive economy** delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion by 2020.

Based on a shared vision of the **enterprise of the future**, Enterprise 2020 is a new reference initiative for companies committed to developing innovative business practices and working together with their stakeholders to provide solutions to emerging societal needs.

"Enterprise 2020" is there to act as an incubator and spin off for companies willing to innovate with peers and expert stakeholders on projects to produce tangible results and models that can be shared externally across industries.

(2006) 136 final)

4 Outlined in Strategy for sustainable development, adopted by European Union at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001 and charter for fundamental rights of the European Union proclaimed in Nice 2001.

5 The Communication can be downloaded from the European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemlongdetail.cfm?item_id=5511

6 <http://www.csreurope.org/data/files/enterprise2020/enterprise2020hr.pdf>

Collaborative ventures have been organised under four main thematic areas: Transforming markets; Inclusive societies; Health and Wellbeing; Transparency for trust.

Various European networks have been established to support the concept and practice of CSR, such as:

- The European Multi – stakeholder forum⁷. It brings together EU organizations of employers, business networks, trade unions and NGO in order to improve knowledge and practice between CSR and sustainable development;
- CSR Europe,⁸ a business network devoted to promoting CSR;
- The European Alliance for CSR.⁹ The European Alliance for Corporate Social Responsibility is an open partnership for enterprises to promote and encourage CSR. The Alliance was launched in 2006 as a joint initiative of the European Commission and the business community;
- Various networks have been established to promote business ethics like: European Business Ethics Network (EBEN)¹⁰, Social Venture Network Europe (SVN EUROPE)¹¹ or European Social Investment Forum (EUROSIF)¹²;

Cluster analysis by responsible competitiveness and national competitiveness

Clusters have become the focal point of many new policy initiatives in the last few years, in Europe as well as elsewhere around the globe. The challenge set out by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 to make Europe “the worlds most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy” in particular has sparked interest in new approaches to economic policy for competitiveness. Mobilizing the potential of clusters is seen as critical to reach this ambitious goal (Ketels, 2004).

Michael Porter (2001) defines clusters as geographically proximate groups of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities. Clusters are important, because they allow companies to be more productive and innovative than they could be in isolation.

While clusters are part of regional economies in countries across the globe and at all stages of economic development, there are indications that they might be particularly important for understanding and addressing the economic challenges that Europe is facing. Many Europeans are concerned that their prosperity, productivity, and innovation levels fail to keep pace with the United States and increasingly with competitors from other parts of the world like Asia. While the overall levels of skills, infrastructure, and institutional capacity in Europe seem to be on par or even better than elsewhere in the world, many researchers have identified rules and regulations that hamper flexibility, for example on the labour market, or reduce incentives, for example through high tax rates,

7 http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/csr%20ems%20forum.htm

8 <http://www.csreurope.org>

9 <http://www.csreurope.org/pages/en/alliance.html>

10 <http://www.eben-net.org/>

11 <http://www.svnnederland.nl/svneurope>

12 <http://www.eurosif.org/>

as potential reasons for the European performance gap. The recent work on clusters and competitiveness suggests that differences in regional specialization patterns across cluster categories could be an additional, potentially very powerful driver of this gap. Regional clusters enable companies to reach higher levels of productivity and be more innovative – this is what the available research indicates. If European regions suffer from weaker regional clusters and cluster portfolios than their peers elsewhere in the world, this might be an important factor keeping them behind in global competition. Comparing higher-ranking countries such as Belgium, Malaysia and Costa Rica with lower ranking countries like Paraguay, Pakistan and Mali has limited policy implications, as well as comparing them with other wide-angle lens international indexes like the Human Development Index and the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Indexes.

The analysis revealed a statistically-robust set of four clusters of countries, broadly distinguished by their stage of development. What these clusters show is that there can be no cookie-cutter approach to building responsible competitiveness. Countries need to design their own strategies, blending business action, policy drivers and social enablers in the most effective and appropriate combination for their stage of development. Nevertheless, some generalizations are possible for the four broad clusters of countries (figure 1):

- **Starters**: this cluster of lowest scorers is made up of 31 countries, or 29% of the total list. The largest countries to fall into this cluster include China, Bangladesh and the Russian Federation. Many of these countries have already signalled a commitment to responsibility through signing and ratifying international treaties, and other policy drivers, but are struggling to implement the basics, like workers’ health and safety and freedom to organize among businesses. The need for Starters to focus on these basic rights is strongly emphasized by Guy Ryder, General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation. These countries mainly are constrained in their focus on low-value and often low-quality exports and are a long way from moving up the value-chain or developing global brands.
- **Compliers** (Republic of Macedonia): India is unusual in being a low-income economy, while the other 32 Compliers are classified as middle-income countries. Other large countries in the Compliers cluster are Brazil, Turkey and Mexico. The Compliers account for as much as USD 1 trillion of global trade. Compliers focus on demonstrating progress on meeting international quality, labour and environmental standards, and so are building their capacity to capture market share in the global supply chains of more quality-conscious brands and consumers. Domestic civil society is not a significant driver for compliers.
- **Asserters**: this cluster is made up of 24 countries, just under a quarter of the total list. Countries asserting their responsibility credentials range from Spain and Italy to the United Arab Emirates. Asserters are countries moving from the back foot to the front foot, seizing opportunities in responsible competitiveness. Some of them, like Chile and South Africa, are actively engaged in developing and promoting international standards that will provide them with a competitive advantage. Some Asserters are building national brands associated with responsible business and government practices to attract foreign direct investment and promote a first generation of global product and corporate

brands. For many Asserters, a vibrant civil society environment – challenging business but ready to collaborate in finding solutions – is a critical element in advancing the broader national project.

- **Innovators** (Sweden): this cluster of highest scorers is made up of 20 countries and the list is dominated by Europe, followed by other OECD countries. Innovators are working to embed responsibility into the core of their domestic economies, stewarded by relatively well enforced statutory regulation, well-designed corporate responsibility strategies, reinforced in most instances by strong NGOs, media watchdogs and consumers demanding responsible new products. Beyond this, knowledge-based innovation provides the leading edge of all of these economies. Sustained innovation in the context of scarce and highly mobile talent requires flexible working conditions and dynamic, trusted public as well as private institutions. It also demands attention to detail, cascading responsibility into SMEs and overseas investments as well as large domestic firms. For Innovators, responsibility competitiveness is no longer an add-on, but the heart of the economic model.

CSR: Macedonian case

The interest in the CSR concept in Republic of Macedonia is growing. In December 2004, the UN Global Compact in Macedonia was launched. The membership in the Global Compact Network is increasing. By the end of May 2006, the number of Macedonian companies - members of GC has increased to 47. On May 25 and on November 30, 2005, Conferences on Corporate Social Responsibility supported by UNDP and USAID project were held. In the mean time, journalists were trained in the CSR concept. At the initiative of several NGO-s, separate investigations about the CSR were performed among business entities in Macedonia. A number of initiatives in the CSR sphere were also separately taken by the economic chambers. Although there has been an increase of activities in the field of CSR, there still remains the need of a holistic frame that will be a guideline and an initiator of the activities in the CSR domain. The results of the recent research¹³ showed that those business entities who say that the term CSR is completely unknown to them account for 24,35% of the respondents, while 48,45% said that the term is known by them, i.e. that they have heard of it but cannot define it. 29,9% of the respondents completely knew what the term means. This investigation represents part of the activities of UNDP towards enhancing CSR aimed at definition of the level of knowledge on CSR and providing recommendations for further activities.

According to the findings of the research and the results of the SWOT analysis of CSR development in Macedonia, the National Agenda on Corporate Social Responsibility for the Republic of Macedonia 2008-2012 was prepared and published¹⁴ and the vision, objectives and priority measures have been established:

13 Conducted by Mirjana Borota Popovska, Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research – Skopje, and commissioned by UNDP, 2006.

14 By the national coordinating body on CSR in 2008.

Vision:

Promoting sustainable business growth that encourages social inclusion and prevents environmental degradation.

Main objectives and measures:

1. Raising awareness on CSR
 - ✓ *Public campaigns on CSR*
 - ✓ *Research on CSR*
 - ✓ *Stimulating cooperation and dialogue*
 - ✓ *Creating databases in the field of CSR*
 - ✓ *Providing CSR training and education*
2. Developing the capacities and competences to help mainstream CSR
 - ✓ *Training and exchange of experience*
 - ✓ *Developing CSR performance management*
 - ✓ *Improving corporate governance*
3. Ensuring an enabling environment for CSR
 - ✓ *Creating CSR incentives*
 - ✓ *Creating legal obligations for CSR*
 - ✓ *CSR disclosure*

Still, the truth is that there is a need for greater effort and proactive approach from each possible side: the governmental bodies, business associations, labour unions, companies, academic society, media and NGOs in implementation of these measures and activities that will promote the CSR concept in Macedonia.

CSR: Sweden as a positive example

Sweden is doing more than most, and has been doing so for some time. Back in 2007, in the final State of Responsibility Competitiveness report by international non-profit organization AccountAbility,¹⁵ Sweden topped the Responsible Competitiveness Index. The index was based on a range of parameters covering climate, working environment, corruption and social issues among companies in 108 countries.

AccountAbility's Responsible Competitiveness Index (RCI) ranks Sweden as the country that is doing most to advance its business competitiveness through responsible business practices, ahead of Denmark, Finland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. In other words, Swedes know how to do business while taking climate change, gender, human rights and anticorruption into account.

Responsible Competitiveness's findings are based on a wealth of sector and issue-specific cases from Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Europe and South Africa, two new innovative country-level indices, and findings emerging from a Global Policy Dialogue on Responsible Competitiveness conducted over two years in association with the UN Global Compact and partners from Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America.

¹⁵ Institute of social and ethical accountability - Copenhagen

The RCI is an innovative, country-level index that provides metrics and methodology for exploring the relationship between corporate responsibility and competitiveness, and includes the National Corporate Responsibility Index (NCRI) that measures the national state of corporate responsibility covering 80 countries across five continents. Responsible Competitiveness predicts that governments worldwide, as well as businesses, will increasingly build responsibility issues into their strategies to develop and maintain their national competitiveness.

Responsible competitiveness is about making sustainable development count in global markets. It means markets that reward business practices which deliver improved social, environmental and economic outcomes; and it means economic success for nations that encourage such business practices through public policies, societal norms and citizen actions.

There is a significant correlation between the competitiveness of a country and its corporate responsibility level. This might indicate that (AccountAbility, 2005):

- Competitiveness gains in a country may not be sustainable unless underpinned by responsible business practices. That is, consistent growth in competitiveness depends on a greater responsibility of the society as a whole, business, government and civil society.
- Corporate responsibility can fuel country competitiveness. This possibility, the heart of the Responsible Competitiveness proposition, seems to get some support from the data.

The results (figures 2, 3) verify in short, that Sweden is on top on current world trends, maintaining a sustainable economic growth based on business practices that achieve economic development without significant damage to the environment, taking stakeholders into account and working together with civil society to achieve these objectives.

Sweden leads as best example in:

- ***Women's Empowerment***

The World Economic Forum has developed a benchmarking system to measure the size of the gender gap in various countries according to the level of advancement of the female population. It includes 58 countries (30 OECD countries & 28 other emerging markets) and measures the extent to which women have achieved full equality with men in five areas: economic participation; economic opportunity; political empowerment; educational attainment; health and wellbeing. The top ten countries were (1st to 10th): Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Canada, UK, Germany, and Australia (AccountAbility, 2005). Sweden is the most progressive country worldwide, in part due to an equal number of men and women in parliamentary and ministerial positions, a long-history of women at the ballot box, high female labour force participation rates and generous maternity leave (AccountAbility, 2007).

- ***Environmental management***

Sweden stands out in first place of the ranking, obtaining a score of 2.7, a full 0.9 above the second-placed score. This points towards a great efficiency in the applica-

tion of environmental programmes and a remarkable example of interaction between the regulatory environment and business practice (AccountAbility, 2005).

- ***Low carbon economy***

Another important report considering Sweden is the Climate Competitiveness Index 2010, which identifies good practices in countries around the world in the low carbon economy.

- ***Compulsory reports***

Sweden was also the first country to demand sustainability reports from state-owned enterprises. The reports have to comply with guidelines from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI seeks to uphold global standards in sustainability reporting and make it easier to assess and compare companies from social, environmental and economic perspectives. A survey has shown that compulsory sustainability reporting has raised awareness among companies and led to greater sustainability efforts.

Figure 1. Countries in each cluster

Starters	Compliers	Asserters	Innovators
Angola	Albania	Botswana	Australia
Bangladesh	Argentina	Chile	Austria
Benin	Brazil	Costa Rica	Belgium
Bolivia	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Canada
Burkina Faso	Colombia	Estonia	Denmark
Cambodia	Croatia	Greece	Finland
Cameroon	Dominican Republic	Hungary	France
Chad	Egypt	Israel	Germany
China	El Salvador	Italy	Hong Kong, China
Ecuador	Georgia	Jamaica	Iceland
Ethiopia	Guatemala	Korea, Rep.	Ireland
Gambia, The	Honduras	Kuwait	Japan
Kenya	India	Latvia	Netherlands
Kyrgyz Republic	Indonesia	Lithuania	New Zealand
Madagascar	Jordan	Malaysia	Norway
Malawi	Kazakhstan	Mauritius	Singapore
Mali	Lesotho	Portugal	Sweden
Mauritania	Macedonia, FYR	Slovak Republic	Switzerland
Mongolia	Mexico	Slovenia	United Kingdom
Morocco	Moldova	South Africa	United States
Mozambique	Namibia	Spain	
Nepal	Nicaragua	Taiwan, China	
Nigeria	Panama	Thailand	
Pakistan	Peru	United Arab Emirates	
Paraguay	Philippines		
Russian Federation	Poland		
Tanzania	Romania		
Uganda	Sri Lanka		
Ukraine	Trinidad and Tobago		
Zambia	Tunisia		
Zimbabwe	Turkey		
	Uruguay		
	Venezuela, RB		

Source: AccountAbility (2007) *The state of responsible competitiveness: making sustainable development count in global markets.*

Figure 2. National Corporate Responsibility Index 2005

	National Corporate Responsibility Index - NCRI - 2005	Internal dimension:	External dimension: Civil society context	Environmental management
1 Sweden	73.5	1.85	1.30	2.68
2 Finland	72.2	2.12	1.35	1.82
3 Switzerland	70.7	1.51	1.46	1.80
4 Denmark	70.7	1.91	1.43	1.39
5 United Kingdom	69.0	1.96	0.99	1.34
6 Netherlands	68.3	1.53	1.16	1.33
7 New Zealand	68.2	1.98	1.28	0.62
8 Australia	68.1	1.78	1.16	0.97
9 Germany	68.0	1.51	1.01	1.45
10 Estonia	67.8	0.85	1.14	1.92
11 United States	67.5	1.80	1.16	0.72
12 Norway	67.3	1.42	1.17	1.04
13 Canada	67.1	1.63	1.09	0.88
14 Austria	66.7	1.17	1.14	1.17
15 Belgium	66.7	1.39	1.23	0.80
16 Ireland	66.6	1.20	1.14	1.09
17 France	65.3	0.97	1.00	1.06
18 Japan	65.2	0.69	1.06	1.27
19 Slovenia	64.6	0.19	1.21	1.40
20 Israel	62.0	0.91	0.61	0.47
21 Spain	61.9	0.13	0.70	1.20
22 South Africa	61.4	1.08	0.29	0.49
23 Lithuania	60.5	0.06	0.70	0.73
24 Hungary	60.3	-0.07	0.05	1.71
25 Slovak Republic	59.8	0.22	0.27	0.89
26 Czech Republic	59.5	-0.47	0.46	1.32
27 Portugal	59.1	0.26	0.43	0.37
28 Korea	58.6	-0.06	0.70	0.17
29 Chile	58.3	0.48	0.42	-0.14
30 Malaysia	58.1	0.91	-0.50	0.56
31 Costa Rica	57.5	0.13	0.38	0.02
32 Thailand	57.5	0.34	0.21	0.01
33 Greece	57.4	-0.27	0.47	0.28
34 Latvia	57.2	0.08	0.55	-0.29
35 Italy	56.9	-0.60	0.53	0.41
36 Mauritius	56.7	-0.13	0.57	-0.27
37 Brazil	56.4	0.08	0.01	0.16
38 United Arab Emirates	55.6	0.18	-0.72	0.79
39 Poland	54.7	-0.67	0.14	0.19
40 Bulgaria	54.6	-0.49	0.34	-0.30
41 Namibia	54.5	0.41	-0.25	-0.53

	National Corporate Responsibility Index - NCRI - 2005	Internal dimension:	External dimension: Civil society context	Environmental management
42 Philippines	54.1	0.18	-0.14	-0.56
43 India	54.0	-0.17	-0.06	-0.32
44 Jamaica	53.9	0.24	-0.15	-0.70
45 Botswana	53.7	0.12	-0.18	-0.58
46 Trinidad & Tobago	53.7	0.08	-0.32	-0.37
47 Panama	53.6	-0.27	0.09	-0.55
48 Egypt	53.6	0.08	-0.35	-0.36
49 Jordan	53.5	0.14	-0.86	0.26
50 Romania	53.2	-0.55	-0.14	-0.09
51 Uruguay	53.1	-0.81	0.25	-0.36
52 Sri Lanka	52.5	0.06	-0.37	-0.72
53 Mexico	52.4	-0.67	-0.10	-0.31
54 Croatia	52.3	-0.66	-0.19	-0.21
55 Tunisia	52.2	0.22	-1.08	-0.02
56 Colombia	52.0	-0.45	-0.44	-0.24
57 Kenya	51.2	-0.22	-0.16	-1.15
58 Argentina	50.9	-0.78	-0.25	-0.50
59 Ukraine	50.4	-0.75	-0.46	-0.44
60 Morocco	50.3	-0.04	-0.78	-0.83
61 Peru	50.2	-0.67	-0.24	-0.90
62 Indonesia	49.8	-0.64	-0.60	-0.58
63 Dominican Republic	49.5	-0.93	-0.11	-1.07
64 Turkey	49.1	-0.70	-0.24	-1.28
65 Uganda	48.9	-0.67	-0.84	-0.56
66 China	48.8	-0.35	-1.31	-0.28
67 Nigeria	48.8	-0.56	-0.50	-1.19
68 Zambia	48.6	-0.36	-0.65	-1.27
69 Macedonia, fyr	48.3	-0.43	-0.52	-1.47
70 Russian Federation	48.3	-0.66	-0.83	-0.80
71 Malawi	47.4	-0.68	-0.87	-1.07
72 Honduras	46.4	-1.23	-0.88	-0.77
73 Venezuela	46.4	-0.99	-1.01	-0.89
74 Paraguay	45.9	-1.54	-0.59	-1.03
75 Ecuador	45.5	-1.22	-1.05	-0.89
76 Zimbabwe	45.0	-0.20	-1.70	-1.29
77 Bangladesh	44.9	-1.65	-0.79	-0.98
78 Guatemala	44.9	-1.42	-0.81	-1.24
79 Vietnam	44.8	-0.70	-1.70	-0.85
80 Bolivia	44.2	-1.80	-1.04	-0.73
81 Bosnia & Hercegovina	43.4	-1.22	-1.08	-1.62
82 Algeria	41.0	-1.36	-1.76	-1.39
83 Pakistan	39.2	-1.80	-1.69	-1.67

Source: AccountAbility (2005) *Responsible Competitiveness: Reshaping Global Markets Through Responsible Business Practices*.

Figure 3. Responsible Competitiveness Index 2007

RCI Ranking 2007	Country	Country Abbreviations	Responsible Competitiveness Index 2007	Policy Drivers	Business Action	Social Enablers
1	Sweden	SWE	81.5	86.0	90.2	74.7
2	Denmark	DNK	81.0	89.9	86.9	76.6
3	Finland	FIN	78.8	83.9	84.1	76.7
4	Iceland	ISL	76.7	83.5	74.9	86.3
5	United Kingdom	GBR	75.8	88.8	75.9	76.6
6	Norway	NOR	75.5	83.8	77.3	75.9
7	New Zealand	NZL	74.9	88.6	72.2	80.0
8	Ireland	IRL	74.6	85.0	73.8	78.1
9	Australia	AUS	73.0	82.7	73.6	73.3
10	Canada	CAN	73.0	83.7	72.5	74.8
11	Germany	DEU	72.7	81.8	74.8	70.1
12	Netherlands	NLD	72.6	81.6	75.0	69.5
13	Switzerland	CHE	72.5	87.8	74.5	65.7
14	Belgium	BEL	71.9	86.1	70.1	73.0
15	Singapore	SIN	71.3	83.7	74.4	63.5
16	Austria	AUT	70.9	84.1	71.6	67.2
17	France	FRA	70.1	76.9	69.2	73.6
18	United States	USA	69.6	72.6	72.1	68.6
19	Japan	JPN	68.8	80.7	68.9	65.7
20	Hong Kong, China	HKG	68.3	84.5	68.9	60.6
21	Portugal	PRT	65.9	79.2	63.1	65.7
22	Estonia	EST	65.0	73.5	67.4	73.0
23	Slovenia	SVN	64.1	76.0	61.3	63.7
24	Chile	CHL	64.0	80.3	65.4	67.9
25	Malaysia	MYS	63.7	82.3	68.4	59.2
26	Spain	ESP	63.7	73.3	61.4	63.3
27	Korea, Rep	KOR	63.0	69.3	62.8	60.7
28	South Africa	ZAF	62.5	75.8	66.9	61.3
29	United Arab Emirates	UAE	62.4	75.1	63.6	52.1
30	Lithuania	LTU	62.1	78.7	64.0	63.6

RCI Ranking 2007	Country	Country Abbreviations	Responsible Competitiveness Index 2007	Policy Drivers	Business Action	Social Enablers
31	Israel	ISR	61.6	76.9	63.1	64.2
32	Italy	ITA	61.2	76.0	55.8	61.6
33	Greece	GRC	61.0	72.9	61.1	52.6
34	Taiwan, China	TAI	60.7	68.8	62.5	67.5
35	Latvia	LVA	60.3	77.6	61.0	62.1
36	Costa Rica	CRI	60.2	78.8	64.2	54.8
37	Thailand	THA	60.0	76.3	65.3	53.5
38	Jamaica	JAM	59.8	77.0	64.9	52.8
39	Czech Republic	CZE	59.7	78.0	61.1	59.1
40	Mauritius	MUS	59.3	79.4	58.0	62.7
41	Botswana	BWA	59.3	82.0	57.5	61.8
42	Kuwait	KWT	58.7	74.1	61.6	56.5
43	Slovak Republic	SVK	58.2	77.9	59.0	57.0
44	Hungary	HUN	57.7	79.9	57.8	55.9
45	Peru	PER	56.8	70.3	60.7	52.8
46	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	56.7	76.6	57.4	54.4
47	Namibia	NAM	56.4	77.6	55.5	56.1
48	Indonesia	IDN	56.1	72.5	59.0	51.3
49	El Salvador	SLV	55.9	77.8	55.7	53.5
50	Jordan	JOR	55.7	74.9	57.9	50.3
51	Turkey	TUR	55.6	72.4	56.9	53.6
52	Uruguay	URY	55.6	75.5	52.7	59.8
53	Croatia	HRV	55.5	73.1	58.0	50.6
54	Poland	POL	55.4	74.7	53.6	57.8
55	Colombia	COL	55.1	77.4	56.0	49.9
56	Brazil	BRA	55.0	72.3	56.4	52.3
57	Mexico	MEX	54.8	70.5	57.6	50.1
58	Romania	ROM	54.6	68.1	54.9	56.4
59	Bulgaria	BGR	54.4	70.4	51.3	60.9
60	Tunisia	TUN	54.3	79.4	60.6	35.8

RCI Ranking 2007	Country	Country Abbreviations	Responsible Competitiveness Index 2007	Policy Drivers	Business Action	Social Enablers
61	Philippines	PHL	54.0	74.5	60.9	37.3
62	Panama	PAN	53.9	70.1	55.2	51.1
63	Georgia	GEO	53.4	80.0	53.4	45.8
64	Moldova	MDA	53.3	69.7	55.2	48.9
65	Macedonia, FYR	MKD	53.1	70.2	54.6	49.0
66	Argentina	ARG	53.1	69.8	52.1	54.0
67	Egypt	EGY	52.6	69.5	58.3	39.9
68	Sri Lanka	LKA	52.4	76.9	54.9	40.6
69	Dominican Republic	DOM	52.4	70.9	51.2	52.0
70	India	IND	52.2	67.4	64.0	52.5
71	Lesotho	LSO	52.1	78.6	51.8	44.2
72	Guatemala	GTM	52.0	75.1	53.1	43.3
73	Kazakhstan	KAZ	50.8	64.8	55.0	41.7
74	Albania	ALB	50.4	73.2	53.1	37.8
75	Honduras	HND	49.9	72.1	51.1	40.4
76	Venezuela, RB	VEN	49.8	64.1	53.5	41.1
77	Nicaragua	NIC	49.5	73.5	47.4	45.1
78	Zambia	ZMB	49.0	80.4	58.4	40.5
79	Ecuador	ECU	49.0	72.3	49.0	40.5
80	Uganda	UGA	48.1	85.2	52.2	45.6
81	Nigeria	NGA	48.0	76.3	56.3	43.6
82	Kenya	KEN	48.0	78.5	55.0	44.3
83	Russian Federation	RUS	48.0	61.7	51.9	38.0
84	Bolivia	BOL	47.5	63.1	47.9	42.6
85	Cameroon	CMR	47.4	69.3	46.0	41.5
86	Paraguay	PRY	47.3	70.0	42.1	48.4
87	China	CHN	47.2	64.2	50.4	35.9
88	Zimbabwe	ZWE	47.2	66.1	60.1	39.5
89	Mali	MLI	47.2	74.4	50.4	52.9
90	Tanzania	TZA	47.1	72.5	55.5	43.8

Source: AccountAbility (2007) *The state of responsible competitiveness: making sustainable development count in global markets.*

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THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

Regional economic integration is an agreement on cooperation in the economic sphere between two or more states. When we say economic cooperation activities, we mean all forms of economic activities and ways that the member countries can achieve. Lately in the framework of this cooperation there is an expansion and deepening of a large number of shapes and economic activities. Within these economic activities we distinguish the following: the trade of member countries, the flow of foreign direct investments, services in various fields, the system of standards and intellectual property standards, giving and receiving credit, franchising, licensing, harmonization of trade policies, tax harmonization, strategic alliances and joint ventures, the harmonization of legislative policy, international rules, etc.

The Regional economic integration is organized at different levels. Each level is distinguished from each other, the level of the highest ranking includes something more than the previous one. In general term, these regional economic integration levels are known as: free trade area, customs union, the common market, economic union and political union. The main reasons why countries are grouped in the REI are two: economic nature and political nature.

Liberalization of international trade and development is one of the main determinants of globalization. Almost all economists agree that the economic growth of countries depends on opening of their national economy to the global economy.

Key words: Regional economic integration, free trade area, customs union, the common market, economic union and political union.

Globalization – irreversible social process

The definition of globalization is given by a large number of authors. In essence, almost all define globalization as the major transformation or change of social-economic development. Some authors compare globalization with a fast train that travels quickly through the stations of the world. Each nation must build its platform in order to join that train. Other authors symbolize globalization with the mist that moves in the open sky, but when colliding with one other it causes thunder and lightning. The comparison of globalization with fire is very interesting and meaningful. That is, if we are careful with fire, the benefits from it can be major such as cooking, use for residential space heating, and many other cases, however, if we are not careful, it might lead to damaging or destroying homes, buildings, neighborhoods and even entire cities.

Modern economy and society in general suffers more and more from transformation. Transformations are diverse, but few are distinct, such as the increase in international trade, capital markets development, expansion of multinational corporations, the development of information and communication technology, increased interdependence among countries and the increase of efficiency and productivity, which are elements of a process that is called globalization. The goal of globalization is the integration of world countries in a community. This community intends to "shrink the world" or blur the borders of countries to liberalize and develop international trade between countries, to advance international financial institutions so that people could communicate and collaborate with a greater efficiency.

The basis of the globalization theory is based on neoliberalism, which means it is a dynamic process of society in which the main purpose is the international trade liberalization of goods and services. Economic globalization is distinguished for the operation of multinational corporations free outside national borders, while the main goal is to maximize profit. In the global society there is a special place for great concentration and centralization of financial capital. The results achieved are above all, the development of science and technology, particularly in the field of information and communication technology.

In terms of globalization, many economic theories and thoughts arise, most of which support it, but then there are those who criticize it. A number of authors discuss the enthusiasm for globalization. They see globalization as a way of developing a future full of hope and worldwide prospect, but there are others with concern and skepticism about the future of the world. In general, two categories of theories dominate. The first is the skeptical category, while the second category represents the group of theorists known as optimists. The opinions of these two parties are contradictory to each other.

From the research studied on this issue, we can say that globalization has its advantages and its disadvantages. The denial of the developed achievements in globalization does not reflect reality. Reality would be incomplete if it bypassed and marginalized issues and concerns that rightfully pointed out the skeptics. Both sides, skeptics and optimists, are wrong when defending their opinions and theories to the fullest. The process of globalization should be studied on the basis of a scientific, realistic and objective point of view. It should be illuminated and observed from all angles, pointing out the positive and negative aspects. Any determination and imposition of thought to others can easily be turned into an ideology. If a country could manage and administer this process to the fullest, the potential benefits are enormous. The process of globalization is certainly not a perfect system. It has weaknesses and shortcomings of its own. The fact of the occurrence of crises from time to time informs us that the company must correct the defects. Gateway is required in more areas such as better management of international finance, reform of international financial institutions and better governance of the same.

Meaning and importance of regional economic integration

Definition of regional economic integration (IER)

Regional economic integration is an agreement for cooperation in the economic sphere between two or more states. When we say economic cooperation activities, we mean all forms of economic activities and ways that the member countries can achieve. Lately in the framework of this cooperation there is an expansion and deepening of a large number of shapes and economic activities. Within these economic activities we distinguish the following: the trade of member countries, the inflow and outflow of foreign direct investment, services in various fields, the system of standards and intellectual property standards, giving and receiving credit, franchising, licensing, harmonization of trade policies, tax harmonization, strategic alliances and joint ventures, the harmonization of legislative policy, international rules, etc.

IER member countries base their cooperation in reaching agreements that can later be signed. These agreements promote economic cooperation by eliminating or reducing many barriers, non-customs and customs. Usually these places are places that belong to a narrow geographical area. The main purpose of these agreements is to facilitate cooperation between them and to achieve a higher level of economic development.

The main activity of IER member countries during the economic cooperation is undoubtedly international trades. Trade has always been one of the main levers of economic growth rate, so the right areas and their development are given priority and special importance.

Regarding the issue of whether regional integration helps or harms the process of globalization, there are various dilemmas and opinions among economists. One side defends the thesis that regional economic integration is against the process of globalization, because the states that become members of a regional integration are not closed to other member countries. This according to them harms global integration. The other side believes that regional integration and global integration, even regional development is a broader model that has positive impact on global trade. Regional integration, according to them, is the first phase of global integration meaning that it should be performed after the first stage of regional integration, following the second phase, which allows countries to integrate into global economy. This last finding can be confirmed by the fact that half of the IER countries are not strictly regionally integrated, but their boundaries exceed regional boundaries.

Appearance and development of IER

Economic integration in the world is not a new phenomenon, rather it has appeared since ancient times. Development of regional economic integration is done in different periods with different intensities of development. We can trace its origins in ancient times, but the first integration of real economic integration was the German Customs Union or otherwise known as the Zollverein, founded in 1818. From this time onwards economic integration not only represents an economic phenomenon and a phenomenon which occurs worldwide, but it has become an ongoing process and crucial to the development

of national economies. In modern economy there is almost no country in the world not interested in any economic integration, whether on regional or global level.

Goals and functions of integrations are in the economic and political nature. The main purpose of economic goals is to foster economic development by member states customs barriers in trade exchange.

Certainly the forms of economic cooperation among members of regional economic integration in the past have been more limited, and today this cooperation is much broader and with a deeper intensity. The beginning of the twentieth century intensified the economic cooperation of member countries and increased even more the number of economic integrations. Attempts and efforts to integrate European countries in a common integration were intensified, especially in the inter-war period.

The main enlargement of IER has been occurred in the second half of the 20th century. After World War II this situation changed radically. This was noticed especially in the countries of the old continent, Europe, whose unity was interested and encouraged by the U.S. The Marshall Plan required from the Europeans to think and act for the unity and development of Europe on their own. In 1960's, a large number of colonized countries gained independence and also increased interest in regional integration and cooperation on the African continent and East Asia. The following two decades, economic integrations concentrated on integrations based on ideology. Thus in the first group were the capitalist countries, mostly developed countries with economies led by the United States. The second group included the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union, while the third group involved the independent countries or third world countries.

The year 1957 was called the year of global economic revolution, because in this year in Rome, Italy was signed the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Later on, the Soviet Union established another integration called Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - which consists of the socialist countries. The establishment of EFTA during these years was the reaction of other European countries led by Britain, who were not members of the EEA.

The last years of this century were called "years of integration", because this was the period when almost all countries had aspirations to become members of any economic integration. The desire and ambition to join the countries in a regional economic integration spread to all meridians of the world. Nowadays, the number of regional economic integrations has increased to approximately 300 and represents a huge increase when compared to 70, which was in 1990. Almost all WTO member countries at the same time are members of one or more IER. The large number of regional economic integrations does not mean that all functions are always successful. Some of them haven't done anything special, while others have achieved greater success, and then there are also those who do not function at all. Integrations that have shown the most success are undoubtedly the European Union, NAFTA in the continent of North America, Mercosur Andean Pact, the FTAA in South America, ASEAN and APEC in the Far East, the Arab League in the Middle East, OPEC, ECOWAS, etc.

Reasons and conditions of establishing regional economic integration

The interest and determination to join the IER countries, as noted above, was big in the past, but it is especially great now. The reasons are numerous, but certainly all of the primary targets are economic growth and improving welfare. All reasons for countries' membership in regional economic integration can be grouped in be in charge of impersonating two main groups:

1. Reasons from economic nature and
2. Causes from a political nature

Economic reasons

a. Liberalization of trade

Countries that have joined the IER are more efficient, faster and safer in reducing trade barriers. One of the most important forms of realizing this development was by liberalizing trade among members. Such ideas and similar thoughts were supported long ago by the founder of the theory of international trade, Adam Smith, known as "the theory of absolute advantage." The core of all international trade theories is that international trade is in favor of economic development of all countries involved in international trade. International specialization and division of labor increased the total amount of production worldwide, and also the welfare of the population. Such thoughts and concepts are inconsistent with the theory of D. Hume, who said that international trade is a game with zero results. According to this, international trade is a game with a positive result, where the participating countries prevail (win-win theory). So, countries with open economies have larger market for their products and services regardless of their size, while countries with closed economies, have smaller market and also lower productivity.

b. Penetration of foreign direct investment

Apart in international trade, the FDI is present in more member countries within regional economic integration than in non-member countries. Investor as usually gives priority to the members of IER, for their FDI. In order to benefit from their common condition and similities. Benefits of FDI are numerous for the host country, as well as for the source or host country. Suffice it to mention the effects on the distribution of resources, capital, employment, the effects on management, balance of payments, strengthened competition, etc.

c. Easier harmonization of rules, culture and ideology within a region on a global level

Regional economic integration has advantages in comparison with global economic integration. This integration, in its context has a number of smaller member states. Smaller number of members in regional integration facilitates the alignment of ideologies, systems (political, economic, legal, cultural), and integration rules compared to global proportions. Of course, countries that become members of an economic integration gain advantages and privileges in relation to other states that are not members. It is well known that some expenditure of the members of IER it depends on the implementation of the decisions that are made by IER. The higher the level of integration, the higher is the dependence

of the country members of the integration. Usually less developed countries have higher expenditures than developed countries.

Reasons from political nature

a. The deepening of political cooperation among member countries

There are also some political reasons for countries becoming members of regional economic integration, including these: political cooperation promotes economic cooperation, avoidance of interstate disputes and eventual integration of several states in a union has weight, but has greater weight in the political arena, economic and international. It is only natural that countries that develop cooperation in the economic fields to have high cooperation in the political field. On the contrary, if states do not develop economic cooperation among themselves, then they lead a governing policy of protectionism and isolationism.

b. Avoidance of political conflict

Countries that are part of the economic integration usually resolve their potential disputes with agreements and regulations that are approved by their institutions. This approach gives a chance for tolerance, negotiation and doesn't allow them to expand and turn into military conflicts. In the past, often with countries that are not members of an economic integration, economic disputes have easily turned into interstate conflicts.

c. The role and greater weight in the global economy

The role and weight of the regional economic integration is to be the largest global economy and politics as opposed to a state, no matter how big it may be. The decision of the EU in global economic and political arenas worldwide changes and has a greater weight than the decisions made by countries individually. This was clear to European countries over time, so the formation and expansion throughout the continent is one of the main goals of EU. Regional economic integration has advantages in comparison with global economic integration. This integration, in its context has a number of smaller member states. Smaller number of members in regional integration facilitates the alignment of ideologies, systems (political, economic, legal, cultural), and rules in comparison to global integrations.

Completion of the preliminary conditions for membership in the IER

The countries which apply for membership of a regional economic integration have to meet certain conditions such as: the desire for membership, geographic proximity, identical trade policy, to take responsibilities and obligations for integration and approximately have the same level of economic development.

The potential country for membership in the economic integration should first have the desire to become a member of integration. If the country has no desire to do so, it is futile to meet all other conditions. The country should also belong to a close geographical area. Geographical proximity makes it easier for the country to use the advantages and privileges that are possible in such cases. A country who wants to be in the economic integration should have a trade policy which is identical or substantially the same as

other member countries. It would not be logical for the country to enforce trade policy that differs from other countries because they will face different problems, for example, a country that has protectionist trade policy could not cooperate well with countries that implement liberal trade policy.

Another important condition that must be completed before the country joins a regional economic integration is fulfilling the obligations and responsibilities arising from its regional economic integration. So, the members must obey the rules and be accountable for all obligations that a member country is expected to realize. The last condition, but not less important is the same level of economic development of the country. If the country is distinguished more by the level of economic development with other member countries, then the consequences for it are extremely negative.

Why some do not want the formation of IER?

Even though most of the world displays the desire and interest to be integrated into regional economic integration, there still exists a percentage of the population that is suspicious and have reserves for their country's integration in these associations. Among the main barriers to join the economic integration two more important ones are distinguished:

- The benefit from the integration of one party, causes losses for the other parties;
- Concern for national sovereignty.

Recently workers of the European Union member countries are concerned about the displacement of companies from their countries in other integration. The power of free labor in other countries creates the risk of losing their workplaces in their home country, so labor unions organize protests and strikes against moving companies. This is one of the negative consequences of regional integration where workers fear. If, for example a Macedonian company produces shoes and cannot afford the market competition (the market is composed of producers and sellers of foreign companies), then the shoe manufacturer in Macedonia will be against regional economic integration.

Another concern that comes from economic integration is the loss of national sovereignty. It is present, especially, for the peoples of small countries. Large companies autonomously make decisions that cannot be in harmony with the host country's economic policy. Also, the integration members must implement rules and principles, that are harmonized to the level of IER. Depending on the level of regional integration role of the state, the government loses importance.

Levels of IER


Regional economic integrations are organized on different levels. Each level is distinguished from each other, the level of highest ranking includes something more than the previous one. In the world these regional economic integration levels are known as:

1. Free trade area
2. Customs Union
3. The common market

4. Economic Union
5. Political Union

Free trade area represents the lowest level of regional economic integration. Signatory countries in this level of economic integration have agreed to eliminate all trade barriers of goods and services occurring between them. Normally the member countries cannot fully apply this overnight, so they agree that the elimination or reduction of customs tariffs be made within a period of transition. General characteristic of this kind of IER integration relates on the fact that the threat policy of member countries is independent. More over, the member countries of IER compared to non members of IER impliments the treath policy that is favourable for them. The most important and well known examples of economic integration at this level are: the European Association of Free Trade (EFTA-European Free Trade Area) and the Association of North America free trade, NAFTA-North American Free Trade Area).

Customs Union represents a second level of regional economic integration. Customs Union presents a free trade area plus common commercial policy towards non-member countries of integration. This economic integration, therefore, represents a higher level than the level of free trade zone. On this level it is important to note the fact that the countries which are members of this integration, generally reduce or eliminate trade barriers or trade among themselves, while in the trade with other countries of non members of integration, common customs tariff are applied.



The common market is the third level of regional economic integration. The common market is a customs union plus free exchange of production factors between integrating members. The characteristic of this level of regional economic integration is that countries which are members of this integration in trade among themselves have no trade barrier. Trade policy towards third countries is common. Beside the characteristics that the other two preliminary levels contain, the common market also contains the part of this integration where there is free movement of factors of production.

An **Economic union** is the highest integration of regional economic mentioned so far. The Economic union includes a common market plus common currency, a common fis-

cal policy and monetary policy. The economic union has all the features, which we mentioned in the previous levels of integration. This integration is distinguished by the level of the common market, within the economic union, and the established institutions which regulate economic policies of member states. Thus, member countries on economic level harmonize monetary policy, tax system, market policy, establishing a common currency, etc.

A **Political Union** is the highest level of a possible regional integration. The aims of this regional integration are to establish joint governance with federal structures of integration. Political Union requires the establishment of a supranational authority, whose decisions are binding for members. With the establishment of joint government, member states have to give up national sovereignty and “delete” state borders. Concrete example of this integration is the U.S. level. Achieving this integration is the long-term goal of the European Union.

Interdependence between liberalization of international trade and economic growth

Liberalization of international trade and development is one of the main determinants of globalization. Almost all economists agree that economic growth of a country depends on opening the national economy to the world economy. Many share the opinion that the system of free market economy along with international trade are among the main levers of economic development of the country. Today, there are no economists who support the idea that economic growth is fueled by the country’s economic isolation, on the contrary, there are numerous signs that the isolation has a negative affect in the economic development.

International trade helps economic growth by making rational allocation of production factors. Countries that trade have the opportunity to inform its partners with the highest achievements of technology. Developing countries can increase their economic growth by implementing innovations of developed countries. Thus, trade liberalization can stimulate innovation, technology, investment requirements and research, teaching technological processes, etc.

The most important factors that influenced the development of international trade, which are both preconditions for increasing the volume of international trade, are:


- Reduction of customs duties; and
- Reducing the costs of communication and transport.

In connection with the reduction and elimination of customs tariffs and other barriers to exchange of goods and services, obviously GATT and the WTO Office have greater contribution and merit. GATT is the foundation that ceased to function until the considerable success achieved in reducing non-customs barriers and customs of international trade. While in 1947 the average customs among GATT members were 38%, in 2009 they decreased to less than 4%.

The second factor, which has a significant impact on the rapid development of world trade, is the development of technology, especially information technology. With the discovery and use of the microchip, the global economy reached colossal progress. In the

process of production and sales of goods and services, cost expenditures decreased significantly. This enabled manufacturers to increase profits and stimulated it to increased productivity and production quantity.

International trade today has an importance in the development of a countrys' economy because of its participation in the structure of the GDP, it grows more and more, increasing the trade of services, while this development helps increase the activity of many national companies.




Source: "International Business" N.Selimi, pg.63, Skopje, 2010

The Influence of Trade on the Development of Globalism

The trend of international trade


International trade since the creation of GATT onwards has seen tremendous growth. Excellent results were achieved especially in the last two decades when it grew at an annual rate greater than the growth rate of GDP. The main reasons for such an increase should be sought in: the liberalization of international trade, facilitation of the transfer of state borders, information technology development and reduction of geographical distance. A better measure of the impact of trade globalization is the development of participation in trade and GDP growth rate of these two macro economic indicators.



Source: World Trade Report 2011, WTO, pg.20

International trade in the period 2000-2010 shows the highest global growth ever recorded, except in 2009. This increase in most cases is twice bigger than the GDP worldwide. In 2010, trade in goods registered an increase of 14.5% compared with a year ago. This increase also represents the largest growth of international trade in the last decade and is fourfold greater than the growth of annual GDP. From this data we see the contribution of international trade on economic growth and overall development of globalization.

The following graph clearly shows the upward trend of the rate of export of goods and services worldwide in the period 1980-2010. Unfortunately, this upward trend was interrupted in 2009 and the cause of it was the introduction of the global financial crisis. Although in 2010 we have an increase when comparing recent years, this growth still does not reach the level of exports of goods and services in 2008. This can best be seen from the graph below.




Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2011, NY

The Trend of Trade Processed by REI

REI 's economic activity is manifold, but the greatest intensity is in the realization of international trade. Trade realized by the member countries of IER accomplished a faster pace than the one in international markets in general. Thus, the share of trade within the IER had risen from 18% in 1990 to 35% in 2008. If we add to this the trade that occurs within the EU member states, the turn out is even greater, so from 28% in 1990, it increased to 51% in 2008.

The data presented above clearly shows that in 2008 compared to 1990 there are major changes in the structure of total exports of goods worldwide. This structural change is 23% complete. This informs us that export of global goods that occurs within the REI in 2008 is more than half of the total exports worldwide.


If we express this value we would have to say that the market value of IER between countries in 1990 was U.S. \$ 537 bilijon, while in 2008 it managed to be worth USD 4 triljon. From the data we can conclude that within IER export, the value increased in 2008 compared to 1990 for 7.5 times. This can be shown more clearly in the graph below.



Source: World Trade Report, 2011, NY

The situation on the export of goods within the REI can be seen in detail in the following table which includes integration in: North America, European Bashikimi, Middle East, CIS countries, Central and South America, Africa and Asia. The graph below reflects our IER export which is fully realized and its integration in theyears 1990, 2000 and 2009. The general characteristic is that this commercial activity registered a steady increase of exports of goods in all integrating countries. Thus in Northern America in 1990, the total exports were USD 548 billion, in 2000 the amount was 1.225 USD bil-

ion, while in 2009 the total exports were \$ 1.602. If we compare the export of 2009 with that of 1990 we will see that in 2009 the export grew three times more. Also, here we can clearly see that the share of trade in economic integration continuously increasing. This increase in the participation of intra-exports increased mostly after 1990, when NAFTA began to function as integration of three states on this continent. From the other integration the database for Asian countries shows that the export from 1990 to 2009 is increasing for five times more. While, exports within the IER achieved to be moved than half of total export.



Source: WTO, International Trade Statistics, 2010

Conclusions

Globalization is a process, which is present in all spheres of social life, but it is most obvious in economy. Reaching for greater profits is one of the objectives of globalization. This can be achieved if there is trade liberalization, integration developing countries and technology.

There is no doubt that economic growth, employment and living standards around the world have reached a high level. Thanks to the opening of the national economy in the world, millions of people fled the impoverished class. It certainly would not have been realized if the base was a closed economy. Isolated economy has not seen the best results to date.

It is an undeniable fact that the gap between rich and poor has widened a lot more during the era of globalization, but it would be wrong to think that only globalization is guilty for this and that it could not do more in the future to alleviate this problem. In this regard, the states that have so far been isolated should try more seriously to be integrated in the international market in order to be able to follow the development of technology and its application in the economy. Only in this way they will be able to use the benefits of globalization. None of the world's problems as unemployment, poverty, the environment, health and environmental protection can be solved by reducing the market, closing borders or support protectionism.

PTA now covers a wider number of issues and involves more structural institutional arrangements. Trade realized by the member countries of PTAs accomplished a faster pace than international trade in general. PTA exports include over 50% of total exports and has contributed significantly to the development of globalization

The world has decided to proceed with developing globalization. This is one of the conclusions of more international institutions. Its support is indisputable, as its promoters are the most economically successful countries, the states that push economic progress. It is of great importance for us to have knowledge about the benefits from globalization.

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EUROPEANIZATION IN EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGICAL MANIPULATIONS

Abstract

The article treats the relation of the European reform system with the traditional understanding of education. Europeanization of education confronted to the traditional ideal of “pure”, “difficult” and “poor” education when young people had to deal with many (unnecessary) facts or traditional encyclopedias. Politics is deeply involved in this confrontation, which is partly in favor of Europeanization, but does not show any readiness for reforms of traditional education. On the one hand, it creates development of pamphlets in reforms, and on the other hand, nihilistic reaction to innovations in education. However, the relation between politics and publicity shows the presence of two fundamental tendencies of interpretation of reforms as follows: localization of truth and the idea of constipated system. It all leads to rejection of measurement in education and requests for generalization of needs in society, especially in the labor market. For that reason, instead of intellectual discussions on political cosmetics, education in South-eastern Europe is in need for discussion on collectivism and individualism in education institutions in transitional societies, since it is the only way to approach serious transformation of institutions, as well as association with environment.

Key words: higher education, Europeanization, reforms and localization of truth.

Introduction

Any departure of the main goals of today’s higher education and global trends in the world is conditioned by the attitude towards modernization, and in our area by Europeanization in education, because these are the basic indicators of young peoples’ interest and social development. However, these forms of education reforms encourage open debate and series of conflicts in a society where an increasing number of young people and their teachers protest with new forms and processes in education. Their discontent accuses politicians as the main culprits for the situation in this area.

Modernization of education today includes some of the basic components that relate to issues of strengthening society by strengthening the educational resources of the population, and because of that the European Union in the last twelve years has been insisting on introducing European standards in higher education. It has become one of the most important standards for SEE countries in the process of joining the European Union. All countries in the region know that modernization and Europeanization of higher education

as an innovation strategy are priority, which in synergy with the economy contributes to increased competitiveness in the global market.

“In a global economy, information and knowledge have become the most valuable resources and a basis for strengthening the competitive position in the global market. Every company should be aiming to personnel planning, selection of the best and their continuing training to reach and increase their competitive advantage in the market. Highly motivated educated employee will contribute the most success of the company”, said Dr. Mary Buzlešić.

If these are the basic attitudes, which clearly have prosperous character, then why such fierce controversy? Is there ideological manipulation in the development of the Bologna process? Haven't we turned the question of this reform into the question- Are you for EU? Haven't we everything related to higher education turned into sensational assessment without measurements and parameters?

These are some of the questions lately burdening modern public of Southeast Europe. Modernization of education threatens some scientific fields and this encourages resistance to modernization.

Why do we need modernization in education?

Modernization and Europeanization of higher education by linking education, research and innovation and building flexible networked structures is the only way to expand the area of competitiveness and university positioning in the new society of knowledge. That is the reason why modern strategic objectives in education can be displayed in a few basic points:

- Democracy of education
- Patriotism
- Responsible education system
- High quality of education
- Openness of the education system
- Measurability
- Effectiveness of education
- Orientation towards social development and development of the individual
- Multicultural education
- Flexibility
- The function of cultural identity

The education system is a social mechanism that allows the distribution of knowledge, skills, work skills, needs and values of all members of society. Influenced by the concept of lifelong education, the necessity and the needs of adult learning, the traditional education patterns and structures are being modified in the sense that adult education becomes an integral part. In democratic societies and economies based on knowledge, education becomes a business partnership and joint responsibility of different actors:

- Social partners – government, employers and trade unions
- Different interest groups: commerce, trade associations, academic institutions, scientific research organizations, NGOs, the institutions for vocational education and their associations, and
- Individuals

Therefore, the system of education management has to be concerned with four levels:

- national –or state level
- regional level
- institutional level
- individual level

The purpose of education reform is to achieve greater individual and social-economic efficiency and effectiveness of education and learning. The overall aims are the changes and adjustment in the structure, organization and functions of education especially in the content of education and learning and ways of their adoption. Modern economics evaluates a broad knowledge and skills, flexibility, mixed forms of training, more objectives, teamwork, problem solving and work-based projects. Among others, these elements made an impact on reform in many European countries over the past two decades, but are the basis of the underlying processes of European integration in education and training.

Why insisting on quality of education?

It is known that quality is one of the factors that company management has to maintain in economy. Similar situations occur in other sectors, for example in health care, where quality based competition has become very important, particularly since health care and education do not provide the possibility for sampling the activities so that a uniformed decision about the quality can be made. It has to be based on measurements and assessment.

“Health care is absolutely different. Patients, doctors and financiers have no basis on which to measure quality, or the relationship between price and quality for a particular doctor, procedure, course of treatment or hospital... Since many health services are used only once, patients cannot rely on their previous experience. They usually get an expert opinion of a physician (or sometimes two, if you seek a second opinion), and it is difficult to assess the quality of that advice” (Porter, 2008: 412-413).

While the quality of economy today is something that has global characteristics, but is also directly related to the competitiveness of large corporations - the quality of education ranges from economic to political and pedagogical components. The quality of education as a pedagogical category and as a political goal doesn't necessarily always have to be on the same basis. There can be a big difference in the quality of pedagogical research, in relation to education policy. At the same time, evaluating the quality is not always consistent with the views of different groups related to education.

Quality in education does not allow creation of closed systems and politicization, a problem that encourages resistance in Bologna. Ian Stronach says that quality is the key to the problem, but what if education is the lock? Pointing to the question whether “quality” led to the unfortunate death of educational philosophy, which is on the other hand the only way you can judge quality issues in education, Stronach in their work sets the polarity between education as a philosophical enterprise or cultural practices and on the other hand the creation of a new language in education that in the core of his interest puts the words: quality, effectiveness, efficiency, control and improvement. This new culture that occurs in all forms so far relies on the key effect of globalization as a crucial regulator. What is sought with quality in a new kind of education are measurable results with quantified indicators of quality, comparison of effectiveness and so on.

So, is the general policy set between the two general trends that are determined by the only opposing components - economic activity and environmental practices?

Academic capitalism, liberalism and education

Academic capitalism is now knocking on the door of all higher education institutions. Some countries and universities are trying to adapt to it in different ways, but it is clear that the trend from the Western countries will move to other parts of the world. Capitalism quickly penetrates through the cracks of market orientation of universities and thus manages to reorganize the institution. Connection with economy, establishment of joint projects, global research, which is in full swing, they all cause university institutions to lose the organizational form that separated them from corporate organizations. Nowadays, under the influence of globalization and competitiveness in the world - academic capitalism becomes a direction that is slowly replacing the earlier form of organization of universities.

„Academic capitalism (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004, 2006) is an influential theory that seeks to describe such changes that are occurring in higher education due to neo-liberal capitalism and globalization. This theory examines the exogenous and endogenous corporatization that is taking place in universities, and concludes that academia is becoming more and more like a capitalist enterprise“ (Walker, 2009: 484).

The authors mentioned by Judith Walker studied the different higher education systems in the world: Japan, Denmark and Latin America and concluded that the institutions of higher education open to academic capitalism through different pathways.

„Academic capitalism requires both the reification of time and an internalization of the importance of managing time in a demonstrably efficient manner. To successfully manage time under academic capitalism is to ensure success for the individual student or faculty member as globally-competitive knowledge workers and likewise to aid in the incorporation of the university into the global economy“ (Walker, 2009: 485).

This largely compromised university autonomy, and Mary Nolan points out that education does not regard the rights, rather it is more oriented to costs. The author argues that

this process of turning towards costs is strongly encouraged by the state, which is completely contrary to the autonomy and quality of education. Therefore, political pressure towards universities intensifies. There is a clear disparity between the states requirements and organizational and financial resources in higher education.

„Education is not considered a right, for which the state pays the bulk of the costs. Rather it is a privilege, for which individuals and families pay. Public universities cost between 3000 Euros and 10,000 Euros per year in tuition. Private universities are much more expensive. New York University, where I teach, costs 40,000 Euros per year for tuition and housing. To pay such high fees, students and families must take out loans, for there is a decreasing amount of fellowship money available. When the average student graduates, s/he is 7500 Euros in debt“ (Nolan, 2010: 1-2).

A separate issue is whether the countries of Southeast Europe can avoid the application of academic capitalism in so far as represented in Western countries. It begins to develop the biggest problems of higher education, leaving the university a closed form whose existence is largely based on political control.

The emergence of business logic developed in universities appears crucial for inclusion in the mainstream of the global market as one factor at a high level of sustainability. Corporate way of thinking replaces the current enthusiasm of scientists.

However, universities do not have the support of the state, or of the wider community we might add, especially because the issue of quality education to the market logic is very complex and uncertain task.

“Also, running a university is much more uncertain and ambiguous undertaking than managing a company, because the higher education market is not tangible, measurable objectives that determine success. Academic leaders can not control the precise indicators, such as for market share, return on investment, stock prices or the cost per unit of production, to determine the progress of their institution. University can not measure the value of their research or to reliably determine how his students learn. For this reason, efforts to adapt to the entrepreneurial model of performance measurement or “target management” are much more difficult and dangerous for universities than for commercial firms” (Bok, 2005: 34).

Therefore, business principles in higher education are largely related to several types of market games:

- Academic competition associated with the relations with institutes and companies;*
- Labor Market and student performance;*
- Education and market competition among universities.*

These facts give uniqueness to university institutions in the development of modern higher education system, hence, we can speak about corporate universities. Corporation is essentially imposed to universities in order for them to become part of economic development, appropriate to their potential.

“What does it mean to say that the university is a corporation? It means many things. First universities are run like corporations by people who are from the corporate world. The Board of Trustees who have final authority draw their members not from universities or public intellectuals. They draw their members

from the business world – finance, real estate, industry, insurance, commerce. They see the university as a business and judge its operations by business criteria. The actual administrators of universities are increasingly drawn not from the faculty but from business and law and from those who have moved between business and government service“ (Nolan, 2010: 2).

Judith Walker (Walker, 2009: 496) in her analysis of academic capitalism points out that its influence changes the logic of the functioning of the university. The weight of this process has a profound effect on the slow progress of young professionals who have to deal with profitable projects, rather than scientific research. The impact of academic capitalism is reflected in the individual development at the university and thus interferes with teaching and research.

Universities haven't bypassed the time-space compression and the high degree of mercerization and corporatization that has greatly influenced the behavior of students and scholars. The result is that more attention is paid to the effectiveness of the university's work than on quality. "I then focus on the link between efficiency, time and academic capitalism, which has become strengthened due to technological changes and intensification of capitalism and its reinvention in neo-liberal form. This section ends with an exploration of how time remains a moral issue in academia, with guilt acting as the great motivator".

In academically capitalistic universities despite underdeveloped global organization time passes so fast that creates a completely new phenomenon 'No time' (no time) in the life and work of students and teachers (and academics). Compression of time and work intensification affects the very principle of the university that recruits more and more professionals outside the sphere of education and science, who have to perform a series of administrative or managerial jobs. The big problem has become the long-term relationship of research and time constraints with financial sustainability. Therefore, the basis, and we might say, research in which it is very hard to predict the end and the result are at a disadvantage. Most authors believe that this is one of the main reasons for resistance by these schools when it comes to capitalist organization of the university. Then, other hidden problems multiply, such as gender equality in universities. For women who work at university it is very difficult to plan their family and life in the long-term.

It is indisputable that the acceleration process at the university has a high risk of superficiality that can become simply a sword and all that has been real for years in institutions shall cease to be valid. Since the sixties, Europe has experienced massification of science and education, and European universities have been involved in controversial business - which we can already call the university business.

These processes influenced the transformation of traditional universities in the direction of increased internationalization. Increased internationalization is driven by the involvement of universities in a number of major research projects and increasing cooperation with industry. Traditionally painted national education systems have begun to slowly break the limit under the influence of scientific advances and internationalization opens up opportunities for development of new organizational forms, and a stronger connection to the corporate logic. The traditional institutions should raise the question of the rela-

tionship between internationalization and quality (Doh, 2008: 83-87). On these grounds the European Union began to develop a transnational project of the Bologna process that differences among national higher education programs aligned with a number of instruments to create a unique area of higher education. Internationalization of university life in the Bologna process promotes a number of key changes within university institutions themselves, but also of national systems:

- Joint management of higher education systems, as the Bologna Process has internationalized systems and set up specific mechanisms to encourage the internationalization of the change in the structure of the university, so that all control mechanisms are no longer at national or regional level;
- Development of new forms of communication between institutions of higher education, but also within institutions of higher education (cycles, time compression, accreditation, etc.), which imposes new standardized forms of work, as well as a new style of expression and new terminology;
- New pedagogical dimension of the work in the university and forming the curriculum culture in higher education;
- Consideration of structural differences, and their outcomes, and harmonization of the goals of education, which would ultimately result in terms of qualifications and competence system.

Therefore, the Bologna Process in its internationalization insists on the quality system to be clearly the most difficult to implement because it requires above all introduction of openness in higher education and measurement instruments.

In a bad set of national control systems, the internationalization is firstly rejected and later, when “forced” to bring the innovation, all is put mainly on the “back of those who study”. Commercialization as part of the process of internationalization has resulted in lowering the quality of certain educational institutions and systems. “Faced with the willingness of states that the number of enrolled students in any way is not connected with the real conditions in terms of teaching, if the influx of young people who want to study, universities readily entered into this type of commercialization. Although at first glance could say that at least in those aspects we follow the tendency of American universities, it should be noted that in our country there is no quality control. This means that, unlike U.S. universities, we are unable even to open the debate to what extent the enormous number of students in direct teaching or teaching in distance affect the poor quality, because we do not have any norms and standards by which to establish a measure of quality. Therefore, commercialization of education in our country becomes an ethical question and is left to the conscience of the academic community in fact” (Turajlić, 2005: 195).

Therefore, internationalization and commercialization in direct contact with the quality have a set of constraints, but they can foster the development of university teaching in several ways:

- Investing more resources into the development of university teaching;
- Increased teacher revenues, hence better motivation;

- Establishment of funds that can enhance the research career of many young students who cannot do this because of their financial status;
- Possibility for personal research.

The Bologna process and higher education governance in Southeastern Europe

The Bologna process is undoubtedly a huge project in education reform and the procedure in addition to a range of positive activities has had its opponents who very sharply rejected the change of previous system of higher education. One of the biggest critics of the Bologna process in Europe is the Austrian philosopher Konrad Paul Liessman. In his book “Theory of Lack of Education” he particularly charges against the reform of higher education in Europe criticizing the bureaucracy, as it relates to the position of the university and its status and quality.

Lisman’s criticism is not original, and is partly based on criticism of the U.S. education system, although the Austrian philosopher, points out some things that are undeniable problems related to the process, especially when it comes to implementing reforms in a large area and with different educational systems. “The intention is clear. By binding introduction of a three-year bachelor courses for all subjects universities receive task to primary accomplish “pro-scientific vocational training”. It seems designed for those countries that do not have differentiated school and vocational-school system. For other countries baccalaureate means completely unnecessary restructure of the university landscape.

“The meaning of the university is coolly liquidated as a place of their professional education, which builds its own postulates in a uniqueness of research work and teaching. The introduction of complete professional-oriented short studies will change the picture of universities more significantly than any other reform before. The scientific and political meaning of Bachelor, which seems so attractive to many Ministers of education, is easily visible: shortening the period of studying and growth rates of academically educated citizens. Polemically put: Bachelor’s completion of studies for those who break the program” (Lisman, 2008: 91).

Liessman is not alone in his criticism of the Bologna process, but critics of the Bologna process should be divided into two groups - those who believe that the previous system was better and those who were not satisfied during the implementation of the Bologna process, but agree that the old system had to be changed. It should be noted that the Bologna process to a large extent today is institutionalized and linked to processes of European integration.

Critics of globalization see the fear of introducing market principles in higher education related to the European mainstream. However, they largely disagree with the views that the Bologna process is the same as neo-liberal concept of higher education, which can be heard in previous reviews. In order to be able to compare we have to start with the question of differences between the neo-liberal concept of higher education and the Bologna process. Most authors agree that the consequences of neo-liberal concept of education are extremely high and contrasted with the development concepts in education.

Finnish authors (Rinne, Kivirauma and Simola¹) provide twelve key characteristics of neo-liberalism that will change the education:

- Consumerism – parents and students in the neo- liberal approach to education are primarily consumers of services
- Privatization – emphasizes the importance of the private education sector, so that consumers can freely choose where they want to buy a service that they want
- Commercialization – introduce the logic of market activity in educational institutions
- Management - educational institutions are seen as a company that need to be managed in a way that companies are managed
- Competition - to encourage competitiveness between individuals, institutions, and develop marketing techniques to raise the image of the institution in this competition
- Deregulation - weakening state influence in the educational process
- Differentiation - various facilities are on offer and individual institutions decide whether to use these facilities or not
- Evaluation - continuous evaluation in order to maximize profit
- Sanctions - to punish institutions that fail to achieve expected results, and reward those that achieve, for example. More funds are allocated to institutions that are qualified as quality
- the introduction of lump-sum funding
- Private spending - personal funding increases
- Cost reduction and economic savings-elimination of unprofitable facilities.²

When it comes to this type of reform being implemented in Europe, Karin Doolan rightly distinguishes between the Bologna Process and the neo-liberal higher education and in this context she points the following:

“For example, a statement in London (2007) states that the objectives of higher education: preparing students to be active citizens in a democratic society, personal growth, creating and maintaining knowledge, stimulate research and innovation and to prepare students for their future careers. Similarly, the Prague statement (2001.) speaks about higher education as a public good and public responsibility, and it is further confirmed by the Berlin communiqué (2003). It does not mean not to mention words such as “competitiveness”, the university contribution to economic development of society, the objectives of the Bologna process, such as mobility in the European market, but the document messages are more complex to claim that the discourse dominated in documents is neo-liberal. In other words, one should be cautious in labeling of the Bologna process as a neoliberal project. It would be more precise to label certain aspects of the Bologna process, as designed in its basic documents, such neo-liberal or criticize their application. Therefore, the Bologna process is a complex amalgam of different ideas and some aspects may serve as a critique of neoliberalism. This is especially true of the so-called social

1 See more on <http://www.iro.hr/hr/javne-politike-visokog-obrazovanja/kolumna/o-neoliberalizmu/>

2 <http://www.iro.hr/hr/javne-politike-visokog-obrazovanja/kolumna/o-neoliberalizmu/>

dimension of the Bologna process, which is important for the discussion of neoliberalism and fees".³ Differences between Bologna and neoliberal approaches are currently in the standards which are highlighted by the European Commission as the uniqueness of the European continent as well.

So the latest conferences in Europe indicate that the adjustment effect moves this process to be a mere copy of some other systems outside of Europe. These processes create doubt and impatience with the students, their parents and teachers because this is a huge shift, which requires time and patience. In this sense, the Bologna process should be seen as an essential step forward in the development of modern society and in our country, and therefore the inclusion in modern European trends.

The system of measurable resistance and university environments

The main problem in higher education has just changed the role of government and state bodies in relation to the processes in higher education, which largely come close to the processes that govern the global economy. For example, Montenegro, Veselin Vukotic renowned economist says that one must accept the new role of the state. "The global economy affects the removal of borders and the role of the state itself. More and more sovereignty from the national level, central government transfers to international levels, or at the local level, local-state region, as is the case in China. Montenegro is located right in seeking conceptualized solutions for place, role and organization of the central state, which lies between the European Union, whose member it will be, and the need to strengthen the local level, micro-regions. There are those who believe that central government should strengthen, not to leave the old lever, the greater the administration, the greater the power of the state. On the other hand, a growing number, especially younger people, even created a special economic school in Montenegro, which gathers around the concept of so-called. Micro-state, a state that would remove barriers facing business, the complete opening of Montenegro, the protection and preservation of private property and the implementation and enforcement of the contract" (Vukotić, 2008: 3). However, does the state appear in a form that is expected from her, so reforms and innovations could have raised the level of development required.

Martina Vukasovic indicates the changed role of the state, which is increasingly becoming a country that loses control function:

"If one accepts that the state has a role in education, two main types of government can be distinguished (de Boer and Goedegebuure, 2003):

- 1. State that controls*
- 2. State that evaluates." (Vukasović, : 354)*

The first term implies a very strong state that repressively leads education, which means that controlled laws are descriptive when it comes to enrollment, progress, completing school, establishing educational institutions, organizations, education, employ-

³ See: <http://www.iro.hr/hr/javne-politike-visokog-obrazovanja/kolumna/o-neoliberalizmu/> Karin Doolan: O neoliberalizmu, Bolonjskom procesu, njegovoj socijalnoj dimenziji i studentskim prosvjedima

ment and migration of teachers, etc. The system management believes that most schools are at the state level, and greater attention is paid to quantitative parameters, and the main actor is the Ministry of Education, that is making decisions, and implementation of reforms is strictly hierarchical and top-down.

State which evaluates has a completely different position in relation to education. Regulation in the field of education is quite flexible in relation to the system. In this sense, the attention is paid to the measurement of the quality through the measurement results (or outcomes) of educational institutions and programs. Very often in this situation occur so called middle institutions (buffer bodies) between ministries and educational institutions, aimed at ensuring the quality of the educational process. This kind of state controls the educational system indirectly (through the aforementioned middle institutions), on the basis of achievements (number of students or students who have completed a given level of education, achievement on tests, etc.). One can often encounter the situation where one of the competencies in the field of education is relocated “down” within the system, so the local administration has more power” (Vukasović, : 355). In addition, it should be noted that in the literature are specifically singled Olsen management models that are formulated from one to another model. And here in the region of Southeast Europe great problems are caused. Politicians in this region have not given up the first model of management and cling to centralized education policy instruments and do not allow any form of flexibility”.

Although formally, states of the region are trying to cross the road to the evaluation model, but it remains a dead end. Bodies formed to have a new approach to education, still have no real authority. The best example of this is the Quality Assurance Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has very little jurisdiction over the education system itself. Director of the Agency. Dr. Nihad Fejzic said that the problems in their work : “lack of understanding of this process, politicization, corruption, and all those who support the current situation in higher education are our direct enemies, and it is expected that these negative forces in the future contest the accreditation process, the Agency, our current and future activities”⁴

The problem of higher education in South East Europe region is quite identical and based on common premises of socialist self-management, which has ideologically managed these areas. It is interesting to review Bode Weber, who was to analyze the attitude of the international community towards higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina and gave the following conclusion: So far, the dominant political and institutional strategies should be complemented by a long-term, not only material support, directed to well-educated, promising young scientists and support group made up of such young scientists, which is in the process of formation. - This group should be in some form included in the monitoring of relations at universities in BiH as well as in strategic discussions that are conducted within international organizations (Weber, 2007: 43).

4 Krajiški info portal, p. 1 www.kip.ba

Conclusion

The demonopolization of studies will result in demands by politicians and employers for change of the orientation of higher education to more efficient and accountable system. In this sense, we should expect closures of some private and also state universities and the opening of new study groups and faculties in accordance with the economic development and application of new technologies (such as reducing the number of teachers and medical schools and their transformation. This process is already in sight after the accreditation in Serbia, as well as pressure on the Croatian authorities to liberalize the opening of private universities. The evident thing is that the studies will generally raise up the costs, because the need to study is much larger than state budgets can follow and the technology will require more use of new models and individual work. In this sense the idea of student protests in Croatia probably will not be able to sustain for a long time. However, it shall not relieve the State investment in higher education, simply because state universities will have to follow the global race to a much greater extent than before. The consequence will lead to strengthening the implementation of lifelong education, and higher education will have to apply a variety of new methods of measurement (competencies, learning outcomes, program goals, etc.) which will form the basis for choice of programs and teachers by students. All these things will open up several new questions that will inevitably be posed by the economic community of Southeast Europe:

- What is to become a modern university in this area? Whether socialist model is sustainable, particularly since the most elite universities are set in large cities without the possibility of developing the campus system
- How long will the private initiative be strengthened, considering the limit of revenue opportunities and setting standards and establishing private non-profit universities.
- Reduction of political ideology in the functioning and progress of the university
- Creating a strategy that will be able to keep pace with global trends
- The strengthening of cluster development with the participation of the university.

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TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

Women's trafficking, in the past twenty years, has become a problem that the contemporary Macedonian society is confronting. With the independence of our country, beside the vast number of changes that have taken place and consumed the various fields of our social lifestyles, a rise in the social deviations has occurred, one of which is women's trafficking. Nowadays, in the era of globalization, women's trafficking is also referenced as modern slavery, or slavery of the 21 century. In a time of border opening between countries and decreasing the gap between the communication among the highly developed and other nations, women's trafficking is often seen as a problem that all the nations are facing, but also on a multinational level, that is, finding of efficient mechanisms for confronting this problem.

Key words: human trafficking, women's trafficking, globalization, contemporary Macedonian society

Introduction

The twenty-first century is a time of change, a time of technical and technological expansion, an expansion of science and computer science, a time for the rise of human and civil rights and liberties. However, even with all of these privileges and achievements which come with time, we can certainly state that in the 21th century there is no decrease of discrimination of certain individuals and groups of citizens. On the contrary, in some segments there is strong discrimination of certain categories of citizens and a rudimentary break of their basic human rights and liberties. Human trafficking is an obvious example of a social deviation, which not only has ceased its existence in contemporary time, but it has actually risen in all countries regardless of the degree of their development. Human trafficking, as a sociopathic activity, is all-present in our country as well. In the last few decades, R. Macedonia is witnessing an increasing number of victims in human trafficking. The most common form of human trafficking is women's trafficking, but it can also include children's trafficking, men or human organ trafficking. However, women's trafficking is mostly present both in our country and on the global scale.

Women's trafficking is the third largest crime industry in the world, and it is referred as the most monstrous of all forms of trafficking and the most common synonym for this is "slavery of the modern age". According to the data from the UN, annually there are

between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people trafficked, even though a large number of experts who work with this problem point out that the correct number cannot be established. Women mostly fall victims of human trafficking and are forced to work as prostitutes, get involved in pornography, sex tourism and similar sexual social deviation. A lot of people consider that capitalist sex industry, which functions under the principles of consumption and demand, with a maximum profit and as one of the most profitable businesses, mainly contributes towards women trafficking. Analyzes indicate that illegal prostitution in many of the country importers does not create the necessary barrier for smugglers, which by bribery, smuggle women in various countries, and leave them there without personal identification papers, forcing them to prostitute themselves and exploiting them.

Some of the common questions among the intellectual and scientific elite, which deals with this issue are fundamental questions about motives for engaging in women's trafficking, but more important are issues related to finding solutions for reducing and preventing this socio-pathological phenomenon. Definite answers to the questions related for the reasons for trafficking women usually move into the connotation of the profitability of that business. Namely, the biggest motive for women's trafficking is in the connotation of the profit made from that business. Considering how living from women's trafficking and how fruitful it can be a business, we can rightly say that profit is the first and most important factor affecting women's trafficking. Of course, we must not ignore the socio-economic status of women, then the social situation of certain countries where recruiting victims of trafficking (an extremely high level of poverty and unemployment), the insufficient level of education of the victims, improper positioning in society, family problems and social deviations in the family, the desire to achieve success and material security and the like. Interesting is the attitude of some scientists who say that in societies where women's status is regulated with declarative legislative and where they are really and truly valued, in such societies it is less likely that they are to be treated ill and be subjected to torture, in such societies this phenomenon is less present. In contrast to these societies, in others where the role of women is not fully defined in society and initiated and included in contemporary social trends, there will be women easily exploited who often become victims of trafficking. As previously mentioned, the academics are more focused on finding solutions to prevent and reduce trafficking.

The defining term of women's trafficking

Women's trafficking, as an international problem, especially in recent decades, especially with the collapse of socialist states, which brought about sharp deterioration in the position of working people, with a number of economic, political, and cultural implications of such conditions on a number of women who lost their status in society, loosing the possibility of providing livelihoods and seeking alternative and appropriate better tomorrow, some of them went into the clutches of women's trafficking. Globalization, to a large extent, is also a factor and its ease of communication and the ability to move from one country to another also contributed to migration, which can rightly be said that

women trafficking is the dark side movement of the population, which definitely damages women, represents a kind of slavery and is certainly a forced and violent form of movement.

When talking about fixing the term of women's trafficking, we definitely do not need an identical definition, any coloring of unique reason for this phenomenon. As adequate provisions for this issue, I will mention a few, certainly not hinting or preferring any of them. Boskovic pointed out that human trafficking / women's trafficking is a social deviance, which is a unique form of organized crime (Бошковић, 2003). Milovanovic talking about women's trafficking is using synonyms for trafficking, noting that human beings cannot be equated with mediation in prostitution (Milovanović, 1995). For Mijalkovic, women's trafficking represents a complex phenomenon that involves endangering the security of the institution based on slavery and exploitation, or proceeding against the person as a slave or subject, so the exploitation of his/her labor, knowledge and skills, physical and sexual integrity and identity in order to satisfy personal or someone else's drives, health or emotional needs or acquiring direct or indirect pecuniary benefit for himself or for another, thus endangering the safety of the state of foreign policy plan, the plan of internal stability, the society in the field of public safety and individual in the field of human rights (Мијалковић, 2005). When clarifying the concept of women's trafficking we should definitely not omit the provision of trafficking contained in Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol of the 55th session of the UN General Assembly, which complements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Under this Convention trafficking involves trafficking in persons through illegal transport and recruiting for emigrational or for economic or other benefits, which transgresses the will of freedom and personality with different means and methods of violence, fraud, abuse of power and authority (Shtulhofer, 2002:14). According to this Convention, we have identified the phases of women's trafficking as follows: stage-recruitment of origin (which consists of criminal groups organizing, selection and recruitment of victims of the same), stages of transit and transportation (which includes planning, organizing and transportation of victims to the corresponding state) phase of Destination-exploitation (which are controlling and exploiting the victims) and the phase of elimination.

Speaking of women's trafficking, it is very important to make a distinction between trafficking and prostitution. It emphasized the cynical Špadijer-Džinič way, just pointing out the significant differences between these two social deviations, marking the following:

- Prostitution is a broader concept and can be run completely independently of women's trafficking;
- Prostitution is only one of the forms of sexual exploitation of victims;
- Women's trafficking is extremely a difficult security problem, which contains many individual forms of threat, while prostitution is a less complex problem;
- Prostitution is based on voluntary terms and may be terminated by request of the prostitute, while the sexual exploitation to which victims are subjected in women's trafficking is almost impossible;

- Prostitution in some countries is allowed, legalized, and women's trafficking is prohibited everywhere;
- Prostitute makes a profit and usually keeps most for herself, while the victim of sexual exploitation in trafficking often gets nothing (Špadijer-Džinič, 1998).

Women's trafficking in the global era

Women's trafficking and children trafficking generates the third largest source of profit of criminal industry in the global era, after drug and arms trafficking, transnational organized crime such as activities by well-organized and complex networks of trade unions forming a criminal network that covers the globe. The report of the General Secretary of the United Nations concerning women's trafficking and children's trafficking, represented at the 58th session of the Commission on Human Rights, noted that women's trafficking and the entire range of human rights violated as it brings are one of the hardest and most gruesome issues of the international human rights agenda. Speaking of women's trafficking, we can rightly say that it results in exploitation and gross violation of human rights, because the first involves coercion and exploitation, and the main objective of this trade is to put people in a subordinate situation in which their work can be exploited under conditions that include human rights. Female victims of women's trafficking are faced with several problems including harassment, violence (verbal, physical), sexual exploitation and other forms of exploitation.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) pays special attention to women's trafficking, noting that in the era of globalization this kind of commerce has become a serious international problem, stressing that any illegal transportation of migrant women is to provide a profit to those who deal with that type of trade. According to the organization itself, trading of women involves: the practice of smuggling of migrants-women in other countries, with or without their conscious knowledge, of deception women migrants concerning the purpose of migration, legal or illegal, physical or sexual abuse of women migrants in order to trade with them, selling or women's trafficking for the purpose of employment, marriage, prostitution or other forms of abuse for profit. As pointed out by this organization, women's trafficking is trafficking in human misery, which dramatically increased in the 90s of the 20th century. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 2000 it is estimated that 1.2 million children were trafficked for sexual or labor exploitation (Biks, Amir (eds.), 2009:24,25).

As a global trans-national problem, women's trafficking (modern form of slavery) is a growing criminal business that annually generates approximately between 7 and 12 billion dollars for organized crime groups. When we talk about women's trafficking globally, it must be noted that most victims of women's trafficking are people from former communist countries and countries in transition, people who are not able to provide their existence or a place under the sun in their native countries decide, often subconsciously, to go to another country, fondly, not thinking of the consequences, with the single goal for better earnings. These women are recruited from merchants who promise them a nice job and good income, and mostly through illegal channels, with forgotten passports, and rare-

ly legally, through travel agencies, women arrive at different destinations in the world, usually ending in a brothel, sexually exploited and abused. Victims of women's trafficking have one goal: overcoming poverty and provision of finance for their own existence, in the hope for higher salary, better employment opportunities and better life quality. But, that dream becomes a nightmare when they get into the clutches of traffickers, and their vision for a successful and happy future becomes bleak harsh reality that puts most of the output in a real maze.

Women's trafficking in the Republic of Macedonia – real situation and strategies

It is very difficult to come to detailed data regarding women's trafficking, as a specific social deviation, i.e. the victims of women's trafficking have to be approached very carefully because of the sensitivity of the issue. The data that are available include research of the non-governmental organization Open gate, realized during the period from 2003 until 2005 year. In this period, 50 client-victims of human trafficking have used the services of the program for direct support. The age group from 15 to 18 years is dominant among the victims and potential victims – 44%, which indicates that this is one of the most vulnerable groups of the population that are victims of human trafficking, but the high percentage of children from 10 to 14 years old is also peculiar – 20%. Regarding education, the largest percentage of the victims and potential victims of human trafficking have completed primary school (40%), 36% have incomplete primary school, whereas 16% have not completed any kind of education. Regarding nationality, 52% are Macedonian, 28% belong to Roma nationality, 16% are Albanian and 4% are Turkish.

The Republic of Macedonia undertakes many projects and mechanisms on institutional level in order to combat human trafficking in a more efficient manner. Those measures include ratification of documents and signing cooperation agreements with other countries and maintaining the level of cooperation with the border police of the neighboring countries because the victims of human trafficking enter the country illegally. In addition, a 12-hour SOS line was activated, which records increase in the number of calls related to trafficking. The National committee against human trafficking and illegal migration to the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the National mechanism for support of victims of human trafficking with women and children, have contributed to the combat against human trafficking as well.

Conclusion

The seriousness of this issue stems precisely from the number of trafficked women and the harmfulness of this enormous socio-pathological phenomenon. In fact, no country is spared from this social evil, and each country should develop an appropriate strategy that will include a variety of mechanisms to prevent and combat women's trafficking. As a concluding observation, we should point out certain suggestions that states should

establish in their national programs in order to successfully deal with this issue. These strategies should be adopted as follows:

- Inclusion of all individuals and groups who can contribute in the fight against women's trafficking. Intellectual, scientific and political elite (as influential creators of public opinion) need to seriously grapple with solving this problem and take action for its eradication;
- To determine and have institutions create organizational forms for providing assistance to victims, and develop preventive actions (campaigns for raising awareness, coordination and supervision of co-operation between countries of origin, transit and targeted countries);
- More involvement in helping the media and raising awareness of citizens on the methods and means for detection and prevention women's trafficking, which will be aimed at informing potential victims;
- Required inclusion of women's organizations and non-governmental research centers for conducting relevant research in order to define the existing forms of sexual exploitation and abuse of trafficked victims;
- Involvement of local government in the fight against trafficking in women, since local authorities have powers to implement the investigations in bars where there is no doubt that victims of women's trafficking are working;
- Organizing debates in schools (primary and secondary) with persons who are competent for that matter, in order to familiarize adolescents with the horrors that brings women's trafficking, especially in places where there is a greater predisposition to recruit victims;
- Provision of appropriate legislation and adjustment of the sanctions for those who smuggle women caught in the network of women's trafficking;
- Signing of international standards, protocols and conventions by which we will approximate the laws of all states and will equalize criteria for penalties of traffickers;
- Providing conditions for employment and advancement of women, their education, so much less often they would become victims of women's trafficking.

Of course, this is only part of the provisions proposed as adequate solution to the problem that is associated with women's trafficking. We definitely cannot afford to circumvent this problem and think that it is far from us. Women's trafficking is happening in our society (Macedonia is a transit and destination country where victims of women trafficking end up) and have to look directly into this, and what is most necessary, seriously approach the possibility for finding affordable solutions for fighting this socio-pathological phenomenon. Only with a comprehensive action and involvement of all individuals who have treated this matter and institutions of the system, we will have success in the fight against this social evil.

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THE GLOBALIZATION INFLUENCE ON THE WORKING FORCE MIGRATION

Abstract

The subject of the scientific study of this paper is the influence of globalization on the movement of labor relations and labor market. Labor mobility and flexibility of the labor market have a significant impact on overall economic developments and especially the change of environment, migrations, educational structure and other important indicators for determining the degree of correlation between the phenomena. History teaches us that when we analyze the early development of the globalization along with this phenomenon there are emerging trends of migration, which are necessary to take into account when analyzing the trends of movement of the labor market.

The international movement of labor migration means that it can be analyzed in terms of outward movement or so-called external migration, which is under the direct influence of globalization processes, but not less important is the internal migration that which occurs within the state and represents an important factor in the balanced development and regionalization of a country.

Assuming that these processes (globalization and migration) in the future will show even greater growth, it is necessary to study the positive and negative effects that occur in each national economy. At no time we should not forget that migration has an impact on the country where labor is moving as well as in addressed countries. Any neglecting or underestimation of the effects of these processes can have extremely negative impact on the countries participating in this process.

The aim of this paper is to try to locate the benefits of the developments of these economic trends and to affirm, and also locate the negative effects of afore mentioned processes, and as well as focusing on them and trying to propose solutions to mitigate and overcome these negative effects.

Key words: Globalization, Migration, Labor market, Labor force, Human capital.

Introduction

The big changes in the way of communication and information exchange, development of the biotechnology, shrinking of the barriers within the national markets, and the increased influence of the global competitiveness have increased even more the inner dependability and integration between economic and other systems in the world, which leads to creation of conditions for growth of international economic relations and the globalization.

Globalization as a complex process is also a multidimensional process, with several aspects: social, political, cultural and economic. The main concern of this scientific paper are the issues that address the economic dimension of the globalization, or to be precise, the mobility of the working force within the frames of a certain national economy, in the aspect of perceiving their interconnection with the global economic processes that are taking place on daily basis.

Free movement/flow of goods, assets, services, people and ideas, are the basic pre-conditions for efficient international /global economy. In accordance to the needs of every legal entity, it is possible to create needed the necessary factors for a particular production within tight timeframe, either all services that can be offered in the same manner, but this excludes manpower. Uniqueness of the workforce comes from the fact that its creation requires time, in which selection, choice education and training of the particular experts is conducted, to satisfy the particular needs of the labor market.

Before the explanation of the text, it is necessary to determine the items that will be used in the text. Regarding Oxford Business English Dictionary, the migration is defined as movement from one town or country in order to live and work in another (Parkinson, 2008: 349).


There are many definitions that describe the meaning of globalization. In this case, the following definition will be used: Globalization means the coincidental effects of three major changes: the accelerated internationalization of production; the sharply increased mobility of capital; and the greater mobility of knowledge or information, from communication of messages to the transfer of technology (Dunning, 1997: 137).

Labor market can be defined as the set of arrangement whereby those demanding and those supplying labor are brought together, and agreements are made concerning the terms and conditions of employment (Pears and Cams, 1992: 129).

If there is a demand for specifically trained personnel, this can be solved in two ways: needed personnel to be hired through regular selection of candidates, which means following the complete procedure for recruiting and hiring new employees, or “borrowing” that specific personnel, which is ready to be included in the manufacturing process, or services offered. The later solution is more efficient for those with a need for specific personnel profile and as a result of the aforementioned, migration takes place, from one to another national economy, which is named as external migration. If it takes place within the single country, e.g. from rural areas towards the urban ones, then it is called inner migration.

The literature that addresses this issue also mentions daily migration, which is described as employee’s mobility on daily basis, without changing the place of residence, or moving the whole family. The reasons and effects of mobility of the working force are presented in the following graph by Krugman and Obstfeld (2009: 162).

Graph 1. “Global working force” shows the reasons and effects of the international mobility of workforce, where the horizontal axis represents the total amount of working force globally, while the left vertical axis represents the domestic marginal workforce product and the right vertical axis represents the foreign marginal workforce product. The essence of this graph is: if the foreign and domestic parties have the same technology, but different relations with the other factors of the manufacture, e.g. land and labor, where the domestic party has labor more than its needs, then the workers will earn less than those who are abroad, and it is direct motivation for the mobility of the working force. This, in the following analysis is one of the basics of the globalization influence on the employee’s income. It is obvious that, in conditions of free competitions of the workforce at the labor market, daily wages tend to be lowered, which means lowering the living standard of these employees.



It is obvious that the structure of the workforce which causes economic migration throughout the history has constantly changed. In the industrialization era, low-skilled workers migrated and performed the simplest and hardest working operations. Nowadays, the employees with higher education and skills are the driving force of this kind of mobility, especially in the sphere of high-tech businesses.

The subject of research of migration of the working force will be the European labor market, due to the fact that the Republic of Macedonia has significant economic collaboration with this labor market, while the goal of our country is to become a part of the European labor market.

Aware of the significance of the globalization influence, European Union takes substantial steps for acceptance and addressing the effects of such movements, such as establishing the “International Network of Migration Institutions - Promoting the public understanding of migration” (Severo, 2008).

In the program for new skills and job openings “of the European strategy for smart and sustainable development Europe 2020”, one of the opportunities for modernization of the labor market includes mobility of the working force as well. Such policy comes from the need for resolution of the so-called “bottlenecks” for working force in the EU member countries, which derives from the inappropriate planning of the needed number and profile for needed personnel, in conjunction with the education system where the needed personnel should be produced. The question is: what profiles of workers the developed countries of the European Union need and how this migration will affect the labor market where the named working force is coming from. At this point, we should take in consideration that this workforce is educated in its home countries, which bears the cost of their

education, while the harvest, e.g. the results of these fully qualified workers are used by highly developed countries. It is not unusual for these workers to tend to return upon the end of their career to their home countries, which again involves spending resources of the particular country, on behalf of social welfare, health care and other social benefits in the period of production inactivity of these workers.

In the recent years one of the most discussed topics about workforce migration of the highly qualified personnel is so-called “Brain drain” and the effects from this activity on the countries where these workers arrive, as well as the effects on the countries they are coming from. This situation can be analyzed through several aspects, while the simplest analysis says that if highly skilled workers migrate, unemployment rate falls. The other fact is that although quantitative decrease of the employment rate, the balance of market balance is affected, which leads to changing the position of the offer and demand for a certain profiles of employees.

This process of mobility of the working force is integral part of globalization and cannot be easily predicted, because migration is specific social economic occurrence, which is consisted of many elements of the international economic relations.

As a result of demographic migration, the difference between developed and less developed countries, the trade liberalization, the communication development, a much more vigorous migration can be expected in the following period. This confirms the last report of the International Organization for Migration. There are far more international migrants in the world today than even previously recorded – 214 millions according to UN DESA (2009) – and their number has increased rapidly over the last few decades, from 191 millions in 2005. If the migrant population continues to increase at the same pace as the last 20 years, the number of international migrants worldwide by year 2050 could be as high as 405 millions. At the same time, internal migrants account for 740 millions migrants (UNDP, 2009) bringing the total number of migrants just under 1 billion worldwide today (World migration report 2010).

The decrease in the employees’ incomes, the extended working week, the increase of the competition on the labor market, the need for higher specialization of the working skills are partly the effects of globalization influence on workforce migration.

Conclusion

By allowing the free movement of the working force, globalization creates the conditions for free competition at international level and by doing so it directly influences the amounts of employees' incomes and increases people's mobility.

The influence of globalization on the labor market is present in the extension of the working week from 36 to 40-hour, when the employees' incomes are kept unchanged. Such conditions lead to the decrease in workers life quality and lower living standard.

In conditions of decreased life span of the companies and their products and when global economic crisis is not overcome yet, the influence of globalization on the safety of preservation of one's employment gains its intensity. These influences of globalization over mobility of working force could be decreased or alleviated through the process of lifelong education and through strengthening the labor market in regulatory institutions. Affirmation of the benefits from the migration of the working force is needed, and these benefits are embodied in the specific skills and knowledge brought by workers from one country to the economies of other countries, where skilled workers are in demand.

In the future, globalization is expected to have higher influence on migration processes, so it is necessary to know all positive and negative effects from globalization and migration as process in order to manage them efficiently and effectively.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF IDENTITY/ Globalization and the "Fate" of National Identities¹

Abstract

The paper analyzes the cultural aspects of globalization in the contemporary world, as a new form of acculturation, interrelation and metamorphosis of national cultures and identities. It especially focuses on the research of the changes in the national and regional identity in the context of European integrations in the Balkans, the relation between national and European identity, as well as the "fate" of national identities of small nations in the conditions of globalization.

Starting from the hypothesis that the geocultural paradigm plays an important role in the understanding the current and future transformation processes of personal and collective identities in the global age, the paper addresses the given topic by combining results of the relevant contemporary theoretical and empirical research. Thereby, it pays special attention to the Balkans and the sociological research carried out (in Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria) by the Institute for Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, within the macro project entitled "The Culture of Peace, Identities and Interethnic Relations in Serbia and in the Balkans in the Euro integration Processes" (2006/2010).

Key words: globalization, identities, acculturation, national identity, geoculture, the Balkans.

The Janus-like Face of Globalization

Globalization is an objective historical process connected to the development of new technologies and the structural production forces of scientific, technological and information revolution. As such, it sets the path for the future development of a post-industrial civilization. However, because of the antagonistic division of social power, it has a Janus-like face in the contemporary world: there is both the developmental and emancipatory side of it, on the one hand, and the enslaving one, on the other. The global empirical data show it to be a predominantly asymmetrical process in the form of monocentric globalism, i.e. of the domination of the mega capital of the central world countries on the global market, exerting its influence in the countries of the semi-periphery and the periphery. In that sense, this process influences not only economic development but also the political sphere and culture. Namely, the countries of the world semi-periphery and periphery are forced to accept the neoliberal concept of dependent modernization, which

¹ This work is part of a larger study done under the project 179074 ("Tradition, modernization and national identity in Serbia and the Balkans in the process of European integration") implemented by the Centre for Social Research, Faculty of Philosophy in Nis and funded by the Ministry of Science of Serbia.

produces the phenomenon of peripheralization of economy and society, and the establishment of dependent culture and satellite status.

The forces of the *third wave* (A. Toffler) have the power not only to contract time and space, but also to significantly influence the metamorphosis of our culture, the modes of acquiring knowledge, the life style... It is in such a context that changes are taking place in the language culture of the contemporary world, and in the formation and metamorphosis of identity. We are witnessing the processes of modernization as well as of radical standardization, codification, quantification and technization of language and of mass use of foreign words and expressions. The number of Anglo-Saxon words (anglicisms) is increasing as well as of those that come from the field of information technologies, bringing about various forms of reductionism - the effacement of the playfulness of language, its hybridization and new forms of uniformity; in a word – the culture of dependence and the phenomenon of language and cultural colonialism (P. Viorilo).

Today we live in a world with over 6,000 languages and even more numerous families of dialects, in a world undergoing the processes of suppression of the languages and the cultures of small nations, and of their diminishment. Researchers write that dozens of languages die away every year, which implies disappearance of the cultures of certain ethnic groups and their unrestrained assimilation (Kristal, 2003: 97-126). And no matter how much such a state of affairs is justified by modernization, globalization and the renewal of liberal imperialism, it should be pointed out that we should respect the culture of differences if we do not want the future of man and of mankind to be similar to the "Orwellian and the new animal farm". To paraphrase F. Mayor, tomorrow will already be late for the UNESCO to pass a resolution on the protection of the small language and culture reservations of small nations and civilizations, as it is archeological value from the past and from the history of mankind.

Contemporary mankind needs a developed consciousness about the importance of multiculturalism and interculturalism, of the *dialogic of culture* (E. Morin) and of the partnership of different civilizations, as prerequisites of the culture of peace, globalization of understanding and solidarity among different nations. In that sense, in addition to opening up towards the world culture, learning foreign languages and modernization of national languages, one should work on the cultivation and preservation of the authentic national language tradition, because it preserves the identities of a nation. That is especially important today when the patterns of cultural colonialism and cultural hegemony get renewed through the processes of asymmetric globalization and monocentric globalism, as expressions of the action of unbridled mega capital.

While respecting the cultures of the major nations (in the West, in the East, in the North and the South), we should also work on the preservation and development of the languages of national cultures. This is especially valid for the Balkans as a region representing an ethnic cocktail of nations, civilizations and cultures.

The *university* has a great *responsibility* in securing a place for the disciplines engaged in national history, language and national cultures in the Bologna process, and in not allowing the given topics to get subjugated by the heteronymous goals of unification and standardization, i.e. of cultural hegemony. The knowledge of the English language is as important today as the knowledge of Russian was in the near past or as the knowledge

of Chinese might be important in the future. But that does not mean that national languages should be allowed to decay, to be destroyed and marginalized. I must remind the reader that the emerging pseudo-elites of the comprador and limpenbourgeoisie not only in the Balkans but also elsewhere, are often more than willing to do exactly such things in the name of dependent modernization and political correctness. But serious institutions, such as universities, which are not only educational institutions but also centres of the spirituality and culture of a given nation, its major national asset, have the responsibility to preserve and further develop the national language, because in the future nations will be distinguished primarily on the basis of their geoculture and not political geography and military power (which was the case in the past), or geoeconomy (as it is the case today).

The great English poet *Thomas Elliot* wrote in his book *Towards the Definition of Culture* that the culture of a nation developed on the basis of two processes of communication: a) the communication with the universal achievements and values of mankind, and b) on the basis of respect for and development of what is the most valuable in national cultural history and tradition. This truth must be taken into consideration when creating a modern concept of cultural policy and a model for reforming the young generations' education. That also applies to language and to the research of the place and role of national cultural identities in the development of a nation.

On the Destiny of the Identities of Small Nations in the Conditions of Globalization

Globalization has led to the expansion of the phenomenon of mass planetary cosmopolitan culture and the formation of the *society of spectacle* (Gitebor), to McDonaldization and glocalization of world culture. That also means suppressing authentic values not only of the elite culture but also of local cultures of small nations and ethnic communities. It is against such a background that the new processes of acculturation, interculturalism, but also of assimilation and cultural imperialism, have risen. And just as the sovereignty of national states is today heavily influenced by the external agents of globalization (the TNCs) and internal separatist movements, so the cultural and national identities of social groups are faced with the impact of the processes of McDonaldization, on the one hand, and retribalization, on the other hand. In connection with that, *Benjamin Barber* in his book *Jihad versus Mc Donald's World*, among other things, talks about the unfavourable position of the identity of social groups between the two given extremes, namely fundamentalism and globalism. "While Jihad has adopted the bloody politics of identity, the McWorld demand bloodless economy of profit. The one who belongs to the McWorld is a consumer. The one who searches for the centre of identity belongs to a tribe. A citizen is neither of the two. How, then, can democracy exist without citizens?" (Pečujlić, 2005: 138). A similar evaluation of how the identity and sovereignty of the citizen gets compromised in the contemporary world is to be found in the latest book by Z. Baumann entitled *Current Contemporaneity* (2008), in which the author claims that the current processes of social-darwinization of the world bring about the creation of an egotistic individualized subject that suppresses the civil concept of equality and democracy.

In the conditions of globalization, and under the influence of the global mass media and global mass culture, new forms of acculturation are emerging: the McDonaldization of cultures, hybridization, transnational forms of cultures. Globalization takes the form of glocalization, i.e. the reverse influence of local cultures on global processes. This reverse influence is hard to achieve because of the antagonistic system of the division of power and because of the global media having a monopoly on and dominance in the public space, creating symbolic violence and cultural hegemony.

As opposed to the postmodern cultural identity, which was ethnic and organically closed, as an expression of, among other things, a certain type of community and automatic solidarity that ruled, the cultural identities of cultural groups in the contemporary world are open, pluralist, and multi-layered because they reflect the modern times. As the French sociologist E. Morin said – they express the dialogic of cultures, intercultural processes in the conditions of social modernization, organic solidarity and globalization.

This emerging and *hypothesized identity* (Z. Baumann) of social groups in the contemporary world is not an expression of abstract cosmopolitanism and insistence on the citizen (i.e. of empty generalizations, or as old Hegel would say, of the unordered consciousness in which the general gets alienated from the individual and the particular), but is an expression of the unity of the national, the international and global – universal values.

Small nations, such as the Balkan ones, and their elites in the conditions of globalization, have special responsibility in promoting national identity and culture. It is the culture that is their greatest treasure, a proof of their existence in the past and of their having a long future.

In the future, social development of mankind, a new division of labour and global economy, and the processes of scientific and technological progress, will make the borders become transparent, i.e. will render the borders not to be an obstacle any more to global mobility. In that sense, it will only be the culture (or, as E. Wallerstien puts it – the geoculture), that sets us apart from the others in the totality of mankind, i.e. what will set nations apart from the other ones will no longer be military or technological power, nor geopolitics, but the values of the human and cultural capital (knowledge, the grey matter, human resources). That is why *F. Nietzsche* was right to say that education is the policy of the future of a society, and why Jacques Delors in his book *Education – A Hidden Treasury* wrote: One of the primary functions of education is to enable mankind to take control over its own development.

Small nations (it is only their demographic, geographic and economic status that I have in mind here) from the countries of the old and the new global and European periphery (such as the Balkan nations today, regardless of whether they are in the EU or are supposed to join it in the future) must create an autonomous model of cultural policy so as to preserve and develop their cultural identity. In addition, they must develop different forms of cooperation (cultural and other) so as for the Balkans to become a geospace of peace, stability and development rather than a powder keg that foreign powers (either those from the West or the East) can ignite any moment.

Historical experience teaches and warns us that whenever the Balkan nations did not want to consider their neighbours their brothers, they, as a rule, got foreign rulers (in the form of the great powers), effectively becoming protectorates. It is time the redefinitions

of the past on the Balkans got exchanged for a dialogue on cooperation and development of a common future, fully respecting thereby the independence of each nation and its cultural particularities.

The results of our empirical research on cultural and ethnic relations in the Balkans (in Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia in 2004 and 2007) have shown that the interviewees consider the conflicts in this geospace to have emerged because of the vested interests of the great powers as well as that it is in the culture that they see a bridge and a factor contribution to cooperation and integration among the Balkan nations.²

It is time the Balkan elites developed consciousness about the importance of the development of and advancement in the regional identity, the closeness of the Balkan cultures and common interests of the Balkan nations. It is also time the given elites reaffirmed the ideas of the pan-Balkan project (first expressed at the First International Balkan Conference held in Delfi, Greece, in 1931) under the slogan *the Balkan to the Balkan nations*.³ I would say that that is a precondition for the development of sound relations in the Balkans, which is as important as the processes of European integrations, and which the Balkan nations must strive for unless they want to become puppets of the new (Euro-Atlantic, European and other) power centres, a geospace of dependent societies and new colonies.

Languages and cultures of different nations penetrate one another in the conditions of globalization particularly intensively, with multiculturalism rapidly changing in interculturalism and new phenomena of global transnational cultures. In such a context, small nations can preserve their culture through their creativeness, and not through archexoticism and folklore. In a word, it is through new means of cultural creativity and through communication and cooperation with other cultures and civilizations that national cultures get developed and enriched. Therefore, they should not follow the strategy of autism, isolation, retribalization, of "murderous identities", but should also not promote cloned McDonaldization, dependent modernization and conflict; instead, they should cooperate and actively participate in contemporary culture. It is only the unity of cultural tradition and modernity, and cultural innovation, that can contribute to the variety of cultures, to a pluralist face of contemporary mankind, as a community of equal citizens, nations and civilizations.

In the Balkans, history has always been larger than its geography, and patriotism has often been dressed in military uniform, serving thereby the bloody harvests of the god Mars. Instead of the policy of redrawing the borders, what we need today is a new policy of the culture of peace, active peaceful coexistence and cooperation, sound creative com-

2 See the following two proceedings: *Kulturni i etnički odnosi na Balkanu - mogućnost regionalne i evropske integracije* [Cultural and Ethnic Relations in the Balkans – Possibilities of Regional and European Integrations], Filozofski fakultet, Institut za sociologiju, Niš, 2006, and *Kvalitet međuetničkih odnosa na Balkanu i evrointegracijski procesi* [The Quality of Interethnic Relations in the Balkans and European Integrations], Filozofski fakultet, Institut za sociologiju, Niš, 2008.

3 See the proceedings entitled *Prva balkanska konferencija* [The First Balkan Conference], Karnegijev fond, Beograd, 1931.

petition of its nations and citizens. We need interpenetration of related cultures and their mutual enrichment. It is time the ghosts of history (*N. Berdyaev*) got exchanged for a clear direction of the Balkan nations and new generations towards the challenges of the contemporary world and of the future.

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IDENTITY CHANGES IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

Abstract

In contemporary systems, there is a prevailing conscience that the society as a whole is dynamic and no static and that it undergoes permanent changes during its stages of development.

Within the course of these changes, the process of globalization emerged, through which economies, societies, cultures and even linguistic communities get integrated by means of communication, transport and trade.

Social, economic, and political bonds that surpass the borders among countries determinately condition the fate of all those living in those countries.

We will see that, according to many authors, such as A. Giddens, the globalization of social relations should be understood first of all as a system of time and space in our social lives. It is not a new process; contrariwise, it dates back some centuries ago when the impact of the west began to spread all over the world. The globalization process did not happen smoothly and unnoticeably – from the very beginning it was associated with inequality among different regions and countries in the world, by emphasizing the importance of the creation of societies in Third World countries.

Some of the challenges Europe has to face with include all the developed countries. The others have to do with the European situation – especially with the elimination of soviet-type societies in Eastern Europe. We should not think that the EU represents just a magnified version of what it actually was before 1989. With its borders open to the east, and consequently, to the south, the EU identity cannot remain unchanged.

The social identity changes depend on several factors, including the technological, economic, political and cultural ones.

Some authors, like Dominique Moïsi, say that Europe and the USA have been gripped by the fear “of the others” and by the fear of loss of identity and national interests. But, according to him, the world today has the greatest possibilities to be rebuilt on the grounds of the “clash of emotions”, unlike the ideas presented by Samuel Huntington according to whom we are living in a world divided by cultural diversities, national interests, and political ideologies.

We will also present parts of our scientific research called “students’ approaches and attitudes towards global and religious movements” carried out with students from the Southeast European University.

Key words: national identity, European Union, social changes, globalization

Introduction

Globalization

In this paper we will focus on the impact of globalization on identity changes and the emergence of the European identity exactly as a result of the latest global developments in all spheres of human life. Also, we will try to explain why globalization causes insecurity and raises the issue of the identity. Among many types of identities, we will dwell on a few of them which are directly influenced by the process of globalization in modern societies.

The general notion which expresses the increasing interdependency of the global society is globalization.

Including a broad array of political, economic and cultural trends, the notion of globalization has become one of the most popular concepts in the contemporary political and academic debates. Globalization represents an ideological concept of the new world order, which implies a series of movements and projects at a global level in favor of the resolution of the political, economic, ecological, climatic and other problems and issues of mankind.”¹

The grounds of our research on the part of globalization will be the theory of the famous scholar Anthony Giddens, though other scholars will also be mentioned. Globalization involves the diffusion of ideas, practices and technologies. It is something more than internationalization and universalization. It is not simply modernization or westernization. It certainly is not just the liberalization of markets. Anthony Giddens has described globalization as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’. This involves a change in the way we understand geography and experience localness. As well as offering opportunity, it brings with considerable risks linked, for example, to technological change (Giddens, 2002: 495).

Based on the above-mentioned, we can say that the dimensions of globalization are very closely related to one another. Upon the comparison of the dimensions of globalization, it is important to point out that those dimensions cannot be strictly separated from each other. So, for example, the global problem of the protection of the environment cannot be observed separately from the economic dimension or the political one. This interrelation not only among the actors but the fields as well, represents one of the features of globalization.

Globalization is not a completely new process. It dates back several decades when the expansion of western influence on the world began. The globalization of social relations has not always developed in a peaceful way; from the beginning it was associated with huge differences and unequal development of different world regions, which contributed to the creation of the so called developing or Third World countries. This is nicely illustrated by Dominique Moïsi who claims that globalization today causes insecurity and raises the issue of identity (Moisi, 2010: 33).

¹ Jashari H., Abdullai J., Zhoglev Z. in the research project „Students and Global Political and Religious Movements”, SEEU Tetovo, 2008, p. 32

At times of globalization everyone and everything is connected and interdependent from one another. Globalization can be seen from different viewpoints. While the youngsters in Europe and the USA have already started to see it as a threat because of the fear of loss of jobs, opportunities, security, financial stability, accommodation, etc., the ones in the Balkans and in other underdeveloped countries see it as an opportunity, as a chance to prosper and build their future careers for themselves and their families. For example, based on the questionnaire the youngsters in Macedonia see globalization as a preserver of global security and as an opportunity for promotion (Figures 3 and 4 in the annex).

Another approach towards globalization, which is somewhat different, has been presented by the American journalist McLuhan who says that globalization is an international system, which replaced the Cold War era. According to him, the supporters of globalization are representatives of the speedy world, enemies of tradition, and followers of free market economy and hi-tech (Pajaziti, 2009: 210).

Richard Muir thinks that globalization is not a political concept, but rather a phenomenon which emerged with the rise of technology, economic tendencies and entrepreneurship, and which can change any political system in the world. In accordance with this conclusion, some scientists in the sphere of international relations confirm that the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a result of global trends in the world economy, which can change the already established political structures (Muir, 1997).

The “Arab Spring” is a pure evidence of the above-mentioned since global movements in the world could break down even the hardest government systems, as were the dictatorships of Mubarak and Gaddafi. One of the benefits from globalization is the Internet, which through different social networks and especially Facebook managed to hitch up the millions of inhabitants in the Arab world and be one of the most important factors for the success of the nation-wide movements.

Based on these as well as other approaches and observations and enunciations on the issue of globalization, we can conclude that globalization is a social phenomenon which ruins the traditional loyalty towards the national state, feelings of national belonging and the national identity itself.

The European Identity

In this context, we can talk about the European Union which is a result of global changes and processes and which strives for creating a supra-national force within which everyone will be united in diversity.

If we attempt to define Europe geographically, we would say that it expands from somewhere in the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, not knowing exactly if it also encompasses the British Isles (“The Euro-Skepticism emerged in the beginning as an emphatically British phenomenon, contributing even further towards the concept of unsuitability or weirdness of the country against the project of a Continental Europe for political and economic integration” (Harmsen and Spirling, 2004: 13)). It would have been even more difficult to define Europe from the cultural or historical viewpoint. It is more than obvious that Europe is an unclear concept with unclear boundaries. The complex

identity of Europe can be defined only if we take into consideration all the uncertainties, ambiguities and controversies. The unity in Europe can only be imagined as a sum of contradictions, as an example of law and power, democracy and despotism, spirituality and materialism, reason and myth...

Within this paper we will set aside the geographic boundaries of Europe, which are equally important in terms of the future of the European identity, and we will deal with the political context on defining the European identity.

Before getting into the essential analysis of what the European identity actually represents, we need to point to out that the identity in the modern societies is diverse and it is expressed as a physical, legal, regional, national, ethnical, cultural, and social identity.

By researching the complex issue of the European identity (as a political and institutional entity), we have to not only go back and analyze what is currently going on in the area, but also have in mind the existing projects for the Europe of the 21st century.

Some might ask "*Why do we need a European identity?*" Until recently, the idea for a European identity was almost equal to the western identity, whereupon Europe emphasized western values as well as the universal human values. Until the end of the Cold War, Europe was part of the west led by the USA where it retreated from its discredited identity on behalf of a universal system of western values.

After the collapse of Communism, the unification of Germany and the attenuation of the importance of the World War II in the contemporary political culture, as well as the emergence of the European public sphere, the European identity occurred. However, this kind of identity is not in tension with national identities since the latter are themselves undergoing some very important changes in their nature. But, the question still remains, "What makes Europe different from Asia, America or other global identities?"

The "European Identity Charter" is worth mentioning in this case, according to which Europe is founded on the values of "tolerance, humanism and brotherhood."²

Currently, there are three different projects within the cadre of the European Institutional Framework, somehow inverse among each other, about what should actually Europe be:

- The first project aims at ordering Europe as a leading economic power in the world
- The second strives for establishing a social Europe paying special attention to human rights and democracy, and
- The third project protects the existing national states and even fights for their enforcement.

From World War II to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the establishment of a strong Europe was fully supported by the USA. National states received support and assistance for integration in a single economic community due to certain strategic and political goals. However, things began to change in the last 15 years and the USA is not really encouraging this project anymore; they are even opposing it, because of fears lest Europe becomes a leading economic and financial power in the world.

² http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwswww/203chart/chart_gb.htm

Other scholars strive for making Europe a social community with strong warranties for human rights and freedoms, for democracy, for equal opportunities for all and for a Europe in which competition in the sphere of education, sports and arts will prevail. Habermas and Derrida's opinions accompany the above-mentioned ideas and approaches. They are striving for the role of social protection, which has to be assured by the social state, which means existence of trust of Europeans in the power of the state (Habermas and Derrida, 2005).

It is obvious that this cannot be achieved without financial means and stable economy, but that is not an excuse for creating a supranational and unmerciful economic (why not a military) power which would oppose all of its competitors throughout the world. According to Joseph Weiler, Europe is unavoidably a cosmopolitan community because it comprises of various different nations and cultures. This means that Europe is a creature whose aim is to promote values of tolerance and humanity (Weiler, 1999: 301).

The idea of a European identity, according to Habermas, is such as to express cosmopolitan movements in modern societies, such as new types of loyalty, memories and dialog. A concrete example of such a cosmopolitan embodiment of the European identity, which has become quite influential lately is *United in Diversity*. As a subject of endless discussions, *United in Diversity* seems to be gaining the shape of self-understanding in contemporary Europe. Therefore, unity can only be comprised of the recognition of diversity and has to refer to values compatible to the fact of diversity. Hence, the European identity can be seen as recognition of diversities and the capacity for being established upon those grounds and values and principles.

However, there is also a third project which is less ambitious and adversative to the first two – this implies perpetuation and even empowerment of national states and exists as an idea mainly in right-wing political parties and movements with a clear racist and nationalist character. The recent developments in some European countries as well as the results from the referenda in France, Denmark and Norway showed that a considerable portion of the population is against Europe's supranational character.

In France, the so-called Gaulist euro-skepticism is well known. It is revealed through *Rassemblement pour la République (RPR)* – a political party of De Gaul supporters who oppose the European Union and fight for the national cause. The Gaulist party has always been a national movement. In a European context, the traditional Gaulist accent on the national sovereignty, unity and dignity is shown with great distrust towards supranational institutions and structures, as well as an opposition against the idea of a federal Europe. The initial Gaulist approach was characterized by antagonism: the Gaulists voted against the European Defense Community in the distant 1954 and then against the European Economic Community and EURATOM three years later, in 1957. There are also other anti-European movements in France and other countries, which are still opposing the idea of the European Union and its supranational character.

In the case of Macedonia and the Balkans, the opposition to the European Union is quite weak, almost inexistent, and the majority of the population is in favor of the integrative processes in the EU and NATO as well and they see it as the only hope to get out of the poor condition in which they are currently living. (Figure 5 in the annex).

As we have seen ourselves, the campaign against the Maastricht Treaty as well as the second-hand nature of the European elections served as a possibility for the euro-skeptics to adjust their convictions and beliefs oriented towards the concepts such as identity, anti-supra-nationalism, sovereignty and national independence.

In this respect, we can point out Gidenns's approach according to which many nations, including those within the EU, have to found their identity on different grounds. This does not mean that national states will disappear. According to the latest developments in the world, it is possible for national states to get re-established even more firmly. This can also be confirmed having in mind what the former US Department of State Secretary, Condoleezza Rice said on one occasion, "the US should in the future be led by national interests rather than the interests of the international community".³ These are the impressions we agree with and we consider that the stronger the national values are the stronger the European Union be.

Some of the challenges Europe is facing with nowadays encompass almost all developed countries. The others have to do with the European situation – especially the elimination of soviet-type societies in Eastern Europe. In post-communist countries, by the end of the 20th century the process of transformations of societies was manifested in various different forms starting from Baltic countries to those that seceded from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The social changes in Eastern Europe date back in the '50s marked by the disagreements between the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and later expanding to Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in the 1980s through the Trade Union Association *Solidarnost* led by Lech Walesa and the Forum of Intellectuals of Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. That was the period of the fall of the Iron Curtain for countries of Eastern Europe which at the same time meant *going back to Europe* (Abdulai, 2010). We should not assume that the EU represents just a larger version of what it actually was before 1989. With its borders open to the east and the south, the European identity cannot be left unchanged. The expansion process of the EU implies exchange of cultural, national, linguistic and even religious values and the more the western values expand to the east, to other countries, the more the values of the latter become an inseparable part of what we call European identity.

Some authors, like Dominique Moisi, say that Europe and the USA are obsessed with the fear from the "others" as well as from the fear of losing their own national interests and identity. However, in his opinion, the world today has the greatest possibility to re-establish itself on the grounds of "clash of emotions" – contrary to the idea of Samuel Huntigton according to whom we are now living in a world divided by cultural differences, national interests and political ideologies.

These were more or less the main ideas presented by renowned scholars on the issues of globalization and social identity as well as our short comments and opinions about the above-mentioned situations.

3 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55630/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest>

Based on the reviewed literature we come to the following conclusions:

- There is an unclear type of a European social identity at the level of a cultural model in which the new forms of self-understanding and self-recognition are emphasized. It is only from this perspective that we can recognize the shape of Europe.
- The European identity, in all of its meanings – personal, collective and social – does not compete with national interests; in fact, it is most probable that national identities are becoming more and more cosmopolitan, as are our personal identities. Both, the national and the European identity should be seen, as most of the other collective identities today, as fluid and weak rather than hard and compacted, rooted deep in the cultural and historical ideologies and mindsets.
- The European identity can also be recognized outside the EU members; with the very preparations and reforms, which are currently being undertaken and implemented in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within their framework of the accession activities, the European spirit is more and more attendant, which in itself means an acceptance of the European identity and its values. In this context, there is a need for greater engagement by European institutions in order to promote these values, as it is also needed to create a more positive environment to accept and implement the democratic policies and principles of western civilizations. National, state and religious values should not be sacrificed on behalf of the acquisition of this kind of European Identity; on the contrary, they should enrich it and make the European slogan *United in Diversity* as realistic and close as possible.
- Macedonia possesses all the preconditions to become a model of a really functional multi-ethnic country in which all its citizens could live *United in Diversity*.

Tabular display of the survey carried out with students from the Southeast European University in October, 2011

Methodology

The research is based on the data collection for the defined indicators by using the content analysis of the essays that were given to the students prior to compiling the questionnaire; based on this the questionnaire items were compiled and then there were three focus groups created to analyze the outcomes of the research, i.e. the questionnaire and to get their feedback on the results. The selection of respondents was based on the random choice, having in mind the color of clothes they were wearing, by deciding on a predefined color in advance. Another method that was used was the comparative analysis, which included collection of different approaches and other researches in order to come to the final product. The below-mentioned graphs represent only some of the questions that we thought would reflect more clearly the ideas and impressions about the process of globalization and the European identity.

The data were processed using the SPSS software for social research.

Surveyed students:	Albanians		Macedonians	
	F	M	F	M
	151	144	105	109
Total:	295		214	




Figure 1.

As can be seen from the first chart, contemporary society is ideal according to almost half of the respondents, and especially male students of Macedonian nationality. By definition, the society is dynamic which is actually shown in the first bar.




Figure 2.

The technological and economic factors are the most influential in terms of social changes, and this can also be proved by the responses shown in the above chart.




Figure 3.

There are quite diverse responses with regard to defining globalization, and this can actually be expected because globalization is a little of everything.




Figure 4.

The global political changes by most Macedonian students are seen as an opportunity for promotion and development, which is not the case with Albanian students – living in a country where you can enjoy all the rights influences the way we see the globalization as a process. Albanians have always been more discriminated in this respect thus their responses are more pessimistic and negative.




Figure 5.

The answer to this question shows, however, that we have a mass of pretty mature students who are not afraid of euro-integrations and are neither skeptical nor pessimistic at all in terms of their national and European identity.




Figure 6.

If the answer to this question is compared to the previous one, we can conclude a conflict of concepts or ideas; however, there is some truth in this as students are more skeptical towards globalization rather than Europeanization, because they still see Europe as a more fanatic and traditional integrity which would not endanger the national and state values and peculiarities.




Figure 7.

It is more logical that the national and state identities are more important within the framework of global political and social changes – they cannot be practiced individually in our homes as can be religion. Moreover, Macedonia is currently facing a problem regarding its name and consequently, its identity, with its southern neighbor – Greece, and therefore responses like are normal.




Figure 8.

This chart represents a positive thinking towards the European identity. In both cases of greater representation of percentages, we can see an optimistic approach in terms of defining the European identity. It is both, a system of values and a unity in diversity. This is what Europe actually represents.




Figure 9.

We cannot really come to a conclusion comparing these data. It depends on how things are seen by different communities and what these social networks are really used for. In any case, this remains an open issue for further research and analyses.




Figure 10.

No Comment!




Figure 11.

We can interpret the above-given responses by a part of Macedonian students as more nationalistic rather than real and professional when they say that Gjorge Ivanov is the most influential person in crating our image of the European identity.




Figure 12.

In the region of the Balkans, there is still a conservative, traditional and patriarchal opinion and approach towards certain taboo issues and there is no room for thinking differently. In given moments it cannot be considered negative at all and this kind of thinking and attitude against the homosexuals is more than expected. After all, God created men and women so that can get together and expand the humankind. No religion in the world allows homosexual relations and marriages.

Resume

The selection of questions in this research was not done unintentionally. Although they might seem quite broad and heterogeneous, they are pretty well related to one-another and to the overall idea of the European (and any other collective) identity and globalization. Some decades ago, people had not heard about gay marriages and parades, about legal drugs and prostitution, about *absolute* freedom of speech and behaviour in this region. This was at least the situation in the Balkans, and especially in the western part of the Peninsula. It still is, though with small changes, and we consider that globalization and collective identities, such the European one, also have their disadvantages, since they negatively influence certain small but yet very important features of a nation or a community, with special emphasis on moral and ethical values, religious convictions, drugs, prostitution and alcoholism.

In the Balkans people still see ideologies through a person that in a way symbolizes it, or vice versa. We believe this also happens in many parts of the world. Therefore, when talking about fascism one cannot avoid mentioning its main ideologist and follower, A. Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin, or Castro. Therefore, personification is pretty important in terms of the creation of a certain conviction about an identity, ideology, country or religion.

Social networks today have become the most important means in social developments and changes throughout the world and they are actually part of the now well-known process of globalization. The *Arab Spring* emerged as a consequence of the active implication of social networks and resulted in the fall of almost all the authoritarian regimes in those countries.

The same can be noted in our country as well, having in mind the latest developments related to the fight against the so called *Islamic radicalism*. Though the protest organizers are unknown, people still managed to get well-organized thanks to these social networks.

To sum up, almost all of the questions in this research are directly or indirectly related to the process of globalization and as such are quite meaningful to us as they were to the respondents (third year undergraduate and first year postgraduate students at the Faculty of Public Administration and Political Sciences at the Southeast European University in Tetovo and Skopje) when they were asked to do them.

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WAS FUKUYAMA RIGHT - HAVE WE REACHED THE END OF HISTORY OR THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION NEVER ENDS?

Abstract

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning, not only of economic, but also of political liberalization. States began to let up and faced the growing demands of its citizens to participate in the process of making and implementing decisions and policies. Thus the world reached a silent consensus about the legitimacy of liberal democracy as “the best system of government, devoid of deep disadvantages and contradictions which would lead him to collapse”. This system according to Francis Fukuyama is the endpoint of the evolution of ideologies - drivers of human activity. Liberal democracy is the maximum that modern man can achieve, and because of that, for Fukuyama it represents the “end of history”. However although life in democracy is full of benefits, its residents are free, equal before the law, enjoy numerous rights, they are controllers of the government that govern on their behalf and for their own good, still cannot be given precise and only answer to the question is it everything so perfect?

Modern societies, despite their “democracy” are not homogenous, but rather even more highlight the cultural, religious and linguistic differences between them. The modernization of societies and the increased interaction between people through electronic communication, mass and social media, trade and tourism leads to a great exchange of knowledge, attitudes, opinions and ideas. Modern man is increasingly seeking to highlight its own identity through the things that distinguish it from the other, fearing not be blended with the majority. On the one hand, with increasing economic and political power of the societies, they seek to influence the creation of a global and universal culture, in which they will have the biggest impact, and on the other hand citizens of these societies begin to define their identity through tradition and religion. Therefore modern societies contain certain contradictions which may be a source of dissatisfaction of the citizens, and thus lead to their mutual destruction. So the question remains, whether the man who lives in a liberal democracy is even more satisfied with his live, that there is no longer need to fight and look for something more?

Key words: Francis Fukuyama, globalization, liberal democracy, end of history

This paper will elaborate the thesis of Francis Fukuyama for the end of history, and also will open some dilemmas including the dilemma - have we reached the end of history or the struggle for recognition never ends?

Francis Fukuyama was born on 27 October 1952 in Chicago. He is a graduate in Philosophy and has PhD in political science from Harvard University. In the magazine for American Foreign Policy “The National Interest”, in summer 1989, Fukuyama publishes his article “The End of History?” In this paper, he actualizes the question of the perspective of ideology, and at the same time caused a major intellectual debate of the late last

century. A large number of intellectuals criticize his thesis, therefore he wrote the book "The End of History and the Last man" in 1992, in which he elaborates his thesis in order not to be misinterpreted.

In this book, Fukuyama, explores and confirms his attitudes, indicating that in the years that have been passed, the world reached a consensus about the legitimacy of liberal democracy as the "best" system of government, free from flaws and deep contradictions that would lead it to collapse. Liberal democracy is the destination point of the evolution of ideologies, drivers of human activity. Liberal democracy is the maximum that modern man can achieve, according to him.

When we talk about liberal democracy we have to do distinction between the concepts: liberalism, democracy and globalization. When the process of liberalization in non-democratic regimes began, there is often conflict between authoritarian government and resistance by citizens. The process of democratization occurs when there is a set out in the normative basis and when there is a beginning in establishing rules and procedures for establishing a democratic order. Democracy represents society in which there are already grounded postulates for a stable democratic system (Zendelovski, 2010).

Globalization is a term that we use for "postmodern" society, it describes today's world and named the time in which we live today (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005). It's not something material; it's not geographic or space defined, but still affects people's lives. Globalization reminds us of Emperor without empire (Held & McGrew, 2003). In essence the term globalization is dichotomous. And while the world becomes much smaller, because of various connections for different and apart countries, at the same time he became bigger because the opening of new and broader horizons (Osterhammel & Petersson, 2005). Globalization hasn't got the same affect neither on all countries, nor on all processes. And its impact on states is seen in interconnection to solve the big, important, issues that cannot resolve within the state as economic problems (global financial recession, the rise of poverty), environmental problems (global warming, climate change, lack of resources) and security problems (weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, unilateral appropriation of territories under the sea surface and space) (Zendelovski, 2010).

Fukuyama is aware that even stabile democracies today are not righteous or without serious social problems, but still he believes that liberal democracy is free from fundamental internal contradictions that would lead it to collapse. Therefore he argues that liberal democracy is the "end of history" (Fukuyama, 1994).

His use of the word "history" is the subject of numerous criticisms and polemics of theoreticians, especially those who under this term understand only the occurrence of certain events. Because of that, at the very beginning he stresses that the "end of history" should not be interpreted as a failure to appear in new significant and deep events, stopping the time, or some kind of apocalyptic disaster in which all humanity will die. But simply that reached the end of history as a single, coherent, evolutionary process that will take into account the experience of all people at all times (Fukuyama, 1994).

The man and his life in the community evolved from primitive tribal communities in which he lived long time ago, through various feudal societies, theocracy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny, until modern liberal democracy. Societies have changed over the

years trying to satisfy the deep and basic needs of their citizens, their rights and freedoms, and above all, the human need to be recognized by others.

Finding solutions for large and important issues and people's satisfaction of life in a democratic society, according to Fukuyama suggests that the need for progress and development is reduced. The aim of the modern "history" of humanity is in a larger number of states to establish a liberal democracy, which remains only coherent political aspiration that extends over different regions and cultures all over the world (Fukuyama, 1994).

The economy began to liberalize through the creation of free market. Liberal revolution in economy sometimes preceded and sometimes followed the political freedom around the world (Fukuyama: 1994). According to Fukuyama the man is not only economic entity. He is different from other living beings because he is able to feel. If he is treated as less valuable, he feels anger, if he fails in his life, he feels shame, when he is correctly valued he is proud. His feelings lead him through life, encourage him to be active and move it through the whole historical process. The desire for recognition and the feelings like anger, shame and pride are part of the human personality, and they have a significant importance for political life (Fukuyama, 1994).

Fukuyama considers that desire for recognition leads man in bloody struggles for prestige, which results in separation of society into masters who risked, and slaves that are submissive. Ultimately, this separation does not fully satisfy the desire for recognition within any of them. According to him, with a democratic order, differences between masters and slaves would be annulled, and all of them would become mutually recognized citizens who are recognized by the state through the provision of a number of freedoms and rights.

In a world where most of the countries are liberal democracies, or at least aspire to become that, Fukuyama believes that imperialist wars should be minimized because liberal democracy replaces the irrational desire to be recognized as bigger than others, with a rational desire to be recognized as equal (Fukuyama, 1994). But are we today witness on struggle for equality in international politics or for unequal recognition of one as better than others?

The struggle for freedom and equality, man win in a state that recognizes and respects his rights, but that is not infinitely long struggle because it ends with the establishment of free societies which recognized their citizens. Still, Fukuyama cannot answer the question: is the recognition that is available to the citizens of modern liberal democracy completely satisfying them? (Fukuyama, 1994). This question opened some dilemmas: even if life is full of benefits in democracy, even if the citizens are free, equal before the law, enjoy numerous rights, even if they are a controller of the government that govern in their name and for their own good, is everything so perfect? Does the system contain some contradictions that would be a cause of unhappiness of the citizens, and this would lead to its destruction? Are people who live in liberal democracy, even more satisfied with their own lives, so they don't need to struggle and look for something new any longer? If the answers to these questions are positive then we really reached the stage when there are no more new ideologies, we have reached the end of history.

History and humanity have moved through centuries by the need for recognition, the need that is satisfied in liberal democracy. This need for recognition is criticized by the theoreticians of political left and political right.

The critic of theoreticians of political left refers to universal recognition, which according to Fukuyama is achieved in liberal democracy. They think that universal recognition is unreal, because the capitalism creates economic inequality, and the existence of poor and rich people, leads to their unequal recognition in any sphere. With other words, liberal democracy continues to recognize equal people, unequally (Fukuyama, 1994).

He replied to this critique that unequal natural abilities of the people, the economic separation of labor and the differences in culture are the most difficult to eliminate. Fukuyama believes that in progressive democracies, poverty as a problem is transformed from a problem of the natural needs to problem for recognition (Fukuyama, 1994). Even the most ideal societies are not immune to social differences. Every attempt for universal equality restricts someone's freedom. Therefore Fukuyama says that there is no such established or natural point where freedom and equality found its balance, there is not even a way for their simultaneously optimization (Fukuyama, 1994).

The critics of liberalism do not disclaim their principles as an obstacle to overcome existing economic inequality. They try to find the perfect place in which freedom and equality would be in balance. We can have freedom without democracy, but equality is characteristic only for democratic countries. Therefore freedom is satisfyingly a small number of people, while equality offers smaller pleasures for the mass. Most famous accusation against liberal democracy which comes from theoreticians of the political left is "unequal recognition of equal people" (Fukuyama, 1994)

More serious critique comes from the political right theoreticians. According to Fukuyama, they believe that the recognition received in liberal democracy, (un)consciously transform the ordinary man in the "last man". The last man, in the spirit of liberalism, has given up from the faith in his higher value; he is satisfied with his own happiness and has no competitive aspirations for something better and more. The last man has no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such a desire, any achievement is not possible as well as any perfection.

According to Fukuyama the society leads forward by *megalothymia*, the desire to be recognized as better than others. This at the same time is the main reason for inequality. If the people have always been equal, then society would never be developed. Human satisfaction at the beginning would bring the man to the end. Modern man wants to believe that his lifestyle is right and the best, his desire for recognition is done, he enjoys the benefits of nature, achieved a material wealth, and therefore he had stopped to struggle for something better.

The man, so many centuries spent in wars, fighting for equality, and now when he finally won, he wonders, is the struggle against injustice what leads him and the society forward? Will destruction of inequality in his life lead to monotony? People are trying to establish the best socio-political system entire life; they think that perhaps the greatest satisfaction comes from the struggle to achieve that high goal, not from the goal itself.

Fukuyama says that the last man's life is a life of physical safety and material wealth, isn't that all that we wish? But when we achieve all that is there any chance that we can

feel at least a bit of frustration that can draw us into new wars and struggles for still unconquered rights?

The need to reach something, to be better than the other, is necessary for life. Democracy as a system providing “exhaust valve” for people with increased *megalothymia* through elections. According to Fukuyama electoral politics is an activity through which a man enters into struggle with others for social recognition based on opposite views. The election canalized ambitious nature of certain individuals.

The stability and power of democracy lies in the fact that non-democratic systems left unsatisfied most of humanity and those who do not want to play by the rules of democracy are few. However, not any regime or socio-economic system is not able to satisfy all people all over the world. Not even liberal democracy.

If we agree that history is moving cyclically, the imperfection of society in which people lives forces them to request a change of that society. Winning the long expected recognition in liberal democracy transformed ordinary man into a “last man”, who is satisfied with everything, and maybe because of his boring he can begin to look for new challenges, whose consequences may be devastating for humanity. When only the liberal-democratic governments will govern in the states, when all people finally live in peace and harmony, when the world will only go forward, what are the chances to find one person who because of any reason will be unsatisfied with it?! Will he start it to fight again, unable to imagine a world without a struggle? Would the latest man create a cruel first people who will start to fight again for recognition?

Looking through history, liberal democracy is the highest stage that man has reached, not because it fully satisfied the human desire for recognition, but because this system has found ways to transform the desire for recognition in a more rational form. As a result, today more and more societies are “hurrying” to the liberal democracy, it is a massive spreading as “a cure” to all those societies “suffering” from another form of government, convincing people that it is the final form of human governance; it is the maximum limit which man can achieve. Societies with different cultures, languages, histories, traditions are more and more closely through political institutions, economic development, and globalization.

Therefore, today’s humanity for Fukuyama, looks like a long string of wagons, which, even if they are made of different materials and different colours, they still look like each other and they all are located along a road. They are only different according to the speed of the movement’s commitment to moving, obstacles that are on the road and their ability to resolve them. As a result to different conditions some of them will be destroyed, others will deviate from the track, third will simply give up at halfway, and some, again, will try to reach the goal after some shortcuts. Still, Fukuyama believes that the city will get a sufficient number of wagons, so that any reasonable person must agree that there was only one trip and just one goal.

Have we reached the final goal, have we achieved perfection and are modern people so satisfied with their lives, that they do not even think that maybe somewhere a better system exists that it is expected to be found? The dilemma continues...

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY VS. NATIONAL IDENTITY

Abstract

The discussions regarding the significance and relevance of the identity represent an inevitable segment of the current sociological, anthropological and philosophical debates. On the other hand, the concept of the European identity formation is one the most relevant topic in the scientific and political sphere. There are several approaches or several aspects from which the European identity can be analyzed and defined as such. One of the existing definitions states that the European identity dwells on the idea of a cultural family. According to another definition, the European identity is founded on the idea of United Europe. Very often, European identity is equated with “universal values”, such as individualism, social cohesion and tolerance. Defined in such manner, European identity is transferred to the sphere of politics and it is given a political dimension i.e. it becomes a political identity.

This paper examines comparatively the patterns and basis of European identity formation and national identity formation, using an approach based primarily on nationalist theory with special emphasis on cultural aspects. In other words, for the purposes of this paper the nationalist theory is the one that is providing a framework for the analysis of European identity formation. The paper is focusing also on the sustainability of European vs. national identity.

Key words: European identity, National identity

Introduction

*I*dentify, as one of the most sensitive issues of current political, cultural, philosophical, sociological and anthropological debates, could be defined as a sense of belonging that enables the people to understand and categorize the world where they live in. Identity is a dynamic process of creating, changing and harmonization, determined by various internal and external factors.

The identity is considered to be a biosocial category. From a biological or sociological perspective, it is impossible to find two totally identical or totally different persons. Each person poses some features that make him/her similar or identical to some other person, or features that make him/her different from another. The dialectical nature of identity refers to the fact that it identifies and differs at the same time, bearing in mind that certain individual or group is identical with some other/s only if the given individual/group is different from another one at the very same time. So, the *Us/Other dichotomy* becomes a constitutive element of the identity.

The identity of each person encompasses both individual and collective dimension. Belonging to a certain group, based on some common features that simultaneously make the given group different from another, is defined as a *collective identity*. There are three main typologies of collective identity: social, cultural and political identity. *Social identity* refers to the relation between the individual and the social structures. *Cultural identity* relates to history and heritage. *Political identity* outlines the relationship between the citizens of a state and/or nation. According to Schneider (Schneider, 1999: 9), citizenship rights and duties provide the foundations of political identity. This division, however, does not preclude a close relationship between these three forms of identity. They are normally interrelated, particularly in the case of national identity. In this respect, the nation is supposed to embody all three forms of identity. The nation is clearly a political actor that strives for recognition. However, it is also supposed to provide the foundations of a society that is based on a shared culture and heritage (Guerrian, 2002: 137).

European identity represents a new form of political identity. There are several approaches in defining and analyzing the European identity. According to some scholars European identity cannot be expected to follow the pattern of national identity, simply because the EU is not a nation-state but a new genre of political institution born out of a new socio-political and economic environment shaped by globalization (Guibernau, 2011: 36). On the other hand, theories of nations and nationalism are well suited to illuminate these questions for two reasons. They can give us some idea of what the integrative factors are, because they try to explain why certain human groups become nations. At the same time they can shed light on the barriers to integration, because they present causes for the rise of nationalist movements, who more often than not originated in opposition to integration attempts on part of the government (Bakke, 1995: 2)

This paper examines comparatively the patterns and basis of national and European identity formation, using an approach based primarily on nationalist theory with special emphasis on cultural aspects. In other words, for the purposes of this paper the nationalist theory is the one that is providing a framework for the examination of European identity and its sustainability compared with the national identity.

Defining National Identity through Cultural Aspects

There is neither a simple nor a unique definition concerning the issue of national identity. For Anthony Smith (Smith, 1991: 14), national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means:

“...national’ identity involves some sort of political community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all the members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong.”

Nonetheless, Smith mentions some other markers, in particular *common beliefs* that contribute to the formation of the national identity. They include the idea that nations are territorially bounded units of populations and that they must have their own homeland; that their members share a common mass culture and common historical myths and memories; that members have reciprocal legal rights and duties under a common legal system; and that nations possess a common divisions of labour and system of production with mobility across the territory for members (Smith, 1991: 13).

Culture, perceived as a set of elements used by the group for the purpose of self-identification, becomes an indispensable segment of the current discussions pertaining to nation. A great number of eminent scholars dealing with the study of nation underline the role and relevance of culture in the process of nation formation.

Why Culture. Culture is one of the fundamental areas of social existence and an immanent factor of identity and development of each and every state. It is an exceptionally specific and heterogeneous sphere that comprises all the material and spiritual values which have derived from the process of thinking and the human intervention in the environment and the society.

A man is considered a *cultural being* due to the impact of culture in structuring his/her inner and external world. The culture had influenced the formation of the thinking process, which enabled him/her to think rationally, to judge about meaningful and valuable issues and, finally, to make decisions about the way people live their own life. It had an important role in the construction of human emotions, subconscious and unconscious dimensions of the individual. There would be no culture without man. Yet, no man would exist without culture.

Claiming that culture has an influential role in the construction of human identity, it is considered as a process of adopting a certain cultural tradition whose distinctive peculiarities derive from the cultural history of the community. Thus, depending on the cultural tradition of the community, the man experiences and lives through *matters* in a different way compared to *others*, as well as the expression of their reactions differs in identical situations.

Under the influence of different cultures, people began to come out with different feelings concerning identical issues. For example, those coming from different cultural backgrounds, experience differently and differently manifest the sense of self-awareness, consciousness, guilt and repentance. Some of them have much more pronounced sense of tradition, belonging, and loyalty to their ancestors and attachment to their own cultural heritage while the sense for the same values of the others is very poor. Subsequently, the issue of skin color, gender, sexuality, life, death, etc. have very different significance and meaning in different societies.

As Parekh argues, the skin color in some environments has a metaphysical significance and plays a role in defining the status and power in the society, while in other environments, it is absolutely irrelevant. Somewhere the sexuality issue is treated as a purely physical function, while at some other environments, the sexuality is attached not only with a cosmic significance, but also it is seen as a divine activity due to the bringing of a new life, and therefore it is covered with mystique and taboos. Even the inevitable

things such as death, are experienced differently in different environments. Somewhere it causes a feeling of human weakness in relation to the nature, however somewhere it is welcomed with a sense of joy because of the belief that it is achievement of liberation from this earthly world of grief.

Through the culture we experience our own identification. The culture gives us a sense of belonging. The role of identifiers, particularly language and religion, are of significant importance in building a sense of belonging to a particular group. Therefore, in given historical circumstances, language and religion – used as an instrument of identity policy - become a basis for determining the intra-group similarities and inter-group differences.

When culture is associated with the concept of nation it is also granted a geographical and political space. The boundaries of the *Other* therefore become social, political and geographical. Culture and community become one at same. The main implications of this shift are to create unity within imaginary community (Guerrina, 2002: 143)

For a great number of contemporary scholars the concept of *the imagined community* coined by anthropologist Benedict Anderson was a starting point in their studies and analyses of the origin and existence of nations. In his work "*Imagined Communities*" Benedict Anderson defines nation as an imagined community because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them - encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings - has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations (Anderson, 1998:19-21).

Eric Hobsbawm considers tradition, memories, myths and legends as a common fiction, thus providing the basis for nurturing the collective ego of certain social groups that subsequently a nation is built upon. He believes that the existence of cultural elites is of particular importance to the creation of works in all fields of culture and pertaining to building the national identity. Nonetheless, he regards literature and language as exceptionally significant, due to the fact that they contribute to the nation to distinguish and experience itself as a distinct entity.

Ernest Gellner (2006: 6), at the very beginning of his work "*Nations and Nationalism*", ascertains the difficulty in defining the notion of *nation* and pinpoints two, in his own words, provisional definitions:

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations make the men; nations are the artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it.

Each of these two provisional definitions, the cultural and the voluntaristic, has some merit, pointing out an element which is of real importance in the understanding of the notion of *nation*. Gellner highlights willingness and culture as crucial elements in formation of nations.

Dominique Schnapper, assimilating Gellner's views, believes that the sense of belonging, as one of the preconditions for formation of nations, derives from a rather long shared history, which according to her, in most cases is either fully or partially coined. When it comes to building of collective identity (in this case national identity) she believes that the adoption of the abstract rights, such as human rights and observance of the state, is insufficient compared to the interiorization of the national tradition, which she regards as a genuine instigator of political mobilization.

According to Pool (1999: 13), the nation is a specific cultural object and our national culture provides a moment of self-recognition through which we both confirm our individual existence and become conscious of ourselves as having a collective existence:

".....It exists in and through the language we speak, the public symbols we acknowledge, the history and literature we were taught in school, the music we listen to, the currency we use, the sporting activities we enjoy, and the news bulletins on the television. These cultural artifacts enable us to recognize that our way of life has an objective external existence, and constitute the social environment which we recognize as ours and in which we are "at home."

European Identity

European identity as a new form of political identity, derived from the novel political institution created out of the free will of sovereign nation states members of the European Union. Namely, the idea of Europe that has literally emerged from the ashes of the Second World War is enshrined within the guiding principles of the European treaties. This idea is founded on the principle of the establishment of economic and political cooperation for the mere purpose of fostering the security and stability in the European region. Simultaneously, the idea of Europe assumes recognition of some kind of common, or so-called universal values, such as: Greco-Roman tradition, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, civil right tradition, democracy, rule of law and human rights. These ideals, which have come to symbolize the guiding principles of the idea of Europe, comprise the core of the European identity.

The former Secretary-General of NATO, Daniel Tarshchys, provided the following definition on European identity:

"... a very strong commitment to the individual, a commitment to social cohesion and solidarity, a state that is neither too strong nor too weak, respect for human rights, tolerance, these are some basic principles. The rule of law of course, the idea that government must be bound by the legal principles and the people must be treated equally."

(BBC World Service, 1998)

Subsequently, the European identity was equated with universal values such as individualism, social cohesion and tolerance, by means of which this category (i.e. European identity) was transferred to sphere of politics. In other words, it was given a political dimension.

Taking into consideration the multi-dimensional nature of identity, the European identity, although categorized as a political one, does not preclude the existence of the other two forms of identity: cultural and social. Even the proponents of the approach according to which the European identity can not be assessed through the lenses of the national identity formation pattern, can not ignore the fact that effort has been made to stress and discursively construct a common culturally defined European identity in a similar way as national identities have been constructed (Jacobs, Mier, 13-34).

European Commission has made an effort to find a new approach in defining a common cultural identity by understanding the political values and beliefs as basis of common culture:

(5) If citizens give their full support to, and participate fully in, European integration, greater emphasis should be placed on their common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity and their membership of a society founded on freedom, democracy, tolerance and solidarity; a better balance should be achieved between the economic and cultural aspects of the Community, so that these aspects can complement and sustain each other.

(Decision establishing Culture 2002, 1)

The creators of European identity equated cultural values with the political ones, thus equating the anthropological and sociological interpretation of the concept of culture with political culture which is purely political concept. For the further promotion of common cultural identity, several symbols were used such as: European flag, European anthem, European day and the European currency.

Although for the purpose of defining a common cultural identity the political values were taken as a basis, the myth creation, which was not exception for the idea of Europe, became an inevitable part of the European identity:

".....Contemporary ideas of Europe have inherited from ancient, medieval and early modern Europe the assumption that Europe is and has always been the centre of civilisation. The Greco-Roman tradition has been portrayed as the root of European civilisation and association of the Christian faith with the European continent has presumed that Europe is, and has always been, the centre of "the Faith". This process creates the mythology on which the idea of Europe is constructed. The assumption that Greek civilisation established the foundations of western and European civilisation is still felt strongly today. It is rare to encounter in-depth analyse of the pre-Greek civilisation in isolation, thus perpetuating the myth created by the Greeks themselves that Greece was the centre of civilisation and that the rest of the ancient world was dominated by barbarianism."

(Guerrina, 2002: 64)

According to this approach European identity is based on the idea of common cultural heritage and common historical experience such as: Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian tradition. On the other hand, many scholars claim that European identity, as a political

identity, should not be based on any particular culture, religion, past history, language or a set of allegedly superior “Western values”. This approach in defining the construction of European identity raises some interesting questions. For example: is it possible to neglect or deny someone’s particular culture having in mind that there is no human nature unrelated to culture, or in other words, no human being was created without the influence of culture; Is it possible to ignore or deny the importance of language in construction of someone’s cultural and overall identity having in mind its multi-meaningful function - as a means of social communication but also as an instrument that provides continuity of cultural tradition.

Is it possible to ignore and neglect religion as one of the most important and inseparable elements of the human identity in general; What about the Muslim population living in the EU member-states; What about Turkey’s accession in EU; Whether religion operates as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism in contemporary Europe and whether, for example, the opposition to Turkey’s accession expressed by some EU member-states derives from its Muslim allegiance rather than from the economic and geopolitical concerns often openly invoked by these countries. This is a highly sensitive and controversial issue (Guibernau, 2011: 34). Is it possible to ignore and neglect a history when many of European countries have spent centuries (and particularly the last one) killing each other, so the notion of a shared history has a sinister connotation (Castells.3).

These concerns and dilemmas question the sustainability of European identity. According to Bakke (1995: 8), Europeans must have something in common apart from living in Europe: in Gellner’s scheme, a shared high culture and increased cross-border mobility would be helpful in making one “nation” out of the Europeans; Anderson’s emphasis is on communication networks; going along with A.D. Smith means to focus on the ethnic or historical foundations of a European identity; and finally, drawing on Hobsbawm, we would concentrate on whether the means of inventing European traditions are available.

European identity vs. National Identity

Smith is pointing out that culture has a crucial role in determining the nature of the relationship between national and European identities. Comparing to the deeply rooted values such as culture, language, religion and cultural heritage, Europe’s common values, such as humanism, individualism, civil right, democracy and the rule of law are inadequate and insufficient in providing solidarity within a group.

Can we imagine an emergence of a European nationalism powerful enough to mobilize masses in the name of Europe; it would be problematic to find a common causes and interests uniting Europeans and prompting them to sacrifice their own lives in the name of the EU. So far, the nation-states retains the emotional attachment of its citizens and when it becomes alien to them or too wide and distant, individuals turn to regional, ethnic, local, and other forms of identity tying them to more sizeable communities that the EU (Guibernau, 2011: 41).

Exactly as Jovic (2003: 63-64) points out to the lack of the cultural aspect as one of the key arguments for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Namely, starting from the definition

of the nation as a political but also a cultural community, often created on the basis of a common language and/or religion, proponents of cultural argument, almost entirely connect the occurrence and disappearance of the nation to the cultural sphere, to the ideas and their realization. According to the same author, intellectual and cultural elites had the most important or at least very important role in the formation and dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Cultural argument claims that non-attractiveness of the Yugoslav idea (formulated by the cultural elites in 19th century) was the main reason for the breakup of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs were Yugoslavs only in situations when/while sharing narratives about Yugoslavhood, the Yugoslav idea. Then, when they stopped to see themselves as part of that narrative, when they stopped believing in it, when it ceased to be credible and convincing, the Yugoslav nation disappeared.

Nations and nation-states are not going to fade away. In fact, they are going to grow and become important sources of collective identity, more than ever, as new, formerly oppressed nations, come into the open (Catalunya, Euzkadi, Galicia, Scotland, Wales, Wallonie, Flanders etc), and as strong nationalist movements assert their rights in the public opinion against the submission of the nation to the European state (Castell, 3).

On the other hand, many examples point out to the fact that there is no united voice between member-states of the EU in some particular areas such as: international relations, foreign policy, security, and monetary policy. For instance: the recognition of Kosovo, the admission of Palestine in UNESCO, the military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and the assistance for the financial crisis in Greece.

The nation-states within EU continue to establish a sharp distinction between “communitarian” and “domestic” affairs in terms of policy and decision-making. For instance, recognition of national and ethnic minorities as well as devolution models are considered as “internal affairs” and remain in the hands of each particular nation-state (Guibernau, 2011: 36).

Conclusion

There are many elements that give priority and advantage to the national identity in terms of European identity. Some of them are history and culture as fundamental aspects of the tissue of everyday life. They provide us a sense of belonging to a particular group, telling us who we are, where we are coming from and where we are going to. Denial or marginalizing the histories and cultures that differ from those of particular group, has profound effects on the subjectivity and the identity in any society. Taking into consideration the *Us/Other dichotomy* as a constitutive element of identity (in this case European identity), language, religion, memories and cultural myths emphasise division rather than unity. The lack of cultural aspects makes European identity weaker than national identities. In other words, European identity fails in reaching a common sense of belonging, whereas the national identities accomplish this task in a very successful manner. In this respect, European identity, as merely political identity and an abstract concept, poses no threat to national identities in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the creators of

European identity should reconsider the future and the ultimate goal of this purely political concept, its prospects, durability and sustainability.

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TOWARDS A EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAFIES IN THE CREATION OF BALKAN MYTHS

Abstract

The rise of the nation and the promotion of national ideology have a key role in the redefinition of the Balkan identities. The new era of modernity is actually offering brand new standards for the definition of Otherness which is a precondition for the construction of the borders among the groups. During the imperial era, the communities were building the vision of the world through religious systems and their obeying as universal criteria. The new conditions of the market economy and citizenship offered the new national state as the only alternative, along with the nationalism, as an accompanying ideology.

However, in order to homogenize the future national entities, it is necessary to create criteria for ethnicity that would be able to create a unique ethical awareness or expulsion on the basis of the so-called mutual collective memory, regardless of the territorial bases or the linguistic-cultural distinctions. Therefore, even during the 19th century the proto-national intelligence would accelerate, establishing the ethnical boundaries, pursuant the myth of the origin and the durability of the discrepancies. This would become an eternal task of the social engineering, as well as a task for the creators who shaped the framework of the Balkan historiographies.

The challenges for the collective identity in the Balkans and the rest of Europe are approaching slowly, but surely. Simultaneously with the new mainstream of the political and economical integration of the Balkan countries into the European Union, the legal framework for the direct mutual communication and collaboration is being created. This threat is, at the same time, diffuse, uncertain and silent. It is not only an outcome of the external threats of the international terrorism which actually crystallize and strengthens the community as destined.

Key words: national historiography, national myths, nation- state, Balkans

Introduction

The rise of the nation and the promotion of the national ideology have a key role in the redefinition of the Balkan identities. The new era of modernity is actually offering brand new standards for the definition of the Otherness as a precondition for the construction of the borders among the groups. During the imperial era, the communities were building the vision of the world through religious systems and their obeying as universal criteria. However, the new conditions of the market economy and citizenship offered the new national state as the sole alternative, along with the nationalism as a necessary ideology.

However, in order to homogenize the future national entities, it is necessary to create criteria for ethnicity that would be able to create a unique ethical awareness or expulsion on the basis of the so-called mutual collective memory, regardless of the territorial bases or the linguistic-cultural distinctions. Therefore, even during the 19th century the proto-national intelligence would accelerate, establishing the ethnical boundaries, pursuant the myth of the origin and the durability of the discrepancies. This would become an eternal task of the social engineering, as well as a task for the creators who shaped the framework of the Balkan historiographies.

The origin of the Balkan nationalisms

The national project which arose from the religious settlement in the late Ottoman Empire generated the contemporary Balkan national discourse. These discourses were arriving from the Western Europe and a clash among the models for building a national ideology appeared. Since the original national ideology, under the veil of liberalism, humanism and the Enlightenment established itself within the framework of the Christian communities, the ethnicity related to the Orthodox Church would become the basic criteria for the building of the national originality. In the early 19th century Pan-Orthodoxy began its evolution toward the promotion of Pan-Slavism. The opposition towards the liturgy in “the Holly Greek Language” became the basic motif for the beginning of the quest for the medieval Empires’ roots of the Slavic communities.

This phase continued along with the subsequent transformations. In the middle of the 20th century, the Slavic groups began to construct their own “ethnical boundaries”, based on the speech dialect. In addition to that, while the Serbian nation created an institutional framework first, the Bulgarian proto-nationalism which soon followed maintained the Pan-Slavic aspect of the separation of the Orthodox Greek linguistic ecumenism. Hence, the Macedonian example would equally head toward the language distinction from the Greeks at the end of the 19th century in an effort to construct the boundaries toward the Otherness, but seemingly in terms of political distinction from the Bulgarian and Serbian factor.

First, the proto-national elites generated by the citizenships strive to construct special churches that would later establish the basic paradigms of the presence of the nation, while representing the secular modern system within the mass education. Hence, at least one generation would be needed to go through the educational institutions in order to secure the project of creation a homogeneous nation. The myth of the national unity in the forthcoming phase could be sermonized in terms of the primary societal institutions of socialization, as it is, for example, the Family. Nevertheless, in practice, the inconstancy of the character in these institutions, such as the variable nature equally regarding the physical and ethnical boundaries, prolonged the whole national homogenization until the first decades on the 20th century.

Nation’s genesis becomes a fundamental element in its strengthening. Even if there is a fictive past, yet it must be real. This is the reason why the culture continuity is con-

tingent and inessential (Mirtimer (ed), 1999: 34). Hence, the historical continuity needs to be invented, by creating an antique past that would overcome the effective historical continuity through semi-fiction or falsification. (Smith, 2000: 53)¹. National thinkers attempt to provide an answer to the following questions: what is the nation's origin, what are the nation's diacritical features, who belongs and who does not and what is the future of the nation (Brunnbauer, 2004: 165).

“Critical markers” such as religion, language and mutual territory do not denote one, same identity. Therefore, there must be a so-called “invention of the tradition”, there must be a creation of “imaginative communities” and there must be “a basic invented myth”. The group needs to own a mutual famous past, divine ancestors, hard times in the past, etc. Smith does not argue on the significance of the relativistic position of the historical truth and even not about it being irrelevant for the national phenomenon. Clearly, the ability of the national historians to document fables and the explosion of the unsatisfactory fictions is an important element within the sustainable relations amongst past, present and future, on which the national community is based (Smith, 2000: 55). According to Gellner, the high cultures strive to become the basis of the new nationality when right before the emerge of the nationalism, the religion was tightly defining each underprivileged as an opposite of the privileged ones, especially in times when the underprivileged have not got other mutual positive feature (such as the mutual history) (Gellner, 2008: 107).

Geertz locates the most obvious changes that appear along the process of national constituting within the second and the third phase, but the largest part of the far-reaching changes – the ones that change the general direction of the societal evolution- are happening less spectacularly during the first and the fourth phase (Geertz, 2007: 329).¹

1. Nationalism firstly appears as an expression of resistance towards the foreign (foreign culture, language, religion etc). This resistance within the industrial society, along with the sense for collective destiny with others creates the collective awareness and contributes to the generating of groups of intellectuals – the ones that consecutively are the first bearers of the nationalism. They strive towards creating political unit and, further on, toward creating a nation on the place of the country.
2. The euphoria lasts for a certain period after the creation of the state. After the establishing of the institutional system, the question arises again: “Who are we doing such a thing?”
3. Creating the artificial “we”, while there is a defining of the language as an issue during the defining of the nation itself (Ibidem, 330-333).

¹ According to Rousseau: “ the first role that we need to follow is the one for the national character. Every population has or should have one, character; if it is lacking we need to start stimulating it. The politics for Renan is not enough. The country as such cannot function solely as a social cemented nor can the relation among their citizens. It could be provided solely through the “ history” or even more through the historical comprehension and “ the cult of the ancestors” (Smith, 2000: 8, 11).

Balkan historiographies and the creation of national myths

Within the context of the Balkan nationalism and the building of the collective national awareness, the educational institutions have a key role. Through their curricula, they reconstruct the vision of the mutual past. In addition to that, the primordial aspect of the organic origin of the nation predominates almost universally. It is primarily based on ethno-linguistic traits of the group. Analyzing the Macedonian historiography, Brunbauer argues that the national discourse is determined by the primordial and essential approach that refers to the national and ethnical identity as something inherited and not a subject of change (Brunbauer, 2004: 188).²

Hence, even in the Balkan context, the myth or the myths are a product of the contemporary period. Even if they existed in the preindustrial past, their significance and symbolic value have considerably changed. National historiographies insist on the quest for a more profound historical past, in order to place the nation solidly and as far, as possible, into history. Thus, the Greek myth about the origin comes from the amalgam between the Byzantine Christian tradition and the antique past of “classical Greece”³. The Serbian and Bulgarian examples both insist on maintaining the continuity from the legendary medieval Christian Empires. Further on, the Macedonian historiography creates an image of a synthetic generating of the nation from the ancient past and the medieval Slavic tribes. The Albanian history has a pure religious and anti-Ottoman feature, but attaches a national overtone to the Skenderbeg’s rebellion.

It is clear that one cannot neglect the era of Enlightenment and National awakening as a significant segment of the historical past. However, it is built through attaching an essence to a natural and necessary process that comes as an outcome of the past, and vice versa - the past as a product of the reformed conditions of the present. Thus, in practice, the national unity is maintained on the basis of referring to the blood relations and the ethnicity in the country, rather than the commitment and loyalty towards the civil state. More or less, this is being replenished with the usage of mechanisms for coercion and idealistic stimulating.

Modernism and the creation of the modern state do not deny and supplant the primordialism at once, while the latter appears as dominant, especially in conditions of building of the newly-formed states. All of this contributes to the phenomenon and strengthening of the nationalism, racism or tribalism and the interstate separation with disputes (Geertz, 2007: 24-28). The increased Primordialism does not present an issue by itself inherited from the past that comes as an obstacle for political, social and economic modernization, but it is a reflection of the first serious (even though still relatively unsuccessful) attempt to realize a modernization of such type. This dialectics, dissimilarly expressed, is a general trait of politics of the new states (Ibidem, 29).

2 “Facts” are organized and the sources interpreted in a manner that would serve as an evidence of the existing of the Macedonian nation. The question about nation and nationalism in the Macedonian Historiography lacks with theoretical basis (Brunbauer, 2004: 189).

3 The Elements of the national narration under the sponsorship of the central government are pulled from the past. Karas claims that even in the self-aware modern country where the national identity mainly if formed through school programs (geography, history, literature and religion), worship of the national monuments, ceremonies on the national holidays, military and civil service, yet there is a transfer of the fundamental tradition (Karas, 2004: 295).

It should be stressed that the influence of the historical curricula within the reconstructing of the memory and tradition of the collectivities, should not be considered as a classical invention of tradition, but as a final form of the created general awareness through selective interpretation of facts. In the case of the Balkan nations there are some examples when the tradition itself is completely invented, such as the case of the system of rituals and symbolic manifestations derived from the building of the cults of the national monarchies, symbols (flags, hymn etc.) or the events from the distant ancient or medieval past that were completely erased from the collective memory and to which a new form and significance is being given - all of that in a function of the nation.

Even though these examples could be seen in all Balkan nations, they do not structure the national core, neither they dominate the system of construction of the national discourse. Historical facts, events, individuals and symbolic values derived on their own basis in terms of contemporary times are reshaped on the basis of selective reading regarding facts, events or individuals. For that reason, the contemporary national historiographies most often clash in their efforts to establish a monopoly of the national myth. The foreign myth could be experienced as a historical threat regarding the building of the alternative vision of the past. Further on, it can directly jeopardize the national myth through its direct negation, including the perception of the sense of jeopardizing, in terms of undertaking the values of the myth itself. Those values, as well as the negativities are equally inseparable in terms of the system of national historiographies.

Hence, the selection of the historical facts, events and individuals can be done in two ways. The external selection means excluding foreign historical elements, regardless of their relevance in the production of the historical processes. The tendency is clear. By exclusion of the Otherness, the one that is into possession is enraptured often being put into function of the contemporary politics. The second is directed toward the exclusion and selection regarding our own historical moments - meaning that the heroic past is created by the modern national historiography through elimination of all events and individuals that cannot merge into the appointed matrix of history. This selection could be equally motivated by ideological, political, religious, traditional and other reasons.

The depiction of continuous existence through time, while creating the nation up to the contemporary modernity is replenishing the myth of the origin. The establishing of the connection between the Antique and the Middle Ages with the modernity is actually a challenge to which the national history devotes a significant part of its mission. In addition to that, even in conditions of nonexistence of a certain continuity for national self-recognition, the myth for organic origin is being constructed through a search of relation with the distant past in terms of linguistic and historical traits. Frequently, the variable nature of the Balkan case is being explained as a foreign national infliction or as a national superiority, deep into the history of the medieval empires and antique kingdoms.

According to Smith, proliferation of the invented nations' traditions is qualified as "state-mania". According to the socio-constructivists, nations are socio-politically constructed falsifications, even though fabricated by the cultural engineers which design symbols, mythologies, rituals and histories in order to compete in specifically chosen manner with the mass modern needs. The historical continuity needed to be invented by creating the antique past that overcomes the effective historical continuity or through

semi-fiction or by falsification (Smith, 2000: 53). Smith does not argue that the essentiality of the relativistic position of the historical truth and likewise is irrelevant to the national phenomenon, as well. Clearly, the ability of the national historians to document fables and exploding unsatisfactory fictions is an important element within the sustainable relations amongst past, present and future, to which the national community is being based on (Ibidem, 55).

For example, in 1830 Jakob Fallmeraijer attacked the national stance that the modern Hellenic people are the descendants of the antiques and he claimed that they are mostly Slavs and Albanians. In response to that, Paparigopoulou claims that the Hellenic identity has been linguistic and cultural, but not racial. He strengthens the position of the Byzantism as a positive part of that certain continuity whose civil code was adopted by Kapodistria in 1928 and King Otto in 1835 (Karas, 2004: 318). This aspect of the fundamentalists of the Greek historiography justifies the assimilation that is being transforming from the significance of the “Holly” language with the framework of the Church service to a more contemporary interpretation of power of “the high culture”, that is, in the case of the Greek nation, represented through language and culture⁴.

This refers to the models for national constituting and building the nation alone. Namely, within the context of the Balkans until now in the current scientific thought dominates the assumption that the nations are based on the ethno-linguistic model of existence of the organic settled nations. The basic substantial national elements are the language, the culture and the territory, according to those aspects bears the second denotation. But as long some deepened substantial theoretical analyses are done, the conclusion is different. Beginning from the assumption of Brubaker, according to which the French comprehension for nationalism is state-centered and assimilation - oriented and the German one is Volk-centered and differentiating- oriented. Therefore, the first one is based on building universal cultural values and the second one is based on organic cultural, linguistic or racial communities. Hence, the second comprehension of nation is considered ethnocentrically and not as a political fact (Brubaker, 1999: 1). Such interpretation of Brubaker could be implemented in the framework of the Balkan historical- national context while there we may distinguish two differentiated phases within the national construction:

1. The first phase includes the French model using the assimilative power, placed on political ground;
2. In the second phase, the sense of ethnicity of the organ nations or ethnos is built. After the ascertaining it will get a tendency to recycle with the next generations.

“The nation alone is a culmination of the long past for challenges, sacrifices and devotion. Out of all the other cults, the one for the ancestors is the most legitimate, because they made all that we are now. The heroic past, great men, fame etc. are the societal base on which the national idea is rising” (Smith, 11). For Renan, the shared suffering is more

4 Thus, Paschalis Kitromilides refers to the cultural continuity through which “the forms of cultural expression, related to the Christian kingdoms and Orthodox service are being inherited”. The other argument that is used is the opposition of the Palaeologists forwarded equally towards both the western Catholicism and the Ottoman- Turks, which is interpreted as for an issue for expressing the Greek nationalism. But therefore the question arises: Is this Byzantine (Romaic) sentiment not only a confessional loyalty or is it ethno-religious nationalism? (Smith. 2000: 43).

important that the shared joy. The first is especially the one that maintains the collective memory for a long time through the history (Smith, 12).

Collective memory of the national community is consolidated through emphasizing the historical moments of suffering and sacrificing on behalf of the group. The memory of the hard times is used by the political subjects of the national present as a mobilizing attribute that is being used in the moments of the crisis of the present. Frequently, in moments of economical crisis, national consolidation is an alternative for sustaining the unity and the order in the society. But, as in the example of former Yugoslavia, the exploitation of nationalism into political aims could cause new national catastrophes, ethnic, religious or group disputes that are difficult to control.

Yet, every Balkan historiography constructs visions of the historical past where they were the victims in collective national sense. Thus, the one that the Greek historiography presents as a myth about the refugees after the Greek-Turkish war, then the Bulgarian one has it by the “injustice” with the preclusion of the “San-Stefan’s Bulgaria”, further on the episodes of the national rebellion such as the massacre at Batak. Furthermore, the Serbian historiography is a collective victim of the “Kosovo Battle,” but seemingly the recent history of national defeats related with the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia etc. While the Macedonian historiography focuses to the “Bucharest Peace” of 1913 and its separation of the “ethno-geographical” whole. It is impressive that each Balkan nation- state, except R. of Turkey, places the myth of the “Turkish slavery” through their national history as a dark, illegitimate part of their past.

One of the most essential segments of the modern history derives from the relation of the nations- states towards their Ottoman past and their general interpretation of the history. There are two approaches towards the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans: first, it is illegitimate (the myth about the Turkish slavery) and it represents a black hole in the history of this region and, second, the Ottoman heritage is being experienced as a legitimate continuation of the Byzantine tradition (Mazover, 2003: 19, 20).

The first interpretation is the fundament according to which every official historical fact of the Balkan nations- states was built. According to it, the Ottoman period is only the dark side of their history and this period appears only as an obstacle of the continuity of their medieval and antique kingdoms into modern nations-states. The Orthodox Christian tradition of culture and religion of the Balkan peoples is placed in a function of their perception of the Ottoman past where, framed through the religion, a survival of those cultures is provided. The latter is the basis for the building of the national myths, as well as the one that is named as “famous history of the ancestors” (Karakasidou, 2002:16). At the same time, there is the following perception of the West: “*The Balkan and the Adriatic as a final line of control and defense to the Muslim East*” (Noris, 1999: 18).⁵

5 This viewpoint is followed with the perception that, excluding Albania, is built by the nations- states in terms of the process of Islamizing as an illegitimate, regardless if this process was done in a violent or peaceful way. Especially in the 20th century all of the above was used by the Bulgarian state to conduct a coercive re-Christianization of its citizens, while the rest of the nationalisms, the attitude towards the Muslim monolinguals remains as discursive attitude towards the Otherness, equally produced from the Christian non-accepting of the group but as well as from the refusing of the Muslim communities to be integrated into the frame of the national whole.

The second interpretation is to comprehend the Ottoman heritage as a complex symbiosis of the Turkish, Islamic and Byzantine - actually the Balkan tradition. It is based on the logical assumption that the mutual life during few centuries needed to result with a mutual heritage (Todorova, 2001:241). The Balkan is, before all, very important as a western hypostasis of the Ottoman historical heritage, and its significance is increasing or decreasing into one complex and indirect linkage with the refusing or accepting the Ottoman past. This is the case especially nowadays, as almost in all of the Turkish ideological and political spectra a profound reexamination of the Ataturk republican heritage is being done (Ibidem, 74). Mazover claims that due to the desire to become Europeans, the citizens of the Balkan national states ought to deny the legitimacy of the Ottoman past (Mazover, 2003:21). Thus, for example, the discrepancies that were imposed on the Christian citizens in Macedonia into the national competition at the beginning of the XX century radically violated the dynamics of trade, intercourse and coexistence that were present during the late Ottoman Era (Kakraksidou, 2002: 84).

“The Golden Age” of the Balkan national myths is identifying mainly two constitutive elements: Pre-Christian powerful empires and cultures that arose in this region and the Christian medieval empires that preceded the Ottoman Islamic domination. The one that to the Greek myth represent is an antique classical heritage and medieval Byzantium. The Bulgarian, Serbian and the Macedonian myths represent the medieval Christian Empires that owned their own territorial centers onto which modern national states extend. Nevertheless, the Macedonian myth about the “well-known times” tremendously overlaps with the Bulgarian myth for existence of the statehood. Both of them neglect the fact that the Empire model is based on the triangulation religion- ruler- vassalage and it is not based on the national centric perspective to see the ethno- linguistic context of the group determination. Even more, the Serbian myth is undermined in its last decade, due to the loss of territorial base that redefines the manifest content after the establishment of the independence of Kosovo.

Seemingly, the battle for building the fundamental myth between the Pre-Christian antique past and the Christian concept of the historical statehood is remarkable. In the case of Greece, those discussions were opened during the creation of the modern state in the 19th century. They are tremendously manifested through the battle for establishing an official language on the basis of antique *Koine v Katharevousa* or the Folks contemporary demotic. Yet, among the others, those discussions are vastly opened after the year of 1990. Therefore, in Macedonia there is a tendency for reexamination of the Golden Age in favor of the Antique Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, while in Bulgaria more of the significance was given to the Pre-Christian culture of Thrace. Yet, it must be mentioned that as much as the “Pan-orthodoxy” and the “Pan-Slavism” were supported or facing a support from the Russian sphere of influence, Pre-Christian antique had become an integral part of the “Western Civilization” and it has been supported from the West. Hence, the current conditions of recalling the Antique in some of the Balkan nations which derived from the communist regimes after the 90-ties in the 20th century is actually tremendously a product of the modern globalization of the thought and the canalizing of the West as a basic criterion according the which the intellectual elites perform their defining.

The Heroic time is completely established in the Christian perception of construction of collective visions for self-sacrificing on behalf of the others. Hence, the heroic time proceeds after “the Golden Age⁶” and it is being given an anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic trait. Even Skanderbeg’s “Albanian” rebellion is being given a Pan-Christian trait, despite the fact that the contemporary historical visions build different images of the national heroism. The rest of the myths are mainly connected with the national liberation movements and rebellions directed against the Ottoman Empire – First and Second Serbian Rebellion, Greek Rebellion and the Battle for Independency, April Uprising in Bulgaria, as well as the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia. Further on, the Nation’s War of the Balkan People during the periods of the Greek and Macedonian Battle, The Balkan Wars, World War One and World War Two and even the Greek Civil War that despite of its general ideologically bases, in practice grew into a dispute of the Greek nation – a state with Macedonian minority.

It is interesting to mention that many of the heroes are a subject of aspiration of several nationalisms. Thus, the heroic mythology about Alexander the Great is equally produced by the Macedonian and Greek historiography, even though that it is incorporated much earlier by the second one; the myth about the heroisms of *Krale Marko* (King Marko) is equally placed into the Macedonian, Bulgarian and Serbian national epics. The mythology that is made about the character of the Macedonian revolutionary movement in the late Ottoman period is a subject of competition between the Macedonian and Bulgarian historiography.

Even if many of the educated members of the audience still stand for the belief that the roots of their own nations could be traced several centuries ago, most of the educated has nowadays left the old perennialism. Current dominant Orthodoxy is mostly modernistic (Smith, 2000: 27). Therefore, the integrative revolution does not slay the ethnocentrism. It only modernizes it. On the road to modernity, the national state tends to amortize the clash of the primordial and civilized linkage. The future of such nations-states is ether balkanization, fanaticism or leviathan state that would enforcedly deny the recognition of the ethnicity (Geertz, 2007: 79-82).

However, the Balkan primordial viewpoint still remains grounded within the framework of the national historiography. The primordial clashes are mainly concentrated around the battle of the educational system that unites the linguistic and religious issues and questions (Ibidem, 32, 33). This emphasized the primary role of the curricula as a base for the national homogenization and proliferation of the national mythology. The linguistic identities are being passed on from generation to generation through folk songs and oral traditions while the collective memory and national identity are being passed on from professional class of constructors of identity and institution (educated bureaucracy)

6 An exception is only the constructing of the myths for heroic past of the Antique. But those myths are not vernacularly established and a product of the collective memory, but artificially produced from the institutions in the nations- states. Hence, their mass presence in the Greek state is an evidence for strong institutional presence and usage of the mechanisms of the legitimate coercion, while in the cases with the rest of the Balkan nations, even though they exist, the extent of such myths is minimal. It the foreword of the “Shadow of the Balkan”, the Bulgarian poet Pencho Slaveikov writes: “Our folk songs do not pass the border of the 14th century, i.e. they do not signify previous historical events”... In his songs they (the people) have kept the names of a few pre-historical animals, but not the name of any king, for us” (Brasford, 2003: 171,172).

that is being raised in the modern period (Brunnbauer, 2004: 293). Creating the national identity by the national historians, especially in the early constituent period is experienced as a national and state assignment. The basic scheme of the national historiographies is to establish a linkage of the continuity between the Middle Ages (or earlier) and nowadays (Ibidem, 293, 294).

Conclusion

Creating homogenous nation state was the first priority in the newly formed Balkan nation- states. During the 19th century they produced preconditions for social, national and identity integration which was supposed to be imposed by institutions of mass education. The groups which do not fit in projected national pattern were predominantly assimilated or expelled. This was a proof that in the process of building Balkan myths both territorial and ethnical national models were used. In the same time, national mythology of separate nations clashed on their border lines. Some national heroes or events were excluded, but others became subject of pretension of several nations.

The future projections of this region develop toward the integration into the European Union. So, the common European identity project can also be imposed in the region of the Balkans. But, in the same time, Europe creates West Balkan region which, besides being a symbolic waiting room, can also be seen as political ghettoization of few problematic national issues and, in David Noris's terms "the last line of defense against Muslim east".

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“EUROPEANIZATION” OF THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Abstract

The subject of discussion in this paper is national identity and the question is whether national identity is a form of identity that can sustain a political community of the state and/or a union of states. The effectiveness of a political community, whether the nation, the state or the European Union, relies on the legitimacy derived from its members. We are in the realm of collective identities and particularly cultural identity that brings this discussion about new forms of identity in contemporary Europe into the area of nationalism studies. European identity, at this stage in history, cannot be cultural, for culture being historically constructed is too contested. “Europeanization” means a construction of a new collective identity, a new understanding of identity and its dissociation from the ethnically dominated territory of the nation-state. With this in mind, this article turns to concepts of identity as the term is employed in national discourses and argues that political integration of culturally diverse communities requires a form of identity beyond the boundaries of standard vocabulary of nationalism even in its civic form. This study is supported by the case of the Republic of Macedonia on two matters, Macedonian-Albanian relationships in the country and the relation between Macedonia and Greece on the “name issue” in order to draw implications for “Europeanization” of the Macedonian national identity.

Key words: national identity, ethnic identity, civic identity, “Europeanization”

Introduction

Democratization of the new post-communist regimes has become synonymous with European integration. The shift from candidate-state status to fully-fledged membership in the European Union is nearly impossible without the resolution of minority issues, which tells us more about the international status of the state than its sovereignty. The rhetoric of national sovereignty is an empty one without the full inclusion of its minorities. The post-communist citizen needs to reconstruct his/her national identity in the face of major systemic, institutional and normative changes. Such a reconstruction and redefinition of national identity is not well served by the old vocabulary of “ethnic nation”, finally in control of its national destiny, and other well-known phrases that populate national rhetoric.

The dissolution of Yugoslavia was a shock to the majority of its population. So, what happened? After having considered various reasons mostly connected to the rise of na-

tionalism in post-communism, an obvious gap appeared in this explanation. Something more substantial was happening. The country split because seven decades of the Yugoslav nations coexistence in the common state failed to create a sense of common purpose, or what Bhikhu Parekh called a “commitment to continuing existence” of the political community (Parekh, 2000). The systemic insecurities and political entrepreneurship associated with post-communism put enormous pressure on the historically evolved constitutional arrangements within Yugoslavia (Hakan, 1998: 107). When these needed readjustment to the new situation, the most important factor - the conviction about the future of the common state was absent and the state was sacrificed to a bloody solution because all ethnic nations were inspired by their ethnic identities. The elite manipulations, the rise of nationalism, the use of historical events as a justification for the mutual resentment were merely tools in nationalist politicians’ toolbox (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991: 132).

The general sadness that accompanied that particular breakup of the state was a disappointment of “multinationality test” failed. I have argued that the new democracy was actually a stimulating factor for the rise of nationalism, which in no way diminishes the fact that sustaining political unity in multinational conditions remains difficult. The price for national self-determination of Yugoslav nations has been extremely high. My question here is whether there are lessons to be learned from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Macedonian-Albanian relationship in the context of European integration. If economic, political and cultural interdependence is not enough to forge political unity, what is? What is it about national identity that makes the past seem if not more than at least as important as the future? More pertinently, how can the narrative of the nation, and thereby national identity, be constructed in such a way that its foundations involve a common future rather than a common past? The following attempts a normative approach that may answer these questions.

National Identity: Looking Forward to the Past?

The dissolution of Yugoslavia and Macedonian’s independence brought Macedonians into an insecure situation. First of all, they were no longer citizens of a big, respected and militarily powerful country, but henceforward rather a weak and poor state. Their existence as a nation was still not accepted by all neighboring states, with Bulgaria refusing to recognize the Macedonian language and nation, the Serb Orthodox Church refusing to accept the autonomy of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and Greece voicing strong opposition to the self-styled name of the new state and hence delaying its international recognition (Roudomentof, 2002).

In the new independent Macedonian state Albanian minority has succeeded to change the preamble of the Constitution in order to reflect the situation in state: a multicultural state with a sizeable Albanian national group (25 percent) and other minorities (10 percent), not the state of the Macedonian people as the former preamble suggests. The reason for seeking the changes in the preamble of the Constitution was not to undermine the Macedonian national identity, but to strengthen the identity of the Albanian national

group within the state. When such a move is opposed, the assumption is that national identity is a valuable national resource whose value can be diminished simply by the recognition of another identity whose members may then presume an equal status within the state. Identity begins to represent security and prestige in a logic, which suggests that more recognition of one group means less recognition for the other. Following this logic would mean that one group's identity is purchased at the expense of lesser recognition of another group's identity, which can only mean insecure nationhood feeding off a weak identity (Slaveski, 2003). In the case of the Macedonian-Albanian relationship, at least two damaging elements work against in this sense of threat: the historical memory and the insecurity of the new state. Whichever way, this is not a situation that can sustain a multicultural society comprising of different cultures, whether it is within a state or society of states.

When looking at the connection between national identity and foreign policy-making, it becomes clear that national identity helps define the parameters of what a polity considers its national interests at home and abroad (Prizel, 1998). This is based on a collective memory, which is hardly a reliable source in the case of South East Europe states, which are all, to a greater or a lesser degree, multicultural. It is precisely this past-inspired view of Albanians as a danger to the Macedonian nation that was at the heart of disputes between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in the newly independent Macedonia. It is the exploitation of the still in-secure Macedonian identity that provides a platform for the forces opposed to post-2002 government that in contrast to the previous administration, has secured the Macedonian candidature for the admission in the European Union. There is no doubt that the future of the new Macedonian state is not well served by national identity steeped in painful experiences of the past. Moreover, it is an identity wholly inappropriate to the future expectations which lie in democracy, in Europe and with the Albanian minority. Identities are not divorced from institutions, they may not be politically constituted in their essence (Miller, 2000: 125-141), but they can be reconstituted by political arrangements.

Differentiating: The Nation and Political Community

What was at the heart of disputes between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority in the Republic of Macedonia? The intolerance claimed by both sides is a result of a certain dynamic, which Brubaker calls a "triadic nexus involving three distinct and mutually antagonistic nationalisms" - that of a minority and the newly nationalizing state where they live and the external national home - land to which they belong (Brubaker, 1996: 4). Although Brubaker does not deal with the Albanian minorities in this context, it can be argued that the role of the external homeland is well exemplified by Albania, which has some 2 million of its ethnic kin spread all over the neighboring territories, namely Macedonia (500 000) and Kosovo (1,5 million) as a result of the historical processes after the Balkan Wars. The issue to explore is that of dual affiliations (Waltzer, 1992: 141-171), civic and ethnic and the situation when they conflict; when a minority feels more loyal

to the “external” homeland, or is perceived not to attach enough loyalty to the state of residence and citizenship.

A minority in the political sense of the word, is not given by virtue of existing, but by virtue of a decision to represent itself as such and this is where dual affiliation comes to be viewed as a threat to a state or vice versa. Minority nationalism too carries a political agenda: formulation and articulation of its demands, which may involve sustaining an unfavorable vision of the state, in order to remain credible (Beiner, 1999: 1). If the state does not respond to demands from minorities, the perception of mutual threat increases. The minority comes to view the state as not worth the emotional commitment, thus confirmed in its not-belonging, whilst the majority is justified in its view of the minority as not committed to the state which it consistently views as its own (Brown, 1999: 281-302).

This is of course the worst scenario, but its dynamics became very visible in Macedonia from 1991 to 2001. In the present context, it is important to note that since the Ohrid Framework Agreement was reached, the “Albanian issue” has been losing its significance in domestic politics. There are two interrelated reasons for this positive development. First, the circle of mutual mistrust has been slightly, even if not sufficiently, broken up by the new partnership and the pursuit of mutual accommodation in the common venture. Second, the main objective of Macedonia, its Albanian minority and Albania as an integral part of this “triadic nexus” has become the European integration, which requires all sides to reassess their strategies and seek compromises. In that sense, the European Union, by promoting political conditions in which new identities can be reconstructed has become an important and active actor - arguably, a fourth element to complement the old “triadic” relationship.

Fundamental to democracy are equal political rights, which in principle are guaranteed by citizenship, but it is important to note that awarding citizenship is not a guarantee of full inclusion and participation. The problems faced by the Albanian minority in Macedonia are not about being denied citizenship. Ethnic Albanians felt that they were being denied an equal political status and a share in the governance of the state. Currently, the main focus for the Albanian representatives is to enhance their newly achieved political status and safeguard greater autonomy for their minority.

Ethnic/civic Distinction: Blurring the Boundaries

The modern state has for a long time rested on social and cultural homogeneity, hence the perception that unity means homogeneity. In multinational (multiethnic or multicultural) states the process of homogenization can be conflicting, mostly due to the assumption by the dominant nation and its nation-building elites that the state is their own nation-state, which implies the exclusion of other cultures from ownership of the state. Civic identity tends to miss a chance as soon as there is a disagreement about political unity affirming policies. Ethnic nationalism is as much a consequence of the failure to establish political unity, as it is its cause, for the disintegration of the state, the loss of its

legitimacy, diminishes civic affiliation and leaves the field open to ethnic mobilization (Green, 2000: 68-90).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia changed the civic identity of the Albanian minority, who found themselves citizens of a new state they were less than enthusiastic about. The result manifested itself on two interrelated levels: the minority was presented as a potential threat to the territorial and national integrity of the state, and the state, in the eyes of the minority, became to be perceived as a serious threat to their existence as a distinct national group. The result was the narrowing of both identities, the Macedonian and Albanian, in the sense that they became defined in purely ethnic terms. Similarly, the mobilization of Macedonians within Yugoslavia could not be done on the basis of civic identity, for the state that should have inspired that identity was being questioned - in both cases the state failed to create a political nation and lost to an ethnic one.

The concept of civic identity in Macedonia is still extremely weak, and many ethnic Macedonians therefore resented the proposed change of the constitution's Preamble because they were afraid of losing the state for whose recognition they had to fight so hard. Politicians and intellectuals voiced concerns that, if the Macedonian people were not explicitly mentioned in the preamble of the constitution, the very existence of the Macedonian nation would be in danger. This view resonates with the widespread notion among ethnic Macedonians that they, as a nation, have fought for centuries for their own national state, which they now do not want to lose. Ethnic Macedonians still perceive Macedonia as their "natural" state, and involuntarily make more "space(s)" for the Albanians (Atanasov, 2004). There is still resistance for the Framework Agreement, which is especially emphasized among the ethnic Macedonians and which is often labeled as damageable for the Macedonian state (Gocevski, 2003, 120-121).

The Limits of Shared National Identity

The importance of national identity, it is argued, lies in culture, in language and a "story", all of which provides us with a moral agenda. Being a part of a political community may indeed not satisfy the more subjective elements of belonging, but does not exclude cooperation and political willingness. By the same token, a passionate sense of identification with one's nation may bring about a sense of dissatisfaction with its current form and institutions (Brunnbauer, 2002: 9). In the case of the Republic of Macedonia the Albanian minority is much more committed to cooperation within the post Ohrid Macedonian governments than it was before. According to the Framework Agreement "the parties invite the international community to monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the signed agreement" and request such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in the cooperation with the Stabilization and Association Council. In other words, implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has been set up as a precondition for integration of the country into Euro-Atlantic structures.

Under these circumstances, EU integration and NATO membership appear all the more important as they rank among the few projects on which members of the majority

and the other communities agree. To various degrees, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians are persuaded that only the Atlantic Alliance can protect Macedonia from external as well as domestic threats, thereby guaranteeing peace in the country. Consensus on membership in the European Union is even stronger. Most citizens of Macedonia feel it holds the key to a significant improvement in socio-economic standards and to a better future. In Europe without borders, Albanians will be closer to their fellows in other states and ethnic Macedonians will establish close relations with Macedonians that live in the neighboring countries. So, in the long run, the European option will make less important the demands of ethnic collectivity (Stefanova, 2003: 181).

The future admission of the Republic of Macedonia into the European Union will not be due to the efforts of Macedonian nationalists, but in fact a victory over them. The political cooperation in this case is not based on a sense of belonging to a particular culture, but is motivated by a common political aspiration, by belonging to a political community and sharing its fate together. The pragmatism and the willingness to compromise in order to direct the common fate in the best possible direction can be preferable to culturally-based identity which is prone to block compromise in the face of conflicting interests. At the heart of political unity is the accommodation of conflicting interests, whatever their nature, whilst unity based on cultural homogeneity is not a guarantee to either political unity or political cooperation.

Securitization of the “name issue”: New Government’s Policy

When ethno nationalism is on the rise in response to a perceived external threat in a particular state, the ethnic identity of the groups in that state will also rise to counteract the “loss” of identity space (Miller, 1995). The greater the intensity of the external threat, the greater the intensity of ethno nationalism and the stronger the mobilization of ethnic groups will be. The Framework Agreement lacks devices for “societal peace-building”, in particular for addressing the societal security needs of the ethnic Macedonians. In addition, at the international arena identity of the ethnic Macedonians is also challenged.

Claim of the Republic of Macedonia to use its constitutional name in the international arena is interpreted by Greece as a threat to its own identity (Roudomentrof, 2002). However, the Macedonian claim is not exclusive. Macedonia depends on the name “Macedonia” as the designation of both its state and its people. In other words, only the Macedonian identity is threatened. For Macedonians the name issue is a matter of identity and their existence: Macedonians do not have another “matrix” state to secure their identity; their identity is challenged by other neighbors and the provisional name implies a provisional status of the state. The applicability of a societal security dilemma in this case steady rests on the presence of the concept’s essential element, misperception and “illusory” incompatibility (Slaveski, 2003).

Beside the fact that the feeling of national identity cannot be judged by others, the Macedonian government is aware of the reality and it accepted negotiation about the name of the country. However, both sides are not capable to solve the problem by bilat-

eral negotiation, especially due to the fact that Greece is a member of NATO and the EU, two organizations that are the goal of Macedonian foreign policy in terms of membership (Novakova, 2006). The United Nations' mediation role in the Greek-Macedonian dispute is a sustained effort to establish communication in reaching an agreement which will resolve the misperception and avoid potential dynamic of a societal security dilemma. However, negotiations to resolve the dispute have not yielded a solution.

Few had ever engaged in an open debate on Macedonian identity and ethnic Macedonian nationalism. Under these circumstances, some kind of repercussion was to be expected, as it is now a renewed search for self-confidence and pride (Slaveski, 2009). However, the real question is: How long can ethnic Macedonians stand on this position? And, what consequences can this policy produce, integration or isolation of the country? Macedonia is facing strategic choice and changes in Strategic Culture. Whether it will be "fine tuning", compromise and integration in Euro-Atlantic structures or "fundamental change" in security policy goals is still tentative?

Instead of Conclusion

In the light of the above discussion, let me return to the Macedonian-Albanian relationship within the Republic of Macedonia. Now, the situation is different than before the conflict and coexistence is more realistic option than separation. However, not even the most optimistic state-builder in the Republic of Macedonia envisages a sense of shared identity between Macedonians and Albanians in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it would appear that the historically troubled relationship is beginning to settle into a political community identifying with the new state. The pre-condition of the successful continuation of this process is the belief that each group's future is best safeguarded within the state's current institutions. Should the part of the population which does not identify with the current institutions wish to destabilize them, the easiest way to do so would be through the exploitation of national sensibilities. These are rooted in history and largely depend on the extent to which mutual mistrust can be overcome. In each case it would appear that the emphasis on the identity of the political community and its future is a better safeguard for the coexistence of culturally diverse groups within one state than the emphasis on the national identity with its inescapable and unchangeable past.

The main aim here has been to make plausible the idea that the stability of a political community is better served by constructing a polity-based identity which looks towards the common future, than by a shared national identity. My argument has been that the extent to which national identity with its cultural content and preoccupation with the past can inspire political unity is limited. Its limitation lies in its inherent ethnic emphasis, which does not easily extend from "one" nation to "more" nations. The character of contemporary Europe is best described as "more" nations, whether inside the states or between them; consequently, the nation needs to be re-defined, if it is to address cultural diversity and offer an answer to political unity. The suggestion here is that the new definition of "the nation", the one which can give substance, direction and purpose to political

unity and successfully sustain the project of European integration, is that of a political community with a sense of shared political future, but not necessarily a shared national identity.

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DOES THE EU ENLARGEMENT INFLUENCE THE NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY? A Longitudinal Analysis in Old and New Member States

Abstract

This paper investigates whether changes occur in the national and European identities of the citizens from the old and new Member States following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Complementary, it seeks to identify the major attitudinal determinants of national and European identities for the EU citizens. The analysis focuses on the 27 EU Member States and uses individual level data from the 2002-2009 Candidate Countries and Standard Eurobarometers. The descriptive statistics and multivariate quantitative analyses reveal that no relevant changes occur in the levels of national and European identities. The two types of identities coexist and are shaped at various levels. Their determinants appear to be quite stable over time, thus indicating no major alterations after the enlargement.

Key words: identity, enlargement, attitudinal determinants

Introduction

The most recent enlargements of 2004 and 2007 meant the formal inclusion of approximately 90 million citizens into the European Union (EU). The inclusion of 12 new Member States moved the EU border eastward and diminished the heavy influence of some Old Member States (e.g.: the Polish and Czech influence on the Lisbon Treaty). The macro-consequences of the enlargement arrived within a few years: faster circulation of capital throughout Europe, higher migration flows, rapid economic growth in Eastern Europe, and increased support for extreme right parties in many European countries. However, it is unclear if the enlargement coincides with changes in the attitudes of individuals towards their country or the EU. In this respect, this paper investigates whether changes occurred in the national and European identities of the citizens from the old (EU15) and new Member States (NMS). Additionally, it focuses on determinants of national and European identities and their explanatory power before and after the enlargements. Accordingly, this analysis is driven by two interrelated research questions: Is there a change in the identity attitudes after the enlargement? If so, how do determinants of identity attitudes change over time?

To answer these questions, I focus on the 27 EU Member States and use individual level data from the 2002-2009 Candidate Countries (CCEB) and Standard Eurobarometers (EB). I use descriptive statistics and multivariate quantitative analyses to investigate

the changes in national and European identities and their possible causes over the years and countries. The tested explanations are density of political discussions, political attitudes (i.e. trust in the national institutions and EU), general retrospective attitudes (life satisfaction), economic variables (prospective evaluations), EU membership evaluations, and the left-right positioning.

The first section conceptualizes the term of identity and scrutinizes the layers of identity formation. The second section formulates few testable hypotheses to explain the levels of national and European identity. Next, I briefly discuss the research design and variable operationalization. The fourth section provides general empirical evidence and includes the multivariate analyses of determinants for the national and European identities in the old and new Member States. The conclusions summarize the main findings and elaborate on their implications.

Identity Formation - From National to European Identity

The concept of “identity” has contextual meanings (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 1). In its basic form, social identity is the complex of emotional and rational factors derived from the awareness of belonging to a group (Tajfel 1978: 63). This process implies both the positive identification with one own’s group and the strengthening of particular features through a comparison with other groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). At individual level, identity refers to the abilities of persons to acquire and internalize values characterizing the group to which they belong (Festinger, 1954). The development of the group is modeled by the sense of common identity (Smith, 1995). The modern period projected the state as a major driving force of identities. Various theories from the field of nationalism studies consider identity as a social, cognitive (Turner 1981; Turner 1991) and elite construct (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1983) or as a product of ethnic (Smith, 1998) and cultural interactions (Hutchinson, 1994).

Defining “who we are” is a dynamic process, not static, irrespective of the level of identity. The reasons for which an individual attaches loyalty to a certain group¹ are constantly evaluated and, consequently, the belonging is redefined. This happens since the sense of common identity that bound the members (Smith, 1995), the value and emotional significance attached to the membership (Tajfel, 1978: 63; 1981) are sometimes lost. There are instances in which the modification is rarely possible. For example, once the identity is formed on the basis of experiences accumulated within specific social culture, the bonds can hardly be broken (Dijkink, 1996). However, the key point to remember is that identity shifts can sometimes occur. This process is not primarily based on exclusion. Although Huntington’s claim (2004) according to which we can define our belonging to a group as soon as we know the principles we are against does not completely lack empirical support, it also fails to capture the reality. In order to maintain the collective/group identity, the members have to retain particular norms, values, interests, and attitudes which provide a self-contained image shaping both their identity and relationships with other groups.

¹ Identity is defined as the belonging to a certain group perceived by its members as different from other groups. For details, see Cottam et al. (2004, 45-46).

Following Anderson's (1983, 1991) conceptualization of the nations as "imagined communities", the rise of nationalism within contemporary Europe cannot be neglected. However, identity is not confined solely to the state, especially in Europe where the fully sovereign nation-state has reached an end (Habermas, 1994). In this context, previous studies revealed two possibilities: a divergence between the national and European identity or a multi-stage identity formation. On the one hand, individuals consider their national identity as being threatened within a broader European context in which they interact with a multitude of cultures (McLaren, 2002). As a result, they display negative attitudes towards the EU and thus provide solid bases for Euroskepticism. On the other hand, there are multiple layers of identity (Madens et al. 1996) in which the nation-state becomes the propeller of identity formation at the European level (Jannsen, 1991; Anderson, 1998). According to the latter view, individuals often identify with several territorial communities simultaneously (Brewer, 1993). The coexistence of national and European identities is thus possible; they are not opposites but heavily intertwined (Marks, 1999; van Kersbergen, 2000; Haesly, 2001; Brutter, 2003; Risse, 2003).

The differences between national and European identities are not limited to territoriality. The multiple identities interact differently with each other: some are separate identities (no overlap), others are cross-cutting (overlap without integration), others are nested (integrated), and marble cake (reciprocal influences) (Risse and Grabowski, 2008: 2). Empirical evidence supports the idea that the European citizens display multiple identities. While there are continuous debates regarding the core common elements of such an identity (e.g. cultural vs. political vs. economic), there is a certain trend towards the European becoming a secondary identity for many citizens. Even if we consider the multi-layered approach and we refer to European identity as a second layer, there are a few relevant obstacles. First, the EU is a young community composed of old communities – the nation states – animated by individual strong feelings of separate belonging (Jansen in Boari and Gherghina, 2009). Second, the European identity is built upon the national one. Very few characteristics shaping group identity – language, culture, historical experience, single economic and geographic areas, and shared necessity for security – can be reproduced at European level without being mediated by national layers. Consequently, very few people consider themselves Europeans without belonging initially to a country (Jacobs and Maier, 1998). On a complementary key, European identity means allegiance to broader political values and principles such as democracy, tolerance, and transnational cooperation (Citrin and Sides, 2004: 49). Third, the diversity of the 27 Member States creates a heterogeneous entity that adds a supplementary component to cognitive mobilization towards identity: the acceptance of other cultures (McLaren, 2002). Such instances could fuel lower degrees of identification at European compared to national level.

Earlier studies provide empirical evidence supporting the coexistence of the national and European sets of loyalties: recent figures from survey data illustrate how dual national and European attachments increased by 10% in less than a decade starting 1992 (Citrin and Sides, 2004: 50). Such shifts in attitudes take place even in countries known for their Euroskeptic traditions such as the United Kingdom. The national and European layers of identity are strongly interconnected in contemporary EU. The debates from 2005 in France and the Netherlands reveal these two different identity perspectives: the cosmo-

politan project corresponds to the elite-level appealed to political citizenship and rights, whereas the national-populist project centers on social citizenship, ethnic elements, and cultural authenticity, emphasizing the economic and cultural threats of enlargement (Fossum and Menendez, 2005; Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 11-12).

Explaining Identity

One of the bases for group identity is the interaction between individuals. When the layer of reference is a political community – such as the nation- state or the EU - the complex decision making mechanisms and the sophisticated institutional arrangements can be understood mostly through communication and interaction. The high level abstraction of these processes is worsened by the inattentiveness and ignorance of people (Bennett, 1996; Blondel et al. 1998). Accordingly, people who communicate may be better able to follow what happens and thus their identity will be enhanced. We expect intense political communicate to positively influence the level of identity (H1).

The level of satisfaction with life can foster national and European attachments (H2). Such satisfaction is not limited to political or economic aspects, but it entails cultural and social components. Furthermore, earlier research explains how perceptions of favorable national and personal economic conditions positively correlate with attitudes towards the EU (i.e. support) in the Member States (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Palmer and Whitten, 1999; Tverdova and Anderson, 2000). Thus, I expect positive assessments of the economic future to have a similar impact on the national and European identities (H3).

The relationship between political trust and identity is bidirectional. Berg and Hjerm (2010) illustrate how national identity can shape political trust in various ways, differentiating between civic and ethnic types of identification. At the same time, the causal arrow goes in the opposite direction as the political state is the reference object of the national identity. This is why citizens are expected to develop a higher sense of belonging to a state in which they have confidence. As the political institutions of the central administration – Parliament and government – are the primary tools for decision making within a state, I expect citizens trusting them to display a higher level of national identification. Rohrschneider (2002) argues that citizens that trust their national institutions have the tendency to vest confidence in the EU institutions as they trust the stances adopted by the national leaders at European level. This tendency of citizens to display attitudes towards the EU according to their evaluation of domestic political institutions is mostly observed with respect to the integration process (Franklin et al., 1994; Rohrschneider 2002). A similar logical mechanism is employed by identity formation and thus I expect trust in domestic political institutions to positively influence the national and European identities (H4). A similar argument can be developed about the trust in the EU that is expected to have a higher impact on the European identity than on the national one (H5).

The benefits of EU membership can also influence positively the sense of belonging (H6). Benefits are not restricted only to the economic dimension, but involve in addition freedom of movement, access to labor markets etc. It is intuitive to expect that

respondents who perceive their country as being part of a select club of prosperous and democratic states foster a higher sense of national belonging. Similarly, the perception of EU as a source of benefits advances identification with it. For this hypothesis, I expect a stronger effect for the European rather than the national identity. Finally, left and right have different meanings in the political spectrum. Traditionally, a positioning to the right of the spectrum indicates a tendency to favor the national entity. This is the only variable for which I expect divergent effects of the positioning: a positioning to the right to enhance the national identity, whereas a positioning to the left to favor a European identity (H7). However, differences may occur between old and new Member States as left and right have a different meaning in Western and Eastern Europe. Age is used as a control variable.

Research Design

When referring to identity, the qualitative analysis is the most appropriate tool to examine and to explain the development over time and across countries. However, the quantitative analysis can help identify general trends – the goal of this paper. I use descriptive statistics to estimate how citizens from the EU Member States perceive who they are and to observe the relationships between the two levels of identity – national and European – across time. The analysis covers the 2002-2009 period, i.e. two years before the largest enlargement from 2004 and two years after the most recent enlargement. The used data does not come from panel surveys that allow observing the shift in identity over time in the same individuals. Instead, I rely on data where different individuals are included in the surveys: Consequently, I cannot draw conclusions regarding the individual behavior. Whenever I refer to a change in the direction of national identity, I imply the general trend of the respondents from a specific country to position themselves more in this category than before.

The individual level data comes from the CCEB and EB surveys, one from each year. I selected those with questions about identity or related items: CCEB 2002.1, EB 57.1 (2002), CCEB 2003.1, EB 60.1 (2003), EB 62.0 (2004), EB 64.2 (2005), EB 66.1 (2006), EB 69.2 (2008), and EB 71.3 (2009). The year 2007 is not included in the analysis as none of the surveys had questions about the European identity. These surveys are appropriate to map trends as they include large comparable datasets in terms of standardized questionnaires, sampling method, and data collection. All the “do not know“ or “do not answer” responses are eliminated from the sample, being considered missing values.

The national and European identities are operationalized through two proxies. For the 2002-2006 surveys, the identity is considered in the answer of the respondents to the following question: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be [NATIONALITY - refer to citizenship]/European?” There are four initial response alternatives: “very proud”, “fairly proud”, “not very proud”, and “not at all proud”. The variable is recoded, the categories being merged two by two: the first two form the national identity category, whereas the last two form the category of people who lack national identity. For 2008 and 2009, when the battery of questions is modified

and these items no longer appear in the questionnaire, I use a different proxy. The asked question is: "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to the region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (...) our country/Europe?" The available answers are "very attached", "fairly attached", "not very attached", and "not at all attached". These are recoded into two categories, similar to the procedure from the 2002-2006 surveys. The proxies used for the identity variable are not identical. The pride of belonging to a nation is not the same thing with feeling attached to the same nation. However, they are functional equivalents for the purpose of this study. They both capture specific attitudes towards the country and Europe. The association coefficient between pride and attachment (run for the 2004 EB) is 0.9** (statistical significant at the 0.01 level).

The density of political discussions is operationalized as the answer provided to the question about how often a respondent discusses politics. The responses may be 1) never, 2) occasionally, and 3) frequently. The life satisfaction variable is operationalized as the answer to a question asking directly this; available responses were: 1) not at all satisfied, 2) not very satisfied; 3) fairly satisfied, and 4) very satisfied. The prospective economy is a dichotomous variable assessing the expectations of respondents about the future of their economic situation (as answer to a question using these words). Trust in domestic political institutions is an index reflecting the trust people have in political parties, legislature, and government. It ranges from 0 (no trust) to 3 (trust in all three); trust in the EU and EU membership are dichotomous variable. The left-right positioning is a three scale variable with three values (left, centre, and right), whereas age is a four category variable. All variables were scaled from the smallest to the highest assessment.

The Coexistence of National and European Identities

The logic emphasized in the theoretical framework indicates the coexistence of national and European identities. Two expectations are derived from those arguments: 1) the national identity to be stronger than the European one and 2) the dynamic of the two type of identities to be relatively independent. This section provides empirical evidence supporting both expectations. In this respect, it presents the general trends of national and European identity. It uses individual level data from CCEB and EB between 2002 and 2009 and distinguishes between the old and new Member States. Figure 1 reflects the longitudinal evolution of national identity with similar levels in the two types of Member States. Approximately 90% of the European citizens display attachment to their national identity, slightly more in the EU15 compared to the NMS. However, following the last wave of enlargement, the level of national identity in the NMS exceeds that from the EU15. Whereas the stability of national identity appears to characterize the citizens from the EU15, the NMS register a continuous (although minor) increase (with one drawback in 2006) throughout the examined period of time.

By comparing the percentages in Figures 1 and 2, we can easily notice that there are more respondents attaching loyalty to their country than to Europe. The European identity is displayed, on the average, by three quarters of respondents; there are slightly more in-

dividuals from NMS feeling Europeans than those from the EU15. Overall, the European identity gravitates around the same values, with minor oscillations across the years. A major downside appeared in 2005 when the consequences of the Constitutional Treaty’s failure were visible and when some of the NMS encountered difficulties in the aftermath of their accession. Apparently, the year following the accession registers drawbacks with respect to the European identity (see 2008 in the figure). In general, two conclusions can be drawn. First, there are no relevant differences between the attachment to Europe of citizens from the old and new Member States. Although the beginning of the analyzed period marked a relatively high difference, by 2004 the levels were almost equal due to an initial decrease among the citizens of the NMS. Second, the enlargements do not appear to influence the levels of European identification on medium term; there are only short term effects (one year).

Figure 1. Level of National Identity among the citizens from Old and New Member States





Figure 2. Level of National Identity among the citizens from Old and New Member States



One explanation for these low oscillations is the understanding attached by citizens to Europe. The theoretical framework emphasized the fuzzy meaning that a broader community like the EU can have to its citizens. Table 1 includes the different meaning attached by citizens to the EU in three different moment (2004, 2007, and 2009). These are not

exclusive categories; the figures indicate the percentage of people who mentioned those features for the EU. The most popular meaning attached to the EU is the mobility of people, followed by peace. The latter is somewhat normal if we recall the theory mentioning that democracies do not go to war with each other. Two economic features are also pointed out by a relevant percentage of citizens: the Euro and economic prosperity. Such evidence confirms earlier findings that mentioned the support for the EU as mainly driven by economic and mobility factors. It is somewhat surprising that a relatively small percentage attaches the meaning of democracy to the EU given its positive efforts in Eastern Europe resulting in democratization (Pevehouse 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005; Gherghina 2009). Unemployment and bureaucracy are the two negative perceptions observable for a share between one fifth and one quarter of the European citizens.


Overall, two general trends are visible. First, there are some differences between the meaning attached to the EU by citizens from the old Member States compared to the meaning attached by citizens from NMS. For example, peace, Euro, being stronger in the world and the EU as waste of money are features identified much more by citizens from the EU15; the citizens from NMS see more the EU in terms of economic prosperity, social protection, and mobility. Thus, citizens associate the EU either with features broader than their nation-states (the case of the EU15) or with features corresponding to their needs (the NMS). Second, and more important for this longitudinal investigation, there are rare instances in which the meaning changes over time. Peace is one of those features, quite likely determined by the presence of troops belonging to some EU member State in Iraq or Afghanistan. Cultural diversity is another example, relevant for our case. In a nutshell, the stability of meanings can explain the relative stability of European identity across time.

Figure 3 presents the percentages of citizens in the EU15 and NMS holding both identities. The levels and general trend are similar to those from the European identity. There are minor oscillations over time. Unlike the European identity, the dynamic of the citizens holding both identities differs between the EU15 and the NMS. The latter have a higher tendency of stability: with the exception of 2005, the percentage of citizens with the national and European identities is similar. Although certain oscillations are visible for the EU15 respondents, there are no clear connections between them and the enlargements.

Table 1. The EU Meaning for Citizens from the Old and New Member States (%)

		Peace	Economic prosperity	Democracy	Social protection	Free mobility	Cult. diversity	Stronger in world	Euro	Unemployment	Bureaucracy	Waste of money	Loss cult. Identity	Crime	Ext. border control
2004															
EU15		38	25	25	13	55	31	32	48	18	25	24	15	21	24
NMS		38	34	29	23	57	25	26	30	17	19	15	11	17	14
2007															
EU15		37	21	21	11	54	28	29	46	15	26	23	13	21	21
NMS		31	27	25	14	60	23	20	28	11	14	12	9	15	9
2009															
EU15		29	18	22	11	44	20	25	38	14	22	22	12	16	17
NMS		22	19	23	14	54	16	19	27	13	14	15	8	12	8

Figure 3. Percentages of Citizens having both National and European Identities



These general trends lead to three conclusions. First, consistent with previous findings, there is a priority of the national over the European identity: more individuals identify themselves as belonging to a nation rather than Europeans. However, as illustrated in Figure 3, a large number of respondents has both identities. Second, neither national nor European identities appear to be influenced by enlargement. Whenever oscillations occur, they appear random. The major failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the first impact of accession in some new joiners had only minor consequences with respect to identity. If the stability of the national identity is not surprising, at European level one could have expected a different dynamic given the increased number of Member States. However, the empirical evidence illustrates stable identification of citizens with Europe, primarily

due to a similar understanding of the EU across time. Third, there are no relevant differences in the attitudes of citizens from old and new Member States, their degrees of identification and trends are fairly similar. The following section takes this discussion one step further; it investigates to what extent the determinants of the national and European identity function and change over time.

Converging Explanations

Table 2 includes the logistic regression coefficients for national identity at three moments in time: two years before the largest enlargement and the years following the two most recent enlargements. The evidence generally supports the hypothesized relationships with no relevant differences between EU15 and NMS respondents. There are two exceptions. First, the density of political discussions has a counterproductive role in the case of the citizens from EU15: those respondents who discuss less politics with their friends attach more loyalty to their country. For NMS the relationship is weak. Second, the effect of the EU membership on national identity is mixed in the EU15 countries. For example, in 2005 respondents who consider that the EU membership is negative are more likely to have national identity, whereas in 2008 the situation is reversed. The third best predictors for national identity are life satisfaction, trust in political institutions and age (older respondents are more likely to have attachments to their country). At the same time, the prospective economy does not perform greatly in explaining national identity. Similarly, the EU related factors do not perform quite well indicating that national identity is shaped somewhat independently from the European processes. From a longitudinal perspective, two observations are relevant. The explanatory potential of the statistical models is quite stable across time. Second, there are isolated cases (e.g. the left-right positioning in 2008) in which the direction and statistical significance of predictors suffers modifications. Consequently, similarly to the general trend from Figure 1, the explanations are relatively stable over time indicating no major changes in the attitudes of individuals.

Table 2. Determinants of National Identity

Variables	2002		2005		2008	
	EU15	NMS	EU15	NMS	EU15	NMS
Frequency of political discussions	0.62** (0.06)	0.98 (0.05)	0.62** (0.05)	1.04 (0.08)	0.90 (0.07)	1.14 (0.13)
Life Satisfaction	1.52** (0.05)	1.77** (0.04)	1.37** (0.05)	1.60** (0.07)	1.19** (0.06)	1.46** (0.10)
Prospective Economy	1.08 (0.04)	1.17** (0.04)	1.12* (0.05)	1.02 (0.07)	1.08 (0.07)	1.05 (0.12)
Trust in Political Institutions	1.29** (0.04)	1.55** (0.04)	1.34** (0.04)	1.36** (0.06)	1.20** (0.05)	1.39** (0.11)
Trust in the EU	1.07 (0.09)	1.03 (0.08)	1.24** (0.08)	1.21 (0.13)	0.96 (0.12)	1.46* (0.19)
EU Membership is Good	1.08 (0.06)	1.16** (0.04)	0.91* (0.05)	1.21* (0.09)	1.19* (0.07)	1.47** (0.13)
Left-Right Placement	1.51** (0.05)	-	1.42** (0.05)	1.21** (0.07)	1.12 (0.06)	0.95 (0.10)
Age	1.16** (0.04)	1.13** (0.03)	1.15** (0.03)	1.31** (0.05)	1.30** (0.05)	1.16 (0.08)
Constant	1.08	0.34	2.27	0.44	2.65	1.96
Nagelkerke R ²	0.08	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.06
N	8,815	6,991	10,575	6,288	10,553	6,383

Notes: Reported coefficients are odd-ratios (standard errors in brackets).

** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

A similar story is told by the statistical analysis for European identity (Table 3). The statistical models – performing much better than for national identity – have similar explanatory potential over time. There is general support for the hypothesized relationships, two exceptions are again observable. The political discussions have an ambiguous role in shaping the European identity, whereas the respondents positioned to the right of the political spectrum are more likely to have this type of identity in the EU15 countries (contrary to our expectations). The most prominent variables are those connected to the EU: trust in the EU and the positive evaluation of EU membership. A citizen having confidence in the EU or considering the EU membership as positive is on average two times more likely to display European identity compared to those who do not trust the EU. A positive evaluation of life and the favorable economic prospects foster European identity to a greater extent than in the case of the national identity. Moreover, contrary to what was observed for the national identity, younger people appear more inclined to display European identity; however, the likelihood is somewhat weaker. Compared to the coefficients in Table 2, European identity reveals slightly more differences between the EU15 and NMS, but they remain quite reduced in the overall picture.

Table 3. Determinants of European Identity

Variables	2002		2005		2008	
	EU15	NMS	EU15	NMS	EU15	NMS
Frequency of political discussions	1.06 (0.04)	0.96 (0.05)	1.10* (0.04)	1.12* (0.06)	1.25** (0.03)	1.19** (0.05)
Life Satisfaction	1.36** (0.04)	1.64** (0.04)	1.22** (0.03)	1.27** (0.05)	1.12** (0.03)	1.35** (0.04)
Prospective Economy	1.12** (0.03)	1.19** (0.04)	1.16** (0.03)	1.04 (0.05)	1.22** (0.04)	1.14** (0.05)
Trust in Political Institutions	1.12** (0.03)	1.02 (0.03)	1.10** (0.02)	1.00 (0.04)	1.12** (0.03)	1.02* (0.04)
Trust in the EU	1.99** (0.07)	2.95** (0.08)	2.24** (0.06)	2.16** (0.08)	2.07** (0.06)	1.74** (0.08)
EU Membership is Good	2.30** (0.04)	1.32** (0.04)	2.02** (0.03)	2.03** (0.06)	1.96** (0.04)	1.92** (0.05)
Left-Right Placement	0.98 (0.04)	-	1.02 (0.03)	1.22** (0.05)	0.96 (0.03)	1.20** (0.04)
Age	0.97 (0.03)	1.09** (0.03)	0.91** (0.02)	0.92* (0.04)	1.02 (0.03)	0.95 (0.03)
Constant	0.08	0.19	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12
Nagelkerke R ²	0.21	0.18	0.22	0.19	0.20	0.15
N	8,494	6,702	10,478	6,447	10,523	6,358

Notes: Reported coefficients are odd-ratios (standard errors in brackets).

** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

Conclusions

This paper aimed to identify whether changes in identity attitudes occurred after the EU enlargements from 2004 and 2007 and what elements drove these changes. The first major conclusion, derived from the evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2, is that enlargement appears to have had no effect on national or European identity; no relevant changes occurred over time in either EU15 or NMS. The visible drawback occurred for European identity around the fuzzy period following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. Although more citizens identify themselves with their nation rather than with Europe, the European identity registers quite high and stable values. Such stability can be caused by similar meanings attached to Europe by citizens over time (Table 1). The same holds true when analyzing the percentages of people holding both identities. The latter leads to a second conclusion: the national and European identities are not exclusive, rather complementary. However, their determinants are different. The national identity is primarily shaped by domestic components, whereas the European identity is related to the European processes. Third, the determinants of national and European identity have fairly similar explanatory power over time. Thus, no changes appear to be produced by the EU enlargement in the attitudes of the citizens.

By departing from the trends identified in this paper, further studies can distinguish between identity components (e.g. social, cultural, political or economic) and focus on cross-national variation. In this respect, the meaning of identity for the EU citizens re-

quires a detailed exploration to combine qualitative assessments and micro-level investigation focusing on the content of the self-declared belonging. Future analysis can explore the identity formation in the European societies and thus address the nuances arising from the various minority-majority relations or the nexus between national and European identity.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN “UNKNOWN POLITICAL OBJECT” OR A POSTMODERN POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTING OF ITS OWN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IDENTITY

A European identity is an abstraction and a fiction without essential proportions. Identity as a fiction does not undermine but rather helps to explain the power that the concept exercises.

Bo Stråth

Abstract

This paper represents an explication of the fundamental premises for the definition of the term identity in a political / international political sense, in correlation with the ontology of the European Union as a specific legal and political entity. Therefore, we should not talk at any costs about the EU “nationalisation” or “etatization” because of the specific geopolitical, strategic and certainly the geo-economical conditions, in which it is born, grows and functions, which are also radically different in relation to others. Namely, when talking about the Union in relation to others, at the same time its specificity must be stressed, also autonomy and distinctiveness as attributes of its international political identity.

The title of the paper stems precisely from the formulation of the European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who once said: “The EU is functional, but also an unknown political object on the international political scene”. In this respect, are presented the key benefits of the Lisbon Treaty in this area, because it appears as a “new opportunity” for the embodiment of the EU as a political union. This Treaty, initiates the Union in a *politea sui generis in status nascendi* or a political community of particular type in a phase of birth. In this regard, this paper underlines the postmodern nature of the Union, which makes it different than other global actors even more. On this basis, there is emphasis that identity is not something static, or fixed, but it is a dynamic process of (self) recognition, differentiation and establishment of a recognizable image of the particular political community in the existential environment. While taking into account the growing “density” of the multilateral relations, permanent communication with other international actors and the intensity of the globalization as an unstoppable process, the Union within its Common Foreign and Security Policy, aims to produce a referent level of solidarity and cohesion as essential elements of such political / international political identity. In addition, the paper presents the theories and doctrines of realism, liberalism and their derivatives, such as: neorealism, neoliberalism and neofunctionalism as dominant theories that more accurately specify the essence of the international political identity, nature and profile of the Union in the international relations.

Key words: International political identity, political community, European Union, postmodernism.

Defining the international identity of the European Union

The problem of defining the international political identity of the European Union comes not only from the complexity of its specific nature, but also from the complexity and specificity of the identity as such. Identity in general, as a concept, implies the existence of autonomy, distinctiveness and divergence of one political entity in relation to another or other homogenous and heterogeneous political entities. So, the identity as such, and thus the international political identity, starts from the differentiation of what it means: “I” vs. “You” or “Us” vs. “Them”. Analogously, this formulation essentially corresponds to the syntagm of the theorist Bo Stråth, when he says: “Europe and the other and Europe as the other” (Jansen, 1999: 34). Or as theorist Heinrich Schneider argues: “Anyone in search of her or his identity will pose the question: ‘Who am I?’ With regard to collective identity the questions are: ‘Who are we? Where do we come? From? Where do we go? What do we expect? What will expect us?’ But these questions really serve to clarify another, more fundamental one: Why and how can we (or must we) talk in the first person plural?” (Jansen, 1999: 34), in addition, Heinrich Schneider stresses that “there are two common answers; one of them sounds as follows: ‘Because we want it that way!’ The other one refers to certain things that we have in common: a common history, common views about our present situation, common projects for our future and the tasks that are facing us there (...) Collective identity as well needs the distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’” (Jansen, 1999: 34).

In the interest of further defining of the notion of (international political) identity, Schneider also presents the fundamental elements of an international political identity, as follows:

1. The “spiritual ties” as they are manifested in a common “world of meanings” (a “universe of symbols and relevancies”), as they allow the achievement of a consensual “definition of the situation”, and including the three dimensions of a shared “today”, “past”, and “future”;
2. The “delimitation”, knowing what is special about “our thing” as compared to other people’s things (“*nostra res agitur*”- not some “*res alienorum*”); and
3. The ability to act and bear responsibility through authorization and, thus, institutionalization (which means, in consequence, **polity building**) (Jansen, 1999: 13).

In relation to this, it can be concluded that *the identity is not something static, or fixed once and for all given, but it represents a dynamic process of (self) recognition, differentiation and establishment of recognizable image of one political community, and therefore an emanation of certain image / impression in the environment which surrounds that political community.* In that sense, the (international) political identity is a continuous process of maturation, construction and constitution of the basic parameters for (self) identification of one political community, in the existential and objective reality. The politics of identity refers to a set of ideas and values in one political community, which are used to mobilize and induce a state of cohesion and solidarity in the interest of identification of its international political profile. In this interest, the British politician Malcolm Rifkind, will

add: "consultation and co - operation [within the EU] are now instinctive (...) Thus, the foreign policy cooperation between EU member states could be interpreted as the beginnings of a learning process where the actors involved increasingly perceive themselves as a 'We'" (Aggestam, 2011). In addition, Rifkind says: "*Europe does not yet have the single coherent world vision, the deep - rooted instincts of a national foreign policy. That is not to the discredit of the European Union. But it is one more reason why we should see [Common Foreign and Security Policy] as a complement to our national foreign policies, an increasingly robust complement, but not a replacement*" (Aggestam, 2011).

Analogously, the sincere intention that should constantly convey in favour of the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union means giving greater contribution by the member states, in the further building of its international political identity and the provision of adequate functional capacity, in favour of its foreign political activities. A more precise definition of the international political identity of the Union gives prof. Radovan Vukadinovic, in his book (with Prof. Lidija Cehulic) "The Politics of the European Integration": "[International political identity of the EU is] a set of governmental policies that politically harmonized by the member states, create international political position of the Community [or the Union] or its international political identity in the role of distinctive and unique international political entity on the global political scene" (Vukadinovic; Cehulic, 2005: 118).

Namely, the progressive political unification of the Union, in the future will need to enable not only the constitution of its own international political identity as its diversification quality to others, but also to handle the "desperate" situation, in which the Union is described as "an *economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm*" (Hill, 2002: 6). Analogous to a kind of complexity such as the Union and its variable (international) political nature, the text below will present the dominant concepts of the international relations theory (IR), including the theoretical positions regarding the EU and its international political identity.

The European Union in the international relations theory

Within this paper, the international political identity of the Union will be treated as a synonym of autonomy, originality and uniqueness of the EU as a specific political and legal creation, able to act independently and equally in relations with other entities on the international political scene. Based on this, recognizing the permanent attempts for defining the Union as an actor in the international relations, the question of essence, assumes the necessity of its constitution in the form of state or another kind of political union (*polity*) or its future "evolutionary stagnation" in the form of atypical and intergovernmental political organization *sui generis*. Therefore, if the Union would constitute itself as a state, we may speak about the political centralization of its powers and competencies or supranationalisation of the current European system of states, and thus its identification as a political entity identified in the international relations in a classical, *realpolitik* sense. But if it stayed in the state of so-called "evolutionary stagnation", in its present form as

atypical intergovernmental organization *sui generis*, it would mean maintaining the condition that produces only a friendly and functional regulation of the relations between its member states, and thus disharmonic and partial action in international relations, which prevents the constitution of its monolithic international political identity. Namely, The Union is mainly treated as *inter - governmental regime* or a “system for regulation of certain interstate shares on certain field, without the possibility of constituting of its own unique international political capacity, power and identity” (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 83). Analogously, the fundamental difference that exists between the Union as an intergovernmental organization *sui generis*, as opposed to other forms of international organizing and structuring, consists precisely in *state - building tendency* for its constitution in a political union (*politea*), fully integrated as an autonomous political entity in the international relations. In this respect, prof. Christopher Hill presents the four basic elements upon which exists such diversification of the Union, as opposed to other international organizations and structures. It comes to:

1. The state-building imperative;
2. The pressure for institutional reform;
3. Issues of democracy and accountability; and
4. The (super) power-building imperative in international relations (Hill, 2011: 6).

From this enumeration, can be noted the existence of specific components of the Union as a *sui generis* category, its axiological profile and its tendency to realize the *polity - building* concept, as a prerequisite for the accumulation of political power and its autonomous political acting on the international scene, as a relevant political entity. In this respect, the European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso gave his opinion, who on one occasion said that: “the EU is functional, but [also] an **Unknown Political Object** on the international political scene”. Namely, the formulation of the Union such as Unknown Political Object (UPO) firstly was coined by the former European Commission President Jacques Delors, who argued about the Union uniqueness and its divergent characteristics in relation to others. In the paper bellow, I will analyze the European Union and the possibilities for constituting its international political identity through the theoretical framework of realism as a fundamental doctrine in the international relations theory.

Realism

According to the doctrine of realism, only the states are those political entities that are considered major, basic and fundamental actors in the international relations. In accordance with this, the European Union, starting from its atypical *sui generis* nature, could not be treated in the context of realism as a classical political entity with its own international political identity. Because it does not possess the elementary properties, capabilities and attributes of a state, and therefore neither a political status of complete and identified political entity on the international political scene in the framework of this doctrine can be recognized. From this approach, stems a minimalist definition of the EU that it is defined as a supranational and intergovernmental union in the absence of statehood and political ability or lack of essential features and requirements to be established and

constitute itself in the form of state. Therefore, because of the lack of statehood capacity, it is classified in the atypical political entities, positioned outside the circle of relevant actors in the international relations.

However, the doctrine of realism recognizes and respects the importance of the international organizations and other entities identical to them, but treat them as secondary in terms of autonomous, sovereign and independent states, as basic and leading actors on the international political scene. In accordance with that, as fundamentally important element of the international political identity stands military defence capacity, as a secondary but not less important condition for identifying a relevant and complete political entity. With this question, the theorist Bretherton will say that "without the formation of European defence and military capacity, while independent of the military and political power of the United States" (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 83), the Union is not able to constitute its international political identity, and therefore to be independently and autonomously profiled on the world political stage as a separate and complete political entity. From this thesis the substance of the *Gaullist doctrine* can be seen, as a doctrine opposed to US influence in the process of European unification, transferred through the NATO as suitable medium for the practicing of the US political influence on the overall Euro - integrative processes. The essence of this doctrine rests precisely on the attitudes, statements and commitments of Charles de Gaulle, in the "struggle" against the Atlantism as a "Trojan horse" of the American "hegemony" over Europe. Atlantism as such, assumes *a priori* military and political influence of the United States and its loyal ally Britain through the NATO on overall Euro - integration processes, starting from the end of the Second World War, during the Cold War and the period after it. In this respect, as a protest against such "negative trend which usurps sovereignty and determination of community of the European states and peoples" (Mauriac, 1996: 192), on one occasion, Charles de Gaulle emphasized: "I think that Europe should defend itself in Europe and with consideration of geography, history and psychology, Europe cannot be defended in London (...)" (Mauriac, 1996: 192). Through this sentence, he suggested the necessity for formulating the basic preconditions for constituting the European international political identity, and simultaneously constituting the Union in a complete political union (*politea*), independent and autonomous in relations to other political actors in the international relations, including the United States. But based on the progressive evolution of the realistic approach, the international relations theory gives birth to a new flexible and more rational concept. That theoretical concept is neorealism.

Neorealism

In accordance with the doctrine of neorealism, the problem of the EU and its international political identity is often treated through the economic performances versus political ones. Consequently, prof. Radovan Vukadinovic will say that:

[The EU] as one of the largest importers and exporters, first succeeded in effectuating its unquestionable and enormous economic power internationally, and implementation of its specific foreign political actions, it gradually started becoming an important and creative actor on the world political scene. Using its specific means of an international political action, in a world where more and more inter-

twined economic, trade and political functions, it began to acquire the status of an important international [actor] (Vukadinovic; Cehulic, 2005: 118).

According to prof. Vukadinovic, the institutions and norms of the EU “still do not have the capacity, which would reflect positively on the constitution of its international political identity” (Vukadinovic and Cehulic, 2005: 118). Within this, the institutional political development has important significance in the political unification of the EU and the constitution of its international political identity, as its legitimate basis. Given this, the neorealism treats the EU as primarily an economic structure, with some attempts for political profiling, but also emphasizes the absence of its autonomous military and political capacity, through which further identification as a relevant political entity on international plan is prevented. In this regard, the namesake author will emphasize that:

[Many] theorists once spoke that the economic [dimension] of the [EU], completely overshadowed the political one, and from the foreign policy there is no trace. Others resigned claiming that the failure to create a federation of the West-European countries, the concept of European political union will be permanently abandoned as a failed attempt and unrealized idea for creating a European federation, and it will be removed and the [constituting] of the international political identity of European integration [in general] (Vukadinovic and Cehulic, 2005: 125).

In that context, the question of institutional and political capacity of the Union as such, should contribute to its construction in political union with the original international political identity. Within this, the Lisbon Treaty appears as a “new chance”, but as a “last option” for the embodiment of the EU in political union, of course through its quasi – federalist intentions. Its significance is enormous, because it represents a last investment in the political unification of the Union. **This** Treaty initiates the Union as a *politea sui generis in status nascendi* or a **political community of particular type in a phase of birth** (Ilik, 2009: 35).

This means that the specific nature of the Union will continue to exist, but in “enhanced” and modified form, which in future *should serve as the basis for its further political modelling*. The Treaty in its essence represents a quasi - federal act, because of its confusing, complex and vague content, and also its partly constitutional determination, which is done through a “compromise” with the protagonists and opponents of European federalism, seeking to satisfy the both sides, and thus to be constituted a *distinctive type of federalism without federation*. Through its effectuation, the Union has grown into some kind of initial political entity *sui generis*, with more than confederate and less than federal nature. Unlike the neorealism, the neoliberalism believes that the institutional capacity of the Union does not represent very important component in the process of constitution of its own international political identity.

Neoliberalism

The neoliberal theory, believes that “regardless of the institutions and norms of the EU and their impact on the process for establishment of its international political identity” (Vukadinovic and Cehulic, 2005: 118), *the main place is occupied by the member states,*

which through their conduct in international relations create an international political picture of the Union as a whole. This aspect comes from the theory of anarchy in the international relations, while not taking into account the power and importance of the institutions as legitimate basis for the constitution of the international political identity of the Union. Moreover, the neoliberalism treats the Union as a politically "painted" economic structure with loose political ties between its member states aimed at fulfilment only of their national economic and security goals and interests despite the supranational ones. In contrast, some of the protagonists of liberal IR concept, especially those belonging to the early liberal tradition, believe that "the institutions and norms significantly influence the behaviour of member states and the definition of the international political identity [of the EU]" (Vukadinovic and Cehulic, 2005: 118).

Neofunctionalism

The European international political identity, regarding neofunctionalism is aspectuated through *the power of institutions and norms in the process of creating an autonomous European foreign policy, its international profiling and of course its effectuation on the international political scene*. On this basis, it produces and confirms the importance and need for the institutional political stimulus of the processes for constitution of the international political identity of the Union. Within this doctrine, the Union can be treated as a "civilian power" and "normative power" as *idée force* derived from the Union's attitude and commitment in the promotion and affirmation of its proclaimed central values, in a way that it influences relations to other political actors on the world political scene, in a constructive, cooperative and peaceful way. In the context of "civilian power", the theorist Hanns Maull noted:

- The acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- The concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
- A willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (Smith, 2005: 2).

According to this enumeration, the Union through its progressive institutions, seeks to act constructively on the overall international relations, thus not using military means but through the power of its values and diplomacy, intends to improve the international relations and structures, based on the principles of cooperation, mutual respect and economic progress. In addition to the neofunctionalism, a basic contribution gives the theorist François Duchêne, who is considered as a father of the "civilian power Europe" concept. Namely, Duchêne says: "[The Union represents an] exemplar of a new stage in political civilization. The [EU] in particular would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power (...)" (Smith, 2005: 2). Duchêne also emphasized the Union interest

“in trying to domesticate relations between states to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics (...)” (Smith, 2005: 2), which in principle, represents a unique quality of the European Union international reasoning, added and upgraded with its central values such as: “international cooperation, solidarity, domestication of international relations (or strengthening the rule of law in international relations), responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance” (Smith, 2005: 2). In line with this formulation about the “civilian” nature of the Union, which alluded to its ability and normative capacity for cooperation based on the values such as solidarity, tolerance, pacifism etc., it represents an axiological opposite to the *realpolitik* concept, which in itself, absolves the power of “stronger” as a way to deliver the international political preferences of the particular political entity.

Concluding remarks

Thus, starting from the above interpretations and formulations of the IR theoretical concepts about the European international political identity, it can be concluded that, however deep inside the Union, it contains institutional problems, obstacles and limitations, that at the very beginning, it hampers to take a position of unison international actor, which according to the logic of nations - states and *realpolitik*, will be able to articulate itself on a international scene, as a relevant actor and political factor. But what is also important to emphasize, is that the Union as a pacifist union, post - war project and (unfinished) postmodern political process, *must not and should not build its future on the nation - state concept* (which in principle is a modern concept), but it should continue to build itself on its genuine, distinct, civilian and co - operative basis, which draws its legitimacy precisely from postmodernism as its philosophical discourse. In that sense, the basic elements of certain postmodern entities according to Robert Cooper in “The post - modern state” are cited as the following:

1. Breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs;
2. Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance;
3. Rejection of force for resolving disputes and consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour;
4. Growing irrelevance of borders, come about both through the changing role of the state; and
5. Security based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability (Cooper, 2011).

On basis of this enumeration, it can be concluded that the Union itself in many aspects of its existence receipts the determinations of post-modernity, and thus, it emanates its postmodern energy through the world, willing to constitute itself as an international actor with full capacity, by rejecting the *realpolitik* as a concept, at the same time, accepting the politics of cooperation, interdependence, domestication, the irrelevance of borders, mutual openness and collective security, as issues which completely demarcate its

postmodern nature in the quest for constituting its own international political identity. Or as Prof. Lucio Levi emphasized: "Thus, today the European Union is the laboratory for a new kind of statehood (...) Its historical significance can be interpreted as the first stage in realizing the **Kantian design** of the 'universal republic' (...) It is the start of the era of federalism, or rather of new forms of statehood based on solidarity among nations and international democracy" (Levi, 2011). Also, it must be highlighted that, maybe the Union so far is "Unknown Political Object" on the international political scene, as Jacques Delors has emphasized, but in the same time, the Union is functional (although rudimented) political actor, which needs to evolve in a higher evolutionary political phase, for its constitution as a political union, more supranational and less intergovernmental, embracing the federalism and postmodernism in its future (international) political evolution.

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**MACEDONIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF EU
INTEGRATION:
*Superficial changes or soul-deep transformation?***

Abstract

This paper enquires into the Europeanisation of Macedonia's foreign policy. First, it examines the extent to which Macedonia's foreign policy positions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) OSCE have become convergent with the preferences of the European Union (EU). Then, it investigates specific changes in the organisation of Macedonia's diplomatic services, which can be traced back to Macedonia's interactions with the EU. These preliminary findings contradict the traditional view considering that states' foreign policy is impervious to exogenous change. They suggest that Macedonia's foreign policy identity is being re-constructed through its interactions with the EU. To establish this, the paper examines the mechanisms that best explain Macedonia's behavioural and organisational changes. It argues that these are predominantly driven by soul-deep mechanisms of social, contextual learning; that simple, organismic learning also plays a role; and that the significance of superficial, mechanistic learning, i.e. mere compliance, is often overestimated.

Key words: Europeanisation, foreign policy, Macedonia, convergence

Introduction

In international relations, foreign policy is often considered, and reified, as the preserve of the state. It belongs to the field of high politics, a field that is peculiarly insulated from the twists and turns of "normal" politics; a field in which interests are posited as fixed and resilient to exogenous change; a field that seems immune to social processes. With the gradual consolidation of EU structures of external governance and the intensification in foreign policy matters of EU's external relations, a new reality, however, seems to be emerging in Europe. This new reality emphasises that contemporary politics shall increasingly be understood in terms of multi-level governance, rather than monolithic

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government; that states' foreign policy is not as idiosyncratic as initially presumed; and above all, that it is constructed with interactions that develop beyond (and sometimes regardless of) national borders. In Europe, these interactions involve EU non-statal actors. They are at the core of the Europeanisation phenomenon (Marciacq 2012b).

Interactions between actors from the EU and Macedonia in the field of foreign policy are no spring chicken. They were first institutionalised in 1997 through a Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue and developed in the subsequent years with the Regional Approach, the Stabilisation and Association process, the European Partnership and the Accession Partnership. Although the integration process did not really prioritise foreign policy matters, it was part of the relationship that was being built. And it should not, thence, come as a surprise that, in those matters too, Europeanisation eventually became a burdensome reality for Macedonia.

There has been some ground-breaking research on Europeanisation in general and in the field of foreign policy in particular (e.g. Tonra 2001; Wong & Hill 2011). But the case of the Western Balkans, not to mention of Macedonia, has hitherto attracted very little (if any) attention. That is unfortunate, considering what such academic endeavour can possibly unveil, like Europe's transformative power in non-EU Europe, the changing nature of states' external governance, and the international sources of states' foreign policy. Though these research challenges exceed by far the scope of the present paper, they underpin its *raison d'être*.

This paper scrutinises the Europeanisation of Macedonia's foreign policy in three domains: voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly, declaratory behaviour in the OSCE and geographical coverage of Macedonia's diplomatic network. It first seeks to measure quantitatively the changes that have affected these three domains. Then, based on interviews with EU and non-EU diplomats, it evaluates the extent to which these changes can be attributed to interactions with EU actors. From this qualitative examination, it infers which mechanisms of Europeanisation are at play. The paper emphasises that in those matters, Europeanisation is rather driven by soul-deep mechanisms of social, contextual learning, that simple, organismic learning also plays a role, and that the significance of superficial, mechanistic learning, i.e. compliance with the CFSP *acquis*, is often overestimated.

Macedonia's voting behaviour in the UNGA

Since its admission to membership in April 1993, Macedonia has been actively participating in the activities of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which it even presided over in 2007. In this important *forum*, it took part in world discussions on a wide variety of foreign policy issues, whether on international security, economic and environmental politics or human rights issues. Occasionally expressed by vote, Macedonia's positions in the UNGA are a good depiction of its preferences in world politics. They can readily be compared to other actors', namely the EU, in an attempt to unveil patterned changes.

According to the UNGA rules of procedure, “any representative may request a recorded vote” in the UNGA, which happens with one third of the resolutions considered controversial (see Luif 2003). The votes are accordingly recorded individually and saved in the UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS), where they can be consulted. There were 1294 resolutions submitted to vote between 1993 and 2010. Only *states* may vote, following the one-country, one-vote principle –thus, not the EU. If Macedonia’s voting behaviour is to be compared to the EU’s, the positions of the latter will have to be modelled. As the EU coordinates most of its positions internally, it is here possible to model EU positions as those for which EU member states voted in a strictly identical manner (Marciaq 2012a). EU positions are thus modelled as consisting only of the unanimous positions of the member states of the EU (12, 15, 25, 27). Having circumvented this methodological issue, the study can now measure the dyadic levels of voting similarity (LoS) between Macedonia and EU unanimous positions, Greece, and other actors (see Table 1: Levels of Similarity (LoS) in voting behaviour (UNGA)1). 100%-LoS/EUnanimity means that Macedonia and the EU behaved in a perfectly identical manner.

Table 1: Levels of Similarity (LoS) in voting behaviour (UNGA)

	MAK vs. Eunanimity	MAK vs. GRC*	MAK vs. USA	MAK vs. RUS	MAK vs. CHN	CRO vs. Eunanimity	ARM vs. Eunanimity
1993	76%	69%	22%	63%	51%	55%	84%
1994	84%	78%	29%	60%	46%	80%	86%
1995	93%	72%	33%	70%	52%	85%	89%
1996	93%	83%	46%	66%	57%	93%	77%
1997	91%	84%	39%	70%	53%	91%	82%
1998	88%	89%	34%	63%	53%	92%	75%
1999	89%	88%	34%	68%	50%	92%	74%
2000	98%	97%	38%	64%	55%	96%	71%
2001	92%	90%	32%	60%	49%	96%	75%
2002	100%	97%	32%	66%	55%	98%	69%
2003	96%	95%	32%	66%	51%	100%	74%
2004	100%	93%	35%	62%	52%	100%	71%
2005	98%	96%	30%	62%	54%	100%	71%
2006	100%	95%	25%	61%	56%	100%	74%
2007	100%	97%	29%	65%	61%	100%	69%
2008	100%	96%	26%	57%	53%	100%	74%
2009	98%	94%	45%	58%	49%	100%	64%
2010	100%	79%	32%	66%	56%	98%	64%


* data for Greece in 1996 discard 22 "absent" records

Source: own calculations based on UNBIS and Voeten (2008) databases

Three key findings can be inferred from the examination of Macedonia’s voting behaviour in the UNGA (see Figure 1: Macedonia’s voting behaviour in the UNGA compared1). First, Macedonia’s voting behaviour is clearly *convergent* with the EU. In 1994, Macedonia voted just as the EU in 84% of the UNGA resolutions submitted to roll-call votes, whereas between 2004 and 2010, it voted 100% like the EU, except for one resolution (RES/64/209). Macedonia’s foreign policy coordination with the EU, enacted in New York, thus proves rather effective, in as much as it helps negating voting discrepancies.

High levels of voting similarity can equally be observed between Macedonia and Greece, despite a substantial discrepancy in 2010, which can be traced back to the EU’s now withering capacity to reach unanimous positions and Macedonia’s occasional absence in the UNGA. Second, Macedonia’s voting behaviour is *distinctively* convergent with the EU. Its resemblance with Russia, China and the United States is at best limited (about 60%, 50% and 30% of voting similarities respectively). This indicates that Macedonia and the EU adopt in the UNGA a specific way of voting, which does not reflect a global trend. Third, it is clear that Macedonia is not sharing this pattern of voting alone with the EU. Other candidate states, as Croatia, have a very similar pattern of voting behaviour. But the effects incurred by Macedonia (or Croatia)’s exposition to EU’s transformative power in the UNGA are not homogenous in non-EU Europe. Armenia, for instance, has a rather divergent voting behaviour.

Figure 1: Macedonia’s voting behaviour in the UNGA compared



Source: this graph is a partial rendition of Table 1

What if Macedonia’s voting behaviour was only convergent with the EU by a matter of chance? Convergence may indeed reflect a correlative rather than causative relationship. This hypothesis is not unrealistic, if this convergence was to be driven by “independent problem solving”, i.e. two actors reacting (or voting) similarly, but *independently*, as a response to parallel problem pressures (Knill 2005, p. 6). Considering the level of communication that has been institutionalised in New York between EU diplomats and Macedonian delegates, and the wider context of European integration in which Macedonia places itself with respect to the EU, the possibility of explaining Macedonia’s convergent voting behaviour through “independent problem solving” is highly improbable though. Instead, one should stress the importance of political dialogue both in the EU and Macedonia. In order to reach this aim, the EU set up an alignment mechanism in New York, by which it informs Macedonia (amongst others) of its voting position prior to the UNGA plenary session. Although this alignment mechanism cannot constitute a rationale for

Macedonia's actual convergence, it certainly fosters communication between the EU and Macedonia on UNGA affairs, and discredits the independent problem solving hypothesis.

Convergence may take many different "directions" (Holzinger & Knill 2005, p. 778), and more details should thence be given as to its measurement. In this study, unlike many others focusing on EU member states alone, the measurement does not seek to assess a level of regional cohesion, i.e. the mere "decrease in variation of policies" amongst European states (Knill 2005, p. 6). It measures what Knill names "δ-convergence", i.e. an indicator of alignment, obtained "by comparing countries' distance changes to an exemplary model" (ibid.). In this paper, the exemplary model is the EU, modelled as consensus-reaching actor. The difference is significant, as it assumes that EU positions are fixed, and act as a pivot against which non-EU positions can be weighed. It supposes that convergence emerges from the unidirectional alignment of Macedonia with EU positions, not the reverse.

Macedonia's declaratory behaviour in the OSCE

In the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Macedonia coordinates its foreign policy with the EU, most notably by means of declaratory alignment. On issues related to European security, which range from political and military affairs to human rights, the EU almost systematically offers to Macedonia (since July 2005), amongst others, the possibility to align itself with EU statements. It communicates the draft of the statement a few hours before the OSCE meeting, and, if Macedonia unconditionally adheres to it, it is included in the list of alignees on the behalf of which the EU Presidency is allowed to speak. Alignment in the OSCE does not allow Macedonia's participation in drafting the statement, and it is exclusive, unlike in the UNGA, in that alignees are prevented to issue complementary or supplementary statements in their national capacity (Marciacq 2011). Since declaratory alignment, viewed as a speech act, implies a congruence of interest on the basis of which a given foreign policy action is undertaken jointly by the EU and the alignee, studying the frequency at which Macedonia has aligned itself with the EU (LoA) in the past will shed light on another aspect of Europeanisation (see Table 2) The analysis shows that Macedonia aligns itself quasi systematically with virtually *all* the statements the EU issues in the OSCE. In the past years, its level of alignment has oscillated between 91% and 99%, and it culminated most recently in 2010-2011 (see FigFigure 2: Macedonia's declaratory behaviour in the OSCE compared This development follows a regional trend (cf. Montenegro or Albania), but is distinctive from Serbia's declaratory behaviour (characterised by ups and downs, which can be traced back to the Kosovo issue) and from other candidates' as Iceland (which started at lower levels of alignment). These findings, at first sight, denote Macedonia's deep-rooted acceptance of EU's preeminent role in European security, and its very strong readiness to fuse its national voice with the EU's.


Table 2: Levels of Alignment (LoA) with EU statements (OSCE)

	MAK	SRB*	MNG	ALB	ICL
2005	92%	88%	n/a	96%	58%
AT-2006	98%	92%	n/a	94%	63%
FIN-2006	94%	88%	78%	94%	68%
DE-2007	96%	85%	88%	97%	70%
PT-2007	98%	78%	94%	96%	86%
SLV-2008	92%	72%	99%	96%	76%
FR-2008	91%	71%	94%	89%	76%
CZ-2009	96%	56%	97%	96%	92%
SUE-2009	96%	74%	99%	99%	88%
SP-2010	97%	84%	94%	95%	98%
BEL-2010	99%	85%	98%	96%	99%
2011/1-HU	98%	77%	94%	93%	98%

* in 2005/2006, Serbia-Montenegro

Source: own calculations based on primary data collected in the OSCE Office in Prague

Figure 2: Macedonia’s declaratory behaviour in the OSCE compared



Source: this graph is a partial rendition of Table 2

The driving forces underpinning Macedonia’s alignment in the UNGA and OSCE

It has been seen that Macedonia’s (δ -)convergent voting behaviour in the UNGA can be understood as an instance of behavioural *alignment*. Alignment with EU positions, thus, emerges as a phenomenon that seems to affect Macedonia’s multilateral diplomacy both in the UNGA and the OSCE. This phenomenon is all the more interesting, since it occurs in an environment that fosters interactions between EU and Macedonian actors, political dialogue and foreign policy coordination. Although much credit can now be given to the Europeanisation thesis to refer to this phenomenon, an etiological analysis

should examine the driving forces underpinning Macedonia's alignment so as to 1) establish Europeanisation for good; 2) characterise the Europeanisation process in action.

What role does conditionality play in determining Macedonia's alignment with EU positions? As a candidate state, Macedonia shall abide by specific obligations, derived from EU's CFSP acquis. These provide that Macedonia and the EU shall "tak[e] full advantage of diplomatic channels between the Parties, including appropriate contacts in the bilateral as well as the multilateral field, such as the United Nations, OSCE meetings and elsewhere", and that cooperation should namely ensue through "providing mutual information on foreign policy decisions" (Joint Declaration on political dialogue, 29 April 1997). In addition to this procedural duty, Macedonia and the EU shall coordinate their foreign policy in view of "bringing about mutual understanding and increasing convergence of positions on international issues" (ibid.; Stabilisation and Association Agreement of 26 March 2001). Macedonia's efforts at complying with this substantive obligation is monitored by the Commission, e.g. in its progress reports and pre-accession Questionnaire. Tempting though it is, alignment cannot be explained by mere compliance. Interviews with diplomats show that there is in praxis little, if any, pressure by the EU for instituting alignment on contractual grounds (interviews 34_1, 3b_1, 14b_1, 25b_1). The EU does not engage diplomatic *démarches* with regards to UNGA resolutions to prevent non-alignment (interview 34_1). Nor does it blame Macedonia in case of non-alignment in the OSCE, although EU delegates sometimes do enquire into Macedonia's motives "out of curiosity" (interview 3b_1).

If compliance does not play the foreground role in explaining Macedonia's alignment in the UNGA and OSCE, what about social learning? Interviews with Macedonian diplomats do indicate that socialisation plays a central role in informing Macedonia's behaviour in multilateral fora. More than elsewhere in non-EU Europe, Macedonia defines its foreign policy priorities in the UNGA and OSCE in collective rather than individualistic terms. Alignment, after all, is primarily motivated by Macedonia's holding "the same overarching values as the EU" (interview 3b_1), especially with regards to human rights. It participates in the expression of a collective teleology –that of building security in Europe and beyond, demonstratively participating in European foreign policy, and pointing out one's "European way of thinking". Macedonians, in this respect, often refer to a symbolic shift "from security consumer to security provider" (e.g. interview 41-42-43_1, 3b_1), which, originating from Nato/EU lexicography, may indicate that Euro-Atlantic norms have proved effectively resonant with Macedonia's identity, and that social learning may have also operated through suasion. Underpinned by this collective teleology, alignment has become a norm on its own for Macedonia's diplomacy, i.e. a position that is applied "by default" (interview 3b_1). This is very visible in the way Macedonian officials consider or read EU positions. They most typically take for granted the normative correctness of the position and, thus, the appropriateness of alignment. For instance, they find it hard to conceive an instance of non-alignment, except when non-alignment has been negotiated at the highest bilateral level with third partners (in which case it is motivated by instrumental, rather than normative grounds) (interview 34_1). In all, the normative appropriateness of alignment is only reflected upon when the EU does not reach a consensus position in the UNGA, or when EU statements in the OSCE specifi-

cally address Macedonia. Social learning is finally fostered by the intensity of contacts between EU and Macedonia's delegates. There are for instance weekly meetings in New York and Vienna between EU candidates and the Presidency. In this context of regular encounters, it is encouraged by the fact that decisions for alignment are increasingly taken in Vienna and New York, rather than in the capitals. Because they often face very tight deadlines for replying to EU's alignment proposals, Macedonian delegates tend indeed to take decisions locally i.e. in an environment that is very prone to socialisation, rather than requesting instructions from their capital.

Are there further mechanisms, which account for Macedonia's frequent alignment with EU positions in the UNGA and OSCE? For a small-sized country as Macedonia, alignment with EU statement can finally be understood as a rational response to a structural lack of diplomatic resources and expertise. This dimension should not be neglected, considering the fact that Macedonia's permanent representations only count three diplomats in New York and seven in Vienna. Under such conditions, alignment represents a non-negligible economy of time and work (interviews 34_1, 3b_1), especially because delegates no longer need to write national statements. It also provides them with an opportunity to get informed on world affairs at minimal costs, extend Macedonia's foreign policy scope of action, and gain in international visibility. This opportunity is real, and leads to get Macedonia interested in topics "in which we would otherwise not have been interested" (interview 3b_1).


Macedonia's diplomatic network

The two dimensions previously examined in this paper have unambiguously pointed at the role played by foreign policy coordination. A more subtle examination will be required, however, to identify and properly assess the role of the EU as to the following phenomenon. Since 1993, the number of Macedonia's bilateral representations abroad (embassies) has been surging from 23 in 1996 to 38 in 2011 (see FigFigure 3: Macedonia's embassies worldwide Three-fourths of these embassies are located in Europe, and between 2008 and 2011, half of Macedonia's new embassies were also opened in Europe (in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Kosovo, Norway). Besides embassies, Macedonia's diplomacy can also rely eight permanent missions dealing with multilateral affairs (e.g. representation to the European Communities/EU in Brussels, the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Nato in Brussels, and most lately, the UNESCO in Paris), a Liaison Office in Athens and an increasing number of Consulates General - three in 2004, eight in 2011 (Mircev 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia 2011a).

Although it would surely be exaggerated to render the EU somehow "responsible" for the expansion of Macedonia's diplomatic network, the passive role of the EU therein should not be disregarded. Opening embassies abroad is not part of EU conditionality regime in Macedonia, and it is not a recommendation that the EU formulates either. EU demands for administrative capacity-building efforts in foreign policy matters usually concentrate on supporting the development of CFSP structures *stricto sensu* (e.g. crea-

tion of CFSP units within relevant ministries); ensuring that officials are “appropriately trained”; making sure of the proper institutionalisation of the EU interface within the MFA (e.g. through the creation of the posts of political director and European correspondent); vetting that EU technical and security standards for the exchange of classified information have been met; and that there is a legal-administrative capacity to implement EU sanctions and restrictive measures. The scope of the CFSP *acquis* in foreign policy administrative matters does not go beyond these requirements. But it does not mean that Macedonia may not identify its interactions with particular EU member states as supportive of its overall plans for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this case, the intensification of bilateral relations, epitomised by the opening of new embassies, finds its rationale in a wider European and Euro-Atlantic context of regional integration. Macedonia’s MFA, for instance, justifies the opening of its Embassy in Prague in 2008 as responding to “the efforts of the government in the overall intensification of its relations with EU member states” and it stresses that the Czech Republic all the more important to Macedonia as it is “member of the Nato and the EU” (2011b). Likewise, it argues, regarding the opening of its new Embassy in Tallinn in 2010, that Estonia has “many times expressed at the highest level its strong support for the announced expansion of the EU and Nato, and strongly support Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integrations” (2011c). And finally, interviews with diplomats show that Macedonia’s candidate status is often appealing to third countries: These open embassies in Skopje, to which Macedonia responds by opening embassies in non-European countries. Considering the importance given to the EU context in those cases, speaking of Europeanisation seems perfectly appropriate to understand (rather than explain, though) the expansion of Macedonia’s diplomatic network in Eastern Europe.

Figure 3: Macedonia’s embassies worldwide



Source: personal communications with the Macedonia’s embassies and MFA

Soul-deep or superficial changes?

This paper has highlighted important changes in Macedonia's multilateral foreign policy and diplomatic network, which it could trace back, at least partly, to actual and prospective interactions with the EU. These changes exemplify the spreading phenomenon of Europeanisation in a policy field that was far from an obvious candidate. One question remains, though. How "deep" do these interactions affect Macedonia's foreign policy? Three mechanisms of change have been studied in this paper (for a theoretical background analysis, see Prawat & Floden 1994). First, there is compliance, or mechanistic learning, a mechanism motivated by rational calculations, positive incentives and negative rewards. This mechanism produces the thinnest change of the three, as it conditions change upon an objectivised legal-institutional environment. It does not imply that change gets anchored in states' identities, and makes it then little resilient to objective changes in the legal-institutional environment. The second type of mechanism that has been scrutinised in this paper is social, contextual learning, proceeding as suasion or socialisation. This mechanism not only affects behaviour; it also transforms, in a soul-deep manner, actors' interests and identities, because it implies the internalisation of intersubjective knowledge. The third mechanism, i.e. simple, organismic learning, finally produces halfway changes. It relies on the assumption that actions are motivated by an individualistic will to remedy internal shortcomings and alleviate subjective dissatisfaction.

In Macedonia, it has been seen, compliance does not play a major role in (re)orienting the country's foreign policy. Changes in Macedonia's foreign policy thus appear to be deeper than merely determined by conditionality. They are in fact often well anchored in Macedonia's foreign policy identity, although not all changes can be traced back to social learning. Thinner changes, which emerge from internal constraints related to resource scarcity, also occur. But all in all, this paper shows that the interactions between EU and Macedonia's actors also affect the latter's foreign policy in a deeper way. It is an invitation to soften the conceptual boundaries underpinning the notion of foreign policy, which might not be as insulated as imagined; and to acknowledge that the EU's transformative power affects non-EU Europe in its least expected domains, and through remarkably thick interactions.

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ECOLOGY IN CAP AND BULGARIAN AGRICULTURE

Abstract

The development of the human society, globally, is becoming more and more dynamic. However progress confronts humanity with serious, even existential challenges crossing national borders. Some of them affect the very conditions of its existence. Precisely such are the environmental problems that accompany the contemporary society.

For more than a decade, ecology has been an integral part of the priorities of the European Union. All sectoral policies are becoming increasingly greener. Ecology is put forward as one of the highlights in the “Europe 2020: smart, green, for everyone” strategy, announced at the end of 2010. An illustrative example is the Common Agricultural Policy. Solving of current tasks, related to ensuring food security, natural resource conservation and preservation of the environment, reoriented the CAP to promote environmentally sound production.

In this context of global and regional problems and policies the topic of Bulgarian Agriculture as a part of the EU area is tabled. We discuss some of the results of empirical sociological research carried out in 2010. The region, in which our survey was conducted, is characterized by the sustainable development of typical small-acreage agriculture, carried out, as a general rule, on privately owned land. It is known that this type of farms do not have a dominant share in production. But they are particularly important in terms of regional development and help stop the migration and depopulation.

The results of our research showed that farmers, although not familiar with specific ecological requirements and recommendations of the Common Agricultural Policy, widely applied traditional, learned from previous generations, agricultural practices that are inherently environmentally friendly. A strong role in the motivation plays the traditional attitude towards the land as a family value. Now applied practices, complemented by awareness raising and introduction of innovations is a prerequisite for synergetic effects in the implementation of the objectives of the Community policy in the new programming and budget period after 2013.

Key words: environmental culture, environment-friendly (green) practices, traditional agricultural practices, Common agricultural policy.

On October 12, 2011, the European Parliament discussed the new changes in the oldest, most dynamic and most expensive community policy – CAP. In his speech „A new partnership between Europe and its farmers” Dacian Ciolos - Member of the European Commission, responsible for Agriculture and Rural Development, noted the need for a redefinition of the CAP to the new budget and the reference period 2014 – 2020. The key aims of the reform are:


- to establish a new balance of interests, ensuring a more active partnership between society on one hand, that pays financial resources for this policy and farmers, on the other, whose production activities taking place in contact with the ecosystem, provide livelihood of the population, maintain rural areas and preserve biodiversity;
- to introduce a long-term requirement for a new type of competitiveness, both environmentally and economically sustainable;
- to ensure that agriculture flourishes throughout whole Europe;
- to simplify the CAP.

As an EU member, Bulgaria is bound to implementation of all common policies and of standards set out in them. As a part of the international community, it is bound by decisions of supranational institutions and is influenced by global realities and trends, including concerning environment protection.

When considering the spreading of environment-friendly (green) practices in agriculture, in particular, it has to be born in mind that the region, in which our survey was conducted, is characterized by the sustainable development of typical small-acreage agriculture, carried out, as a general rule, on privately owned land, - something which has always been a fundamental family value for the Bulgarian peasant (and now it is as well for 27% of our respondents). There is an obvious attachment to the inherited family land and will to preserve it of full value for the successors. Three quarters of the respondents (74, 7%) declare that for them it is more important to preserve the quality of the land for the years to come than to get a better harvest in the current year. This attitude is a strong motivating factor for taking care, for the implementation of knowledge inherited from generations and for openness to adopting innovations.

In this sense, it is indicative how respondents perceive environmentally friendly practices.

Figure 1: In your opinion, green practices are mostly: (in %)



- A** – A possibility to preserve the environment
B – A possibility for an additional income
C – An opportunity to enter new market niches
D – Constraint on production

For more than half - 51.1 %, they are mostly a possibility to preserve the environment. This result represents a true investment for friendly attitude towards nature, further environment- and sustainable agriculture in the future business of agricultural producers. Additionally respondents identify proenvironmental practices as an opportunity for additional income. Almost 24% think in this direction, which is a good prerequisite and represents a possible attitude towards orientation to the production of organic products, whose market share is still to be expanded. Green practices are also evaluated as an opportunity to enter new market niches. It is a view shared by 10.7% and is also very encouraging result. One may resume that the region has producers of agricultural goods, actively thinking about entering new markets with competitive and high-grade local products. In our study, 51.3 percent of the respondents said they are willing to pay a higher price (often up to 30%) if they have a guarantee that the food is clean. Founded distributions and dependencies give reason to expect that the improving economic situation in the country and income growth against the backdrop of the registered now awareness of the importance of environmental cleanliness of food for human health, there will be increasing demand and consumption of this kind of foods. The results of a Eurobarometer survey suggest that similar attitudes are quite common in EU countries (EB November – December 2009). The survey shows that only 14.4% of the respondents see the environmental practices as constraint on production.


The configuration of the estimates corresponds to the high ecological sensitivity, already expressed by the farmers in Blagoevgrad region. This is a logical finding, given the type of production (small acreage), which is predominant in the region. The age cross section of our data strengthened even more optimistic tone - 90% of the respondents from 18 to 29 years (36 points more than in the whole sample) say that for them the environment-friendly practices are mostly a possibility to preserve the nature. From the aforementioned you could decipher very optimistic codes about the future of agriculture in the region, and why not in the country as a whole. The positions of the youngest are irrefutable proof of their ecological maturity. For about 12.5% of the same age group, the environmental friendly practices are mostly possibility to enter new market niches. These are the only two options, which they choose. "A possibility for an additional income" is the answer of the most pragmatic farmers - in age groups 30-39 and 40-49. Every third of them shares this view. Exceeding of almost 10 points above the average is recorded in both groups. At 40-49, the 50-59, and 60 and more are reported the highest values in the reply that the environment-friendly practices represent a limitation in the production activity- between 17 and 21%, and the exceeding over the average, with almost 7 points, is the most expressive amongst the oldest farmers. And this result has its logical explanation. After reaching certain age, people begin to fear the new and the unknown, doubting whether they will be able to deal with change and avoid it.

Within the survey, information was collected describing the various aspects of the internship in terms of the care for the land. Overall, the results speak for (especially in certain directions) high ecological culture of agricultural producers in Blagoevgrad.

The majority of the respondents - 57.7 % claim that they fully comply with the qualitative characteristics of the land when deciding which crops to grow. To this group we can add respondents which answered "rather yes" - almost 35%. Totally, the farmers, for

whom most important are the qualities of the main agro-ecological resource – land, are above 92%. Respondents with negative answers – “rather not” and “not at all” are less than 8%.

Figure 2: To what extent do you take into consideration the qualities of the land when choosing crops?



However, it should be borne in mind that this is a production in small acreage. The good knowledge of the owner of the possibilities for cultivation of each crop on the land that he processes is an essential condition for maximum harvested good yield. This information and reports are transmitted from previous generations and is inherited and kept on coming. This is another profile for assessment of traditional agricultural practices. Its significance will be rediscovered and will represent a growing interest for study, given the changes in the Community Agricultural Policy.

When choosing a technology, 17.4% of respondents entirely take into consideration the land qualities and 33.9% tend to take it into account. The biggest part of the respondents answered that they tend not to take it into account - 34.8 percent. Almost 14 percent answered that they do not take it into consideration at all. Data on the compliance of the quality characteristics of land resources with the technological requirements of the crops grown reveal the complexity of this dependence and its mixed modality. Naturally, the highest percentage of responses were “tend not to “. Explanation for this result can be found in the lack of specialized knowledge that more than 20 years after the dissolution of the cooperative structures is hardly available. Many of our respondents do not have any information, and do not have the possibility to obtain it. Here the advice of relatives and neighbors, or the advice of the shopkeeper is insufficient. The absence of specialized care represents a problem whose seriousness will be highlighted even more when the new green practices begin to enter and the environmental imperative within the CAP begins

to strengthen during the new reference period after the year 2013. Then we will probably learn from the experience of some of our neighboring countries and the practice to create service agricultural structures will be applied in our country too.

As to this topic, age variances are again most pronounced in the group of the youngest. Over 53% declare that they tend to respect the qualities of land in the choice of technology of planting. This represents almost 20 points more than the average of the responses of all respondents. Also, amongst the youngest is registered the lowest percentage of the response “entirely” - only 6.3%, with an average of 17.4%. This variance represents over 11%. The frankness of the farmers from 18 to 29 years is indicative. This is a signal of future problems if these young people remain within the production sphere with this, honestly stated and acknowledged deficit of specialized knowledge. The highest proportion responded that they entirely take into consideration the quality of land when they choose technology is reported amongst farmers aged 40-49 - over 34%, which exceeds almost twice the total amount. And this result is natural. It can be explained by the fact that in the abovementioned group the people are most active, proactive, and already have accumulated knowledge and experience. Here are the farmers who mostly benefit from the opportunities of modern information technologies.

In the next age group - 50 to 59, there is a significant proportion of respondents who entirely take or tend to take into account the technologies of the growing cultures with the qualities of the land. So do six out of ten respondents. For most elderly - 60 or more years old, less than 40% comply completely or respond “rather yes”. This result clearly demonstrates that only the rich life experience and a long agricultural practices are not sufficient to manage the technological discipline in raising cultures and also to comply with the qualitative characteristics of the land. These results are disturbing and indicate a need for searching and finding a way through European programs to fill these gaps. Only the rich nature and good agro-ecological condition of agriculture, which is famous for Bulgaria, are not sufficient for competitive and environment-friendly production.

Crop rotation is defined as substantial environment-friendly measure in the recent CAP amendments. In the forthcoming new reference period beginning in 2014, special emphasis is put on crop rotation in relation with the role of agriculture for the protection of the environment. In this respect, the results of the study are indicative of the attitude of respondents to the rotation, or rotation of field crops and the importance they attach to the rotation in collation with the properties of the land. In doing so, 10.9% take fully into account the properties of land, 29.3% “rather yes”, 30.2% “rather no”, and not at all - 29.7%. These are results that, after further detailed study would be a valuable source of information on the bottlenecks in the system of green agricultural practices. Properly organized, crop rotation is the activity which contributes substantial benefits to the environment. To realize a suitable rotation of field crops, a range of specialized knowledge is required, as regards the physiological requirements of plants as well as the technological specifics of their growing in the various phases of their development, including harvesting. Last but not least, all of these requirements should be combined with the properties of the earth. This is a kind of agricultural system, the management of which requires very specific knowledge and skills. But in the new CAP based on good agricultural practices, farmers have to manage environmental agricultural systems as well. The survey results show

that this task would be hard for Bulgarian farmers. The above results give us reasons for this finding. Only one out of ten respondents takes full account of the properties of land in crop rotation. One out of three respondents – tends to take, which, given the complex system connection in relation to the factors of properties of land and crop rotation, makes it a quite arbitrary response. The highest share have the answers “rather not” – over 30%. If we add the “not at all” answers, it will turn out that six out of ten respondents do not comply with the properties of land in field crop rotations. Here the group of the youngest experiences the most serious difficulties. The deficit of knowledge and information is significant and this is the main reason for this low score. These young people will find it hard to create sustainable farming systems if the information vacuum has not been filled. Despite their long experience in the field the representatives of the top age group - over 60 years, also have difficulty in matching the properties of land with crop rotation. This once again shows the need for specialized training and consultancy, as a prerequisite and necessary condition for implementing green practices and sustainable farming systems to meet the environmental imperatives of the revised CAP. For this purpose strengthening of the administrative capacity with specialists qualified in this not quite simple matter is needed. The producers have already manifested their interest.

As to the contemporary tendencies, the information about production of ecologically clean commodities is significant. According to the answers of the inquired, 19.3% of them have been already producing such production /although some of them only for self consumption/, 24.9% are planning to start such production in the coming 1 to 2 years, 31.0% haven't decided yet and 23.8% are going to stick to the standard production. It was found through indirect questions that only about 1/5 of the inquired are aware of the requirements for denomination of a production as biological/organic, which indicates serious information deficit among those people. This assertion is also confirmed by the answers of the more than half of the inquired that they are not aware if their farms will be able to meet those requirements in the forthcoming one or two years.

The conclusion is that information deficit is a very important factor, which regardless of the positive attitude, will hinder the introduction of the modern ecological practices. The information deficit about the possibilities of the CAP to support ecological production is quite obvious. 52.7% of the inquired are absolutely not acquainted with the agroecological payments for biological agriculture, 48.6% - with agroecological payments for management of the lands with high biologic value, 43.8% - with agroecological payments for preservation of the lands and waters. We can also add the corresponding 25.2%, 29.5% and 37.3%, less familiar and it presents an impressive level of lack of information. It is also evident through the difficulties to determine which production is more profitable – ecologically clean or standard. This is a real obstacle for the initiative, innovation and economic activity.

In conclusion we can say that the interconnections between the new ecological imperative and traditional agricultural practices are direct and straightforward.


Ecological sensitiveness of the agricultural producers from the region of Blagoevgrad transforms into ecological culture and expresses itself as a positive attitude and implementation, though to different extent of traditional and contemporary practices. This is a precondition for unique synergical effects in the future sustainable integration of the

CAP ecological imperative and traditional agricultural practices and essential factor for preservation of the environment in case of the agricultural activities.

And there is a lot of data demonstrating that expanding external and internal market for organic products exists. The empirical data clearly shows that people associate food quality (including its ecological purity) above all with their health. The presence of harmful substances in food is considered to be the most dangerous and in their assessments respondents put this risk factor ahead of such as pollution of the air, the water and the soil. Perfectly logical, the opinion on the dangers of contaminated foods grew into a desire to reduce the content of harmful substances as one of three priority tasks that must be solved urgently. It was placed on second place (from 7 options) and the difference with the first - “reducing air pollution” is on the borderline of the statistical significance. At the back are positioned “To reduce water pollution” “Soil Pollution Reduction”, “Construction of modern storage facilities for household waste”, “Recovery of damaged areas of human activity”, “Ensuring the safety of repeaters for mobile operators.” Main differentiating factor is the education - solving the problem with food quality is undoubtedly a priority for respondents with higher education, while among those with lower education, it gives way to other, traditional environmental problems.

The study shows that the consumer behaviour, for one reason or another, did not adequately comply with the expressed concerns about the ecological purity of food. Less than one third of the people care about this quality of foods they buy. Another 45% do so sometimes. 24,1% of the respondents do not seek such information, and a small part—1.6%, do not know at all what that is.

Figure 3. When you buy foods, are you interested in whether they are environmentally friendly




- A – Yes, almost always
- B - Sometimes
- C - No
- D – I do not know what does it mean

This aspect of the consumer behavior is very closely connected to financial status and education. Other differentiating factors are age and, to some extent, gender. The group of the respondents, which are always or almost always interested in the ecological purity of the foods, is dominated by people with university degree and secondary vocational education, those, who have very good and good financial status, young people under the age of 30 and the women. It is indicative that around one fifth of the respondents who are uneducated or have elementary education have responded that they do not know what ecologically clean food is (this share in the whole sample is 1,6%).

The actual consumption of ecologically clean foods, however, lags significantly behind the declared interest in them. During the survey less than one quarter of the respondents have replied that they have bought such product during the last month.

Figure 4: Have you bought ecologically clean product during the last month?
(in %)



A - Yes

B - No


C - Do not remember

From the group of those, who gave a positive response (24.2% of respondents), only one-sixth (apparently for the moment, this is contingent of a conscious and sustainable oriented towards organic foods) are able to remember the name of the manufacturer. This points to the idea that the others have either done accidentally such purchase, or have chosen socially prestigious answer which is not adequate to their actual behaviour. (From the group of the respondents who identified their material situation as very good, on the direct question for purchase of environmentally friendly product in the last month, 24.1% responded negatively, while the question of the manufacturing company 37.9% - (14 points more) said they are not buying this kind of products!) However, even the positive response for prestige is an indication of potential interest. The memory of the name of the manufacturer is quite sure indicator that there is systematic and durable orientation toward manufacturers of this type of production or at least that the implementation of such a purchase is carefully thought out, a targeted search result.

Analysis of information on a certain set of indicators geared to the conclusion that low real consumption of green foods is determined mainly by economic reasons. More than a third of the respondents - 38% declare that they would not (and most possibly

cannot) pay a higher price for ecologically clean products. Obviously, at the moment, the material condition of people, their limited financial resources are a very serious limiting factor in the selection of food. Indicative of this is the information in response to a question that is decisive for the respondents when purchasing food products.

Figure 5: What is decisive for you when buying food?
(in %)



A – The price

B – The quality

C – The price and the quality

Approximately half of respondents said they look for a balance when choosing between price and quality. This response clearly dominates all social-group differentiation, and amongst the adults over 60 years is distributed along with the answer, giving priority to price. Amongst the younger people between 18 and 29, those who are seeking balance between price and quality is the highest part. In the rest of this age group the distribution is definitely in favor of quality, while amongst others ages there is a parity (30-39 years old) or the price advantage (40-60 years old). For about one out of four respondents, however, the most important in the purchase is the price. The dependence on financial condition clearly outlines the differences. While 37.9 percent of people with very good financial condition are choosing food products favor of quality, those who are not so well off represent 16.0%. And just the opposite - the price is decisive for 27.6% of respondents with very good position and 46.6% of those with bad position. The established distributions and dependencies give grounds in the expectation that improving the economic situation in the country and income growth against the backdrop of the registered and now awareness of the importance of environmental cleanliness of food for human health will increase demand and consumption of ecologically clean food.

It should not be forgotten, however, the other influencing consumer behavior factors which are secondary, but in a new situation may appear with decisive influence – the insufficient recognition of the ecologically clean and organic products as well as distrust in the control and the correlation between the indicated and actual quality.

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The global financial crisis, quickly evolved into an economic, affected the entire globalized world and shook the wholeness of social life. Need to successfully overcome the emerging challenges requires significant revaluations and reshaping the configuration and the priorities of many national economies. The selection of promising development orientations became crucial for the future. In May the Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism of Bulgaria organized a conference for presenting a sectoral strategy to attract investment in Bulgaria. Among the priorities that the country will declare in the EU, as the Prime Minister said, are opportunities of agriculture. At the same economic forum, the Minister recommended the use of natural resources of the country in order to become a recognizable manufacturer of organic foods and to realize its great potential for development of green economy and clean technologies. That is the shortest way for the country's integration into the new strategy of the old continent - "Europe 2020 - smart, green at all," announced on 03/03/2010 by the European Commission.

Note

In the article has been used data from the empirical sociological survey "Modern society: between vulnerability and sustainable development." - representative for the population over 18 in the region of Blagoevgrad, includes 1057 persons in 65 settlements, the sample is combined - stratificated (according to the type of settlements - Blagoevgrad, towns in the district and villages) and two stage cluster and empirical sociological survey "Environmental culture of producers of agricultural products" - in 56 villages, one stage cluster sample.

Both were carried out in March 2010 (Project "The transformation of the national value system and its synchronization with European patterns: the development of environmental culture as an indicator of translation of European values in the Bulgarian society", project leader Assoc. prof. A. Mantarova), funded by National Science Fund.

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IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION ON CROSS CULTURAL MANAGEMENT THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Abstract

We live in the era of globalization. Economies of the world are connected and without borders. The whole world is a source of business opportunities. Trade barriers are falling, money flows freely across the national borders. In globalized economy, you can buy and sell everything almost everywhere in the world with the click of mouse. Everything is global, products, standards, customers, competitions, workforce, and managers.

Global managers are looking for the best source of raw materials and the best markets all around the world. However, the most important task of a global manager is to find the best people worldwide. Companies are located across the world and hire people and managers from all parts of the world. The most important characteristics of a modern global manager are to understand other cultures and the ability to work with people from different cultures. Many business deals around the globe failed simply because managers did not understand other cultures.

Primary research has been done on the sample of 50 managers from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of this research is to determine the cultural characteristics of managers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their ability to respond to the challenges of globalized world.

Key words: culture, globalization, managers, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Globalized economy

We live in the era of globalization. Economies of the world are connected and without borders. The whole world is a source of business opportunities. Trade barriers are falling, money flows freely across the national borders. In globalized economy, you can buy and sell everything almost everywhere in the world with the click of mouse. Everything is global, products, standards, customers, competitions, workforce, and managers.

Markets can no longer be regarded as domestic and foreign. The whole world is one market that changes constantly. Global managers need to observe the world globally but operate locally, because business activities take place at a local level. Managers have to know and understand the local environment in which they work, which means the national culture of the country where the job is done. There are huge differences in national

cultures of various countries and they determine the daily life of the country and doing business in that country. Not a single manager or a company can succeed without knowing in depth the national culture of the country in which it operates. The company that wants to sell in global economy has to negotiate with foreign distributors and the sellers. The company that wants to buy raw materials has to negotiate with the manufacturers or suppliers of raw materials. The company that wants to establish its factory in another country has to negotiate with authorities to obtain all necessary permits. The company that wants to buy another company in a foreign country has to negotiate with the owner of the company. The company that wants to make a joint investment in a foreign country has to negotiate with partners from that country.

Many business deals around the globe failed simply because managers did not understand other cultures, although all other details of business deals were done perfectly. Business requires the achievement of business deals, which are the result of negotiation.

When Lee Iacocca was running Ford, Ford wanted to buy a Ferrari. Top executives of Ford went to Italy, to personally meet Enzo Ferrari. The agreement was reached and deal was sealed with a firm handshake. Later, a team of Ford attorneys was sent to Italy with contracts to formalize the deal. Enzo Ferrari was disappointed with the Americans, because he expected that they had a gentleman's agreement and not an agreement with lawyers. The deal was never made. (Cullen, J. B., and K. P. Parboteeah, 2008).

Swiss multinational company, Kiel AG, has decided to buy a successful American company Edwards Engineering Inc. in order to expand on the U.S. market. Tom Edwards, owner of the company wanted to sell it, as he was close to retirement. He was also satisfied with the price Swiss offered. In negotiations, Edwards, as a typical American, was friendly, open, sincere, direct, and he wanted to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Swiss were totally confused by this behavior and considered it dangerous and untrustworthy. They were formal, moderate, distant, and polite and not in hurry to make a deal. When they ask a major U.S. auditing firm to review the books, Edwards broke the negotiations, because he felt insulted and did not want to waste his time on the Swiss. (Cullen and Parboteeah, 2008).

The preceding examples show that each party negotiated in a way that negotiations are done in their culture. So, business deals that have all chances to succeed, failed simply because parties did not understand differences in national cultures. Both examples are from so-called Western cultures, which mean the negotiations were between the Europeans and Americans. The situation becomes more complicated when it comes to negotiations with China, India, Japan and Arab countries. The economies of these countries are rising. Among 25 companies identified to be the most successful companies in the future, four companies are from Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan, three from India, two from China and one each from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia and South Africa. The biggest factories are in China, the biggest refinery is in India, the richest investment funds are in United Arab Emirates (Zakaria, 2008).

Global managers are looking for the best source of raw materials and the best markets all around the world. Managers lead business operations throughout the world, seeking the best opportunities in the world, and not the nearest.

However, in the era of globalization, when almost any product, service or knowledge can be obtained by clicking the mouse, the company's success depends mainly on people. Managers need to know how to motivate employees who may come from any country and can live in any country. The letter I in the American company IBM stands for international but it could easily stand for intercultural as IBM has 325 000 employees who communicate in 165 languages and sells to clients in 175 countries around the world. (Cullen and Parboteeah, 2008).

The way that company will attract, motivate and retain people is more important than anything else. Employees are the reason for Apple's success. People who work in Apple are extremely talented, motivated and loyal to the company. Steve Jobs, who recently passed away, and the whole management care very much for their people and their opinions. This is unusual for America, which is highly individualistic culture, where loyalty is practically non-existent and is not expected either by employers or by employee. But this was formula for success in Apple's case.

Companies are located all around the world and hire people and managers from all parts of the world. The most important characteristic of a modern global manager is to understand other cultures and the ability to work with people from different cultures. After integration the medical and biotech companies SmithKline Beecham have management team of 13 people from seven different countries. A key criterion for selection is ability, not passport. (Riderstrale and Kjel Nordstrom, 2002).

It is absolutely necessary for global manager to understand other cultures. However, it is not easy. Managers are children of their culture, and carry the prejudices, stereotypes, ethnocentrism, and sometimes xenophobia. At the very least, they think that their culture is the best. They think the way things are done in that culture is best, and often the only possible. Other cultures are often perceived as less valuable or at least very strange. American managers are often frustrated when their partners from other cultures are late to a meeting or when business deals are not achieved quickly; when other things are more important than the power of argument; when workers in factories outside the United States do not want to take responsibility or have their work pace, pretty different from American's management practices. All cultures are very different, but they are right and moral for members of these cultures. Global managers have to be able to understand that. There is no business without understanding these facts. However, there is a shortage of global managers. It seems that markets and companies are changing faster than the ability of managers to change themselves.

In the globalized world, people are moving continuously around the world in search of education, work and better life condition. Today, there is no more homogeneous, closed and secure society. It is estimated that Europeans live in countries where 15-20% of the population of foreign origin. It is also estimated that immigrants will soon make 50% of the workforce in America (Guffey, M. E. 2006). Managers must have the ability of cross-cultural communication because, in a global world, they work with people from different cultures. Managers need to find and hire the best people regardless of where they live. In the early stages of globalization, it was mostly about hiring unskilled labor in developing countries. In a modern company, it is more important to find and hire experts than cheap unskilled labor.

Global managers today have a larger supply of skilled labor than any time before in history. Knowledge has become available. In the sixties of last century, around 5,000 students graduated in the American business schools each year. In the meantime this number has risen to 75,000. Nearly 100,000 graduates of business universities went into the world every year. (Riderstrale and Kjel Nordstrom, 2002) However, this figure is low compared with developing countries. Huge number of professionals lives in developing countries; a number of graduates are constantly growing. India has one of the best educational systems in the world and the best experts in the field of information technologies, medicine, and technical sciences.

It is obvious that it is not possible to live and work in today's globalized world without being open and tolerant to other cultures.

The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a place where many cultures met. Travel guides state that in Sarajevo, in one block you can find a mosque, an orthodox church, a catholic church and a synagogue. Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been a mixture of people, religion and cultures. None of these communities had an absolute majority or lived in isolation from others, so Bosnia and Herzegovina has always represented a various religious, ethnic and social mosaic. The mixture of various cultures is today evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina everywhere, not only in the architecture but also in the music, cuisine, jewelry, and all other aspects of life.

Historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been open to other cultures. Since ancient times, people accepted the achievements of other cultures in technology, architecture, art, cuisine, and lifestyle. In the fourth century B.C. Illyrians, the first Bosnian tribe, took over and adopted new technologies from the Celts, who came from the north and were technologically advanced. Also, at that time Illyrians learned from the Greeks, who came from the south and had advanced Hellenic culture in making coins, building cities, producing arms, tools, jewelry, dishes.

The population of Bosnia in the Roman period was very heterogeneous. It came from the Orient, Greece, Egypt, Trace, Iran and many other countries. It is noted that 40 different religions co-existed at that time and people in Bosnia worshiped 52 different gods. After the fall of the Roman Empire, the region was conquered by the Goths, Alans, Huns, Byzantine Empire and finally by the Avars and Slavs.

During the golden age of the Bosnian kings, Bosnia included in its territory parts of neighboring countries with orthodox and catholic religion.

The Ottoman conquest of Bosnia introduced drastic changes in the political and cultural landscape of the region. Ottomans ruled in Bosnia and Herzegovina almost 500 years and during that time Islamic culture expanded in art, science, literature, way of living and especially in architecture and civil engineering. Historical sources show that Turks never populated Bosnia, however many people from huge the Ottoman Empire lived and worked in Bosnia. Many young boys and men went to Istanbul and got the

highest position in Ottoman Empire, like Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic, who actually ruled the empire during three sultans (Group of authors, 1994).

National censuses, during the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, show that immigrants in the year 1910 accounted for 6.04% of the total civilian population in the country. Most immigrants were from Croatia, Vojvodina, Serbia, Slovenia and Montenegro. Among immigrants from other nations the most numerous were the Germans, Poles, Russians, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, Romanians, Slovaks and others (Group of authors, 1994). Ashkenazi Jews, who were expelled from Spain, found their home in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is an indication that at that time Bosnia and Herzegovina was much more tolerant than many European countries.

War in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 devastated and divided the country. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is known for brutal ethnic cleansing, genocide, mass rape and concentration camps. The most recent research places the number of people killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina at around 100,000–110,000 (some sources cited over 300,000), and the number of displaced at over 2,2 million, making it the most devastating conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. Today 117,000 are still refugees or internally displaced persons. (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2001).

The purpose of this paper is to determine if people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still open to other cultures, as they were during the long history of cultural diversity. We will use results of secondary and primary research.

There have been several studies on social trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war. The results of all studies show that, after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there has been a breakdown in social trust. People have become xenophobic, intolerant and closed in narrow group.

Social trust (The World Values Survey)

Social trust can be measured by trust index, created by The World Values Survey. It is an ongoing academic project led by social scientists to assess the state of socio-cultural, moral, religious, and political values of different cultures around the world.

An Index of over 100 corresponds to countries where a majority of people trust others, while an index under 100 corresponds to countries where a majority of people think one can never be too careful when dealing with others. Countries that have high trust index are Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Netherlands, and Canada. These countries generally trust people.

Bosnia has trust index of 32.4. This index is very low and shows that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not trust each other. This index puts Bosnia and Herzegovina at 91st place out of 117 countries.

Table 1: Social trust

Rank	Country	Year	Index
1	Norway	2007	148
2	Sweden	2006	134,5
19	United States of America	2006	78,8
20	Germany	2006	75,8
26	Montenegro	2001	68,2
32	Italy	2005	60,8
42	Greece	1999	54,6
51	Bulgaria	2006	50,9
68	Romania	2005	43,6
75	Croatia	1999	38,7
76	Slovenia	2005	38,6
78	Serbia	2006	38,2
85	Lebanon	2005	33,8
86	Uganda	2005	33,8
91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2001	32,4
94	Nigeria	2005	29,8
95	Macedonia	2001	29,5
102	Iran	2005	21,8
114	Rwanda	2007	10,2
115	Turkey	2007	10,2
117	Trinidad & Tobago	2006	7,9

Source: World Values Survey

UNDP research on social trust

Oxford research International on behalf of the UNDP, with support of Netherlands Government has carried out comprehensive research on the social and political situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it addresses the general well being, trust, social capital, politics, corruption, etc. in the year 2007. One finding of this research is that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not trust each other. In fact, with only around one in 14 respondents (7,2%) saying that you can trust other people, there appears to be breakdown in social trust. Research finds that social trust is ‘virtually non-existent’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the social fabric in the country is characterized by an ‘absolute weakness of social bonds of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity: international comparisons, including countries as Iraq put Bosnia and Herzegovina on the last position.

Table 2: People’s trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina


Percent trusting all or most of each group	Family	Close friends	Neighbors	Own ethnicity	Other ethnicity	People with a different way of life
Total BiH 2008	82.7	61.1	33.5	21.3	11.0	8.7

Source: UNDP

The report found that the highest level of trust is reserved for family and friends, from whom people derive considerable support. Trust levels are lower vis-à-vis neighbours, and are much lower for ‘outsiders’–non-family members and non-neighbours, including those of one’s own ethnicity. Rather than describing a society suffering from ethnic polarization, these suggest that Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by very low levels of trust towards ‘strangers’.

In this respect, there were almost no differences across gender, age, and ethnic groups, or across the two entities.

Graph 1: Trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina



Source: UNDP

Research at the International University Sarajevo

Students at the International University Sarajevo who took the course Business Communication in the spring semester 2010 answered the questionnaire regarding 5 dimensions of national culture in June 2010.

Results show that the most dominant cultural characteristic of Bosnian students was related to the intolerance and fear from others. The most dominant question was:”Would you work for a manager from other nationality?” Bosnian students answered negative

(Azra Branković, Savo Stupar, (2010), Cultural Differences between Turkey and Bosnia: Does convergence exist, International Symposium, Balkans and Islam: Encounter-Transformation-Discontinuity-Continuity, Cannakale, Turkey, 3-5 November 2011.)

It might be surprising as target group were young people, educated, from rather wealthy families, and one would expect more tolerance and openness. However, this primary research just confirmed the abovementioned UNDP research that did not find any differences in social trust across age group.

Research on education (Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Open Society Foundation Bosnia and Herzegovina (Soros) conducted research on content analysis of all school textbooks in geography, history, language and religion in order to determine what we teach children in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Report was published in October 2007. Results have shown that there is no cross-cultural education in Bosnia. There are three different education systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own educational plan, program and curricula. Studies concluded that existing textbooks on these subjects are filled with nationalist and intolerant language regarding the other ethnic groups, particularly when talking about the recent war and are in many cases fascist in nature. Examined textbooks represent in fact an extension of wartime nationalist rhetoric, filled with hatred and intolerance (Open society fund Bosnia and Herzegovina and Promente, 2007).

The analysis of the 'National Group of Subjects' contents in textbooks concludes that textbooks on national group of subjects and on religious education predominantly deal with only one nation and that they are not in favor of multicultural society. This encourages segregation of students as well as of society as a whole.

Also, these textbooks point out that people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are threatened by other peoples living in the country. It is underlined as a lesson taught in the past that should be a guideline for relations between peoples in the future.

In their research, Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina also found that textbooks contain parts that interpret differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily as a problem, and rarely as potential or wealth. This content in curricula encourages the attitude that living in multicultural society is complicated because different groups have different values, expectations and tradition that are not complementary. This supports attitudes of governing ideologies that it is impossible to live together in this area.

Primary research on managers in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The purpose of this research was to determine the cultural characteristics of managers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Openness to other cultures is taken as an indicator of the manager's ability to respond to the challenges of globalized world. Primary research has been done on the sample of 50 managers from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The interviewed managers work for various businesses (banks, consultancy, hotels, leasing, computers, services, production) or in public administration (ministries, government agencies, and parliament). They belong to different ethnic group (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) and have different gender (approximately, half of the managers are men and the other half are women).

The primary research has concluded that managers in Bosnia and Herzegovina are much more open to the other cultures than the average citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Openness and tolerance of managers in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be in the middle on the scale from 1 to 5. Managers are the children of their cultures; however their education, job position in organization and society, what inevitably enabled contacts with people from other cultures, made them more tolerant and open to the others. Research did not find any difference in cultural characteristics among ethnic groups or between men and women. However, research found that managers in business are more open to other cultures, willing to take a risk and strive for results. This result is expected, as managers in business have to make business in globalized world in order to survive and they know how to do it. Managers in public administration have a secure job and fixed salary, not really related to the results of their or institution work. However, these managers have also to be open and tolerant to others, as Bosnia and Herzegovina wants to be a part of the European Union and managers in government institutions have to negotiate with EU and later on to cooperate with many nations in European Union or other to solve common problems.

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THE BIG GOVERNMENT' OF B. H. OBAMA AND THE DODD – FRANK ACT

Abstract

The global financial- economic crisis that all characteristics of its crisis nature began apparently to manifest in the summer 2008 in a completely striking and dramatically manner has highlighted and imposed the dilemma of power, competencies and functions of the modern capitalist state. In general, primarily and especially, in the area of the social-economic relations.

Especially the functions of the modern capitalist state that were applied and demonstrated in USA both as a respond to, and a solution of the financial–economic crisis (first of all, the anti-cyclic nature of the applied fiscal and monetary policies, exactly as determined and recommended by John Maynard Keynes), have theoretically, ideologically and politically troubled exactly the determination and definition of the social–economic functions of the modern capitalist state. That is, primarily the concrete concept and the concrete ways of anti-crisis application of the fiscal and monetary policy have clarified to the extreme limits the problem of the theoretical and ideologically political identity of the modern capitalist state.

This clarification of the problem of theoretical and ideologically–political identity of the modern capitalist state in the societal field of social–economic relations, complemented and strengthened through the previously conducted reform of the health care system from the position of strengthening the power, competencies and functions of the modern American capitalist state, has also imposed the interest in the phenomenon of the so-called Big Government to the theoretical and ideologically–political plan.

It is understandable and very normal that this interest that is especially and primarily theoretically and ideologically–political, has occurred and was demonstrated exactly by the American theoretical and ideologically political (Republican) right wing. So it happened that among the other striking theoretical and ideologically- political products and reactions appeared ultra (neo) conservative and ultra (neo) liberal Tea party movement, as well.

If we sublimate, the (neo) conservative and (neo) liberal reaction to the awakening of the left–capitalist/capitalist interventionist “Big Government” is located and moving along the theoretical and ideologically political path of emphasizing the loss of the civil/individual freedom for the interest of expansion and growth of the state/ bureaucratic powers and functions. That is, the subordination of the civil/individual interest is explicated theoretically and ideologically-politically as being exerted for the benefit of the prevalence of the state / bureaucratic interests.

Within this thematic and problem context, besides and after the reform of the health care system, the theoretical and ideologically political troubling of the phenomena of the very intensive strengthening and expansion of the “Big Government” in USA is included and manifested exactly in and through the concrete provisions of the Dodd - Frank Act.

It is so because this Act, on the basis of the strengthening and expansion of the theoretical and ideologically political concept of the state interventionism (the concept and the policies of the “Big Government”) regulates/reforms the social–economic area of the financial markets. It is an Act (Wall Street Reform) which from the theoretical and ideologically political positions of the capitalist state interventionism should essentially enable and provide stability, accountability and transparency of the financial markets and protection for the customers of those markets.

Key words: “Big Government“; B. H. Obama; Dodd – Frank Act; Wall Street reform; state interventionism.

Introduction

The Dodd – Frank Act is passed with the primary goal to promote the stability and security of the financial markets (Wall Street) in USA, in a way that it would regulate the financial markets and protect the customers.

President B. H. Obama, after the Act was passed in both Houses of the Congress, has signed it into law on 21 July 2010 and the Act began to produce legal action.

The Act was previously submitted in the Congress by, at the moment, Democratic majority in the Congress and was aimed to express the state–interventionist, financial–economic and generally the social–economic philosophy, ideology and policy of the actual elite of the Democratic Party, as well as of the administration of the actual President Barack H. Obama in very effective way. The formal proposers of the Act, proposed on 2 December 2009 were the Democratic representative/parliamentarian (member of the Representative House of the Congress) and at the moment the chairperson of the Finance Committee of the Representative House, Barney Frank, and Christopher Dodd, Democratic senator and at the moment chairman of the Banking Committee of the Senate.

This Act thoroughly and dramatically breaks off the continuity of the neoliberal deregulation and liberalization of the financial markets in USA, which has gained its strongest momentum during the presidency of Ronald W. Reagan and his neo-liberal, social-economic theoretical conception, ideology and policy (Reaganomics) until the period of occurrence and development of the major financial–economic crisis, starting from the summer 2008 until nowadays.

The major financial–economic crisis being dealt with by the administration of the President B. H. Obama on the basis and through the theoretical concept and ideologies and policies of the state interventionism of J. M. Keynes, has created productive conceptual, ideological and political space for state–interventionist / regulatory activation in the field of financial markets.

The Dodd – Frank Act which contains a number of fundamental provisions through which the determination of the President Obama’s administration for regulation of Wall Street and protection of the customers at the financial markets is actually put into effect. At this point, we could systemize those fundamental determinations as follows:

1. Consolidation of the regulatory agencies and establishing a new Council for evaluation of the risk in the system

2. Comprehensive regulation of the financial markets, including the better transparency of the financial derivatives, which are exchanged / bought and sold at the secondary financial markets
3. Protection of the customers at the financial markets also includes establishment of a new Agency for protection of the customers and unification of the standards for customer / investor protection.
4. Tools that would be used in conditions of financial crises, including the “response regime” complementary to the existence of FDIC / Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, intended to the proper / safe management of the firms that should go bankrupt, including that FED / Federal Reserve / the US Central Bank would accept the loan certifications of the Treasury / the Ministry of Finances of US in extraordinary and emergency cases.
5. Critical measures for increasing the international standards and cooperation, including proposals regarding the importance of the accounting regulation of the credit rating agencies.

The last, fifth provision is both very important and sensitive because the three of the large/global agencies for credit rating (Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Ratings) have permanently given the highest credit ratings to the financial derivatives that have shown and approved at the markets to be toxic and non-payable, in that way misleading (of course, for their own high profits) the investors to invest in “junk” securities.

Neo-liberalism, Deregulation, Liberalization

The Dodd – Frank Act should successfully play the role of a general legal framework aimed to the reforming of the financial markets in USA (Reforming America’s. . . , 2011; US financial market reform, 2010) . It is about an intention to reform the financial markets in general, which means regulation of the secondary financial markets, that is, the markets of financial derivatives as well (Ware, 2005). The secondary financial markets are exactly those markets that have experienced their radical expansion in the moments when the total economic growth in US has reached its highest rates (Gray, 2007). At the same time, those were the moments when the reputation of the neo-liberal economic / social – economic policies (Sasajkovski, 2004), grounded generally on the economic theories of the Chicago School of F. A. Hayek and M. Friedman, have also reached their highest levels. It is a period in which not only the Republican administrations, that is, those of R. W. Reagan (Reaganomics), G. H. W. Bush and G. W. Bush, have designed their social – economic policies naturally ideological/ideological– politically, strictly on the premises of the neo- liberal theories, but it is also a period of the Democratic administration of President W. J. Clinton (Eshbaugh, 2005).

In essence, the fact is that during the left ideologically–politically oriented democratic administration of Clinton, serious regulatory actions for regulation of the total complex of financial markets were not undertaken; in contrary, the process of virtually endless innovation of the financial derivatives of the secondary financial markets was permanently running. It was that way, in fact, it had to be that way simply because the possible ideolog-

ically motivated efforts of the President Clinton administration for pro-regulatory reform of the financial markets would unavoidably confront the major course of the substantially high economic growth of the American economy grounded on neo-liberal theoretical premises and performed through neo-liberal social– economic policies (Sasajkovski, 2001). Regardless the basic ideological determination of Clinton as a politician, it would clearly be political suicide to intervene in the ideological and political matrix of the neo-liberal social– economic paradigm, which provided high rates of economic growth within those historical and social moments.

Therefore, during the time of the left oriented Democratic administration of President Clinton essentially neo-liberal social and economic policies continued to be carried out, including also within those ideological- political frameworks the abstinence from reaching for policies of pro-regulatory reforms of the financial markets (de la Torre, 2006) .

Moreover, during the administration of the President Clinton the Congress has passed a law, which open / deregulate the financial markets in US to almost maximum possible limits. Namely, on November 12, 1999 the Gramm – Leach – Bliley Act was passed, sponsored by three right wing / Republican Congressmen – Phil Gramm, Jim Leach and Thomas J. Bliley, also known as an Act for modernization of the financial services, in the period when the Republicans had majority in both Houses of the Congress. It's most important feature was that the US financial markets became open / liberated and deregulated for the banking, security and insurance companies, as well. In that way, the fundamentally important Glass – Steagall Act was derogated; this Act was passed in 1933, at the moment when the Great Depression reached its climax and that law prohibited the financial institutions operating on the financial market to be built like a combination of investment banks, commercial banks and insurance companies.

Regarding the topic of this paper, it is very interesting and important that the President Clinton, without any strong opposition, has signed the Act proposed by the Congressmen Gramm – Leach – Bliley, including himself / his presidency / his administration (left / democratic ideological – political orientation) in the main course of a continual (right / republic ideological – political orientation) pro-liberal and deregulatory reform of the financial markets in US (Sherman, 2009).

The passing of the Gramm – Leach – Bliley Act in the Congress and its signing by the President, placing it in the left / democratically right / republican ideologically political context, was in fact the second major economic / social – economic failure of the administration of President W. J. Clinton, at the end of his mandate, of course, after the disastrous failure of his effort to reform the American health care system through introduction of a basic health insurance for all people without exception, at the very beginning of his first mandate. This reform of the health care system in reality is contained in two legal projects: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed by the President on March 23, 2010, and Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, signed by Obama on March 30, 2010. That is, the administration of President B. H. Obama succeeded to pass those Acts on the reform of the health care system and it is undoubtedly major achievement of his social – economic policies, in addition to the Dodd – Frank Act – the pro-regulatory (ideologically political left / democratic) reform of the financial markets in USA.

It is very interesting and indicative that through the entire period of dominant reign of (right) neo-liberal theories and neoliberal social – economic policies in US, even at the time of (left) presidential administration, the period of significant growth of the American economy grounded on the ideological postulates and the concrete social – economic policies of the so- called Reaganomics, the presidents / governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED), and the American Central Bank, were the two persons having rich careers in the investment banking and the insurance companies - Paul A. Volcker, Jr. and Alan Greenspan and one person from the academic community who is clearly neo-liberally determined – Ben Bernanke. Especially Greenspan was the one who has strongly and fiercely supported the further, almost unlimited deregulation and liberalization of the financial markets (Strahan, 2002), that is, he was also strongly and fiercely opposing all indications both by the academic and political circles, for possible regulation of those markets. Greenspan was extreme adherent and supporter especially of the development of the secondary financial markets, that is, maximum unlimited liberty of the financial subjects (not that much the commercial banks but the investment banks and insurance companies) to create and operate / market financial derivatives at the secondary financial markets.

Exactly the global financially economic crisis, that is, the bubble found in its generic core, were (that bubble and that crisis) in fact formed from boundless “mountains” of contaminated, worthless, non- payable (“junk”) financial derivatives, placed at the extremely deregulated and liberated secondary financial markets in US (Roxburgh, 2010).

Indisputable is the exactness of the statement for that “junk”, that is, for the consequences caused by the global financially economic crisis (or, maybe they were only the last drop in the glass of crisis), but also so indisputable is the statement that those subjects (investing banks and insurance companies, especially the speculations of the hedge funds) that were marketing that “junk” had especially good earnings (through the famous bonuses) their managing apparatus.

Here is the connection between the business / working past of Volcker and especially of Greenspan and their positions and actions as presidents of the federal reserves, that is like fierce advocates of the unlimited development of wealth of financial derivatives and both the deregulation and liberalization of the secondary financial markets. For such positions and actions they had really suitable social – economic environment – the success of the neo-liberal Reaganomics (parallel to the identical success of the neo- liberal Thatcherism in Great Britain), that is the high rates of economic growth in US in the periods of their mandates as presidents of FED.

It is really very important to point out in this context that at the same time period Volcker and Greenspan had incredibly strong support for their deregulatory and liberal policies by a number of Treasury secretaries / ministers of finance as well. In that sense paradigmatic is the case of Lawrence H. Summers, Treasury Secretary in the period of President Clinton and shortly the President of the National Economic Council / NEC of President Obama.

In the summer 2008 when the crisis appeared Henry M. Paulson Jr. was the Treasure Secretary who claimed that the crisis was not so serious and that the markets of derivatives were not so much contaminated; previously, he was CEO of Goldman Sachs, an

investment bank that had a major role regarding the speculative investments in the secondary markets.

2008 Global Financial –Economic Crisis, State Interventionism, State Regulation

This neoliberal idyll between the combination / “organic unity” of the market deregulation and liberal theories and policies and the high and stable economic growth was ruined by the global financial – economic crisis (The global financial crisis: . . . , 2009) . It was / it is still a crisis that has showed and proved without any dilemmas something which is of most profound and essential significance in the context of the topic of this paper. It is the fact that the neo- liberal economy, the economy of the rationally and to the maximum liberated / free markets, the economy of rationally and optimally conducted deregulation and liberation simply has no its own autonomous mechanism and instruments of something that could / should be an efficient and effective anti-crisis / counter- crisis management (Sasajkovski, 2009). It is in any case indisputable because the development of the crisis showed and proved that it can be prevailed only / exceptionally through the mechanisms, instruments, competencies and power of the state / the state interventionism / the state regulation (Aikins, 2009).

Speaking in this sense, it is not accidental the admission by neo- liberal theoreticians, politicians and bankers that “all of us were Keynesians“ . The fact that after the short denial of the Secretary Paulson Jr. to admit that the anti-crisis / counter- crisis instruments, measures and power of the state interventionism should be activated and mobilized, the very Secretary himself as well as the President of FED, Bernanke, were official proposers and bearers of the state – interventionist anti –crisis / counter- crisis measures. Measures that are by their nature in collision regarding the nature of the neo- liberal economy, that is, neo- liberal markets. In that way the right / republican neo- liberal government of G. W. Bush most openly and directly, at least with a function and objectives of anti-crisis / counter-crisis management, had to accept the capitalistic – left / state – interventionist theory of J. M. Keynes on the counter-cyclic (anti- crisis / counter / crisis) of the use of the state interventionism, certainly, based and carried out firstly through activation and mobilization of the fiscal and monetary policy, among other things, followed / updated by decrease of the reference rates to zero (0,25 %) and by conscious and rational adoption of the growth of the budgetary deficit. The nature of the crisis enabled this anti-crisis / counter- crisis approach – **the crisis was- and still is stag-deflation** (recession + deflation) , it is a syntagm used for the first time by Nouriel Roubini, and not stagflation (recession + inflation) , such was the case for example with the Big Depression. Exactly due to this inflation component of the Big Depression, the right / republican administration of H. C. Hoover, consistently to its ideological / ideologically – political determination, anti-crisis / counter- crisis, that is, anti- depressive / counter- depressive, tried to act through the increase of the interest rates and introduction of fiscal discipline, simply in order to

regain the trust of the markets which were to get the economy out of the crisis, instead of the state interventionism (relevant use both of the monetary and fiscal policies) .

In that way the right / neo- liberal government of G. W. Bush found itself in essentially the same position like previously did the government of W. J. Clinton, when, as it was previously elaborated and underlined, the administration of Clinton had to essentially redirect its left / state – interventionist ideally – typical ideological / ideologically - political orientation, being unable to oppose the main neo-liberal course of stable growing American economy, at the time when the Republicans passed the Gramm – Leach – Bliley Act.

Stag-deflation nature of the 2008 Great Crisis, that is, its deflation component (Rou-bini, 2008), enabled the strong use of the monetary and fiscal policies – their facilitation as two basic components of the anti- crisis / counter- crisis state interventionism. Although, we must emphasize that the left / democratic administration of President F. D. Roosevelt, which has inherited the Hoover’s administration, in those stagflation conditions of the Big Depression remained ideologically / ideologically politically consistent and successful through the New deal project, that is through the activation and use of the fiscal and monetary policy, strictly respecting the theory of Keynes, succeeded to raise the level of the aggregate demand in an anti-crisis / counter- crisis manner.

Given the dominance of those theoretical and ideological / ideologically political frameworks of the anti-crisis / counter- crisis use of the state interventionism, the administration of B. H. Obama has had completely suitable ground to approach a serious revision of the neo- liberal basis of the today’s American economy. It is special counter neo-liberal reform of the US economy, grounded on the fundamentals of the state – capitalist interventionism and carried out through the policies and the processes of strengthening of the competencies and the power of the state regulation in regard to the permanent deregulation and freedom of the markets, predominantly in regard to that permanent deregulation and liberalization of the financial markets (U. S. Financial Regulatory Reforms:., 2009).

That is exactly the essence of the Dodd – Frank Act – to employ the almost epochal moment of the major financial – economic crisis, essentially as a crisis which has its own genesis at the point of the fundamental weaknesses and dysfunctionalities of the optimally deregulated and liberalized financial markets, especially of the secondary financial markets – the markets of financial derivatives, that is, as a basic crisis of both the American and the global neo- liberal economy (The Global Financial Crisis..., 2009). Economy which unlimitedly urges and radically strengthens the market speculations, based on the maximal realization of the greedy interests of the financial corporatism of Wall Street to disadvantage of the customers of those markets (Jafee, 2011). That is exactly why the Dodd – Frank Act is nominated and defined by its proposers in the Congress, as well as by Obama’s administration, not only as a law on (regulatory / state – intervening) reform of the financial markets (Wall Street), but it is also underlined that the aim of this law, that is, the reform of the financial markets (Calomiris, 2009), as one of its most essential and fundamental objectives, is to provide a protection of the customers of those financial markets whose interests are jeopardized by the radical greed of the neo- liberal financial – market corporatism.

Speaking in this context, we should also emphasize that the major financial – economic crisis, as one of its most relevant consequences, imposed the need of transparency and, it elucidated the incredibly strong unscrupulousness of the financial markets, caused fundamentally exactly from the greed of the financial – market corporatism, wherein that unscrupulousness is primarily manifested as disrespect and deceit of the customers of those markets (primarily the secondary financial markets) – placement and sale of securities (primarily financial derivatives) while completely knowing and being conscious that they are totally and absolutely speculative, worthless, non-payable, deeply toxic, in one word, simple “junk” .

Final Point

In reality, Dodd – Frank Act represents a synonym, symbol and metaphor for revitalization of the regulatory politics of the state interventionism in the fields of the social and economic relations in USA. This Act, along with the acts reforming the health care system – through introduction of obligatory basic health insurance (resulting in high penalties for the people who will not be insured), in the most direct, thorough and essential way indicates and illustrates the directions, forms and contents of the building / restoration of the American “Big Government”.

In addition, these reform projects could be supplemented by the announcement of the Plan to create jobs made by the President Obama, which in this (preliminary) phase of its promotion, elaboration and argumentation contains a package of left- democratic/left capitalistic state intervention determinations/particular social – economic reforms that should really cause large ideological- political tensions in USA – for example, interventions / reforms in the tax, labor, social protection areas etc. It should be expected that the mentioned tensions would be more certain and stronger due to the actual right – republic / right – capitalistic majority in the Congress, which will surely try to force the actual administration, as well as the left – democratic/state – interventionist minority in the Congress to involve in heavy discussions and compromises that would certainly and possibly, even in certain strategic points ideologically and politically balance the reform/state – interventionist sharpness of the plan.

Yet, while analyzing in this sense we should not exclude the ideological and political relevancy of the pressure that the radical right (neo-conservatist and non-liberal) movement Tea party would more than certainly exert.

However, that is what exactly happened – the ideological and political discussions and compromises that have followed this summer 2011 the painful proposing and passing the law on increasing the amount of the fiscal debt, for example.

In any case, the statement for the missed opportunity is undisputable, created by and through the depth and seriousness of the American and global financial – economic crisis, as well as from the theoretical concept and the concrete social and economic policies for its resolution (both the concept and the policies of the state interventionism), by the Administration of the President Obama through those two legal projects – the Dodd – Frank Act and the laws on reform of the health care revitalizing the theoretical concept of a “Big Government”, that is revitalizing the theoretical concept of the left – capitalistic state

interventionism – the concept of state regulation of the social and economic relations/ state regulation of the markets (primarily the financial markets) visa vi the competition/ exclusively right – capitalistic concept of neoliberal deregulation and liberation of the social-economic relationships/neo-liberal deregulation and liberalization of the markets (primarily the financial markets) .

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CHANGES AND PROSPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNIC IDENTITY - The case of Bulgaria

Abstract

Contemporary social changes in Bulgaria instigate a broad range of interactions between various ethnic groups, from harmony to tensions. Involved is transformation of national identity, emergence of new, different from existing, types of identities. *First process* here is the crisis of the built in another historical contexts Bulgarian national identity. Its flexibility and ability to co-exist with various ethnic groups, to enforce multiculturalism, to set new forms of integration and differentiation is contested by the imperatives of social time. *Second process* occurs from redefining of the very concept of ethnic identities within the nation-state. The design of the dominating unified and monolithic nation is no more taken for granted. Due to various reasons, in Bulgaria from the late 1980s and early 1990s each one of the major ethnic communities (Bulgarian, Turkish and Roma) 'rewrite' the basic parameters of their self-consciousness, the we-image and they-image. These processes are characterized by

- enhanced ethno-centrist attitudes;
- increased ethnic distances;
- prevalence of negative They-images;
- enhanced intra-ethnic stratification

21st century brought systematic and contemplated building of ethnic and national identities. In our case, historically established cultural substance, the Bulgarian people, holds as a principle compatibility, and co-existence of diverse groups. It is rather a process of institutionalization and continuation in noticeable forms of this traditional version of the relationships between the different ethnic backgrounds. Important here is to emphasize the productive, positive trend, linked to the transformation of national identity, which is modified according to a larger community, that of the European peoples.

Key words: ethnic identity, national identity, ethnic interactions and adjustment

We all live in a world, where both unification and diversification processes take place faster than ever. In traditional societies of the not so distant past one's identity was fixed, durable and steady, a function of predefined social roles, customs, faith and mythology which provided direction to anybody's behaviour. Brutal and prohibitive penalties for the non-obedient pointed to everybody's place in the world, rigorously circumscribing the realm of thought and behaviour. Man was born and died as a member of a particular clan,

tribe, fixed kinship system. Thus, in both pre-modern and the totalitarian societies, identity was straightforward and out of any kind of consideration or debate. Probably the pleasant part of the story was that no one had to cope with identity crises, or to alter his/her identity with the seption of certain extreme occurrences. Man could be a hunter, craftsman or a farmer, in addition to belong to the tribe where he was born and doomed to die – with the only alternative when being captured and enslaved in another tribe.

The nation-state, which promotes usually single or prevailing ethnic identification, was crucial, during the 19th and most of the 20th century, for an enhanced, even exaggerated ethnic manifestation, commitment and intensification. When a person's 'own' nation-state is absent, or their respective country is far away, on the contrary, we may see the fading out and degradation of the identity, and the gradual adoption of a foreign one – i. e. assimilation. Correlation between ethnicity and self-determination of the minority groups seem to be the most successful among the multiple and compact contexts where there is a shaped and well developed ethnic identity. Such groups, bolstered by the motherland, have protection against pressures to be assimilated.

In modern times, technological advancement allowed huge human groups to communicate between themselves, to know about each other, and to be ever more interdependent. As more and more people form political alliances using disembodied communications technologies, the kinds of identities that matter seem also to be modified. Changing technologies have a profound impact on our philosophical understandings of who we are. Attempts to decode human genetics and possibly shape the genetic make-up of future persons, to clone human beings, or to xeno-transplant animal organs, and so on, all raise deep philosophical questions about the kind of thing a person is. Altering bodies through sex change or cosmetic surgery dramatically change identities, with immediate consequences for the kinds of identities involved. Identity becomes much more mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflective, and subject to change. According to modern view, ethnicity is not given once and forever – it is emerging, evolving, strengthening or weakening variable under the heavy impact of specific historical conditions, circumstances and trends, though always in conjunction and opposition to the 'other' (for more details Nikolov, 1996, esp. pp. 6, 15-17; Nikolov, 2000). Thus, both identity, and the issue of identity, become increasingly problematic in modern times.

Our continent, Europe, only recently faced the test of the mutation and complication of national identities no longer based on single, fixed, or dominant ethnic or religious affiliations. Most prominent example here is the French Republicanism, which in its classical form denied recognition of the various sub-identities vis-à-vis the imposed 'Frenchness', used by the State to mould French society coercively. After World War II European elites were strongly committed to the idea of creating a 'post-national' European identity. Despite the progress achieved in the establishment of a powerful European Union, the European identity remains still more a vision than a reality. While a layer of mobile, cosmopolitan Europeans does indeed exists, only few people think of themselves as born Europeans or feel pride when playing the European anthem. With the defeat of the European Constitution of referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, ordinary citizens again showed the elites their reluctance to surrender national and State sovereignty.

Europeans are experiencing mixed feelings about their national identity. The old European national identities continue to exist, people still have a clear sense of what it means to be British, a Frenchman, a Pole or a Greek, even if it is not very politically correct to affirm these identities too strongly, or, in many cases, regionally identities 'peep out' from behind the British, German, or Italian papers. National identities here in Europe, compared with those in America remain more ethnically affected. Thus, while all European countries have the same liability to formal, political citizenship, abiding pressure of ethnic devotion makes it much more difficult to convert this into a really heart-felt equality of citizens.

European experience is far from homogeneous. In most countries the identity debate gradually grew, partly driven by the terrorist attacks, rise of the populist right, and the developments in the post-communist countries, especially the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. Expansion of relativism make it more difficult for the postmodern people to affirm the values, and shared beliefs required of immigrants as a condition for their residence. Postmodern European elites appeared to be misguided by the contemplation that has advanced beyond identities defined by religion and nation. Repeatedly praising diversity and tolerance, they find it more difficult to reach agreement on the definition of the nature of the arrangements for politically and economically common policies. Main queries are whether the continuously increasing immigration is producing a new comprehension about the national identity; whether it contributes to the shaping of entirely new group identities in Europe, or changes introduce only certain new elements and depletes the old ones. With the emergence of second, third, and further generation descendants of immigrants, this issue becomes exceptionally complex. These are, in fact, both 'new' Europeans who crave to belong to their new home country, and Europe at large, but altogether to preserve the main traits of their former identities (see for more details Robyn, 2005). Today millions of immigrant parents' descendants grow up, attend school, and seek an occupational future in the European countries where those parents first went to work temporarily¹. Researchers try to grasp on such issues as what kind of identity, especially the ethnic one, bicultural adolescents have; is it justified to talk about so-called double identity and does such a situation provokes certain identity problems, and so on.

As for Bulgaria, current social changes are associated with a broad range of relationships between different ethnic groups, from harmony to tensions. At the core is transformation of national identity, from which in fact new types of identities, structurally and functionally different from previously existing and relevant to changing social realities, emerge. Two processes come with this. *The first one* is that of falling into crisis of the Bulgarian national identity by changing ethnic identities, and the evolving European identity. We tried to demonstrate here its specific characteristics, generated by specific contexts. Bulgarian national identity was built in many different historical contexts, with both more or less radical or subtle breaks, fostered by involvement of members of several or all ethnic communities by accepted values and objectives coming along with the com-

¹ The share of the total population with foreign origins ranges from about 5 per cent in the Netherlands and Sweden to 15 per cent in Switzerland, and ranging in the other receiving countries somewhere in between (Liebkind, 1989). There are many researchers who have demonstrated that the identity formation of young immigrants and second-generation immigrants would be more problematic, and the self-esteem lower, than in the native youth (Weinreich, 1979).

munity's own interpretations. This means that it possesses the ability to create space in the co-existence of the various ethnic groups as equally worth, to enforce multiculturalism, which shapes both diverse and coherent social worlds, sets new forms of integration and differentiation. Such a "soft", flexible national identity is always open to the imperatives of social time. *The second one* occurs from redefining of the very concept of ethnic identities within the nation-state. Before 1989, at the time when the idea of the unified and monolithic nation dominated promoted for numerous political reasons and imposed on all ethnic communities in Bulgaria. Consequently, ethnic identity was then never problematized or rather not allowed to be raised as a problem, and even less to be openly manifested, residing entirely in the sphere of private life where ethno-cultural models of behaviour were stored and reproduced. For various reasons, in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the 20th century in Bulgaria a complete crisis of identity was set in motion. Each one of the major ethnic communities Bulgarian, Turkish and Roma 'rewrite' the basic parameters of its ethnic self-consciousness, the We-image as a whole and They-image toward other ethnic milieu. The general trend of that crisis, with their specificities for each of the major ethnic communities, is characterized by

- enhanced ethno-centrist attitudes;
- increased ethnic distances;
- prevalence of negative They-images;
- enhanced intra-ethnic stratification

Some theoretical premises. Human beings are socialized to think, feel, and act in ways that may be culturally specific to the experience of certain group. Such a central assumption, i. e., that culture and the self are closely interrelated instigates great interest among modern sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists who seek to clarify the ways in which culture can repeatedly determine individual models of thought and behaviour (Smith, Bond and Kagitcibasi, 2006). In this presentation we aim to examine how identities are shaped by cultural contexts – in particular, those of the transition from an imposed totalitarian single prospect, and the multiplicity, and even confusion of choices in the current freedom of self-identification. We try to propose a model of a new process in which individuals can reach to identify their positive and negative personal qualities/attributes both in terms of dominant cultural orientations and universal psychological needs. Further, we should try to find how to test this point of view by anticipating the contents of the self-identified strengths and weaknesses of various reference groups.

We use here the term *identity* to indicate in the broadest sense the individual self-determination in terms of the objectives, values and beliefs, both chosen or ascribed, that give direction, purpose and meaning to life (Bosma and Kunnen, 2001; Waterman,

1999²). Issues relating to identity reveal who we are and what we aspire to be – both in our own consciousness, and in the minds of the others. An average individual in full capacity of mind is believed to have relatively thorough control and managing over his/her own identity, and thus, psychologically and legally, is considered responsible for that identity, in terms of both merits and failings (Côté and Levine, 2002: 48). However, more recent approaches to identity involve much more sociological perspective, and describe *identity as both 'internal' and 'external' to the individual... internal to the extent that it is seen as subjectively "constructed" by the individual, but is external to the extent that this construction is in reference to "objective" social circumstances provided by day-to-day interactions, social roles, cultural institutions and social structures* (ibidem, p. 49). This relates to both personal self-identification, pertain to the utmost aspects of personal experience acquired in the course of interaction with the close milieu, but also to the purportedly social identities such as race, ethnicity, and nationality. In this presentation we shall try to examine personal attitudes about the assets and flaws, merits and failures of individual self-identification because we conceptualize these key self-descriptions as an important source that motivate behaviour after individuals often try to highlight and build on their positive attributes, trying to modify and mitigate manifestations of their negative attributes (Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee and Katsura, 2004; Crystal, Kato, Olson and Watanabe, 1995; Lo, Helwig, Chen, Ohashi, Cheng, 2011). Individual needs to be free of anxieties and hesitations regards his/her background and nature, which is a precondition for any socially noteworthy accomplishment,. depends on how clear and free of conflict are the socio-cultural conditions under which one's identity has been built and exists. Even more important – we further aim to elaborate a theory about how these self-identified strengths and weaknesses can be determined internally and externally, and defined by the individual both in terms of basic psychological needs, social and accepted/internalized cultural values. We should begin with a discussion of relevant differences in cultural context.

Among the most prominent critics of the fixed and consistent identity concept, Jacques Lacan, considers the individual subject as decentred; there is no such thing as an autonomous self. A central thesis in French psychoanalytic Jacques Lacan's theory is personal identity Ego, constituted in relation to others parents, peers, friends, relatives, colleagues, larger society, the mass media etc. The identity is thus constantly undergoing changes which are dependent on our relation with others and can be discussed in terms of preliminary structuring of the subject (Lacan 1975/1991}.

Thus, in the interaction with these, individuals play a number of different roles. Since there is a disparity between the personal and social identities, each individual is found in a continuous search for a noteworthy way of merging these miscellaneous roles. Further-

2 As a working definition of identity we accept here purposeful self-attachment to a structured normative and value-based social-life field, which includes basic attributes of a community. Or, national identity can be defined as a concentric distinctive field, where in the center is the political, understood as an authentic interaction that penetrates all social spheres. In general, its structural components are dynamically organized into two complexes. One consists of items such as statehood, legal system, Armed Forces, legislative and executive bodies – i. e. all structural and institutional chains, directly coupled with the state power. As for the other, it arranges those who by and large may be described as cultural: the foremost moral values, populace's peculiarities, the symbolic codes, notional 'stuffing' of material space environment, specific symbolic semantics, science, culture in the closer sense, arts, literature etc. (see Nedelcheva, 2004, 2011)

more, any individual should simultaneously be a personality himself and a member of one or more groups. As the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor notes (see Gutmann, 1994), the idea of a modern identity is essentially political, since modern policy is based on the Hegelian principle of universal acknowledgment, and thus requires recognition by others. Now, however, the idea of universal recognition, based on the shared individual comprehension is not sufficient, especially when groups that have been discriminated in the past, are now playing visible roles. This means that modern policy discourse on the issues of identity, swivels around the requirement for recognition of group identities, i. e. public validation of equal status for groups, that in the past were discarded – such as the Kurds or the Afro-Americans and American Indians, Saami, Tuaregs, etc., but also women, gays and lesbians, and so on. As Sonia Kruks puts it, “The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of ‘universal humankind’ on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for respect ‘in spite of’ one’s differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for oneself *as different*” (Kruks, 2001, p. 85).

Thus

Our narrow purpose here is to explore the mobility of ethnic identities with reference and on the basis of *the Bulgarian case*³. Among the Bulgarians identity is associated mainly with the crisis of national identity, of whose transformations different forms of nationalism were ‘born’. However, as a whole, functioning of the common and open a national identity was retained, and nationalism’s modifications are still primarily defensive and not loaded with intolerant aggressiveness. It should be borne in mind that the Bulgarian ethnicity is the one who owns and manages the main resources of the power, but despite that, it does not stretch to the ultimate types of the discrepancy. Rather, expressions of the ‘catastrophic consciousness’ if we use the expression of the historian and writer Vera Mutafchieva, appear to be exceptionally strong. This is what crafts the traumatic Bulgarian ethnic identity, notably lucidly manifested in respect to the ethnic Turks with the amplified mistrust, even fears and anxiety, during the late 1980s and early 1990s of the 20th century.

During the same period, the Turkish ethnic community became visible to the public consciousness. The most noticeable were processes of vigorous ethnic partition and emancipation, demonstrated in the construction of the very community, active ethnically distinct manifestation of the self as a value, formation of political, intellectual and economic elites in search of a new social appearance and efficient mechanisms for the actual realization of their respective rights and obligations, in the enhanced social self-confidence which implies a rather zealous civil position and attempts to overcome the various forms of exclusion and marginalization.

Much more intricate developments are associated with the crisis of identity in the Roma community. This is due to the specificities of the Roma identity, i. e. the perception

3 Analysis here was based on the empirical sociological survey *Nacionalna Identichnost i socialni vremena, pp. etnicheski diferenciacii* National Identity and Social Times. Ethnical Differentiation. 2006-9. Research team, Tanya Nedelcheva (head), Albena Nakova, Nina Pekhlianova. Funded by the National Fund ‘Scientific Research’, Ministry of Education, Youth and Science. See also Nedelcheva, 2011.

of belonging to the amalgamated compound, structured and hierarchal Roma community with many subgroups. It is a *multiple identity*, on the one hand, and *borderline*, on the other. Complexity in the study and definition of Roma identity derives mostly from the fact that the Roma ethnic community lacks those attributes, around which generally identities are built. Almost all of these are externally attributable, “imposed” by the other, different ones, by the non-Roma. The ethnic identity of the Roma is amorphous, dispersive, multiple, resinous, but it is namely that community which generates the most frequent ‘micro’ troubles in our society.

If in the early 1990s of the 20th century among the Roma the trend towards turkicization and formation of anti-Bulgarian moods prevailed – which means not just a crisis of ethnic identity, but targeted action for redefinition of it, in the second half of the 1990s in the background of the ‘appeasement’ processes of the manifested ethno-differentiation and redefinition of ethnic identities overexposure of the Roma equal treatment and the formation of the Roma ethnic identity were set in motion. From now on that community was increasingly strongly situated in social space and indicates the projections of its future image.

The beginning of the 21st century is a period of systematic and contemplated building of ethnic and national identities. Notwithstanding the strong socio-economic, political, and so on tensions and disturbances, the process of ‘Europeanization’ of Bulgarian society carries on without extreme disparities, preserving sufficient degree of consensus and ethnic coherence. This indicates that historically established cultural substance, the Bulgarian people, holds as a principle compatibility, and co-existence of diverse groups. Underlying here is the ability to live with the other, fusion of various cultural models, integration of specific ethnic domestic rituals, customs and practices. Its development is rather a process of institutionalization and continuation in publicly visible forms of this traditional version of the relationships between the different ethnic backgrounds. Important here is to emphasize the productive, positive trend, linked to the transformation of national identity, which is modified according to a larger community, that of the European peoples.

In this social context the Bulgarians Muslims are placed in a complicated situation. Purely factually, on the basis of the understanding of ethnicity as blood, as a genus, they are part of the Bulgarian ethnicity. Their religious affiliation places them in the same confessional community with the Turks. Undergone dramatic historical situations which have propelled them into utterly disparate conditions, Bulgarian Muslims appear to be a rather heterogeneous community. One part of them is identified just as Bulgarian Muslims, distinct from both the ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Turks. However, this identity requires construction of origin, past, history, etc. Another part adopts the Turkish ethnic identity, or more precisely, appreciates the Turkish ethnicity as proxy. The problem here is whether the Turks accept them for their own and what distance they place between ‘us’ and ‘them’. A third part chooses the Bulgarian ethnic identity. In some sense it can be said that they choose their genuine ethnic identity, but as far as each identity has many options and it there is always a certain kind of instrumental choice, which makes any definite

statements irrelevant. Of course, it has to be recognized that the extent of inclusion to Turkish or Bulgarian ethnicity is determined by the particular situation, which means that both self-sufficiency and freedom are considerably implicated⁴.

We still need to frame the basic preconditions that we will follow in the analysis. The first is that the Bulgarian Muslims here shall be regarded as a cultural community, in so far as this characteristic is most neutral. Second, the Turks and the Bulgarians are also defined as cultural communities, irrespective of the ethnic specificity of their cultural distinctness. Third – ethnic characteristics will not be taken into account, and in this sense we will attempt to interpret only the national identity of those communities.

An important phenomenon, describing the specifics of that community or identity, is the high degree of its confinement. Not only because they live detached in a regional plan, not only because this is typical of any minority. The Bulgarian Muslims have more reasons why they amplify even intentional internal and external separateness; we may list here, for example, the unforgotten insults, sensitivity of their perception by both Turks and Bulgarians as “second rate”, the experience of itself as the most fervent guardians of certain traditions and customs, etc. But the main is deficiency of social emancipation, unaccomplished essential collective social self-confidence, unfound place in the national social space, and nebulous future image. Perhaps because of this they “wobble” between identities, self-names, between origins and both externally- and self-attributable features

After periods of various imitations endorsing Bulgarian or Turkish nationalist mythologies, being socially invisible and adjusting to each specific situation, making faint attempts to find future prospects by the so called Pomak party or the primarily Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS, Bulgarian Muslims are now increasingly available to impose their own cultural uniqueness, right to existence as different from both the Bulgarians and Turks, to find own social place, increasingly vigorously and intentionally seeking place within decision-making power resources in local government and so on. Their intellectual potential has already been mobilized and is setting as a minimum goal, at least being acknowledged by the others as a distinctively existing Bulgarian Muslims’ community, but also more and more actively involved in all spheres of public life. Its mission is evoking that of the intellectuals during the building of the nation-states, and it is thus to be much expected that the formation of a new community alleging ethnic status, has been accelerating in the last 2-3 years. Their distinction, internal mobilization, claims of power resources is not only increasingly articulated, but above all the endeavour for the community to be in the near future an equal constituent part of the nation-state.

Our analysis proved what is probably obvious, that there is a challenging issue with crucial consequences for the future of great masses of people and major institutional arrangements – national and supranational. This requires considerable attention and great responsibility of the academic community to further study and analyze the issue, and to provide the policymakers and the general public with persuasive, credible, well-grounded and explicable solutions.

4 The first group of Bulgarian Muslims are called ‘autonomous’, the second – Turk-leaning, and the third – Bulgarian-leaning.

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DYNAMICS OF IDENTITIES IN TRANSITIONAL SERBIA¹

Abstract

Due to rapid social changes, Serbia faces an enhanced dynamics of identities and their alteration, appearance of new and disappearance of old identities, as well as oscillations in the emotional legitimacy attributed to these identities. Apart from global social processes, the specificities of the Serbian transitional society also play an important role in the creation of identity matrices.

This paper deals with these changes in the identity map of Serbia, trying to determine the types of present identities, their dynamics, and emotional legitimacy attributed to them by the respondents, and analyzing the results of the research conducted in the period from 2007 to 2011: *Culture of Peace, Identities and Interethnic Relations in Serbia and in the Balkans in the Process of European Integration* (Centre for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, 2007; *European Value Survey*, 2008; *Cultural Practice of Population in Serbia* (Institute for the Study of Cultural Development); *Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia* (Centre for the Empirical Study of Culture, 2011).

The authors' intention is to capture the change, tendency, process – the dynamics of “old” (ethnic, religious) and “new” (professional, civil) identity. Family identity can occur both in a traditional and modern form, therefore we are also going to deal with the issue of family identification in order to recognize the dominant model in Serbia. Although identities have to be “fixed” to a certain extent, still the identification of the individual and collective creation is a living process which reacts to current social happenings.

Key words: Identity, Dynamics, Serbia

Introduction

In the Balkans and in the contemporary Serbian society, which is characterized by the “narcissism of small differences”, the establishment of strong boundaries and distances in relation to others and that which is different is present. For one society to organize itself in a democratic manner, it is necessary that the actors possess a cultural and moral capacity which is reflected in the universalization of values and acceptance of different actors as moral subjects. Since social values and their validity delineate social groups, we can consider ourselves members of the same social community only if we preach and

¹ Prepared as a part of the project *Tradition, modernisation and national identity in Serbia and Balkan in EU integration processis* (179074), conducted at the University of Niš – Faculty of Philosophy, and supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.

practice the same value, and observe at the level of everyday social reality an array of social groups living their transitional reality next to one another, and not one with the other.

Serbia as a transitional country faces numerous problems that burden its social life. Changes of value system in a society that transitions from one social order and ideology to another are inevitable, but these changes are also requirements for a successful concept of social community. In such conditions a debate is brought to professional circles on a relation between traditional and modern elements in a social reality; modern social relations are wanted and traditional ones are missed. A discourse that frequently occurs in Serbian public regards the convergence to the EU as a threat to the sovereignty and national identity, and sees modernization and globalization processes as a danger to traditional form of life – “Serbian way of life”. Formation of identities present among the Serbian citizens that can successfully conform to new social needs is also an imperative for survival and development of the contemporary Serbian society.

Social identity is defined as a sense of an individual that he or she belongs to a certain social group, along with emotional and moral significance of this affiliation.² In other words, it is a concept of an individual as a member of a group. Since the individual consciousness is to a large extent intermediated by a collective consciousness, the answer to the question “Who am I?” largely corresponds with the question “Who are we?” The term “identity” is defined in sociology as a “sense of selfhood”, and it refers to what people think they are and what their most important feature is, whereas a reflection of others does not always coincide with self-reflection (Jary, D and Jary, J 1991). Identity is in a continuous forming, it is a process, because, as Z. Golubović says, identity always shapes, it adapts and distance itself over a long time and painstakingly by accepting and repelling, by self-identification and wider collective identification, along with constant reconsidering and modifying (Golubović 1999). Greater importance is given to some dimensions of identity than to others, which indicates their agents, but also the projection of “self-awareness”. One should bear in mind here the entwining of the personal and communal.

Studying social identities is always sociologically relevant and modern, because the fundamental thesis of human existing as members of collective identities (family, tribe, nation, class, race, political party...) is based on the concept of identifying people as members of social groups. It is evident that a person lives in a socio-cultural surrounding in which he or she acquires specific features (primarily the language, social norms, values...) Therefore, a person’s identity is a social identity, because in the process of adaptation and identification the basic role is given to common social values which are internalized. Each social identity is developed from the feeling of belonging to something, from emotional charge, and from moral meaning that comes from that belonging. There is more to be understood under the term of collective identities than a mere tradition; it should be recognized as a possibility of individual variations in relation to common experience that is contained in the memory of a people; the Other is more subjectively coloured. In context of this definition, the collective identity is a permanent struggle between the power

2 Identity refers to how people understand themselves and what is important to them. Important roots of identity are gender, national and ethnic affiliation, sexual orientation, etc. “Two types of identity are often referred to by sociologists: Social Identity and Self-Identity (personal identity).” (Giddens 2003:32)

of inertia and dynamic cultural force, which is especially clear in different crisis situations and in danger induced from the “outside” or the “inside” (Cassirer, E 1985). That is where a positive function of those deepest layers of the collective identity comes on stage, and if these layers carry emancipating contents, they enhance a choice of different identification contents (subject of their own life as opposed to collective social actors).

From a large body of anthropological, sociological, cultural theories of identity it is possible to abstract completely conflicting ones: first, those that see an identity as natural and unchangeable, and second, those that regard them as a result of fragmentary decisions, as something that “is constructed, that is worked on, and that is a result of a choice” (Rose, 1966). The first set of theories assumes that the identity is like an immutable core with identity features that can be found in a territory, language, culture, religion...; the second one assumes that an established identity has a possibility to distance itself from any kind of natural determination. For example, the social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1986) considers multiple social identities that are established by equal participation of both individuals whose personal identity is in question and members of a group to which they belong and who all together form a single group, collective, cultural identity.

Each identity is relational, Zagorka Golubović believes, and she draws attention to Habermas’ idea that the identity is reached when a person is capable to perceive the difference between the traditional norms and those that can be justified by principles, thus a person is aware of what is being imposed upon him or her, and what one should choose on one’s own and that one should behave according to one’s own choice: “I (Ego) stands behind all lines of particular roles and norms and presents itself as a person who satisfies the requirement of consistency, in other words, the “role identity” is replaced by the “ego identity” when the actors are met as individuals, and not as “role players” (Golubović, 1999).

In a network of multiple identities a priority is established, which implies the answer to the question of primary affiliation. Traditional identities become non-functional, and social changes create new conditions for constructing new and different identities. Traditional bases of the identity are destabilized (immersion in people, nation, religion, kinship network), so one speaks about “discontinuity” (Giddens) as a significant characteristic of modernization. Pre-modern structures in which an individual was completely incorporated are disintegrated, but simultaneously, “differentiation of the individual from the wider structures” is made possible (Friedman Jonathan, 1996). This means differentiation of differences and uniqueness, which was simply impossible within the closed traditional structures, but it also means providing possibility for constructing different (new) identities in a cultural and social milieu. Views on the identity construction exclude the idea of automatism, because people are active agents who create and modify their values under different influences, and in this sense R. Connel claims that “agents of socialization cannot produce mechanical effects” (1987).

After the identity disorientation caused by the fall of socialism, different types of identification have been offered in Serbia: nationalistic and ethnocentric option has largely been a matter of choice. After all, experiences of the pervious twenty-year period, but also in a midst of current tensions concerning still undefined borders of Serbia, we ask

the question: what are the results of the identification process in Serbia? Toward what ideologies do the Serbian citizens lean?

Identities in Serbia from the perspective of empirical research

Results of a research conducted in Southern Serbia (2007)³ show that the most important identity of the respondents is the family identity, which presents them as parents and spouses; it is followed by the identification with the nation, profession, city... In reference to the identification with the Balkans and Europe there is almost identical proportion of the respondents declared as such. At the bottom end of the identification scale can be found political identification.⁴ This analysis has shown that the family identification has the central role on the identification scene in Serbia, which is not the case in other countries, so this phenomenon cannot be considered as a general trend.⁵

The question "How important is it for you that others know about you?" (2007) gave the following percentages within the option "It is important for me that they know...": "that I have children", 68.9%; "that I am married", 58.8%; "to what people I belong" 45.5%; "my profession" 41.4%; "in what town I live" 40.0%; "that I am from the Balkans", 38.3%; "my religious affiliation", 37.5%; "that I am European", 37.3%, "what kind of music I listen to", 26.1%; "my political affiliation", 10.8%.

The research⁶ conducted in 2010 in the entire territory of Serbia shows some of the following results of the study of self-identification. In this case the respondents were asked to define the most important, then the second and third most important identity from the offered identification list: identification with gender, family, profession, political party, region, town/city, the Balkans, Europe, nation, religion, country, race, and the whole world.⁷ By far the most dominant identification is the one with family. In the most cases (64.8%), it is the first choice of identification. The second first-choice identity is the gender identity in 16.0% of cases. The professional identity is present to a significant

3 Field research "Culture Orientation, Ethnic Distance and Culture of Peace in Serbia and in the Balkans", conducted in coordination of authors within the project *Culture of Peace, Identities and Interethnic Relations in Serbia and in the Balkans in the Process of European Integration* realized by Center for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, with financial support from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia. The sample of 1650 in total, organized in three subsamples, was studied in three cities: Plovdiv (Bulgaria), Skopje (Macedonia), and Niš (Serbia), with identical number of the respondents (550).

4 See further in Dragana Stjepanović-Zaharijevski, Danijela Gavrilović: Identiteti i porodične vrednosne orijentacije na Balkanu, *Sociologija* (1) 2010

5 When compared with Bulgaria and Macedonia, both countries have ethnic identification as the dominant one (Zaharijevski, Gavrilović 2010)

6 Research titled "Cultural Practice of Population in Serbia" has been conducted by the Center for Study in Cultural Development of the Republic of Serbia on a representative sample in Serbia, with statistical error from 2.5% to 95%, under the direction of Dr. Predrag Cvetičanin. See in Cvetičanin, P., Milankov, M. 2011. *Kulturne prakse građana Srbije*, Beograd, Zavod za proučavanje kulturnog razvitka.

7 In this research, the respondents were asked to rank three groups to which they belong. Other groups were not marked. For them it is most important that they are (the percentages show the first, second and the third choice respectively): Man/woman 16% 22,7% 7,7%, Father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister (family status) 64,8% 15,0% 4,1%, Member of a certain profession (doctor, clerk, teacher, worker...) 3,0%, 11, 1%, 9,1%, Member of their people (Serb, Roma, Hungarian, Albanian...) 2,4%, 12,7%, 12,0%, Member of their religion (Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Muslim...) 1,3%, 6,9%, 9,1%, Citizen of Serbia 1,9%, 7,2%, 16,2%, World citizen 2,7%, 2,4% 9,4%)

extent as the second form of identification (11%). The most commonly chosen as the first, second or third forms of identification are family, gender and professional identity. The ethnic identity also appears in a significant number of cases as the second choice of identification. The religious identity and the identification with the Serbian state (as a citizen) also appear to a certain degree (7%). The identification with the state is a significant third choice (16.2%). The identification with one's city appears as the third type of identification, apart from the already mentioned professional and ethnic identity; the identity named in this research "world citizen" also appears here. The identifications with the Balkans and Europe were not the first three choices.

According to the distribution of responses, the gender identification is the first choice for 16% of the respondents, the second for 22.7%, and the third choice for 7.7%. This identification comes right after the family identification according to its significance, which means that gender is an important identification marker and a constitutive part of identities in Serbia.

The family identification in Serbia is a priority; for 64.8% of the population the family status (father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister) is the first choice of identification, 15.0% take it as the second choice and 4.1% as the third choice. Other forms of identification mentioned earlier in the text do not appear with significant percentage, neither as the first, second nor the third choice (below 3%).

It is interesting that the civil identity preponderate over the ethnic identity, so a larger number of respondents identify themselves with the citizenship than with the ethnicity. If we look at the ethnic identity more precisely, the following results emerge: only 10.1% completely agrees with the statement "A Serb who is not an Orthodox Christian (not baptized) is not a real Serb", while 9.8% mostly agrees with the same statement. There is 21.5% that completely agrees with the statement "Orthodox religious education has to be compulsory for all students if we want spiritual recovery of our people"; 15.8% mostly agrees with the same statement.

This findings imply that even the nature of the ethnic identification is changing, so today only few people exclude those Serbs who are not Orthodox Christians from the body of the Serbian people, which is one of more significant indicators of identification and one very important for the process of forming the Serbian ethnic identity as well as for the period of ethnocentrism and ethnic conflicts. When asked what the most important thing is for someone to be recognized as a citizen of Serbia, then, according to the data of EVS for Serbia (2008), the most important is the official language and respect the institutions and obey the law.

Family as an identification focus

With the fall of socialism, re-traditionalization and repressive forms of identification are being established as a response to challenges of social changes. The processes of social transformations and confined socio-institutional framework drastically jeopardize the family by imposing it to the consequences of long-lasting repressive tendencies. Family relations, family structure and family functions undergo moments of crisis in a midst of

negative events which produce high level of traumatization of individuals and families (Milić 2004). The family is now more than ever left to its own. Impoverished and burdened by numerous problems, it necessarily goes back to obsolete forms of community in order to secure survival. Hence, there is no surprise in the findings of the sociological researches: in a situation of social transformation, the family is seen as a domain with the central spot in everyday life and it represents the greatest value (Zaharijevski, 2005). The “awakening” of old models of marital and family fellowship with already established models of family relations is a specific answer to challenges of social changes, this is the conclusion of these researches.

Our analyses are focused on the family identification because it has been seen as significantly the strongest one in contemporary Serbia. This is also attested by the following data (EVS for Serbia 2008): 1/ level of importance of the family in a live of an individual; 2/ attitudes about family and gender relations; and 3/ attitudes about marriage. Since the family identity can be experienced both in a traditional and “modern” way, we wanted to show the type of family, marital, and sex/gender identity (which is also very important) that we come across in Serbia.

A family is a union which is given the greatest significance in Serbia: it is very important for 85.3% of the respondents, and important for 13.5%. In terms of importance it is followed by work (very important – 58.3%, important – 38.1%), friends and acquaintances (very important – 41.15%, important – 55.0%), leisure (very important – 31.0%, important 50.3%), religion (very important – 17.5%, important – 54.6%), and politics (very important – 6.0%, important – 22.1%).

Analysis of predominant attitudes about family and gender relations has determined that a large number of the respondents agree with statements that a happy childhood requires a complete family (both parents) as many as 89.5%; that motherhood is a requirement for life fulfilment for a woman (73.4%); that marriage is not outdated institution (79.5%) – which should be seen as indicators of traditional values matrix. On the other hand, there is a high percentage of approving single-mother status (63.9%) – which supports the claims that modern patterns of behaviour and choice are accepted.

Several more statements have been further examined so that it would be possible to conclude more evidently the family identification dynamics that changes from the traditional values pattern to the modern ones. High percentage of responses concerning a statement that people should decide themselves whether to have children or not should be regarded as modern (50.6% of the respondents completely agree with this statement, and 44.8% agrees); but there is also a high percentage of those who completely agree (45.5%) and those who agree (43.7%) with a statement that it is a duty of adult children to take care of their sick and incapable parents, which is the statement closer to the traditional values pattern. Opinions that marriage or other types of committed relationships are necessary for happiness (completely agree 27.6%, agree 42.5%) are more prevailing than the opinion that it is acceptable for two people to live together outside marriage (completely agree 18.7%, agree 44.2%). Since the difference is not large it can be discussed that acceptance of new forms of marriage partnerships becomes more flexible. Although a more liberal attitude is seen here, this certainly cannot be said when it comes to deciding whether homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children (completely agree

2.1%, agree 5.8%); stereotypes and homophobia is still dominant here. The traditional understanding that bearing children is an obligation to the society is being abandoned (only 8.3% agrees completely, and 25.5% agrees with the statement that it is an obligation), which is also an indicator of abandoning the traditional value matrices.

The dynamics of family identification is also measured through *gender roles*. Namely, the traditional value pattern assumes asymmetry of gender roles: a woman is closer to nature and the private, and a man is closer to culture and the public. As opposed to that, the modern value pattern affirms gender balance and equality. The complete agreement with statements about the roles of women and men appears in high percentage in relation to equal parental responsibility (46.7%), equal contribution to household income (44.6%) and the attitude that a working mother can have equally warm and secure relation with her children as a mother who does not work (36.0%); this is followed by the complete agreement with the attitude about employment as a condition for independence of a woman (30.6%), etc. The percentage of those who “agree” is highest in confirming the significance of employment of a woman for her independence (49.0%), equal contribution to the household income (48.9%), and equal responsibility toward home and children (47.2%). Data with the lowest agreement are indicative, such as with the statement that a preschool child is more likely to suffer if his or her mother is employed (completely agree 1.1%, agree 36.0%), and with the statement that an employment is acceptable but that most women actually want a home and children (completely agree 1.9%, agree 36.9%) – which supports the already mentioned conclusion that there are still stereotypical matrices which keep women “trapped” in gender roles. However, the agreement with statements concerning the change of the gender roles toward more modern patterns prevails. “Coming out” of a woman from the private sphere is accepted, but moderate agreement with statements concerning the gender-balanced reality prevails over the complete agreement, which indicates that there is traditional hindrance still present.

Parental responsibility is also a “litmus test” that indicates the prevailing family values pattern as a source of identification. It is known that children are highly valued in the Serbian culture; therefore parents have great responsibility to bring children to the right path, but also to take care of them as long as they are not capable to live independently. As many as 70.2% of respondents believe that regardless of qualities and flaws of parents, children have to love and respect them, while 25.7% believe that children do not have any obligation to respect and love their undeserving parents. The majority of population (77.4%) believes that parents are responsible for their children even when it is to their detriment, which is typically Balkan attitude, while only 12.9% of people believe that parents have their own life and that one should not expect any sacrifices from them, which is the attitude of Western culture.

The perception of a *successful marriage* is also an indicator of changes of the identification matrices. “Very important” are fidelity (78.2%), children (70.5%), openness to discuss problems between spouses (61.0%), good sex (46.7%) and these are followed by income, time for friends and personal activities and hobbies, equal division of labour at home, good housing conditions, life separated from parents, religious values, the same social background, and finally, agreement in politics. The more complete image of value transformation is obtained when requirements for a successful marriage are observed

through the estimation that they are “important”. Incomes (55.5%), time for themselves (55.2%), good housing conditions (54.1%), equal participation of spouses in doing chores at home (49.7%), etc. are perceived as important requirement, and these are the very indicators for the tendency of responsible views on marriage as a type of equal partner relationship in conditions of prevailing choices, which represent departure from socially adjusted and arranged marriages whose purpose was giving birth to children, male children if possible, in order to continue the lineage.

Conclusion

After the performed analyses, we can say that the Serbian contemporary society is dynamic in terms of identity changes. “Old” identities (ethnic, religious) are, based on our finding, put aside and they do not represent the dominant identification matrix. Despite the presence of the discourse that calls for preservation of the ethnic and religious identity, it appears that people in Serbia are tired of “great stories” and they turn to their families through which they live their collective identities. The given results do not allow any exclusive conclusions on traditional or modern patterns, because of the very fact that there are acceptable statements that fall into both groups. Therefore, it is better to refer to the *dynamics of family identification from the traditional toward modern*, and about their simultaneous existence with the tendency of development toward plural models where a choice replaces social arrangement.

The task of future researches is to reconstruct the existing dominant identification matrix. One should determine if this priority of attachment to family is a dominant choice and need or, on the other hand, it is imposed and a necessary requirement for a community in a midst of adverse social conditions.

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DANGEROUS SENTIMENTS: NATIONALISM AND POLITICS IN MACEDONIA

“The politics becomes a means not only for achieving certain interests, but also for defining the identity. We know who we are only if we know who we are not and frequently, only if we know who we are against.”(S. Huntington)

Abstract

When shall we see the beginning of the end of the twenty years ‘name dispute’ between Macedonia and Greece, which left Macedonia in front of the NATO and EU doors, and which threatens to disintegrate the state along ethnic lines? When does the moment come when a chance may at least appear that “the nationalism of the powerless” will be considered reasonable when their goals are within reach? If international politics still functions on the principle expounded by the realists – that the strong do what they want while the weak do what they must, and having in mind the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, the question arises: how much time it takes for the nationalism of those who believe that are powerful enough to get what they want (saying: “these are our rights and they are nonnegotiable”) to break down the nationalism of the “powerless”?

The main thesis in this article is that whatever was achieved so far, as a result of the pressure on Macedonia to change its constitutional name in these twenty years comes down to the following: Macedonian nationalism increased and strengthened, the antagonism between the Macedonian and the Albanian political parties deepened, and the democratic process in the country was undermined. However, the results of the early elections in 2011, indicate that the Macedonian society slowly consolidates, under the so called ‘fatigue’ of ‘protracted conflict’ and prepares for a compromise.

Key words: nationalism, national identity, ethnic sensitivity, ‘name issue’, international relations

Demonstration of power in international politics

If international politics still functions on the principle expounded by the founder of Realistic school (Tukidid, 2000) that the strong do what they want while the weak do what they must, and having in mind the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, the question arises: how much time it takes for the nationalism of those who believe that are powerful enough to get what they want in order to break down the nationalism of the “powerless”? Their main ‘argument’ is: “These are our rights and they are nonnegotiable”.

To make myself clearer, when shall we see the beginning of the end of this name dispute, which left Macedonia in front of the NATO and EU doors, and which threatens to disintegrate this multiethnic state along ethnic lines? When does the moment come when a chance may at least appear that “the nationalism of the powerless” will be considered reasonable when their goals are within reach?

In about twenty years, I would say. (When an internal armed conflict takes place that jeopardizes the security of the whole region, that timeline is much shorter) (Zartman, 1995, Gurr, 1993).

My thesis is that whatever was achieved so far as a result of the pressure on Macedonia to change its constitutional name in these twenty years comes down to the following: Macedonian nationalism increased and strengthened, the antagonism between the Macedonian and the Albanian political parties deepened, and the democratic process in the country was undermined. However, the results of the early elections in 2010 indicate that the Macedonian society slowly consolidates under the so called ‘fatigue of protracted name-issue conflict’ and prepares for a compromise.

Increasing and straitening of the politic of nationalism (authoritarian style)

Here are several indicators in context of this thesis. The early elections in 2008 were provoked by the political crisis that Greece’s strong pressure on Macedonia caused by insisting that the country changes its name, *erga omnes*, as a precondition for its membership in NATO and EU. The Bucharest Summit in 2008, when Greece put a veto on Macedonia’s entrance in NATO, was only the peak of this demonstration of power. The signals that the prime minister Gruevski’s government will agree with the reference ‘Skopje’ in brackets, next to the name of the country, if this is accepted by the citizens at a referendum, wasn’t sincere enough. The veto directly affected the political stability of the country. The opposition accused the government of destroying the European future of the country. The government accused the opposition of treason. The fierce mutual accusations led the whole society in a paranoid atmosphere of searching for culprits, so that the epilogue was organizing early elections. The opposition party, the leftist SDSM, which was more flexible in regard to resolving the dispute with Greece, assumed the position that the referendum means avoiding responsibility on the part of the government and, mainly because of that, it was defeated at these elections.

The citizens of Macedonia responded to the Bucharest veto by giving massive support to the rightist-centrist party VMRO-DPMNE and its leader Nikola Gruevski. Although the proportional electoral model in Macedonia disperses the political power, Gruevski won 63 of 120 Parliament seats at the early elections in 2008. Together with its coalition partner, Ali Ahmeti’s Albanian party DUI, he controlled two thirds of the MPs, enough to change the constitution of the country. If to this success we add the victory that Gruevski’s coalition achieved at the local elections, then it is understandable that the policy of not yielding to Greece, which VMRO-DPMNE has been a proponent of for twenty years, won full legitimacy. He addressed the voters with a simple and understand-

able request: 'I want a stable government, I want a majority with which no one, at home or abroad, will be able to blackmail me!'

The indisputable rule of Gruevski between 2008 and 2011 brought something good for the country, but it also caused the following political instability, parliamentary crisis, and new early elections in 2010. After the elections, the government concentrated on what the poverty stricken citizens of a country in transition mostly understand and approve of: fight against corruption, establishing law and order, although sometimes with excessive force and strict sentences. The tax discipline has been increased, which has filled the budget with money and enabled the government to spend more for public goods. The unemployment rate of over 30% has not decreased, but it has not increased either as a result of the world economic crisis. Nevertheless, the proposed economic and investment boom has not happened because the country is seen abroad as insecure. The average salary remained on a level of 300 EUR a month, the inflation augmented, the external debt rose, while the poor became even poorer. Although it promised to deal only with economy, Gruevski's government spent a lot of time, energy and money to strengthen the Macedonian national identity, choosing the road of a symbolic confrontation with Greece. The younger generation of politicians of VMRO-DPMNE, ostensibly pragmatic but in fact inexperienced nationalists in international politics, played on the card of the Macedonian national sentiments. They did not invent the Macedonian nationalism, nor it is an exclusive property of this party, but they aroused and misused it, as a response to the Greek provocative nationalism. The national passion was already here, as is the case with other young nations: I shall quote Huntington that in similar situations "the politics becomes a means not only for achieving certain interests but also for defining the identity. We know who we are only if we know who we are not and frequently, only if we know who we are against." (Huntington, 1996) The dispute with Greece became more complex to resolve because it expanded.

Macedonia, and perhaps the wider region, is not a favourable milieu for the principle of the majority Westminster democracy: "the winner takes it all". (Lijphart, 1977) The political power has affected the winners. VMRO-DPMNE and especially Gruevski, since 2008 until these elections acted as an "anti-party": that is, having a majority in the Parliament, they attempted to humiliate and marginalize the opposition in every way possible. The parliamentary discussion was evaded and replaced allegedly with direct communication with the leader and the people. This is not only lack of sense for the place and role of the opposition in the parliamentary systems, but it is also underestimation of the democratic process in the name of achieving party goals. The opposition was faced with the greatest blow when, in the name of the fight against corruption, an accusation was raised against some of its most significant leaders, and armed and masked police officers and civil servants from the tax bureau stormed into the premises of the popular oppositional television, A1. I do not mean to imply that the opposition has no fault in this. The freedom in our country does not always go hand in hand with responsible behaviour of the opposition or the journalists, for example, but still the final impression is that for the democratic process in Macedonia it is more favourable to have a better balanced and controlled authority.

Misusing ethnic sensitivity

When the cold war ended and Yugoslavia disintegrated, the euphoria for creating a nation-state overtook Macedonia as well. The strengthening of the national cohesion and identity was a way to survive, but in a country in which 25% Albanians and other nationalities live, it was done at their expense. However, the anti-Albanian sentiment is due to the nationalistic ideology of VMRO-DPMNE which at the time was led by its former leader, Ljubco Georgievski. This ideology was defeated with the end of the armed conflict in 2001, and the signing of the Ohrid Agreement. The party revised its program becoming more pragmatic, changed its leader and got back to power at the elections in 2006. The reason for the election success of this party was due to the great dissatisfaction of the ethnic Macedonians from the solutions of the Ohrid Agreement, which were considered unjust and imposed by force. Just as a reminder, this agreement gave the Albanian community in Macedonia, which statistically is 25% of the population, rights that are very similar to the cultural autonomy in Belgium and a high degree of constitutionally guaranteed local autonomy. Power-sharing or a certain altered consociational form would also be a good description of the post-conflict resolution for Macedonia. The state is not unitary, and it is not a territorial federation either, but stabilized the country in the last ten years.

The international community would not have been able to help end the conflict and establish peace if it did not encounter the support of all relevant parliamentary parties in the country. First of all SDSM, the biggest opposition party in the Parliament in 2001. This party played a crucial role in forming the broad coalition during the war conflict in 2001. The peace wouldn't have happened if the 'international community' hadn't persuaded four main political parties in the parliament (two Macedonian and two Albanian parties) to form broad coalition in order to impose political solution with the Albanian guerrilla and impose peace in the country. In August 2001 the peace agreement, the so called Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed and the election in which took part the former guerrilla transformed in political party DUI took part. SDSM won the election and formed a government in coalition with DUI. But the decisions it made in its four-year mandate were difficult decisions: forming a government together with the recent enemies, just disarmed guerrilla fighters, changing the constitutional system as an obligation of the peace agreement, handing over to its Albanian partner, DUI, some municipalities in Western Macedonia, such as Struga, which were traditionally under the authority of the ethnic Macedonians, etc. The award that followed by the American administration, recognizing the name of the country, was a great success of SDSM and DUI coalition government, but obviously insufficient. The party (SDSM) that set off to undertake unpopular solutions in the name of peace and stability of the country lost the elections in 2006.

This short analysis shows that continually the most successful political position is patriotism and nationalism. Those politicians who make unpopular compromises lose the elections. This rule proves even truer when a nation, such as the Macedonian, is concerned, which, justified or not, feels threatened both by the Greek and the Albanian nationalism.

‘Playing’ on the card of national feelings

When at the early elections in 2008 after Bucharest, Gruevski asked the citizens to enable him to get absolute majority so that no one can blackmail him, he did not only have the Greeks in mind or the international factor. First and foremost he meant the opposition as well as the Albanian partners in the government, who exert pressure, among other demands, for the name dispute with Greece to be resolved sooner. If there is something that unites the Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia it is the perspective for accession to NATO and EU. If something divides them this is the conditions under which this integration is to be achieved, i.e. a compromise on the name. While the Macedonian majority rejects the possibility of accessing EU and NATO if the price is changing the name of the country, the Albanians favour urgent membership in NATO and EU hoping that their economic situation will be better. Of course there are some political fears among the nationalists that the Albanians will unite in a great Albania.

Gaining absolute majority in the Parliament, Gurevski could lead a policy that was not much concerned with the interests and needs of his coalition partner. Millions of resources from the budget were dedicated to strengthening the Macedonian ancient and modern identity. It is a controversial phenomenon in which, unless he or she is a Macedonian citizen, this person is interesting for analysis. All the more important facilities were named after Philip or Alexander of Macedonia. A huge monument of Alexander the Great on the city square stands high above the monuments of local heroes, such as Goce Delcev, Dame Gruev and the revolutionaries from Veles. Metodija Andonov-Cento is also here; he was imprisoned by Communists as a supporter of the ideas for Greater Macedonia, in order to emphasize the anti-communism of the party in power. The museum of VMRO-DPMNE in classical style is being erected with a very quick pace, and here one can find all the exiled activists of the rightist option of the old VMRO – Todor Aleksandrov, Vanko Mihajlov and others. In short, the politics directly and conspicuously redefined the previous Macedonian Slavic national identity sending a message that the Macedonians are direct descendants of Philip and Alexander the Great. The Gruevski government outlined the new Macedonian-defending nationalism: rightist and anti-democratically oriented.

Closer to the solution?

In June 2011, the Prime Minister Gruevski, with his stable 2/3 majority did not have to respond to the political crisis with early elections. He was led not by reason but by passion: to show everyone that he is right, in reference to the dispute with Greece and to eliminate the political opponent. The expectations were not fulfilled however, and I see in the election results a beginning of the consolidation of society and maybe a preparation for compromise with Greece, which will help Macedonia go on. At these early elections, Gruevski lost the absolute majority and won 56 MP seats out of 123, with three new MPs from the Diaspora. SDSM won 15 MP seats more than it previously had. The number of MPs from this party is 42. The winner among the Albanian parties is DUI of Ali Ahmeti, which won 15 mandates, while the other two Albanian parties, DPA of

Menduh Tachi and NDP of the professor of economy from SEEU, Rofi Osmani, won 10 mandates. According to the already established custom, when composing the coalition government, Gruevski first addressed Ali Ahmeti. Now the relations between the former coalition partners will be different. Ahmeti, as he announced and received more important ministerial positions, equality between the Macedonians and Albanians in the decision-making and more favourable allocation of resources from the budget because, as he said, Albanians are 'autochthonous' people and did not shed blood for minor political interest'. And, of course, he promised that the dispute with Greece will soon be resolved. SDSM also learned a lesson from its election defeats and approximated its position to the position of VMRO-DPMNE in regard to the name dispute: that a reasonable solution should be found, which will be acceptable to the people at referendum. For the first time in twenty years the political position of those two biggest parliamentary parties, the one on power, the other in opposition, came closer. Both parties at this stage stand up for compromise with Greece about the 'name-issue', which will be confirmed at the popular referendum. Does this mean that the country is closer to the solution and thus to NATO and EU? On the one hand, the answer is positive. It seems that the politics of the prime minister Gruevski and its party VMRO-DPMNE, which articulated in a most open manner Macedonian nationalism, political authoritarianism and not yielding to Greece in the last twenty years, is in difficult situation. Society slowly and painfully consolidates around the idea that the compromise with Greece is necessary if the country should keep its fragile stability and advances toward its EU and NATO integration in one piece. On the other hand the popular referendum introduces uncertainty in these political puzzles. Still, we are far from the solution...

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‘ANTIQUIZATION’ AND THE MACEDONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: THREE EXAMPLES ONE EXPLANATION

Abstract

To talk about the national identity of one nation it means to talk about its present connected with its past. Unarguably, the identity of the nation is crucial for its future regarding its existence and prosperity. The paper will try to analyze the ‘antiquization’ in the Republic of Macedonia as parallel process of national identification and international promotion of the country. The thesis of the paper is that the effect of non-recognition of full Macedonian national identity, especially vis-a-vis Greek objections, directly influences and reinforces the shift towards the ancient ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation. The search for antique roots of the Macedonian national identity is the third wave of defence after the successful establishment of first, the federal state and, second, an independent nation. ‘Antiquization’ as a phenomenon is a defence not an attack but will certainly have longer impact on perceptions of national identity in the Republic of Macedonia.

Key words: Macedonian national identity, antiquization, Alexander the Great, governing myth

Introduction

While the nation and nationalism were widely elaborated in the second half of the last century, the national identity as a category long time was in the shadow of the analyses of the processes of establishing the nation and nationalism. The studies of national identity more often have dealt with the explanation and debating of the nation than the identity *per se*, eventhough when the national identity was used as an analytical category by theorists of nationalism there are little discussions of the way the identities are formed and reproduced in time and space (Bell, 2003: 63-81). The end of the century brought new energy in the research of identity, but now with new enthusiasm in different social sciences and not only in psychology and sociology. The recommendations are for the approaches with more human aspects of the individual identity versus power of the structures and states. Suddenly, the identity research becomes a fashion. That is why in the last three decades the literature abounds with national identity studies. The identities are analyzed on every possible aspect: politics, culture, religion, values, sport etc. On one side, when we see the teardrops when the national anthem is playing on any high level sport competition it is difficult to explain why these happened. On the other side, wars were waged for the national glorification, survival or domination. Twentieth century is a classical example of it.

Eventhough the concept of identity is central to many sociological analyses and it is vital in modernity, it is still undertheorized and incapable for analytical contribution as the moder situations requires (Bendle, 2002: 1-2). Identity is perception. The identity is about feelings as well, and about the meaning to the holder of identity. But identifiers of ethnicity do not generate identity automatically because the key is how the individual will choose to identify with these characteristics. For someone the identity is just simply acquired perception. Identity belongs to future as well as the past. Is not something that already exists, transcending the place, time, history and culture. The cultural identities comes from somewhere, they have history. Still, as everything that is historical, they are constantly under transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject of continual 'game' of history, culture and power. (Hall, 1990: 225) We also have multiple identities and we are members of different collectives and groups. Identites as other human activities are conctructed. They are construction both for individuals and collectives. (Schoplin, 2003: 477-490)

Symbolic resources like political values/institutions, culture, history and geography, provide the symbolic raw material which social actors use as they define national identities in public discourse. Thus, 'what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less *what* resources political actors draw upon than *how* they put these resources to practical use ...' (Zimmer, 2003: 181). In this paper the author will show three examples that explain the 'antiquization' of the Macedonian national identity: First, the dominant western discourse in the social sciences about the origin of the Macedonians, second, the Macedonian governing myth of origin and its shifts, and the third, the process of 'antiquization' of Macedonian national identity and public feelings about the past heroes and events. With one probable explainanions and argument that the process of 'antiquization' is older and now is just strengthen and became dominant identity discourse within the society. It is more matter of how than what, eventhough the 'true history' is all around and easy to support by all parties.

Origin of Macedonians in western analyses

In the second half of 20th century there are many western analysts that are writing about the origin of the Macedonians with the titles like 'Who are the Macedonians?' These analyses are trying to argue about the roots of the modern Macedonians that live in the Republic of Macedonia, but even further, to argue about what means to be called Macedonian historically and regionally. The initial motif was the existence of Socialist Republic of Macedonia. The analyses grew in numbers after the 1991 when the Republic of Macedonia became independent state. The battle about who are the Macedonians and who have the right to the ancient Macedonian heroes and history begun. The main contenders were Macedonians form Macedonia, Greeks from region called Macedonia in Greece and to a narrower extent the Bulgarians. For the latter, the differences were the disputed arguments of the Macedonians and Bulgarians about the medieval kingdom of Samuel and the cultural background of the Macedonians. Three small countries fighting

for scarce symbolic and historic symbols. Here are some of the arguments about who are the Macedonians:

1. Until 1923, a bare majority of the population of Macedonia was Slav. It is the national identity of these Slav Macedonians that has been most violently contested aspect of the whole Macedonian dispute, and is still being contested today. There is no doubt that they are Southern Slavs; they have a language, or a group of varying dialects, that is grammatically akin to Bulgarian but phonetically in some respects akin to Serbian, and which has certain quite distinctive features of its own. (Barker, 1950: 10) In regard to their own national feelings, all that can safely be said is that during the last eighty years many more Slav Macedonians seem to have considered themselves Bulgarian, or closely linked with Bulgaria, than have considered themselves Serbian, or closely linked with Serbia (or Yugoslavia). Only the people of the Skopje region, in the north-west, have ever shown much tendency to regard themselves as Serbs. The feeling of being Macedonians, and nothing but Macedonians, seems to be a sentiment of fairly recent growth, and even today is not very deep-rooted. (Barker, 1950: 12);
2. Who is a 'Macedonian'? The word may be used for an inhabitant, or former inhabitant, of a region called Macedonia, irrespective of ethnicity; for a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia, again, irrespective of ethnicity; or for a member of the Macedonian nation or ethnic group. It is the third, apparently most 'natural' usage, which is most controversial. 'Why not Macedonia for Macedonians, as Bulgaria for Bulgarians and Servia for Servians?' Posed in the Times in 1897, Gladstone's question reflected the concerns of a *fin-de-siecle* Western European ruling elite witnessing the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and anxious over the future succession of political control in European Turkey. Already, the new states in the region (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria), as well as a movement claiming to strive for an autonomous Macedonia, were laying claims on the territory and its population, basing these on whatever criteria best suited their national arguments – language, religion, history, household customs, national consciousness. The 'Macedonian Question' thus had high profile, and marked a shift from the politics of empires to that of nation-states. It remained a fraught and contested issue, nationally and internationally, throughout the first half of the century, long after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference redrew national boundaries cutting through the territory. (Cowan, 2000: 1-11);
3. All Balkan territorial disputes have their mythologies; that of the Macedonian question is that of the most bloody, complex and intractable of all, in a small peninsula already well burdened. But unlike Serbia or Greece, in Macedonia there was no basically homogenous population made up of one potentially dominant group that could form the basis of a new nation-state. There was, however, and still is, a plainly dominant majority in the cultural sense, in that there are more people of Slavonic origin living there than of any other group – but only within a patchwork of extreme complexity, with Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Vlach, Pomaks and Gypsies living along side the Slavonic majority; and, moreover, that majority is itself subdivided into Serbian, Bulgarian and 'Macedonian' elements. (Pettifer, 1999: 15-6);

4. On 3 November 1893 in the Ottoman Vilayet capital of Selanik, nowadays known as Thessaloniki, seven Christian Orthodox intellectuals, speaking the eastern variety of the southern Slavic tongue founded a national-revolutionary and conspiratorial organization in opposition to the ruling Sultan with the title of the '(Internal) Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation', abbreviated as IMRO, their goal was the establishment of their own state first in the form of territorial autonomy within the Ottoman Empire as a step towards independence. Within the national-revolutionary movements inside the Ottoman Empire, the terms "Macedonia" and "Macedonian" could refer to at least two different ethno-political contents. On the one hand, they could have regional connotation. This meant that anyone living within the area described as the Macedonian heartland of the 'three Vilayets' – Selanik, Manastir and Kosova – was in this sense Macedonian. On the other hand, 'Macedonia' and 'Macedonian' could be understood in an ethno-linguistic sense, with territorial and denominational components: in this interpretation, Macedonians were only those who (1) spoke east-southern Slavic, and (2) were Christians. (Troebst, 1999: 61-7);
5. Local Macedonians (Lerin, Kostur) constitute a distinct ethnic group, since they are clearly distinguished from the other ethnic groups in the area (such as Pontians, the Vlachs, and the Arvanites) both by themselves and by the members of these other groups. These local Macedonians are the people whose lives have been most dramatically affected by the Macedonian conflict, for inhabitants of the same villages, members of the same families, have adopted Three different national identities with some identifying as Greeks, others as Macedonian, and still others (primarily in the past) as Bulgarians. In fact, I state explicitly that these people refer to themselves as – 'indigenous Macedonians' (i.e., dopii Makedhones). Jane Kowan ('Idioms of Belonging' in *Ourselves and Others*, p.152) also states that 'dopii' describe themselves as Makedones: 'Let me stress that the term 'local Macedonians' is used here in an ethnic, not a national sense, and that the majority of local Macedonians in Florina and Kastoria now have a Greek (non a Macedonian) national identity. Macedonian has replaced Bulgarian as the national identity most frequently adopted by local Macedonians who reject a Greek national identity. This say the Macedonian conflict in Australia has again become a dispute involving primarily two groups: Greeks and Macedonians. (Danfort, 2000: 49);
6. The course of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a variety of South Slavic (and other) national identities and literary languages, as well as nation-states in which those languages were expected to serve as vehicle of power, although the national boundaries did not correspond to the territorial claims being made by any of the parties involved. The earliest published expression of separate Macedonian identity that we know of, however, dates from 1875. The writer was the autodidact stone mason Gorgi Pulevski (b.1838 - d.1894). Between 1873 and 1880 he published three textbooks, and he made no attempt to write in a Macedo-Bulgarian compromise. 'Taka i Makedoncive se narod i mestovo njivno je Makedonija' (Pulevski 1875: 48-49). It is possible to identify sixteen textbook published between 1857 and 1880 by Partenij, Makedonski, Sapkarev, and Pulevski. On 22 August 1892, the Kostur parish school

council adopted the proposal of a group of six teachers who had met previously in secret, and agreed to eliminate both Bulgarian and Greek and introduce Macedonian as the language of instruction in the town school for the 1892/93 school year. *Za Makedonskite raboti* was Misirkov's response to the failure of the Ilinden Uprising and constitutes the ideological culmination of the development of nineteenth-century Macedonian national and linguistic identity. (Friedman, 2000: 182-7) It is prevarication to contend that the concepts of a separate Macedonian language and identity were created *ex nihilo* by Yugoslav fiat (Friedman, 1985: 34).

That is the first part that clearly states some of the axioms in the western discourse of the origin of the modern Macedonians. It is reach, it is burden by the older historical narratives and it is not holistic. The selection is not done with some specific aim or category but just to show some of the deliberations on the topic. Analysts are trying to be neutral but with history one can never be sure what is true, what really happened and what is just a myth and belongs to a mythology. Now we can turn to the 'historical' part and see the governing myth about the ethnogenesis of the Macedonians and its shifts.

The Macedonian governing myth

Tracing the origins of the nation became a primary task for historiography in 1990s. 'Since in the sources, "Macedonians", particularly as an ethnic group, are rarely mentioned, Macedonian historians employ a device equally well-known to their Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian colleagues, namely to replace the terms "Christians/Greek Orthodox/Bulgarian Exarchists", usually used for the designation of the Orthodox population of the region during Ottoman times, with "Macedonians"' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 185). The first generation of Macedonian historians traced the emergence of the Macedonian nation back to the nineteenth century. 'Macedonian national history was traced to the nineteenth century, with its most prominent expression being the revolutionary struggle for freedom, equality and independence' (Frusetta, 2004: 112). At last, on 8 September 1991, the year of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Macedonians voted in a referendum and proclaimed full sovereignty and independence. The journey was finished. The impression was that the Macedonians had created their 'natural' nation-state.

The first important shift in tracing the myth of origin was the attempt to find the origins of the Macedonian nation further back in history, namely in the Middle Ages. 'Now, the medieval empire of Czar Samuil and his successors (969-1018), whose capitals were Prespa and Ohrid in Macedonia, was re-evaluated as a Macedonian state although existing scholarship had regarded it Bulgarian' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 179). The Macedonian historiography separated the Macedonian ethnogenesis from the Bulgarian one. During the second historiographical shift in the early 1990s, efforts were made to include the ancient Macedonians in the national narrative. Macedonian historians challenged Greece's 'exclusive ownership' of the symbols and territory of the ancient Macedonians in order to back up their claims to the name and the land of Macedonia and to create their own ancient national patrimony. The main claim was that the ancient Macedonians were

not Greeks but a different, non-Hellenic people who joined in the ethnogenesis of the Macedonian people by melting into the Slavs who had come to the region in the sixth and seventh centuries. They asserted that ancient Macedonians and ancient Greeks were completely different peoples. The discourse on the ancient Macedonians was intended to substantiate the Macedonians' claims to a long national pedigree and also to a homeland.

The strongest attack came from Greece in 1990s. 'By calling themselves "Macedonians" the Slavs are "stealing" a Greek name; they are "embezzling" Greek cultural heritage; they are "falsifying" Greek history' (Danfort, 1993: 4). Therefore, the nineteenth and twentieth century rivalry about the 'Macedonian question' gained new impetus and new depth. Macedonian national identity was something everyone wanted to have: the Greeks the right to the name Macedonia, the Bulgarians the right to the language, and the Serbians, even recently, the right to the church. However, according to the theories of nationalism, the most wanted element was primarily territory, as one of the main indicators of the nation. So it was in the Macedonian case. Scholars also devoted their efforts to the issue, trying to figure out the roots of the contested perceptions. 'Where there are clashing interpretations of ancestral homelands and cultural heritages as for example in Macedonia, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Palestine – normal conflicts of interest are turned into cultural wars, and moral and political crusades replace everyday politics' (Smith, 1999: 9). History and culture, two separate but inextricable processes, were 'subjects' of proving 'our truth' against 'their truth'. 'In a time of perceived crisis and with limited alternatives, there was little inclination among ethnic Macedonians as a whole for a radical restructuring of national symbols' (Frusetta, 2004: 118).

Rapid social changes in the society freed some 'hidden' versions of the national narrative too. The main 'ideological' struggle was between the two strongest political parties on the Macedonian political scene, Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). While the SDSM stuck to the leftwing version of the national narrative (dominant until 1990s), the VMRO-DPMNE tried, from the pre-socialist period right-wing tradition, to present to the public other 'forgotten' national heroes. Efforts were made to re-open questions from history and consequently to re-think parts of the national narrative. The most controversial revisionist effort, according to Brunnbauer, concerned the attempt to include the 'Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation' (VMRO) of the inter-war period in the Macedonian national narrative. 'The rationale of these attempts was to construct a historical rightwing tradition, which the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party could claim for itself, and to oppose the pro-Yugoslav interpretation of Macedonian history that was politically associated with the post-communist SDSM party' (Brunnbauer, 2004: 192-3). The reconciliation of the two historic 'memories' held by both parties, one as a subaltern perspective different from the governing ones, did not find fruitful soil in first decade of independence. After the VMRO-DPMNE stepped down as the ruling government-led coalition party (1998-2002), we saw, at least from the public perspective, a fading out of the attempts to exploit different national 'stories'. But some heroes (like Alexander the Great) remained as dormant stories and did not wait too long.

Let me present the data from the research done in 2001 among 2000 ethnic Macedonians on the questions regarding the national identity and the past. The average Mac-


edonian thought that the historical roots of the Macedonian state are connected with the **Ilinden uprising** (24.75%) or with **Alexander the Great** (21.35%), and are followed by ASNOM (antifascist state structure from the World War II) and Czar Samuil. Divergence from the average result was recorded among the age groups 18-25 and 56-65 and university-educated respondents. The younger generation, again, prefer Ilinden (26.46%) compared to ASNOM (12.70%), the older generation prefer ASNOM (25.18%), while primary school-educated respondents prefer the Ilinden uprising (24.04%). *Interestingly, among university-educated respondents Alexander the Great (24.74%) was the most popular choice.* Bigger differences, again, are spotted between VMRO-DPMNE affiliates, with Ilinden first (31.02%) and Alexander the Great the second choice (26.74%), giving ASNOM barely (8.02%). Again, VMRO-DPMNE affiliates have significant differences not just in the rating of the historical roots, but in the percentage of importance too. This supports the argument that 'alternative political identities have been emerging, different from those laid down by existing state structures' (McCrone, 1998: 31). This implies that some social groups have different perspectives on national narratives, view national history differently, or at least have subaltern national 'versions'. In the Macedonian case, these groups are the younger and the older respondents and, to some extent, university-educated groups. (Atanasov, 2004) In the case of the Macedonian national identity there are competing differences between unitary and subaltern national myths and narratives. 'The governing myth thus coexists with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of generating their own traditions and stories' (Bell, 2003: 74). This is the case with many nations, both older and younger ones.

This was a picture of 2001 seen through one simple research question. And with this we conclude the part with Macedonian governing myth of origin and its shifts and will continue with the process of 'antiquization' of Macedonian national identity that stir public feelings about the past heroes and events. This will be the third example of the paper argument. The questions that will be cited are from the research done in 2010. (Simoska *et al.*: 2010)


'Antiquization' of the national identity

The data from the research done in 2010 shows that the trend towards 'antiquization' is continuing. On the question 'Do you personally feel as a successor of Alexander the Great?', negatively answered 64,5% of the general public. (Graph 1) Yet, that feels like a successors answered 35,5%, which is certainly not small percentage if we have in mind that the enhanced process of 'antiquization' is just present in last couple of years (2008-2011). Of course, this feeling is dominant among Macedonians (Graph 2), with almost even ratio between those who feel and do not feel close to the Great warrior.

Graph 1



Graph 2




On the question ‘How one can explain the increased interest of the ancient history in Macedonia?’, the answers shows that the antiquization has an effect acquiring the new elements of the state identity. This is proved by the answer that ‘this is an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia’ which is chosen by 29%. With 26% the respondents have chosen the modality ‘this is an attempt to make Greece angry and not resolve the name issue’ and 21% respondents have chosen that ‘this is an attempt to provoke confusion in Macedonian identity’. These are type of answers when the citizens do not have clear opinion and make an enforced selection, and the answers are (3-4 of them) more or less with the same quantity generally (Graph 3). In that case, the columns in the graphs do not have obvious trends. Still, the third answer, for ‘an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia’, divided by ethnic segregation, is most preferred by the Macedonians (Graph 4).


Modalities on the question: ‘How one can explain the increased interest of the ancient history in Macedonia?’

1. It is an attempt to provoke confusion in Macedonian identity
2. It is an attempt to make Greece angry and not resolve the name issue
- 3. It is an ultimate affirmation of the real history of Macedonia**
4. Do not know

Graph 3




Graph 4




And the last question in this argumentation, that will serve to argue about the paper thesis, is the answers on the question 'Which historical person is the most important according to your opinion?'. Here, the Alexander the Great is 'loosing' the battle with the most prominent Macedonian in last 100 years – Goce Delchev (23%) and Josip Broz Tito (14%). The Alexander is shosen by 9% of the interviwees, the same as the Skenderbeg (9%). (Graph 5) This picture is completely changed when the data is segregated by ethnic variable (Graph 6). Then, the Macedonians make the same selection (choosing the Goce Delchev double then the others), but the Albanians exlusively choose Skenderbeg (36%) as well as the Turks choosing Ataturk (27%).

Graph 5



Graph 6



Yet, the biggest and significant differences in answers related to this question is gathered by the **age segregation**. These data are shown in Table 1. Goce Delchev is the first 'pick' in all generations. But, it is clear that the story of Alexander is already part of

the identity concerning younger generations, comparing to older generations which selection as a second choice is Josip Broz – Tito, as significant historical figure in Macedonian history.

Table 1

Which historical person is most important according to your opinion	Age						Total
	18-25 age	26-30 age	31-40 age	41-50 age	50-65 age	over 65	
Aleksandar Makedonski	11,1%	11,4%	10,0%	7,4%	6,6%	9,9%	9,2%
Josip Broz - Tito	7,0%	7,2%	11,1%	18,3%	21,2%	21,5%	13,9%
Goce Delchev	18,5%	18,6%	17,5%	19,9%	26,5%	36,4%	21,4%
Skender Beg	9,1%	9,1%	11,4%	12,2%	5,6%	4,1%	9,2%
Ataturk	1,2%	1,5%	1,9%	1,9%	1,3%		1,5%
Other Macedonian heros	7,4%	6,1%	10,8%	7,7%	10,9%	9,1%	8,8%
Other Albanian heros	14,8%	12,9%	8,1%	8,3%	6,6%	7,4%	9,6%
Current politicians	1,2%	1,1%	1,4%	1,3%	0,7%		1,1%
Other historical persons	11,5%	12,5%	9,7%	4,5%	7,6%	4,1%	8,6%
No answer	18,1%	19,7%	18,1%	18,6%	12,9%	7,4%	16,7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

These were the three examples that shows that the effect of non-recognition of full Macedonian national identity, especially vis-a-vis Greek objections (and veto in Bucharest in 2008 as a blocade to become a member of NATO as a state), **directly influenced and reinforced the shift towards the ancient ethnogenesis of the Macedonian nation.** The story of Alexander was already existent and in use but the governmental structures have chosen to re-interpret it and to make it more significant by building the huge statue of one ‘warrior on his horse’ in the Skopje main square. Actually, the process of antiquization is agenda that consist of more elements but this is the ‘biggest’ one.

Conclusion

The complex of questions for Alexander the Great gives new knowledge in relation to peceptions and interpretations of state identity. Namely, already big part of Macedonians ‘feels’ as succesors of Alexander and, yet, part of them are convinced that ‘he is the most important because our people have its origin by him’. It is difficult to talk about the debt-

ness of these feelings, but the starting quantitative analyses say that 'Alexandromania' is supported by people from cities, those with higher education and people from right wing ideological campus. Main reason for the antiquization is 'the final confirmation of real history' of the Macedonians. Despite these loops, the identity of Macedonian is rather stable, and is linked with the state and the culture, but new elements of 'antiquization' and 'alexandromania' are emerging as part of main body of Macedonian national identity discourse. The attitudes that he is our direct ancestor and that this is our real history are supported by increasing number of Macedonians. Alexander as important historical figure is second choice by the younger generations.

The argument is supported by two conclusions. First, symbolic resources like political values, history and geography, provide the symbolic raw material which social actors use as they define national identities in public discourse. As Zimmer put it, what matters with regard to the construction of national identities is less *what* resources political actors draw upon than *how* they put these resources to practical use. In Macedonian case the choice is clear what is chosen and how are the resources employed practically. Second, the search for antique roots of the Macedonian national identity is the third wave of defence after the successful establishment of first, the federal state (1944) and, second, an independent nation (1991). The defence started anew with the conflict of 2001 and the turbulences that the nation had to go through after the spill over of the Kosovo conflict on Macedonian soil and with Macedonian-Albanian crisis. 'Antiquization' as a phenomenon (2008-2011) is also a defence not an attack (an answer on Greek objections and blockades), but will certainly have longer impact on perceptions of national identity in the Republic of Macedonia. Once you have 'learned' who you are, it is a river of no return.

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ETHNIC IDENTITY, ETHNO-NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (THE CASE OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA)

Abstract

Socialism which in many elements represented a totalitarian political system, based on the supreme authority of the party, relying on crude collectivism, tried to erase all the differences among social groups. The two primary sources of identity: nation and religion, which were suppressed during the socialism, rose to the surface during the period of transition. Marxist ideology had a generally negative attitude towards religion, which led to weakening the religious identity among the population of former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the idea of “brotherhood and unity”, and the creation of a “Yugoslav nation” (during the 1971 Census, the citizens of Yugoslavia were allowed to declare themselves as Yugoslavs) obstructed to a great extent the development of the ethnic identity as well.

The collapse of socialism was followed by a crisis of identity among the population which lived in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Different ethnic groups felt a need for an identity which will distinguish them from others. The search for an identity raises the following questions: Who am I? Where do I come from? Who I belong to? and the like. In response to these questions, the individual seeks to find out what are his/her specific features and what is it that differentiates him/her from the others. Identity is closely connected with the feeling of security, trust and belonging to a particular group. But the efforts to “win” and keep this identity impel people in certain situations to act irrationally and sometimes violently.

Key words: nationalism, ethno-nationalism, identity, ethnic identity, globalization

In the case of former Yugoslavia, in circumstances of ethno-cultural variety in the attempt to answer the question about affiliation, the individual, first of all, binds to his/her ethnic origin since in ethnically mixed environments the identity of the individual is largely tied to its affiliation towards certain linguistic or religious communities. Ethnical identity, more than any other identity, is a product of primary socialization. Since early childhood, individuals learn to recognize the difference between “us” and “them” and to accept with reserve everything that comes from others. This process can run spontaneously and peacefully, but it may be accompanied by tensions and conflicts, especially when others impose their identity on “us”. Such tension-filled situation represents one of the main reasons for ethno-nationalism as a doctrine that sets the ethnic group as a goal of any political activity, and the ethnic identity as a measure of every human value. Ethno-nationalism becomes a power that attracts individuals and groups which carry that “doctrine”, deepened with ethnic myths, heroes and common destiny, like a warlike slogan: “the ethnic group is more important than the personal life.” Where ethnic identity is not

burdened with ethno-nationalism, it represents a tradition that does not put pressure on or restrict the individual. On the other hand, the ethno-nationalism is, basically, a distorted, one-sided, alienated identity, an instrument for manipulation and abuse.

During the last 50 years, a large number of authors researched the term identity, but here, I will pay attention to a few famous, essential theories, which gave considerable contribution in the understanding of this important phenomenon.

According to Berger and Luckmann, identity is a phenomenon which appears from the dialectics of the individuals and the society. After being crystallized once, social processes are the main factors, which maintain, modify and even transform an identity. The social processes involved in the forming and maintenance of an identity are determinate by the social structure and vice versa – identities that are a product of the interaction of the organisms, individual consciousness and social structure, react to the given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, even transforming it. (Berger and Luckmann: 201)

In today's social context, the institutions of modernity shape new mechanisms of the personal identity. Anthony Giddens warns that an identity reflects the changes which occurred as a result of the global ways of social connectivity. Namely, an identity is a product of the reflexive and creative engagement of the social actors with themselves and the world, or with its, more or less, limited resources i.e. an important role, in the shaping of an identity is played by the specific life positions of the individual, thinking of the known and permanent rules of behaviour and the schemes of orientation (Giddens 1991).

An identity is not fixed. It is fluid, variable and dynamic. According to this, an identity can be changed by the variation of the interaction and the exposure to new cultural environments. In the same direction, Goffman claims that the game of identity is played during the whole life and that these roles aren't fixed. The development of a person is a product of the process of individual interpretation of the roles of others and reaction of others to that interpretation. "Management of the impression of self", by Goffman, is a technique with which the actors use in the maintenance of matching impression. Which purpose is the creation of the social identity. He elaborates the problems between virtual social identity (that which the person should be) and the actual social identity (that which the person actually is. In this way people insist to better present themselves to the audience (Goffman 1959).

The social identity implies group self-categorization and self-identification of the individual, with certain stereotypes about his/her group and other, external groups. The term collective identity is closely connected with the dissolving of personality and individuality in broader structures. This is especially important for the terms: ethnic and national identity, that are necessarily associated with theoretically questionable and politically risky terms such as "folk soul" and "national character".

Speaking of the national identity and the internal functions of that identity, we cannot but refer to the famous study by Anthony Smith. The author lists the following basic features of national identity: historical territory, common myths and historical memories, common mass public culture, common rights and duties for all members, a common economy with territorial mobility of its members (Smith, 1991: 14). According to these features, Smith defines the term nation. Besides the external functions of the national identity, such as territorial, political and economic, he also defined its internal functions:

socialization of the individual, as a member of the nation and as a “citizen”, linking members of the nation through common values, symbols and tradition.

Today in the science, there are two parallel types of nation: civic and ethnic, or as Urs Altermatt calls them “state nation” and “cultural nation”. In historical terms, France, UK, USA and Switzerland belonged to the “state-national” tendency. In these states, after the “Great revolution”, the nation was considered as a political community of citizens who are equal before the law, independent of social position, origin, language and religion. The second tendency to define the term nation refers primarily to Germany and Italy, where the feeling of general affiliation relies on the language and culture due to lack of state. The first conceptual tendency generates from the political perception of nations, which was formed on the already existing state. The second one orients itself according to the ethnic understanding that in many cases has people without a state as its precondition (Altermatt, 1998: 38).

Dragan Žunić has a similar opinion, and he says that according to the civic perception, nations are defined territorially and politically, i.e. existence of nation state, while nationality is almost identical to the status of citizenship. According to the second understanding, nations are established on ethnic and racial grounds, on assumed, although distant kinship, on a common history, culture, common language, sometimes a common religion, while nation state is not even necessary although there are fierce fights for it (Žunić, 2008: 177).

Where national identity was formed on a basis of an existing state, a voluntaristic understanding of the nation occurred, which placed the will of the political community in the foreground. Where there was an initial lack of state, the intellectuals were referring to the so-called natural or state categories such as language, origin and culture, creating a community of culture and origin in their perceptions.

In Western Europe, modern nation states were formed from the already existing political communities which after revolution were presented as a community of citizens of the state whose collective sovereignty has turned them into a nation. According to this understanding, the culture, origin and language are secondary factors which play almost no role at all. Nation is as important as the people, the state and the government as political categories. According to this understanding of the nations, ethnic differences should be ignored. For example, the border of France was defined on the basis of geopolitics rather than on ethnography. (Altermatt, 1998: 38-39) It was after the creation of nations in France and Great Britain, when the cultural factors played a major role. And vice versa, people such as Germans, which still had no state of their own, justified the national postulates with their language culture but also strived towards one political community. According to these two basic concepts of defining the nation from the aspect of citizenry (with a Western provenance) and ethnicity (accepted in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), in the last 20 years in the publications dealing with nationalism, two terms have been used simultaneously: nationalism (or civic nationalism) and ethno-nationalism. After the fall of socialism in the former Yugoslavia, ethno-nationalism was demonstrated as an excessive attachment to the nation and its interests, neglecting the interests of other (so far friendly) nations, and the interests of the individuals belonging to that nation. It emerged as a form of national consciousness that constantly emphasizes

the differences between someone's own and other nations, presenting someone's own nation as superior to the others. This led to expressing prejudices against other ethnic groups and doubts about their intentions. Alongside, there was a continuous devaluation of the cultural works and characteristics of other nations in their immediate surroundings. There was a tendency towards establishment of privileged position for one's own nation within a certain area, based on its "special virtues", merits and "missions" which are intended within the region. The ethno-nationalism in the territory of former Yugoslavia was an attempt to "correct" all the errors that were caused to "our" nation as a result of influence of various factors and in various historical circumstances.

The instrumentation of ethnic identity by means of ethno-nationalism was manifested through numerous ethnic conflicts that happened in the territory of former Yugoslavia. The changes that took place during the crisis, from social and political aspects, and the transition of a model of state governance and social and collectivistic paradigm (socialism) into another (democracy), as such, required a new social and interactive pattern in which the ethno-nationalism became mobilizing and homogenizing resource instead of the previous policy of "brotherhood and unity". The question is: Why stirring up ethno-nationalism and ethnic/national exclusivism prevailed over the idea of "coexistence" which was the dominant social value in the previous period and a basis for peaceful resolution of conflicts?

One of the main causes of conflicts that occurred in the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990's, according to a number of authors, is the manipulation with the national issue, where different social, economic, cultural and political issues turn into a problem about "the national", which basically represented ethnification of the politics and politicization of the ethnicity.

In the ethno-nationalistic discourse, almost everything is set on the roots. History, tradition, customs, legends - in the ethno-nationalism all of them represent what is absolute, something completely beyond any doubt. Basic and most important identity in the ethno-nationalism is the ethnic identity. It is defined, given, inherited and cannot be changed. The ethnic identity largely defines the other identities as well. First of all, it defines the religious identity or vice versa. One of the basic problems associated with the ethno-nationalism in the territory of former Yugoslavia is the necessary binding of these two identities: religious and ethnical. To define their own identity, the ethnic groups from the territory of former Yugoslavia used cultural characters, symbols and myths which are abundant in the religion of the Orthodox, Catholics and Muslims. This was especially apparent within the territory of Bosnia, with a mixture of the three above mentioned religions. During the census in Yugoslavia in 1948, concerning the question of nationality, the population in Bosnia was offered three options: Muslim-Serb, Muslim-Croat or Muslim of undeclared nationality. 25,000 Muslims declared themselves as Croats, 72,000 as Serbs, and 778,000 did not declare any nationally. During the 1953 Census, a question about the religion was offered for the last time. Then, throughout the entire Yugoslavia, 12.5% of the population declared themselves as members of the Muslim religion. The term Muslim had a religious meaning only. In terms of nationality, and in accordance with propagandized "Yugoslavism", there was a category of Muslim-nationally undeclared. 891,000 citizens of Bosnia declared themselves as such. Since the 1961 Census,

the term Muslim regained a national connotation again and the term used was "Muslim in the ethnic sense". (Malcolm, 1994) Before the outburst of the war conflict in Yugoslavia (according to the incomplete 1991 Census), 44% of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Muslims, which means that it exceeded the number of Serbs (31%), which in the previous period were the largest ethnic group (Encyclopedia of the nation).

Unlike the other parts of Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina ethnic and religious Muslims overlap, because it is the only place where they form one ethno-national category. It is a fact that before the islamisation, the population in Bosnia had no univocal Croatian or Serbian identity and it would be wrong to call them Serbo-Muslims because it would mean that their ancestors were Serbs before they became Muslims. Regardless of the complex religious, cultural and historical identification of the Bosnian Muslims, they expressed a clear requirement for an identity that will distinguish them from the Serbs and Croats, despite the fact that in their variations of regional dialects they do speak Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian. They identified themselves as members of established Muslim culture which they had accepted a few centuries ago, more or less voluntarily, in the capacity of Slavs under Turkish rule. The Muslim nationality, then, was joined by those who in the everyday life were alienated from the Muslim community and who did not practice religion.

Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina significantly changed. Most of the Catholic and Orthodox citizens felt as national minorities, actually as Serbs and Croats, and identified with the newly created nation states, Serbia and Croatia. Consequently, the Muslims determined their ethno-national identity and since then they declare themselves as Bosnians or Bosniaks in the national sense. The purpose was to emphasize that there are Bosnian and Herzegovinian people, or Bosnian ethnic group which differs from the neighboring nations in Serbia and Croatia, and which is entitled to its own state within its historical boundaries. At the end of September 1993, the National Assembly of all Bosnians in the Parliament in Sarajevo referred to a definition of Bosnian affiliation which places emphasis on regional identity, and discussed religious differences (Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholics) as secondary. Placing themselves within the European tradition and giving priority to the ethno-national identity instead to the religious identity, they tried to decompose the fears of the West Europeans who, consciously or unconsciously, were afraid of a Muslim state in Europe. (Altermatt, 1998:153)

Legitimation of Bosnian identity raised a number of questions, which among other things illustrate the complex cultural tradition in the Balkans. Does Bosniak apply to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or just to the Muslims? How are the other Islamized Slavs from the former Yugoslavia linked to the Bosniaks? Should they be from now on considered a national minority outside their home country? These questions clearly show that in the ethno-cultural mixture of former Yugoslavia, there are no ethnically pure solutions. The conflicts that took place in the former Yugoslavia bear all the elements of an ethno-national confrontation with religious features. The pretensions of the ethnic groups, superior in number and force, such as Serbs and Croats, to create an ethnically pure nation state may be achieved only by means of war, expulsion and forced migrations. Ethnization of society produces or escalates a religious conflict and leads to politicization of religious affiliation. The ethno-national war causes religious hatred. (Altermatt, 1998: 154)

In Serbia, during the process of mythologizing the cult of St. Sava, the idea of the unbreakable link between Serbian and Orthodox, between the ethnic group and the religion, was built. During the war in former Yugoslavia it played the role of ideological precondition and criterion for ethnic preservation and “cleansing” of what is alien. Since Orthodox Christianity was common for part of the Balkan people, it could become a distinguishable mark of the Serbians only through personification and ethnicization of St. Sava (Bogomilova, 2005: 39).

War conflicts in former Yugoslavia included also attempts of ethnic cleansing, creation of ethnically homogeneous areas through mass persecution of other ethnic groups. Ethnic cleansing involves involuntary resettlement of ethnic communities by using violence, harassment, threats and other forms of pressure. Croatia became an independent mono-ethnic state after the war in which thousands of Serbs were forced to leave their country. During the war in Bosnia, which began in 1992 among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the Serbs started ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population. Thousands of men were taken to concentration camps. During the war that took place in Kosovo in 1999, the Serbian forces were accused, by the international community, of ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population in the province. To protect the human rights of the ethnic groups which were targets of the ethnic cleansing, the Western countries intervened as well, diplomatically and military. After the intervention of NATO in Kosovo, a reverse ethnic cleansing began, when the Albanians started persecuting the local Serbian population (Gidens, 2007: 257-258).

The fall of communism resulted in new transformations of societies worldwide. The process of globalization is becoming more evident in all spheres of society, and the states that formerly belonged to the Soviet bloc are no longer isolated from the global community but integrated into it. Some authors, such as the famous Japanese author Kenichi Ohmae, consider the globalization a reason for us living in a world without borders, in which the national identity weakens. However, other authors believe that the strengthening of the so-called “nations without states” is directly linked to globalization. As globalization progresses, people often react with the revival of local identities, trying to assure security in the world of rapid changes. It is a fact that nations, due to the spread of global market, have less economic power than before, but it is difficult to claim that it represents the end of the nation state.

In circumstances of intense globalization, the structural changes in the construction of identity are visible, that is to say an increased hybridization occurs. (Scholte, 2008:307). The hybrid identity overlaps several different threads, so that no single feature has a clear and consistent superiority over the others. Globalization tends to increase its flexibility and fragmentation, especially for individuals who spend most of their time in post-territorial spaces, where multiple identities readily merge and become “lost souls”. (Scholte, 2008:309). Identities in the global world have too much of a multiple and overlapping character to differentiate clearly between “us” and “you”. In circumstances of hybridity, the individuals who in certain aspects belong to “us”, in another aspect belong to “them”. Often, individuals who are connected in a community emphasizing the national aspect of their identity are connected with other individuals who emphasize other aspects of identity such as class, gender, race, religion, etc. The importance of globalization is

not in destroying the nationality, but in the particular complexity of the structure of identity. Globalization has become one of the main reasons for the rapid increase in multiple identities that, during the past decades, had undermined the position of the state-nation as dominant structure for self-determination and collective unity.

The Balkans, as a geopolitical and geocultural space, where civilization arcs intersect, there is a contradictory identity, because of the ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Historically, this contradiction is a product of the activity of many factors such as: tradition, language, religion, relations of power, the impact of large political forces, and migration of the populace. An observation of the deep strata in the collective consciousness is necessary to understand these contradictions, and the change of the rulers of this area (Roman empire, Byzantine Empire, Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary in the past and the influence of USA, Russia and some countries of the EU today) as well.

Taken as a whole, it can be concluded, that the ethnic picture of the Balkan countries is complex and in constant change. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, the process of ethnic homogenization is apparent in this area, mostly, as a result of large ethnocentric migrations of people. The ethnically differentiated natality as well as a large number of factors that aren't of a demographic character, but are conditioned by the complex economic-political situation affected the change in ethnical structure.

The ethnical picture is similar in the area of former Yugoslavia, where we have a mixture of different nations, religions, cultures, in which it is obvious that the formulation "one nation one state" is absolutely unacceptable. The clash of the ideal of homogeneity of the ethnic structure on one hand and the reality of ethnic heterogeneity on the other can become a serious problem for the national minorities from the countries from former Yugoslavia.

Republic of Macedonia has a striking ethnic heterogeneity as well. After WWII the ethnic picture of the Macedonian society, was greatly changed as a result of a chain of events, like the migrations and the changes in the way of declaration of national belonging. The change of the ethnic structure and the decrease of the numbers of Macedonians on one hand, and the increase of the numbers of Albanians on the other, greatly influenced by the ethnic differentiation in natality i.e. the larger natural population growth in the Albanian population.

The orientation of the dominant national culture to the glorious past, leads the national minorities, in the Republic of Macedonia to turn to the mythology based in the ethnicity, which is a reason for deep differences between the dominant culture and the cultures of the national minorities, which leaning on their roots, are hampering their integration in the community of the majority, and in that way they pose a threat to the permanence of the multicultural and multiethnic society.

The primary question which is asked in the era of globalization is: How to maintain unity in a state with many different cultures? For a political community to function, it is necessary for all people to have equal political and civil rights. But except for the common concept of justice, another thing is necessary as a prerequisite for social equality. This is the common identity, which originates from a shared history, language and reli-

gion in one-national countries, which is a source of division in multiethnic states. Ethnic identities need to be adapted, not destroyed to avoid this.

Tradition is a constitutive element in every culture and is of particular significance in the understanding of the existence of identity, for its recognition and the establishment of connection between generations. The knowledge and respect of tradition needs to initiate the need for people familiarize themselves with different cultures, for cooperation and finding a common interest with others. Tradition helps in the preservations of the identity of one ethnic group, but the uncritical acceptance of tradition leads to movement backwards.

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RELIGION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MONO-CONFESSIONAL¹ AND MULTI-CONFESSIONAL COUNTRIES IN EUROPE AND IN THE BALKANS

Abstract

In this paper, the authors will firstly analyze the different places and role of religion in relation to national identity, subject to the prevalence of one or more religions. Secondly, in this context the authors will pay due attention to the role of religion in relation to the historically shaped either strong or weak connection developed between religion and the ethnos.

Based on the analysis of the available empirical material, the authors will draw conclusions on the ambivalent potential of religion regarding national identity, depending on the combination of both of the abovementioned factors.

The conclusion remarks will be illustrated by two case studies, of Macedonia and Bulgaria in order to notice and to elaborate the specificities and similarities of the basic topic of this paper.

Key words: national identity, religion, mono-confessional nations, poly-confessional nations.

Religion has complex and ambiguous relations with the strengthening or the weakening of the national identity. The mono-confessional or multi-confessional character of the given country is one of the factors that, interwoven with many others, demonstrate specific influence over those relations for each particular country. There are examples of such interwoven factors both in the Western European and Eastern European countries, no matter whether the basic religion is Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism or Islam; in this case the historically created and reproduced synthesis of the ethnos/ nation and religion in the mass knowledge is important. For example, interesting and informing is a recent study of those processes in Europe: Italy (Ferrari, 2005), Greece (Molokotos-Liederman, 2005), Denmark (Riis, 2005) are described as countries where “the religion makes the nation”, while the multi-cultural attitudes characterize predominantly England, Germany and Switzerland. Certainly, the thesis that “religion makes the nation”, as well as its consequences for the social status of the small religious groups and of the other denominations depends on a multitude of factors.

1 Under “mono-confessional nations” I take into consideration these cases, wherein one religion is historically and statistically dominant /N.Bogomilova/.

One of them is the *role of the state* as a regulator of those processes.

“Ontological primacy” of the state over religion and the church during the secular 20th century (Zylberberg, 1990, p.93) and in the presence, defines the tendency for each European country, not subject to the form of the government – democracy, totalitarianism, welfare states etc. The “project” of the state, not subject to being called “a dialogue”, “interaction”, dictate, “protectionism”, “ethnic management” etc., is to control the social positions of the church, to instrumentalize it for its own purpose or to marginalize it. In democratic regimes, it is realized through democratic means – legislation, consensus; in totalitarian regimes - both with violence and compulsion (Bogomilova, 2010).

The reason for the comparatively poor presence of the religious pluralism in the contemporary world is namely the state’s pursuit to support the historically created, or even to form missing symbiosis between ethnos and religion, nation and religion for the purposes of strengthening the very statehood. In this context, the mono-confessional character of the given nation is potentially “favourable” circumstance for its strengthening and the strengthening of the statehood, but the way of realization of the later depends on the type of the state and its regulation: monistic or pluralistic, secular or religious etc.

Another factor on which depends the connection between religion and national identity, the direction in which the mono-confessional or multi-confessional peculiarity and their potential conflicting character will act, is whether they are realized in a country, situated in the “centre” or in the “periphery” of the global world - problem, that is considered by the American sociologist of religion J. Spickard. He divides the ethnical conflicts in three types (Spickard, 2010). The peaceful type is characteristic for the countries that are in the “centre” of the global economy (according to him, the economic factor, the level of the economic development determines the way of defence of the rights; in the more developed countries, identities are changed more freely). The conflicting type is valid for the semi-peripheral and peripheral regions of the global system.

E. Gellner conceives the created prejudices as being deeply determined by the social status of their holders, and secondary enhanced by the different cultural features /religion, race/. The ethnical, cultural and other distinctive marks are conflicting factors that underlines the basic features – differences in the access to education and power (Gellner, 1999, p. 128).

J. Liwerant also accepts that collective identities are marginal, secondary effect of the social-structural processes, related mainly to the power and the economic process. This “drama” enfolds in different social arenas (territorial, communal or religious) and in different political – geographic nets (regional, local, national) within the global context (Liwerant, 2002, p.254).

In contrast to the presented points of view, according to which the connection between religion and national identity and its social impact, especially in regard to the potential conflict, depends on the state regulation, economic and power processes, the location of the given country in the global system, Zigmund Bauman shares the thesis that the main factor in that relation are the *interests of the developed countries*. He associates the religious and ethnical conflicts in contemporary times, the opposition of the religious and ethnical relations to the interests of the powerful, developed countries. Confirming ironically, “The global order is in need of large local disorder ...”, he points out, that the

issues of sex, the ethnical and religious feuds eliminate the debate on the material penury “as the deepest source of all inequalities and the entire injustice.” (Bauman, 2003, p.127). He endorses recently increasing criticism of the ideology of multiculturalism, but from a different, humanistic perspective – as a plausible facade that hides, conceals the depth of the problem of poverty, of “material penury”: “The moral shame of the deprivation of resources is miraculously interwoven as esthetical beauty of cultural diversity”; the new culturalism / multiculturalism is equal as the old racism, it is “reconciliation to the fact of inequality”(Bauman, 2003, p.129); “the intellectual burnish of the human’s doom”; “manifest of acquiescence”; “product of mimicry of the world” (Bauman, 2003, p.160). Z. Bauman shares the point of view of the philosopher Richard Rorty, that the involvement of 95% population of the world in the ethnical and religious feuds is premeditate policy.

Looking for the subjects responsible for such state of the matters, Z. Bauman blames the intellectuals to be lacking humanism and courage to choose and protect some particular living style instead of declaring “multiculturalism”; instead of fulfilling their spiritual obligation, they enter new roles and niches of “experts, academic clowns or media celebrities” (Bauman, 2003, p.150). According to Bauman, determination of the theoretical and humanistic horizon in the solution of those problems is the “universality of the human” (Bauman, 2003, p.169).

As usual, each of the points of view, holds as the basic and determining the action of a sole factor (mono-confession, state regulation, position in the world system, economic and power status etc.) goes beyond its methodological limitation in the interaction with the other points of view and factors.

The above-mentioned trends are observable in the Balkan countries as well. One of the most marked tendencies in the last decades of the 20th century has been the involvement of religion, and especially of Eastern Orthodoxy, in the ethnic-political projects in most Balkan countries. But the situation is quite different in each of the countries here depending on the combination of many social and cultural factors.

Bulgaria: the dominant role of the political-state system

National Identity and Political Division

Although it was an important historical factor for cultural and national preservation in Bulgaria, Orthodoxy was not connected with the founding myth of nationality. Moreover, during the Turkish domination the religion tended to acquire an overtone of Greek domination, becoming associated with Greek interests promoted by the Patriarchate of Constantinople (Stanimirov, 1925, pp.141-142).

This was one of the causes why the attempts in modern times to unite the national idea with Orthodoxy were not particularly active or successful. National mythology about the values and missionary projects of the nation were fuelled mostly by the idea of joining “imported” large-scale mythologies such as European values (science, economic growth,

pragmatism); or the Slavic idea, usually embodied by Russia and connected with values such as warm human relations, spirituality, etc. (Bogomilova, 2005).

The second reason for the gradual withering of the Orthodox-based national mission myth in Bulgaria is connected with the specific features of the Bulgarian political elite. In modern and recent history internal divisions and contradictions have marked this elite, by differing foreign-policy orientations, by lack of character and a sense of its historical mission. The political confrontation between the two basic political parties, UDF and BSP, has divided the Bulgarian society into two hostile factions ever since 1989, thus depleting the emotional energy of the elite. This division affected the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as well, weakening it by the creation of two parallel synods vying for legitimacy. The use of Orthodox religion in the national historical mythology in the course of the changes would have been understandable if the confrontation had occurred along ethnic lines - Bulgarians vs. Turks - a conflict that the Communist Party tried to activate in the 1980s. With the start of changes in 1989, this confrontation was replaced by confrontation between parties: the political division overcame the ethnic confrontation.

The influence of the political division on the Bulgarian Orthodox Church: the Schism

Since 1992, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church has been in a state of painful and lasting schism. This division and opposition was a reflection of and influenced by the political opposition between the two main Bulgarian political parties in the beginning of the democratic changes, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (former Communists) and the Union of Democratic Forces.

In coming to power after the democratic changes of the early 1990s, the party Union of Democratic Forces proclaimed that the Holy Synod of the BOC had been a collaborator of the communist regime. Three of the bishops belonging to the circle of associates of the Patriarch Maxim founded a new, "authentic" synod, which received legal status under the administration of the UDF. After the UDF fell from power in 1993 and the former communist party, the BSP, came to power in its turn, state support was transferred to the Synod headed by the Patriarch Maxim.

Analysts believe the schism has political, economic and religious causes (Broun, 2000). The political causes involve the political interests of the parties coming to power in turn and successively supporting either side of the divided Church. The economic interests involve ownership of the property of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

The ultimate result of the schism, to which the ruling party NMSS coercively put an end, first through the Religious Denominations Act in 2002 and then by the intervention of court and police in 2004, was the loss of authority and trust in the BOC. The fragile relation of the Eastern Orthodoxy to the national identity has been eliminated.

The state and the new Religious Denominations Act; mono-confessionalism and religious pluralism

The new Religious Denominations Act (December 29, 2002) asserts "the right of each person to freedom of conscience and religion, as well as equality before the law, regardless of religious affiliation and conviction." (RDA, 2004, p.77).

According to data of the Directorate on Religious Denominations, by December 29, 2002, there were 31 registered religious denominations. 6 years after the new Act coming into force there were around 100. The statistics of the process shows: 1989 – eight registered denominations; 2002 – 31; registered under the new Act: 2003 – 4, 2004 – 25, 2005 – 12, 2006 – 13, 2007-8 – 15; the total number of registered denominations in 2008 – was 99. The Christian religious communities are 87% of all registered religious communities. According to data from the statistical census (NSI, 2011) the confessional belonging of the Bulgarian citizens (total number 5 758 301) is as follows: Eastern Orthodox – 4 374 135; Muslims – 577 139; Catholics – 48 945; Protestants – 64 476; not indicated – 409 898, etc.

Regardless of its positive aspects, compared to the law of 1949 and the fact that it has taken into consideration the basic European standards in this sphere, the new Religious Denominations Act was quite critically judged by certain organizations for the protection of rights, by representatives of the new religious movements, by the largest opposition party, the Union of Democratic Forces especially regarding Article 10 (1) of the law that states: “Eastern Orthodox is the traditional denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria. It has played a historic role in Bulgaria’s statehood and has current meaning in its political life. Its spokesperson and representative is the autocephalous Bulgarian Orthodox Church... (2) The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is a legal entity... (3) No Act or secondary legislature shall use Paragraphs 1 and 2 as grounds to grant privileges or any advantages.” (RDA, 2004, pp.80-81).

The specialists on the issue accept the “traditional Church” status as compatible with the European legal standards and practice (Ferrari, 2000, p.29).

Criticism was based on the interpretation of this Article whereby the very law assigns legal status to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and to one of the two opposed synods, headed by Patriarch Maxim. According to “ECHR Judgment in Case of Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and others v. Bulgaria”: “Moreover, although, the *ex lege* recognition of the Church cannot be seen as incompatible with Article 9 in principle, its introduction in a time of deep division was tantamount to forcing the believers to accept a single leadership against their will.”

Case Study - Macedonia²

Macedonian Orthodox Church and National Identity

It is common to talk about the Macedonian Orthodox Church as a “spiritual mother of the orthodox Macedonian people, in or outside their homeland, as well as of all orthodox Christians living in the Republic of Macedonia” (Commission, 2011).

The commonly known syntagm, Macedonia – the biblical land, applies to Macedonia in the true sense of the word. The roots of Christianity are related to the missionary journeys of the Holy Apostle Paul, recorded in the Apostolic Acts. Macedonia is the first European country where the apostle Paul had arrived, upon the call of a “Macedonian”

² In this case study is accented the role of Macedonian Orthodox Church.

who had kindly asked him, “Come across to Macedonia and help us!”(Grozdanovski, 2007) Apostle Paul was followed by the other Apostles, Silas, Timothy, Lucas, Mathews. In the fifth century, apostle Paul’s brother, Apostle Andrew was crucified.³ Macedonia was entirely Christianized during the apostolic period.

The long history points out the significance of the establishment of the Macedonian Church Justiniana Prima, then the Ohrid Archbishopric and, of course, the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

In the history of the orthodoxy of exceptional importance is the work of the Slavic educators Cyril and Methodius,⁴ as well as their disciples Saints Clement and Nahum of Ohrid.⁵ During the Samuel Kingdom, the Ohrid Autocephalous Archbishopric was established with the rank of a patriarchate. After the fall of Samuel’s Kingdom, the Ohrid Archbishopric existed for entire eight centuries. It was abolished by the Turkish sultan (Mustapha III) in 1767. The period that followed was a period of strenuous and “fierce struggles” for its restoration and acquiring autocephaly.

In 1944, an Initiative Board for organizing the Macedonian Orthodox Church was established. Then followed periods of improving and worsening its relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church, under which jurisdiction it was. However, because the Macedonian Orthodox Church did not find a common language with the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Holy Synod of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Ohrid in 1967, two hundred years after the abolishment of the Ohrid Patriarchate, has proclaimed the Macedonian Orthodox Church as autocephalous (Dimevski, 1989).

The historical introduction to the elaboration of the issue of the orthodoxy and the national identity points out how big is the contribution of the orthodoxy, and at the same time, how big is its significance for the Macedonian identity. The very name – Macedonian, attached to the doctrinal determination, speaks about the special place that the Macedonian Orthodox Church has in the providing and, of course, preservation of the Macedonian identity. The proclamation of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was simply inseparable from the political structures that have provided the necessary support. The building of the relations between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the political structures has unfolded gradually without any disturbances and conflicts in the church / state relation. Exactly in those relations, church – state or vice versa, the symbolic, as well as the real significance of the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Ohrid Archbishopric for the Macedonian people is especially expressed. The symbiosis of the sacred elements and the secular political practices, with their entire fierce occasionally express and develop both the collective and the individual identity (Belchovski, 2011).

The issue of the mythology bases of the Macedonian national identity, of course, supported by the historical facts, as well as the current events related to the non- recogni-

3 Testimony recorded in the church history, in the 5th century, according to Theodoret.

4 Saints Cyril and Methodius have given permanent contribution by creation of the first Slavic alphabet, that is, by their first translations of the liturgy books from Greek into Old Slavic Church language. (Available from <http://www.mpc.org.mk/MPC/history.asp>. Accessed on 17 October 2011)

5 The work of the brothers Saints Cyril and Methodius was continued by St. Clement and St. Nahum from Ohrid, especially by spreading the Gospel among the Macedonian people, the organization of the Church and the monasticism through the action of the Ohrid Literary School. (Available from <http://www.mpc.org.mk/MPC/history.asp>. Accessed on 17 October 2011)

tion by the worldwide orthodoxy (Belchovski, 2011)⁶, as well as the disputes about the name issue, largely contributes to strengthening the historically founded bases of the Macedonian orthodoxy regarding the national identity. Nonetheless, they also create basis for production new myths (Proeva, 2009).

The sociological analyses of religion in Macedonia, after the collapse of socialism, point out to the revitalization process of the religion. According to the empirical data,⁷ obtained from the research, it is said that in Macedonia, religion is revitalized and it is promoted within the nation. In a period permeated with conflicts, religion becomes identification marker of the nation. The national designation in the political events in the region, involves religion in the political segment, whereby covering a significant level of legitimacy of the national policy. The conflicts on the territory of Yugoslavia in the post-socialist period cannot be defined as religious, but religion significantly affects both their course and consequences (Vrcan, 1986). The process of religious life basically expresses the need of emphasizing and living both the individual and collective identities. What characterized this period was, of course, the need to keep and clearly profile the specificity and the distinctiveness of the Macedonian identity. The opening and, of course, the development of the recent events related directly to the Macedonian identity, increasingly contribute for religion to play special important role in keeping the national identity.

It should be also taken into consideration the fact that the ethnical dimension of the political-party organization and operation, as well as the 2001 ethnical conflict, significantly positions the role of religion, assigning a specific colouring to the contemporary political struggle on the Macedonian social scene.

The Church is financially independent. The Church was supported by some of the nationalized assets. Part of some its objects as accepted as cultural heritage and the state takes care for its maintenance.

Macedonian Orthodox Church and the “possible” divisions

The Macedonian Orthodox Church – Ohrid Archbishopric – acts as the sole Orthodox Church on the territory of Macedonia. According to the official data (Commission, 2011), other churches of orthodox doctrine in Republic of Macedonia do not exist or operate as un-registered.

Due to the fact that the Macedonian Orthodox Church – Ohrid Archbishopric is not recognized by the worldwide orthodoxy, part of the believers headed by the Bishop of the MOC, Jovan Vranishkovski, entered into a canonical unity with the Serbian Orthodox Church and on 23 September 2002 the Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church appointed him Egzarh of all territories of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric. Since Jovan was appointed a Serbian exarchin Macedonia, he was accused of several charges for financial misuses, as well as for “inflammation of national and religious hatred, discord

6 This work explicitly emphasized that MOC in its teaching is totally observing the canons that condition the unity of the holy Orthodox Church.

7 The believers’ population in Macedonia is basically determined as a traditional – common, which is self-identified as believing but is practicing the major religious holidays at a regular basis. The existence of the nominal believers, the underlying of the affiliation and identification with the traditional religious collectivity, is not accompanied by the proper level of religious practice, as well as by proper knowledge of the religious doctrine. But, on the other side, the religious identification assumes its clear attributes in the ethnical basis.

and intolerance” (OOA, 2011). The Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric⁸ is not officially registered and recognized by the Macedonian state.

At the official site of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, there are a number of articles, which inform about its existence and operation. Among them, the most striking is the movie that especially underlines that the Government of FYROM⁹ had destroyed the temples of the canonical Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, which is in unity with the canonical orthodox churches in the world. The movie points out that the temple they had sanctified was a month later destroyed by the police of FYROM (October 2004).

Currently the disordained bishop Jovan, as a Serbian exarch in Macedonia or as the Macedonian public calls him “schismatic”, because of the investigation actions and charges brought against him, is outside the borders of Republic of Macedonia. The top leadership of the Serbian church often connects (and sometimes conditions) the dispute with the Serbian Orthodox Church on the issue of autocephaly exactly with the operation of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric.

However, what is characteristic is the fact that the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric headed by Jovan Vranishkovski did not meet with a response among the Macedonian believers and the number of its members remained relatively small.¹⁰ What caused criticism among the Macedonian believers is exactly the fact that part of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric’s activities has been financed by the Serbian Government, as well as by the Greek.¹¹

According to the positive law in Macedonia, until 2008, within one religion cannot be registered more than one religious community. Therefore, the Macedonian Orthodox Church was already registered, which automatically means impossibility for the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric to be registered as another orthodox church. However, the application of the latest 2008 law allows that possibility. Due to the fact that the Macedonian Orthodox Church has added the words Ohrid Archbishopric to its name in the court documentation for registration, the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric had demanded to be registered as a Greek Orthodox Archbishopric of the Pekj patriarch.¹² Their operation was often sanctioned by the state authorities as being illegal.

Although the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric enjoys the support of the orthodox world, it still does not enjoy the support of the Macedonian orthodox believers. The large majority of the Macedonian population continues to identify themselves with the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archbishopric, which is not in canonical unity with the rest of the orthodox churches. The non-recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archbishopric by the worldwide orthodoxy is interpreted as a “motive” for in-

8 On 24 May, on the Feast of the Holy Brothers Cyril and Methodius, he was confirmed by His Holiness, the Archbishop of Pek and Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovtzy and Patriarch of Serbia, and in accordance with the Nish Agreement, the Archbishop of Ohrid and Metropolitan of Skopje. On the same day there was an announcement of the Patriarchal and the Assembly’s Tomos for Autonomy of the Orthodox Ohrid Archbishopric, the Chairman of whose Holy Synod of Bishops is he, himself.

9 It is striking moment in their promotional material the omission of the word “Macedonian” in their name, as well as the use of the reference FYROM.

10 It is speculated in the public that a part of the believers are of Serbian origin.

11 Information available on <http://www.m-p-c.org/news/Jovan-Greece.htm>. Accessed on 04 October 2011.

12 The 2009 State Department Report mentions that its demand for registration was rejected. As unregistered religious community, as well as a community that denies the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, it has lodged complaint for unjustified surveillance and harassment by the state authorities because of their religious beliefs.

creased need of identification with its ethnicity. In the empirical research, more than 90 % of the respondents that declare themselves as orthodox believers come out as Macedonians.

Legal Framework for Regulation of the Religious Life

In the constitutional act of the Republic of Macedonia, the churches, religious communities and religious groups are part of the non-profitable sector. They have the opportunity to establish religious schools, as well as to act within the social policy sphere through foundation of social and charitable institutions. The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, the United Methodist Church and the Jewish Community are mentioned in the Constitution. The multiplication of the minority religious communities in Macedonia was intensified during the last decade of the last century. Their active missionary activity, attached to the established core as well as the developing of religiosity in general, first of all, of the dominant religious structure, stimulates their public promotion. This became especially apparent during the presidency of Boris Trajkovski (1999-2004).

According to the Law on the Legal Position of Church, Religious Community and Group (2008), there are 13 churches, 6 religious communities and 7 religious groups registered in Macedonia.¹³ In this classification, one cannot “recognize” the criteria according to which it is determined why religious collectivities are defined as a church, religious community or religious group. In such a typology of the religious organizations, new religions can register themselves like either a church, or religious community or group. The registration of the religious organizations is done upon the request they submit to the competent authorities, that is, more precisely, according to the title they determine for their religious collectivity. What is characteristic is the fact that most of the religious collectivities tend to register themselves as churches, that is, within that organizational framework. Exactly such arrangement of the matters makes the real picture of the typology of the religious organizations in the Macedonian society to become vague.

The long disputed article of the previous Law, according to which only one church, religious community or group can be registered for one religion, is amended. The objections which were often made and which contested this article as representing “protection” of the traditionally existing or majority religious collectivities, now are not “legally” grounded. Reports of the various monitoring in this sphere state that “the freedom of religion is respected in the practice”. However, they underline that the latest legal frameworks regarding the procedure of registration are slowly going into effect and they disable the religious groups to acquire legal status (State Department, 2009).

The Primary court Skopje 2 is in charge of the registration of the religious groups, in accordance with the Law on the Legal Position of a Church, Religious Community

¹³ According to the 2002 Census of the population in Republic of Macedonia, 1,310,184 citizens, or 64,78 % of its total population identified themselves as belonging to the orthodox religion, 33,32 % of the population identified themselves as belonging to the Islam religion, while 0,35 % were Catholics, and 0,03 %, or totally 520 citizens were Protestants. The number of those who haven't found themselves within these modalities or those who stated as atheists, agnostics, members of the Jewish religion, Apostolic Church, the eastern cults or, those who simple didn't answer this question, numerically were expressed as 1,52 % of the population, or 30,820.

and Group (2008). Although the Constitution lists five religions, as well as the fact that significant resources are “invested” in the majority religious communities, we must emphasize the fact that there is no state church in Macedonia.

There is a legal framework for revival of the religious pluralism. Nevertheless, connecting the issue of religion to the ethnic belonging leaves small space for development of other and new religions. The number of believers in the new religions is minor, which, of course, again indicates the importance of the symbiosis between the ethnicity and religion in the Macedonian religious configuration. The process of formation and registration of the new religious communities takes lot of time. The remarks regarding the “slow” application of the new legal regulation are also attached to it. Although there is a sound legal framework, it is occasionally applied incompletely and improperly.

Conclusion

The dominant religious subject in the Bulgarian “case study” (the Orthodox Church) is in an ambiguous situation with regard to the state and political sphere: a) being institutional element of the as yet unstable state/national identity, the state tends to support and give it preference in some respects; b) being a possible institutional competitor of the political elite when vying for influence over mass demands and moods, the elite is motivated to limit the potential influence of the Church. Today those complex relations undergo interesting changes towards new symbiosis.

In the Macedonian case, the state tends to support the Macedonian Orthodox Church, as one of the key pillars of its identity. The Church and the political elite are rather partners than competitors, in the case of Macedonia. In general, the Church is financially independent, but not internally divided. The Church received support from some of the nationalized assets.

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NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN R. MACEDONIA IN GLOBAL AGE

Abstract

There are more mechanisms through which persons are trying to find and keep their identity. Certainly religion and nation are two powerful forms for belonging and identifying. These are most significant in their effort to complete integration in the Macedonian social system. From a historical point of view the attempt of the Macedonian people for national state is often connected with the struggle for religious independence. In the past, Orthodox religion had the primary function in preserving the national identity. The crucial characteristic of modern time is the following rather paradox act. After the fall of communism, when religion came back in everyday life and social life, sociological analysts expected, that Macedonian citizens would find themselves as subjects of their own faith. But the opposite had happened. Necessity for belonging and identifying with the nation appeared to be much stronger than the religious identification and participation. After its independence, the Macedonian state and the Macedonian Orthodox Church were and still are being negated of their belonging by outside political influences. This sociological analysis is an attempt to review social reasons and consequences for contemporary social conditions viewed through a prism of national and religious identification.

Key words: national identity; religious identity; civil identity

It's up to historical and sociological analysis to show and to prove how from time to time in all societies comes to crisis and revival of religion. But, returning of religion doesn't mean necessarily returning of the church. Revival of religion follows after deep societal crisis. In that time usually comes to revival of national feelings and interests, which is understandable, as we know that religious and national are interlace. If in time of crisis it comes to revival of religiosity than it can be expected and revival of religion ideology. The believers don't adjust their behavior to norms of faith, but norms of faith are adjusting to their needs and interests (Hamilton, 2001).

When person find himself in crisis in him grow interest for religion. Crisis is open process which necessity involves hope. Religion is one of the answers of the real challenge (crisis) which is symbolic force with which help individuals to solve their problems, or they easily adjust. The crisis is teaching people to pray not just to think. Golden era of faith is time of terrible nature catastrophes and social disasters. Then revival of holy can come: hopeless time and its revival are going together. When person is in crisis he began to question not just the world around him but also inside him: He ends to live in security of his experience and knowledge. Except a prayer for his what else left?

Faith is teaching people to made distinction between the feeling of fear, which comes from unpleasant, and danger natural and social phenomenon's from feeling of difficulty which sources is not known and clear. Fear is here to warn and to push them to act: in fear is beginning of wisdom! The feeling of difficulty is all over the soul, depression, restless that stream from the depth of unconscious. That is some inner mood in front of insecure of tomorrow day, which can overcome only with faith (Šušnjić, 1998).

Jesus Christ instead of low offered something more useful. He, who lands on the bottom of human's difficulty, offered salvation through love, faith and hope. If man in what kind of dark moods find himself hope doesn't leave him. Difficulty is feeling of weight, which can't fulfill any opportunity in human's life. On this existentialistic situation of worry people can respond like nihilistic philosophy of life does, or like the way of Christian faith do with resurrection. Existentialistic difficulty is a way that lives only human because only he has opportunity to chouse, and every choice is connected with uncertainty. In every person, the believer is hidden side of self, part that in crisis situations tends to union with absolute and mystical power. How else to explain the fact that in the begging of 21 century in the era of science and technology and rationality, world which follows black and white magic, reading fortune, predicting etc. There is a feeling that we are back in middle age. So, that is not only returning of the church, but also on folk religion and superstitious. In the time of tensions and extreme crisis the society is divided on two confronted sizes, some are believers and others nonbelievers.

Social crisis disturbs stability and with it is calling every individual to think about itself and community in which he lived. In the time of crisis differences are begging to hinder- who is different is danger! Crisis is suitable for racial, national and religious conflicts. Instead of supplementing each other, denying the other becomes characteristic in social relations. In crisis time people are losing orientation, but not the need from it. Seeking without purpose is vagrancy: there isn't objective determination in events, nor subjective believe in their outcomes. In crisis situations even the nonbelievers are inclined to faith if they don't see help from other side. In that moments we are reaching for something that we don't know that we had. In front of us reveal hidden experiences and customs for which we weren't conscious and aware that live inside us. People do what they can and what depends from them power, when they are convince that they can't help itself then he is reaching for some other power (Gidens, 2007).

When suffers society we speak for society crisis, and when suffer individual we speak for personal suffer. What else we can expect in unexpected and rationally unsolved circumstances but human to set on faith and try to find some exit. The life set questions, and symbolic systems give answers. People can choose between different answers, but most often they choose answer that physiologically fit, without difference is it true or false, good or bad, it is important that gives promise. Faith is experience to be brave when everything and everyone sinks. People lose orientation, but still they believe that there is some way out, it is a matter of time when will be found. In that search for way out, people face with ideas, believes and values which are traditionally connected with religion and church. True opportunity they feel as personal hope. Social crisis as it's said creates uncertainty and fear in individuals: that which is structurally shaken is feeling like inner

soul shock. Crisis that shakes the basis of the society can't spare inner peace in individuals, which are seeking way out from it.

In relation of faith it is difficult to compare orthodox nations with non-orthodox: they are less attached to faith. If in homes of ordinary people is seen cross, candle or church calendar that isn't measure of faith, because these symbols are kept more as memory instead as symbols of faith. If it's pointing out that our people are believers, than it's hiding that there are no deep roots of their faith individually, collectively nor in theological culture. Our young people believe, but not only in Christianity also in other shapes of believing (Pavićević, 1988). After communism crash they had finally remembered that they have different ethnic characteristics (different history, language, and culture). When Republic of Macedonia was created (year 1991) politic elite and the nation had mutual opinion that finally they succeeded to create state of Macedonian nation that has its own specifics and differences (different from other nations in the region such as Serbian, Montenegro, Bulgarian and Croatian nation).

Certainly, national sense of identity is followed by religious sense of identity. The religion is classic saint "love all of the other nations as you love your own". Number of sociologists of religion emphasize that in fact nation is act of faith and believing. Through faith persons understand better characteristics of its own nation. Therefore in Balkan region, as a rule, representatives of one nation follow one faith (almost with no exception each Serbian is orthodox such as every Croatian is Catholic). But, there are cases when representatives of different ethnic communities follow same faith. For example: Macedonians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks have same faith, even they belong to different nations. Also, it happens more then one faith to be present in the frames of one nation (most of the Macedonians are Orthodox, but still there are Macedonians who are Muslims). On Balkan Peninsula very typical is the situation with Albanians who have three faiths: Islam, Orthodox and Catholic. All of this tells us that nation and religion should not be identified. Therefore we'll make sharp division between religion and nation, since faith is one and only, while there are more nations. In the world there are orthodox believers Macedonians, Russians, Arabic, Serbians what means that faith is up-national (universal).

Even religion and nation are two powerful forms of belonging and identifying: in order to strengthen national feeling, religious one has to be weakened. On the question "Who are you?" none people would answer: I'm Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim or Protestant. Almost everybody would answer: I'm Macedonian, Serbian, Bulgarian or Albanian. It leads us to the fact that during last several centuries situation has been changed in its root. But, basic characteristic of modern time is the following rather paradox act. 20 years ago when religion came back in social and every-day life, everybody expected that people would find themselves as subjects of their own faith. But, opposite had happened: necessity for belonging and identifying with the nation appeared to be much stronger then religious identification and participation. (Šušnjić, 1998)

Appearance of so strong emotions, conscience and interests can be so expressed only if religious feeling is weakened. That is what is happening in the last 20 years in Macedonia, even influence on its basic religious institutions such as Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). In the past, main role in the history of Macedonian nation was done by Orthodox religion. It kept and secured Macedonian identity in the most difficult mo-

ments. It seems that in 1991 it was forgotten and suddenly Macedonian citizens were proud of being subject of Macedonian ethnic community. In that moment Macedonian state as a world institution took the leading role from MOC, as a saint institution.

In the context of this topic we'll make a short discussion about the relation between religion and nation. At the beginning we'll emphasize doubtless fact that religion and nation are two powerful forms of identification. These are strong mechanisms through which each young person seeks for its identity. Sense of identity is very important for both, Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups in Republic of Macedonia. But these two forms of identity cannot have same intensity in same time. In order to intensify national sense, religious one is to be weakened and vice versa. In certain period religious sense is stronger, while in other periods the national one, no matter whether we talk about members of Macedonian or Albanian ethnic community in Republic of Macedonia. Religion is classical saint, while nation is modern saint. Those who prefer religious fillings are lead through life by the following idea: "Love all nations as you love your own nation". Those who prefer national fillings are lead by the following thought: "Love your own nation, before and above all". I agree with the constellation that youth in the Republic of Macedonia turn themselves more towards their historical past than towards their future. But, nation does not live only with its memory of its own past, but also with a high level of approximation about its future. Determination of its own future gathers the will of the members of certain ethnic community and makes them deeply united. Usually consciousness about mutual past is made complete with the wish for mutual future. Past can not be changed, but it can be acquired. Future can not be completely known, but can be changed.

Great numbers of sociological examinations, which refer to this subject, indicate an interesting data. Believe it or not, they show that religion and nation do not have logical connection. Additionally, here is the fact that religion is national and universal category. But, besides these strong facts, these social phenomena are in an unbreakable psychological connection and secret union! Only in period of national conflicts religious impatience is strengthened. Only in such cases, certain identification of nation and religion that is difficult to understand appears. That's not the case in the rest of "peaceful" times. Best soil for introducing religious and ethnic tolerance is civic society. It is supra-national society in which basic measure is the citizenship. In the frames of this type of society basic human values become more general. Generalization of the values and norms goes towards the level of creation of universal human rights and values. With this, inherited ethnic rights and linked habits, moral and legal norms fall. Universal values and norms followed by human rights and freedoms, are wider then the values of the special ethnic community. However, the system of norms and values has to be risen on universal level. As well as there is separation of the state from the church, also it is possible to separate citizenship from national feature.

All people are equal in front of God, therefore religious and politics institutions should have equal attitude towards them. In this constellation, pretty adequate element is the fact that in Christian and Islamic holy books (Bible and Koran) there are mutual messages for valorization of human behavior. These are messages that cause action in the members of Islam, as well in the members of Christianity and they have universal and general human character. Basic moral principle that is part of the Pentateuch can be found

almost in the same form in The Koran. Islam and Christianity, as two universal religions, give perfect chance for creating general human religious values, which in case they are respected would prevent any kind of religious conflict.

This implies that nation is historical fact, while religion is supra-historical and eschatological category. For the religion and church as her most important institution, the personality of the believer is most important while for the nation most important is the spirit of belonging. If we try to make distinction between nation and religion, then we should say first that from temporary point of view, religion is before nation. The existence of religion is linked to the appearance of the human being, while nation exists in the last two hundred years. Therefore we can say that religion is constant social phenomena, while nation is temporary social phenomena. Secondly, religion is more important than the nation, because it is more general. If you want to say that somebody is good person, you'll say that he is good Christian or good believer – belonging to Islam. Illustrating such constellation, in this situation you'll rarely say, that he is good Macedonian or good Albanian. The expression good believer creates picture of perfectly moral person. Thirdly, from ethic point of view, religion stays above the nation. Religion is ethic category, while nation is ethnic category. Equality of faiths and religious institutions gives more chances for cohesive integration of the society, but the idea for creating one religion gives less chance for realization of integration in all segments of social life. If we succeed to actualize this in temporary dimension, we might conclude that in Republic of Macedonia there have never been any religious conflicts, since those were ethnic conflicts, caused by political aims.

Now, we can discuss about the question: Are national interests stronger than ecumenical consciousness? If we want to answer this question we should find some kind of balance between the views that Macedonia is flowery garden in which peace and good will of people from different religions reign and next view that in our country reigns the law of opposite and sometimes sharpened relations. Basically, R. Macedonia is country that carries the burden of its past and history. That's the destiny of small countries which want to be big, at least in the history. In there two heavenly kingdoms meet and mix: Christian and Muslims. Also it is place of crashing two big civilizations (Orthodox culture and Byzantium civilization, from one side, and Islamic culture and Muslims civilization, on the other side). Shall we expect conflict of the civilizations, on this piece of ground, or multiculturalism, multiethnic living and the treasure of the differences will reign in the future. Speaking about this we shouldn't forget that R. Macedonia is a part of wider region (Western Balkan) which carries the burden of previously mentioned issues. R. Macedonia is an area of religious, cultural, ethnic, social and ideological difference between Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups and therefore it is not strange if misunderstandings, disputes and accidental conflicts are not only of religious character, but also from political ethnic, cultural, historical, ideological and psychological character.

Islam and Christianity are part of the Eastern faiths, but they do not exclude each other. Judaism, Christianity and Islam use different names for same God. Probably, that's because they want to show and proof their difference. But, also they allow believers of different religions to pray and confess in same Holly Temple. Believe it or not, problems appear when internal misunderstandings and conflicts occur inside these religious and

ethnic communities. Due to economic, political, social and cultural reasons, problems and difficulties that can not be solved inside the community do appear. In that moment as a kind of rule, they seek for the scapegoat. Who would that be? Certainly, in these cases, they are searching for the victim in someone from the members of ethnic community that is near them. In that way real reasons for social crises are successfully hidden and also dislocates the attention of its members who are really guilty and should be expelled and punished. Therefore, highly accepted maxim is the one that says that those who can't converse, humanly with the believers of its own religion, would be even less able to do it with the members of another faith.

On this point, Durkheim's sociological thesis is pretty current. Paraphrased it would be as follows: if inside certain social community there is negative, demolishing energy that can disintegrate this community, then, this negative energy is directed towards neighboring social community. In that case "my" community is free of disintegration and internal conflicts. In order to save own tribe, the best thing to do is to attack the neighboring one.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTITIES AMONG THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE BALKANS IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION: CASES OF TORBESHI, GORANI AND POMACI

Abstract

During the Ottoman Empire as a theocratic state, ethnic identities and the ethnic belonging of people were not important vs. the religious identity and determination. The ethnic identity lost its importance in the Ottoman Empire and religious identity was given priority with the aim that all Muslim people belong to one Muslim community. At the end of the XXVIII and beginning of the XIX centuries, the process of the development of modern nations began among the various nationalities in the Balkans. The millet system, with its classification based on religion, became increasingly less viable. A process known as the National Revival was and is much more intensive among the Christian population than among the Muslims. The processes of development and construction of national identities in the Balkan states mainly follow the primordial way, which as a consequence has social antagonisms on a religious base among the people, presented as ethnic conflicts.

The development of identities among the Muslims in the Balkan states at the end of the XX and beginning of XXI century is an issue that has very deep social, cultural, economic and political consequences and in various Balkan states we could see various context, circumstances, state strategies and policies. Ethnic and national identities among Muslims in the Balkans are very changeable.

Key words: Ethnic identity, Muslims, national revival

In fact, to identify means to recognize, to adopt or to determinate. Depending on what kind of basis for identification we take in consideration (culture, religion, region, tribe, ethnos or nation) we relate the term of identity with some adjectives (cultural identity, regional identity, ethnic identity etc.). For the first time, the term identity is formulated in psychoanalytical theory and is understood as the widest base for a certain individual feeling of belonging. (Петровић, 1989: 9). Eric Ericson gave the formulation of the term ethnic identity in 1968, when he tried to determinate the mechanisms of an individual to be identified with a group and he found that identity is a characteristic rooted in the fundament of a person. Indeed, the process of ethnic identification develops through the socialization.

However, in social and cultural anthropology there are some attempts for an ethnos to be observed as a “spirit” or as spiritual principle or collective consciousness. Defining an ethnic group on the basis of subjective believing in common origin, Max Weber pointed that the source of ethnicity shouldn't rely on possessing some properties as symbols of ethnicity, but should be rely on producing, keeping and deepening the differences. According to him, the ethnic identity is built on differences. (Вебер, 1976: 323). On the

other hand, Frederic Barth points to the ethnic boundaries as the main pillars of ethnic identity. Through time the cultural arsenal disappears, but ethnic boundaries exist. Ethnic boundaries implicate inter-ethnic relations and the ethnic identity is formed and exists on contacts with other ethnic groups (Barth, 1969). The theory of ethnos and ethnicity had big inputs in the publishing of Benedict Anderson's "Nation-imaged community"! According to him nation, but also any group, especially ethnic group, is an imagined (but not invented) community. One single member of a group will not meet all members of a group, but they exist in her/his consciousness and she/he has a special attitude towards them, based on solidarity and fellowship. Differences between communities in the first stage are in the construction of their imagination. (Андерсон, 1998). It is important to mention the theory of Thomas Hylland Eriksen and his study on relations towards the Others, towards history and politics. The existence of Others is an inevitable element of ethnic identification: without the Others it is not possible to experience and to understand the We. History is a problem of the past, but an answer of contemporary needs. An anthropologist is not interested in what really happens and what are real or invented traditions, but wants to discover in what way certain historical content is used in the actual process of construction of identity (Eriksen, 1993).

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The long Ottoman ruling in the Balkans caused very important social, economic, political and cultural changes until the present day. One of the characteristics of the Ottoman period in the Balkans was the affirmation of the Islam religion. In the first decades of the Ottoman ruling in the Balkans whole groups of people accepted Islam almost in every region of the Peninsula. Many scholars make conclusions that in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the XV century members of the Bogomilian movement in the Balkans, as a main religious, ethic, ideological and social power, massively accepted the Islam religion (Стојановски, 1987: 31). Other scholars have a position that is not absolutely possible to determinate the religious origin of pre-Islamic groups (Лиманоски, 1993: 32). But the Ottoman government did not force the process of "Islamisation"- term which is often used in scientific books in the Balkans, for the process of changing or shifting the religious belief of the people. They allowed Christians to respect their religion, practice their rituals and their kind of living. The most important issue for the Ottomans was that the "raya" be quite and pay taxes. Christian adult men were obliged to pay a special tax called "Dzizja", from which Muslim adult men were freed.

An act of accepting Islam religion among the people was known as "poturcuvanje"/ "becoming a Turk". For that reason one of the identity names for those people was and is "Poturi". This name sublimates all existing contradictions related with religion, identity and the "otherness". For the Christians, shifting to Islam was identification with a process of naturalization, becoming "other", becoming a Turk (Лиманоски, 1993: 37). On the other hand, in the Middle Ages, Turks-Ottomans experienced and felt themselves much more as Muslims than as Turks in the modern sense of the identity (Smith, 1991). For that reason an identity of a "Turk" was identification with an identity of a "Muslim", and the conversion of people to Islam was called "Turcenje", and the new Muslims became Turks. In this way two basic categories of belonging "in" and "out" of groups were determined: "Turks" and "Christians". This basic demarcation and distinction was

made according to the religious identity, without consideration of the ethnic and linguistic characteristics and features. In this way under the category “Turks” were understood, except the “real Turks”, also Muslim Albanians, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Bosnians, Montenegrins and other ethnic communities which accepted the Islam religion.

During the Ottoman Empire as a theocratic state, ethnic identities and the ethnic belonging of people were not important vs. the religious identity and determination. The ethnic identity lost its importance in the Ottoman Empire and the priority was given to the religious identity, with the aim that all Muslim people belong to one Muslim community. Even ethnic Turks did not feel as Turks, but as Muslims. The phenomenon of losing the ethnic feeling as a consequence of a universal spirit of Islam was installed in the Balkans, too.

At the end of the XXVIII and the beginning of the XIX century, the process of the development of modern nations began among the various nationalities in the Balkans. The millet system, with its classification based on religion, became increasingly less viable. A process known as the National Revival was and is much more intensive among the Christian population, than among the Muslims (Mazower, 2000: 67). The processes of development and construction of national identities in the Balkan states mainly follow the primordial way, which as a consequence has social antagonisms on a religious base among the people, presented as ethnic conflicts. The fight for national liberation and the creation of national states was not just a radical break with the past, but it was negation of the past, too. This caused the creation of nations to be built on the basis of two central principles- language and faith.

South East Europe at the beginning of the XIX century was not a region determined with nation-states, but with symbols of orthodoxy. In those circumstances, the Muslim millet, with no consideration for the ethnic and linguistic diversity, remained as a part of the same discourse of the Otherness. Islamic community and mosques were not national, and they fought against the national consciousness of Muslim people, advocating for the universality of the religion, as a unique leader of collective organization of the believers. Contrary, Christian churches appeared as bearers of national awaking and revival, presenting the institutional fundament of the Balkan nation-states.

The creation of nations on the basis of language among the orthodox faced Slavic people with obstacles in religious aspect, by keeping the old distinctions of “Muslims” and “Christians” from the Ottoman Empire. In that context, the self-integration of groups with the same pre-Ottoman ethnic origin and similar languages but with different religion was impossible. Christian people in the Balkans started to understand the world with the language of nationalism, while their views toward the Muslims stayed in a domain of the same discourse among the religious communities (Todorova, 2001: 260). On the other hand, because the Balkan Muslim were incapable to adopt the national code and practically were excluded from the process of national consolidation and integration, they kept the fluid conciseness, which was an image of the millet mentality as Ottoman heritage (Todorova, 2001:261).

The new state-borders from 1878 and from 1912 became the basic criteria for defining the collective identity. National belonging was promoted as a prime factor for group identification, opposite the former religious collective categorization (Стојановски,

2010: 407). National governments and administration, mainly implemented restrictive politics of integration of Muslim population and their participation in the public life, because of their superstition for loyalty to the new states, bearing in mind that Muslims lost the benefits which they had in the Ottoman Empire. The national ideology imposed cultural identity by taking the control over the economy and conventional collective images from families and from the local communities. The lack of national strategy for inclusion and integration of Muslim Slavic population in the new societies and in a national “WE” or “OURS”, brought confusion related with the definitions of Muslim population. The most important segments in forming the collective identity of nation-state are its institutions, especially the local administration, military service and mass education. While in the Ottoman Empire in the settlements where Muslims speaking Slavic languages lived, or there were mixed settlements with Muslim and Christian population, the political elite and local leaders mainly were from the Muslim community, in national states there were mainly Christians. These politics of “revenge” strengthened the solidarity among the Muslims with different ethnic and linguistic belongings in the new nation-states (Стојаноски, 2010).

However, we have to point the fact that in the collective memory of the Balkan population it was impossible to throw the “collective blame and guilt” towards the Muslims with Slavic languages, because they felt threatened and changed their religion and “became Turks”. The reconstruction of the social matrix that they belong to one nation and have to be considered as “We”, “Us” or “Ours” was impossible because the memories from the Ottoman state were fresh (Лиманоски, 1993: 310,311).

Nevertheless, public opinion for “forced Islamization” of the so-called “Bulgarian-muhamedanes”, “Serbian-muhamedanes”, “Muslim with our blood” and other identity terms, which were used in a time of national revival of the Christian population in the Balkan states, especially in Bulgaria and Serbia, was created in the intellectual circles, before the creation of national states. This public opinion was constructed in a way that Islamization of the Slavic people was made in a forced way by the Ottomans (Стерјовски, 1995: 152), and because the Ottomans had to go back in Asia, Muslims with Slavic pre-Ottoman origin had to come back to their Christians roots (Ајрадиноски, 2011: 30). But these theses in the intellectual circles, found their places in the construction of national and nationalistic state ideology in the Balkan states, whose frustration of “the five-century long Turkish slavery” was unleashed on “our Turks”. In cultivating the myth for homogenous and pure national states, the national Balkan states at beginning of the XX century signed Agreements in 1919 and 1923 in Neuilly and Lozano (Киселиновски, 1987: 121), between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey for changing the population (Svetieva, 2009). A similar agreement was signed between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1933. With these Agreements, most of the Muslim population with Slavic origin was forcibly migrated in Turkey, because they were declared as ethnic Turks. These Balkan nation-states were constructed and implemented in the “Balkan way” (Даскаловски, 2010), with a strong influence of a former Millet system, where confessions, and in this case national orthodox churches, gave the final “stamp” on the national identity (Perica, 2002).

After the Second World War, the Muslims in Tito’s Yugoslavia were in much better position than before the war, as well as in comparison with the Pomaks in Bulgaria who

experienced a total violation of their human rights, especially in a governmental policy of chaining their Muslim names into Christian ones (Maeva, 2008)! The introduction of modern or relatively modern political life in socialist Yugoslavia, accompanied by the establishment of a public domain from which religion was excluded, led to a certain retreat of the ethnic. There is no doubt that confessional identity- the form of the collective identity that had dominated for so long-did retreat when faced with the onslaught of aggressive secularization. In socialist Yugoslavia as well as in other socialist states were produced two major ethnic reconstitutions. The first resulted from the introduction of a modern political identity, the identity of the working class (Vlaisavljevic, 2003: 9). Despite the violent repression of the religious identity, the ethnic identity continued to play a major role in Yugoslav society (even if it was secondary to the political identity). Ethno-religious identity was transformed into ethno-political identity. Interpreted and institutionalized by modern political means, the ethnic or ethno-religious identity became the national identity. Communist ideology and its political institutions took the place of religion. Though politics became more important than religion, this did not mean that the ethnic lost its significance. On the contrary, the ethnic was sufficiently important, indeed more so than either politics or religion, therefore it may be assumed that in taking the place of religion, politics also had to take on its role: to become a political or secular religion. The ethnic emerges here in an entirely modern form: it is a name for the place or framework within which politics and religion relate to each other (Vlaisavljevic, 2003: 9).

In these circumstances with the collective identity of the people, in Social Yugoslavia rose a question of the legal recognition of the Muslim nation. The Constitution of SFRY recognized *narodi* (nations—native peoples which were explicitly named in the Constitution, giving them special privileges) and *narodnosti* (nationalities, with status comparable to that of minorities).

The Austro-Hungarian Empire officially introduced the term *Bosniaks* for the Slavic Muslims who lived in Bosnia; prior to it, it was used to describe a resident of Bosnia regardless of his/her nationality or religion. In a debate that went on during the 1960s, many Bosniak communist intellectuals argued that the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina are in fact native Slavic people that should be recognized as a nation (Jugoslavenski Leksikografski Zavod, 1974: 654). But the name *Muslims* was sometimes rejected - to quote the Bosniak politician and president Hamdija Pozderac: “They do not allow Bosnianhood but they offer Muslimhood. We shall accept their offer, although the name is wrong, but with it will start the process”— In a discussion with Josip Broz Tito in 1971 regarding the constitutional changes which recognized Muslims, later Bosniaks (Wikipedia, Bosnjaci).

As a compromise, the Constitution was amended in 1968 to list the *Muslims by nationality* recognizing a nation, but not the Bosniak name. The Bosniaks considered the Yugoslav “Muslim by nationality” policy to neglect and oppose their Bosnian identity because the term tried to describe Bosniaks as a religious group not an ethnic one. Sometimes other terms, such as *Muslim with capital M* were used (that is, “musliman” was a practicing Muslim while “Musliman” was a member of this nation; Serbo-Croatian uses capital letters for names of peoples but small for names of adherents).

After the 1990s, most of these people, around two million, mostly located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region of Sandžak, were declared as ethnic Bosniaks (*Bošnjaci*,

sing. *Bošnjak*) (DnevniAvaz, 27.09.2011). On the other hand, some still use the old name *Muslimani* (Muslims), especially outside Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kurpejovic, 2008).

The recognition of the Muslim identity as a national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Socialist Yugoslavia in the 1970s caused a reaction in the other Yugoslav republics of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. With the constitutional changes from 1974, the ethnic identification of the people in Yugoslavia was based on the free declaration of every individual according to her/his conciseness, different than previously, when the ethnic/national identification was based on the spoken language. For that reason the republic's authorities in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro were afraid that Muslims in their republic will declare themselves as Muslims in as a nation, and asked that such right have only the Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because this proposal was refused, the authorities in Macedonia launched an informal campaign for encouraging the population to accept the identity of Muslim Macedonians (Makedonski Muslimani) (Ajradinoski, 2011: 44-45). The main role in this campaign belonged to the so-called Republic Community of Cultural Manifestation of Muslim Macedonians, led by Nijazi Limanonski (Лиманоски, 1993: 376-379). A parallel campaign was implemented among Christian Macedonians too, with the aim to accept Muslim Macedonians as their compatriots, as members of the same nation (Дојчиновски, 1987: 29). But such activities did not give the expected results.

With the collapse of the socialist regime, among the Slavic people with Islam religion appeared new processes which were related with respect of human rights, participation in the public life and decision-making processes and bodies. These processes caused new development of the identity, with request for recognizing their local community as a particular national minority in the respective state.

The Kosovo crisis discovered for the public the existence of a new community in Kosovo- Gorans community. Actually it is Muslim population that speaks a Slavic language in a region of Gora, divided between three states Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. Even if they may be aware that they are members of the same local/regional community in present day Kosovo, we may find people from the Gorani community who declare themselves as Boshinaks, Turks, Gorans etc. Member of the Gorani community which live or have migrated to Macedonia, generally declare themselves as Macedonians with Islam religion. In fact, the president of the Union of Macedonians with Islam religion, Mr. Ismail Bojda has an origin from the village Brod in the Gora region. The new independent state of Kosovo recognizes Gorans and Boshnjaks as particular communities, they are mentioned in the Constitution of Kosovo, they have reserved seats in the Kosovo parliament and separately they enjoy minority rights as all other non-Serbian communities in Kosovo. The ethnic identity of Gorani community started to appear in Albania, too. The main intellectual front-man not only in Albania, but broader for the Gorani identity and in direct relation of the Gorani, Torbeshi and Pomaks communities with the Bogomils in Middle Ages is Mr. Nazif Dokle. In 2009 he published a book "Bogomilism and ethnogenesis of Torbesh from Gora in Kukes" (Dokle, 2009), which in October 2011 was translated in *Boshniak* language. Repeated aspirations for appropriation of the Gorani community in the frame of their nation have the Bulgarian scholars, too. Tanja Mangalakova,

a famous Bulgarian journalist, who is preparing her PhD in the field of ethnography, published the book "Ours in Kosovo and Albania" in 2008 (Мангалакова, 2008). This book provoked a reaction among the Macedonian scholars, especially from professor Aneta Svetiva, who responded that "Ours will never be yours" (Светиева, 2009). Bulgarian scholars organized many events, such as expositions of photos, objects, clothes etc. related with the traditional culture of the Muslim population in Albania, in the regions of Golo Brdo and Gora, like the expositions of Veselka Toncheva from the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore with the Ethnographic museum in Sofia. The regions of Golo Brdo and Gora in the expositions were presented as the "most western Bulgarian lands"! (Фокус, 27.01.2011)

On the other hand the identity of the Pomak community in Bulgaria is developing, too. In the last two decades we can find many declarations of Pomak leaders who are saying that they are a separated community from the Bulgarians and Turks, and they want to be recognized as Pomaks. On one occasion Mr. Damjan Iskrenov from the village of Kochan, region of Chech, a representative of the Association of Pomaks in Bulgaria, said that "... the goal of our organization is to make unification of Pomaks, not only in Bulgaria, but in Greece, Macedonia, and Albania, too. We are one nationality as well as the Traco-Macedonian tribes. Truly our people the Pomaks ... of Alexander the Great. He ruled then..." (EthnoAnthropoZoom, 2004: 215). Former member of Bulgarian parliament, Mr. Shikir Bujukov, has a position that although they (Bulgarian authorities) are trying to ignore them as an ethnic group, Pomaks exist with their own culture, traditions, songs, customs etc. They want their ethnic group to be confirmed and to find its place guaranteed by the Human Rights Conventions, according to which all people have equal rights. (EthnoAnthropoZoom, 2004: 213- 223)

However, the most dramatic issue is in Macedonia, with the development of the identity of the Torbeshi community. The estimated number of this community in Macedonia is around 150,000 people and the identity fluctuates among Muslim Macedonians, Albanians and Turks. But, in the last 10 years, the identification of people with the Torbeshi identity as a separate and particular community in Macedonia causes many reactions in the political and scientific circles in Macedonia. In 2006 a leader of the Party for European Integration (PEI) Mr. Fijat Canoski, became member of the parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, and in his speeches in the parliament he declared that he will represent and protect the interest of the Muslim population in Macedonia known as Torbeshi, or as he liked to say "people of my kind (soj)"! (Утрински весник, 30.01.2007) Later in 2010 was established the Torbeshian Cultural- Scientific Center "Rumelija" with Sherif Ajradinoski as the chairman, which in January 2011 proclaimed the "Torbeshian Declaration", with the request that the Torbeshi community be recognized as a separate community in Macedonia and mentioned in a Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (Ајрадиноски, 2011). Immediately came a strong response from the Union of Macedonians with Islamic religion, by organizing scientific public tribunes in cooperation with the national institutes for history, Macedonian language, folklore, the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, the Institute of Ancient Slavic Culture and the Macedonian Ethnologists Society. As an output from the public tribune on the topic "Macedonians with Islamic faith between national belonging and religious determina-

tion”, was published a booklet/collection of work (Дрвошанов (ed.) 2011). The cultural-scientific center “Rumelija”, responded with a scientific tribune, too, where prominent scholars from Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bulgaria gave the contribution of giving a scientific base for the Torbeshi identity. But, this identity conflict in Macedonia is not only in the scientific circles! On the social networks, especially on Facebook, there is a real cyber war between both sides (Facebook, ObedinetiTorbeshi). Some people say that even in the background of closing A1 television and arresting its owner, Velija Ramkovski, (Time.Mk. 24.12.2010) as well as destroying the building complex “Cosmos” that is in ownership of Fijat Canoski, is a political fight against the main front-men of the Torbeshi movement. (Press 24, 04.08.2011)

Concluding remarks

Identity and identification are processes and relations, not a position or status! First of all, identification is an intra-subjective process of identifying or distinction. That is a selective choice of particular cultural elements, with the aim for creation separate identity. The objectivity of ethnicity, together with its history, is a construction, virtual reality. Ethnos is a subjective experience, imagining of reality.

Bearing in mind that Balkan societies were and are diverse society with different ethnic, religious, cultural and other groups and communities, the development of multicultural society and interculturalism is the only way for peaceful development of society with no alternatives. As Andrea Semprini said, multiculturalism in its sense at the same time rises three issues: recognizing diversity in the society on any base, respecting minority rights and respecting the identity of any group (Semprini, 1999).

There is a need for further promotion of the knowledge for human rights, including (special) rights of minorities, the existing ethnic and cultural diversity, tolerance, mutual understanding, coexistence and cooperation in modern plural societies. The myths of ethnic homogeneity contradict the existing ethnic and cultural diversity that can be also a comparative advantage and not just a problem. The existing concept of nation-states is not just an ideal goal of every distinct ethnic community, but also a possible source of ethnic and religious conflicts.

We have to find the common and universal elements of different cultures in societies, and build a consensus and compromise to prevent even the feeling and fear of inequality and domination.

The ethnic or national revival of the Muslim population in the Balkan states, especially among the Bosniaks, Torbeshi, Pomaks, Gorani and other communities, which appeared much later than among the Christians, is in its very early stages. They want to build and construct their identity houses, which are legitimate goals in general civilization sense. Identity is subjective category, and objectification of the same is a long process of intercultural dialog.

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ISLAM AS A GLOBAL PROVOCATION: INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN MUSLIMS FROM TARIQ RAMADAN'S PERSPECTIVE

“The future of Europe-with a flourishing Muslim presence and an open European identity must be based on self-criticism, a permanent and open dialogue and respect of diversities.”

Ingmar Karlsson

Abstract

The worldview ideas of the Swiss-born of Egyptian origin Tariq Ramadan, who according to the “Time” magazine (2004) is one of the 100 most influential world thinkers and innovators of the 21st century, also called a Muslim Martin Luther, nowadays are very interesting and important in view of the fact of the current global changes and turbulences, when the world entered a dangerous new phase. Islam, as one of the largest world religions whose number of adherents is increasing daily all over the world, and is at the same time the most negatively viewed religious structure (islamophobia), especially after September 11, 2001. Europe and Islam have been in contact ever since the 8th century, but the communication today is far more intensive (over 20 million Muslims live on the Old Continent). Today’s European Muslims are not only newcomers but natives; Euro-Islam converts imbue special nuances to the social milieu. Some, like Tibi, discuss Euro-Islam, others like the xenophobes talk about Euro-Arabia and third ones use neologisms such as Londonistan (M. Phillips). Integration versus ghettoisation, Euro-Islam versus ghettoism, Islamisation of modernity versus modernization of the Islam are the main thesis of Ramadan, a university professor, who, in one of his academic discourses, discusses the subjects of belonging, identity, secularisation, Islam, universality, multiculturalism, integration and etc.

Key words: Islam(ism), identity, cultural pluralism, universal values, integration, islamophobia

Islam as a global provocation: Stigma(tisation) as hysterical paradigm

Islam is one of the major world religions, with the largest spreading percentage rate in universal frames, the only religion that managed to withstand secularism, modernism and what Gellner calls the *unholy alliance of consumerist unbelievers*. In the past hundred years, the hold of Islam over the society and over men has certainly not diminished, but on the contrary, it seems to have increased. (Gellner, 201: 8) Islam in the past thirty years has transitioned from the private to the public sphere. Some sociologists call this process an *Islamisation of the Muslims*, holding Islamism as a political ideology whose manifestation is increasingly obvious in all the countries with Muslim population.

However, the representatives of this religion, apart from these trends, are faced with a large worldwide pursuit against them, especially after September 11, 2001, a date that changed the way Islam is perceived in the world history, a date that forced the former Secretary General of UN to say that the world has gone over the threshold of the 21st century through a fire door, that none of us would like to see. (Elkington, 2003) The year when the new millennium started brought a new global agenda: Islam-Muslims and terrorism. In this world ruled by the New World Order, where we witness a dozen of conflicts, Islam and the Muslims are identified as the conflicting party, as the provocation for the globally accepted culture. (See: Ibrahimi, 2006) The ‘demonization’ of Islam i.e. the islamophobia that represents Islam as a religion of force and terror is certainly helped by the ethnocentric and religiocentric prejudices and the focus on purely political benefits or pragmatism. The provocations towards the Muslim community are part of the global agenda, from the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad wrongfully portraying Islamic crucial components over the assaults and the burning of the Koran, to minaret ban, Anders Breivik case etc.

The cultural memory of the modern man is full of politicized and negative mythical images of Islam (the Orient) and everything it encompasses. It is the Islam issue that immediately entices reductive narration and description. The issue is identified with the oil embargo, the Taliban, Mullah and Mujahideen crisis, the plane hijackers, the suicide attacks of the kamikaze, the militant fundamentalists etc. These labels can easily be traced on TV, in newspapers, on portals, web pages and graffiti and so on. As a result of this, Islam is treated as a *problem*. This problem is in the focus of the Occidental, the Westerner of either European or American origin. (Kulenović, 2008, introduction) In general, the Western media often give the impression that religiosity accompanied by violence, better known as fundamentalism is a purely Islamic phenomenon. Karen Armstrong would say:

“This is not the case. Fundamentalism is a global fact and has surfaced in every major faith in response to the problems of our modernity. There is fundamentalist Judaism, fundamentalist Christianity, fundamentalist Hinduism, fundamentalist Buddhism... This type of faith surfaced first in the Christian world in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century” (Armstrong, 2002: 164).

Nowadays, there is another, even more negative syntagm in use and that is the Islamic terrorism. Combining Islam to terrorism is an attempt to deprive Islam of its ethical, cultural and even political legitimacy to speak in the name of the human rights and freedoms. (Filipović, 2002: 15) Filipovic says that the terror and the violence cannot be extrapolated from the originating society tissue, and located in another external point and be assigned to only one religious or ideological source. Accordingly, there is no such thing as Islamic terrorism, but terrorism of particular (sub)groups or states, no matter what historical, ideological, philosophical or theological arguments or justifications are given. (Filipović, 2002: 51)

Armstrong says that the Europeans find it difficult to communicate with their Muslim fellow citizens in a natural, equilibrate manner. During the antiracial protests in Germany, for instance, there were Turkish immigrants who got killed, while in France, the women who chose to wear a head scarf or hijab were treated abominably in the French press. In Britain there are many reactions when the Muslims ask for separate schools for their

children, but there is no reaction when the Jews, the Catholics or the Quakers ask for the same. In general, the Muslims are treated as fifth columnists, saboteurs or groups that have a conspiracy against the European social environment.

The Muslims in the USA lead much better lives. There, the Muslim immigrants are well-educated and belong to the middle class. They work as doctors, academics, engineers, whereas in Europe the Muslim community is part of the working class. (Armstrong, 2002)

We can justly state that all over the world, and particularly in the West, there is a stigmatised paradigm, a xenophobic and Islamophobic perception of Islam as *the other*, as some sort of foreign body.

Tariq Ramadan: Between philosophical and sociological discourse and theological and reformative apology

Tariq Ramadan, born on 26 August 1962 in Geneva is a Swiss academic, poet and writer, one of the major Islamic thinkers, and a former councilor of Tony Blair. (See: Laqueur, 2008: 92-98) Contrary to the last century generation (Afghani, Rida, Abduh), Ramadan represents the new generation of Islamic reformists who advocate the exploration and application of the Islamic traditions and values within a modern pluralistic and multicultural context, calling on the adherents of this religion to embrace Western culture rather than reject it. The most famous Muslim intellectual from Europe, professor of philosophy at the University of Geneva and professor of Islamic Studies at the University of Fribourg, The Kroc Institute, the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, and Oxford University, is an author of over 20 books that elaborate important issues on reinterpretation and reforms within Islam itself and between the Islamic world and the rest of the world.

Professor Tariq Ramadan holds a Master in Philosophy and French Literature and a PhD in Arabian Language and Islamic studies from the University of Geneva. In Egypt, he attended a one-on-one intensive course in Classic Islamic Studies with private tutors.

He is an author of many books including *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2003; *To Be a European Muslim*, The Islamic Foundation, 2000; *Jihad, Violence, War and Peace in Islam*, Tawhid, 2002. His latest books include *Radical Reform, Islamic Ethics and Liberation*, OUP USA, 2008; *What I believe?*, OUP USA, 2009; and *The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism*”, Penguin, UK, 2010.

He is also an author of 700 articles in collective books, academic reviews and magazines. Ramadan works as an expert in various commissions linked to the Brussels Parliament and is a member of several working groups and bodies concerned with Islam, such as Deutsches Orient Institute, British Council, Vienna Peace Summit, The Parliament of the World's Religions 2004 in Barcelona and Laïcité et Islam.

He is active both in the academic and wider circles with his lectures on theology, Islamic Law, applicative ethics, philosophy, social justice, economics, politics, interfaith and intercommunity dialogue. Ramadan is familiar with the polarizing sides, European nihilism and Islamic theism, his doctorate dissertation is entitled *Nietzsche as a Historian*

of *Philosophy*, but he has also studied the Islamic Law at the most famous Islamic university in the world al-Azhar. Apart from using his philosophical and sociological interpretative instrumentalism, he employs a theological approach, as well. In the field of theology, he suggested his proposal for moratorium on stoning and the death penalty. Ramadan says that the *ulama* and the socially engaged Muslims should have an internal debate to prove that the injustices carried out under the religious guise are unacceptable. (Ramadan, 2005b) Within his theological analysis, he treats the concepts of Islamic faith (*iman*), the witness (*shahadah*), the perfection (*ihsan*), the Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), the fundamentals of law (*usul-Al fiqh*), the scientific personal effort (*ijtihad*), the public interest (*maslaha*), the secondary questions (*furu'*) etc. He says that the application of law and justice is closely linked to the sources, the social, cultural, political and economic context. Enforcing the Islamic law is flexible and open to changes. (Ramadan, 2011: 83) It can be said that Ramadan is inclined to reforms but defends the Islamic doctrine and *praxis*.

Integration of the Muslims in the European Milieu: From ghetto-Islam to contextualized or Euro-Islam

There is no Western country, from Canada to Australia, by way of Sweden and the United States, where “the question of Islam” is not intensely debated. Not only populists but also extreme right-wing parties express concern over the new, problematic presence of the Islam and the Muslims. Similar reactions come from the traditional political parties, intellectuals and media. Islam is perceived as a non-Western religion and Muslims are targeted as second-class citizens: outsiders from within who still must prove their loyalty. (MAS, 2011)

With the increasing number of Muslims in the West,¹ the question about what it means to be a European Muslim is becoming increasingly important for the future of both the Muslims and the West itself. The crisis resulting from the Second World War and the necessity for consolidation of the Old Continent brought the first wave of economic immigrants, first the Asians (in Britain), the North Africans (in France) and the Turks (in Germany). The trend continued until the 1970s, when the European economy demonstrated the first signs of weakness. After 1980, the Muslim immigrants went through a mental change and they gradually started thinking about building their future in Europe. After the presence of Muslim immigrants in the West for several decades, it is quite natural to notice tensions between the native Europeans and the Muslim newcomers.

Today, while the media are focused on radical Islam, Ramadan claims, a silent revolution is sweeping Islamic communities in the West, as Muslims actively seek ways to live in harmony with their faith within a Western context. (Ramadan, 2008)

¹ Today in the EU countries there are between 15-25 million Muslims, a number higher than the number of Scandinavian protestants. Only in Germany, there are over 3 million Turks, while in France there are between six or seven million Africans. Today in Europe, the natality rate of the Muslims is three times higher than that of the non-Muslim Europeans. It is estimated that in 30 years there will be around 60 million Muslims in Europe. Some xenophobic circles talk about Eurabia, Londonistan (M. Philips), Euro-Islamia (W. Lacquer), about changing the cultural and civil map of Europe (Karlsson, 2002: 363-364).

Table 1. European Muslims in numbers

country	Muslim population	Total number of population	%
Turkey	68.7 million	68 million	99%
Albania	3.1 million	2.2 million	70%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.8 million	1.5 million	40%
Macedonia	2.1 million	630,000	30%
France	5-6 million	62.3 million	8-9.6%
The Netherlands	945,000	16.3 million	5.8%
Denmark	270,000	5.4 million	5%
Serbia and Montenegro	405,000	8.1 million	5%
Switzerland	310,800	7.4 million	4.2%
Austria	339,000	8.2 million	4.1%
Belgium	0.4 million	10.3 million	4%
Germany	3 million	82.5 million	3.6%
Sweden	300,000	9 million	3%
Great Britain	1.6 million	58.8 million	2.8%
Spain	1 million	43.1 million	2.3%
Italy	825,000	58.4 million	1.4%

Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm>

French, English, German, and American Muslims are reshaping their religion into one that is faithful to the principles of Islam, dressed in European and American cultures, and definitively rooted in Western societies. According to Ramadan, their goal is to create an independent Western Islam, anchored not in the traditions of Islamic countries but in the cultural reality of the West. He offers a fresh reading of Islamic sources, interpreting them for a Western context and demonstrating how a new understanding of universal Islamic principles can open the door to integration in Western societies. Ramadan demonstrates how these principles can be put to practice, and how the Muslims can stay faithful to their principles while participating fully in the civic life of Western secular societies. *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* offers a striking vision of a new Muslim Identity, one which rejects once and for all the idea that Islam must be defined in opposition to the West. (Oxford University Press, 2005) According to Ramadan, there are four factors that create the atmosphere of the huntingtonian conflictual relations between the Muslims and the Western milieu:

1. Simplistic thoughts, “Muslims take our bread, they are to be blamed for the crisis”;
2. Binary vision: Us against them;

3. A victim mentality: "They colonise our state, we are victims of external aggression";
4. Mass-hysteria: Paranoid fear (Casa Asia, 2011).

To the first generations of Muslim immigrants, the Western cultural universe was very disturbing. It seemed that their customs and tastes did not correspond to their culture of origin; the new milieu hardly ever had any respect for the traditional rules of the Islamic morality. The prohibition of alcohol and interest (*riba'*) were not recognised by the Western culture and to them i.e. the Muslims, it seemed that everything was allowed in the name of the freedom. The first and natural reaction to this modern and post-modern libertinism was isolation of themselves as individuals, as families or as communities.

The story of Western Muslims is already different; they have succeeded in many different areas. The second, third and the next generations will have greater knowledge about their countries. The polls (like the Gallup poll) have demonstrated that the Western Muslims of today already feel at home in the Western hemisphere, they speak the corresponding language, respect the laws and gradually build a sense of belonging. On one hand, they are trying to stay faithful to the basic principles of their religion, but on the other hand, they are developing a critical attitude towards some cultural peculiarities that their parents brought from their country of origin. They no longer feel conflicted between being a Muslim and a Westerner (Ramadan, 2011). The new generations of European Muslims have left the geographical, social, cultural, political and intellectual ghetto. From day to day, they participate in debates over sports and music, national institutions, NGOs, political parties and media etc. The names of Zinedine Zidane, Cem Ozdemir (The Green Party), Sami Yusuf and others are popular all over Europe. The signs of success are visible, and now, Ramadan claims, the integration works and the phase of post-integration has started.

According to Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims will play a decisive role in the evolution of Islam worldwide. By reflecting on their faith, their principles and their identity within industrialized, secularized societies, they will become the key in the self-reflection the Muslim world must undertake regarding its relationship with the modern world (Ramadan, 2005a).


There is a third generation of Muslims living today in the West, particularly in Europe. They are much more educated than the first and the second generation and they rejected their parents' meeker stance as their *differentia specifica*, and seek greater acceptance in the society. Sometimes, as a result of the religious revivalism, their efforts are ill-advised, as, for example, Dr. Kalim Siddiqui's call for a Muslim parliament in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s (Armstrong, 176).

Ramadan's most commonly discussed topic is pluralism. In his book *The Quest for Meaning*, he makes synthesis of religions, from Christianity to Islam, from secularists to believers and argues that there is an urgent need for a new philosophy of pluralism so we can coexist peacefully. He says that the positive coexistence calls for mutual familiarity and respect, time and patience. The Muslims in their new environments demand freedom to witness God's unity, spirituality, and respect for these convictions but also mandatory facilities for honest practice of their religious duties. In return, they are required to


obey the Constitution and the laws of the host country, (Ramadan, 2011: 174-176) which they must do undoubtedly. Nowadays, European Muslims (together with the host Muslim converts), according to Ramadan, are in their own country, they are European citizens, *Europeans and Muslims*.

In Ramadan’s opinion, the Muslims of Europe should fundamentally change their mental construct if they want to face the surrounding world successfully. In his opinion, the classical division of the world in the house of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) and the house of war (*Dar al-Harb*), the concept house of agreement (*Dar al’Ahd*) have no origins in the Koran or the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. He believes that these qualifications are works of man, historical categories for describing the world, and today we need to develop a deeper analysis, a new vision within this context. For this purpose, one should study the teachings of Islam. (Ramadan, 2011: 193) Ramadan says that there are many cultures but one Islam and the Muslims should abandon their *victim mentality*. The Muslim is not responsible whether the others accept Islam or not since the individual preferences of the heart depend on God’s will. The primary aim of each Muslim who lives in the *Dar ash-Shahada*, a ‘space of testimony’ in a modern, secular and industrialized society is to keep one’s spiritual life, values and identity. If one country guarantees safety to the Muslims, and this is what the West does, then we should add another dimension to the Islamic message with a universal character: His duty is to testify through his life and work. Wherever one can utter the words *There is no other God than Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger* and practice his religious duties, then that person is at home. This concept opposes the old concepts which enticed the Muslims to reactive attitudes and hold on to their minimal rights as minorities. Nowadays, in the modern world Muslims should remind the people around them of the true God, remind them to work on values and ethics, justice and solidarity. (Ramadan, 2011: 213) In times of strong globalization trends, when the world is turning into equal (Friedman) and a global village (McLuhan) it is hard to refer to the concept of *Dar (house)* since the whole world is our home. The Muslims also live in homes all over the world, from Korea to Alaska, from South Africa to Finland.

Diagram 1: The old and the new world



The old dyadic perspective of the world: face-to face



The new perspective of the world: centre- periphery

Today it is inconceivable to put a border between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. In this era of globalisation, the old dichotomy of the world should be replaced with the

one in the centre (the West and its capitals in the south) and periphery (the other part of the planet). The Muslims who live in Europe are in the centre, in the head that designs the symbolic apparatus of westernization.

Nowadays, Ramadan's thesis is acceptable to many thinkers such as Karlsson who says that the Muslims should definitely be accepted as European reality. They are no longer North African, Indo-Pakistani or Turkish Muslims but part of one European culture. Karlsson stands for creation of a liberal and tolerant Islamic community, and the way to it is through abandonment of the spiritual ghetto and 'demonization' of the Muslims. (Karlsson, 367-370) Because of his reformative discourse, in many Muslim countries Tariq Ramadan is regarded as a destructive element, and his teachings a forgery of the authentic Islam, whereas in some right-wing parties of the West he is considered a fundamentalist, extremist or an Islamic militant (*Sun*). One thing is clear; he sees things from a scientific perspective and tries to find a mutual language for improving the current climate of inter-civilization phobia, and the New World Disorder. He is on the same line with Edward Said who says that we can no longer talk about clash of civilizations but *clash of ignorance(s)*.

Conclusions and recommendations

Tariq Ramadan is defined as a philosopher of the competing Islamic and European thought, who believes in the fundamental change that embraces the young generations of European Muslims. He believes in creating a European Islam as much as there is already an Asian or African Islam. According to him, Muslims should stay away from the reactive and inconsiderate views; they should develop a feeling of self-confidence, based on deeper sense for responsibility. Wherever necessary they should promote good and equity within and through human brotherhood. They should not be allowed to *live in Europe but outside of Europe* or as *Muslims without Islam*. They should be part of Europe with their Islamic identity and spirituality. The European context is favourable because, according to Ramadan, there is peace and safety there and none of the European Constitutions is anti-Islamic *per se*, nor there is legal discrimination although incidents of prejudice and racism do happen. He believes that the integration is the only way for the future of the Muslim community on European ground. Surprisingly, the native European Muslims (Albanians, Bosniaks etc.) as a separate model of Islamic existence are not in Ramadan's focus. In the future, we suggest and hope that translation of Tariq Ramadan's other books will find their way to the publishing houses in Macedonia(n).² We believe that his range of work could immensely contribute to the understanding of the European Islam and create a climate of dialogue and coexistence within our balkanised context.

² His *To be European Muslim* is already published in Albanian by Logos-A (Skopje, 2011).

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Dragan Todorović, PhDFaculty of Philosophy
University of Niš**PROTESTANTISM AMONG ROMA IN SOUTH-EASTERN SERBIA:
STATE AND CONSEQUENCES¹****Abstract**

Mimicking the distribution patterns in European, as well as Balkan countries, Protestant communities in Serbia pay special attention to ethnic and religious minorities, the favourite source of their survival, spreading, and growth. Particularly in its south-eastern regions, Roma represent a religious-confessional reservoir of Protestantization, primarily due to the lack of any kind of pastoral activity among them by the traditional churches and religious communities.

The conversion of Roma into the Protestant religious corpus transforms every aspect of their everyday life, bringing them dignity and appreciation, care and support, hope and perspective, respect within the majority. Positive effects are felt in the improvement of the quality of life in Roma families: the decrease in petty crime, alcoholism, drug addiction and prostitution, better hygienic, working and education habits.

The paper is based on the data collected through observation and participation in religious rituals, as well as through in-deep interviews, based on the structural questionnaire, with members of the Roma Christian Baptist Church, Christian Adventist Church, Evangelical Pentecostal Church and Jehovah's Witnesses in South-eastern Serbia.

Key words: Roma, Serbia, Religion, Protestantization of Roma.

Introduction

Roma are a multi-religious and multi-confessional people living in the Balkans, who have misplaced their authentic native faith on their historical path, embracing the religion of the majority. In Serbia they are the successors of Christianity and Sunni Islam,² but their traditional Christian (Orthodox/Roman Catholic)/Islamic religious-confessional being has been seriously disturbed by the influence of Protestantism, with lasting implications for their identity (Đorđević 2009).

Reluctance and mistrust used to be the indicators of the behaviour of official religious structures and church dignitaries of various proveniences towards Roma as believers. The problem lay in the disinterest of church institutions and high priests, the ones that the congregation looked up to. Orthodox churches and the Islamic Religious Community

1 Prepared within the project *Sustainability of Identity of Serbs and National Minorities in the Border Municipalities of Eastern and Southeastern Serbia* (179013), conducted at the University of Niš – Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, and funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the RS.

2 There are some Shia Islam Roma in Niš and in several places in the south of Serbia. More detailed in: Ђорђевић и Тодоровић 2009.

never established special bodies for missionarying among Roma,³ while the local clergy kept away from Romani ghettos, where everyday activities took place. Driven by the expressed lack of care, the confessional brethren looked down on them at prayers in churches or religious processions, sometimes even with outbursts of religious intolerance (Тодоровић 2007).

A qualitative step forward was not made until a more active presence of the Protestant worldview was established in the last two decades of the previous century, first in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and more recently in Southern Serbia. The local Protestant churches have proved to be well-organized communities, with elaborate mechanisms of integration and inclusion of members into the life and practice of the church, strong social and material reasons for conversion and attachment, and the concept of non-national communities, which advocate equality and brotherhood (Ђорђевић 1987).

Protestantism and Roma

The spreading of Protestantism in Serbia represents a complex and far-reaching phenomenon. A decade and a half ago, the “modern religious and spiritual supermarket” (Eileen Barker) introduced religious pluralism and the need for coexistence and acquaintance with traditional and non-traditional religious structures in the Serbian society. Believers and non-believers were all of a sudden overwhelmed with various religious worldviews, slowly becoming the objects of increased influence of minority, primarily Protestant, religious communities.

Into the religious area of Serbia, especially its southeastern parts, where traditional religions and confessions were predominant (Orthodoxy, Islam), “small religious communities” – Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists, Methodists, Mormons – enter in a three-fold fashion: through *evangelization* (among religiously uneducated and spiritually hungry individuals, who cling from the state of non-believing to one of the numerous possibilities offered on the religious “market”); *conversion* (of traditional believers, whose belief is confined to practicing few religious rites of the “forefather’s” religion /baptism, wedding, funeral/); and *proselytism* (“buying of souls” among the ardent believers of traditional religions, whose knowledge of their own religious tradition and rituals is regularly followed by the well-developed religious consciousness of the basic postulates of faith) (Тодоровић 2009).

Sociologically speaking, they are using the dissatisfaction with life of people in the modern society and the flaws of the major religious communities, which are not sufficiently dedicated to the genuine spirituality. The obvious “void in the soul” of the contemporary man is skilfully filled by none other than the Protestant religious organizations, through their teaching, spontaneous piety and forms of collectiveness where one can experience human closeness and spiritual peace. The variety of reasons that favour the con-

3 Only Catholics have the Special Board for the Care of Roma and organized care of migrants since the Second Vatican Council, institutionalized in the Code of Canon Law (1983). It states that the host country is in obligation to assure migrants and Roma the rights to their language and spiritual heritage. Finally, the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People recently passed the *Guidelines for the Pastoral Care of Roma* (2008). More on the attitudes of church dignitaries and representatives of Romani elite as believers in: Живковић, Тодоровић, Јовановић и Ђорђевић 2001.

version of Orthodox believers, Catholics and Muslims to Protestantism can be systemized into four groups: *socio-economic*, *theological*, *cultural*, and *political*.

Following the suggestion of the renowned Serbian sociologist of religion and romologist Dragoljub B. Đorđević (2007, 145):

“There is no more urgent business for sociologists of religion than the study of Protestantization of Roma... since this phenomenon is so complex, far-reaching and determining that it comprises everything that the modern sociology of religion should deal with.”

The research was undertaken into the process of *Protestantization of Roma*, that is, into the newer process of massive inclusion of Serbian Roma into small religious communities of Protestant provenience, particularly on the territory of South-eastern Serbia.

Research sample and methodology

The research was conducted on the sample of 60 baptized believers of Roma nationality belonging to several Protestant religious communities on the territory of South-eastern Serbia (Christian Baptist Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Christian Adventist Church, and Evangelical Pentecostal Church). The sample also encompassed 14 Roma and non-Roma leaders of the above religious communities, and 6 religious leaders of the majority religions (Serbian Orthodox Church and Islamic Community).

The data was collected using the in-deep interview method on the basis of a standardized procedure with *Roma believers* and *non-Roma and Roma leaders* of Protestant religious communities in South-eastern Serbia. The interviews were conducted between December 2008 and March 2009.

Protestantism in South-eastern Serbia

Sharing the fate of their brothers and sisters on the entire Balkans, where the representatives of traditional churches, but also the public opinion supported by the common stereotypes and thorough ignorance, have referred to them most often as “sects”, members of small religious communities have mainly retreated into closed, tight circles comprising few believers, only sporadically raising their voices in the last half a century in the public life in Serbia, merely as objects of outbursts of religious intolerance.

That is how old, i.e. at least five decades, the history of Protestant religious organization in the south of Serbia is (Тодоровић 2010). And it is Leskovac which is the heart of that movement: in the early 1950s, Mrs. Vera Davidović, an Evangelical Christian believer, came with her husband from Belgrade to Leskovac. A decade later, two sister communities emerged from that common core of believers: Evangelical Pentecostal Church and Christian Baptist Church.

Baptists in the South of Serbia

The missionary spiritual work of Baptists in this region started right in Leskovac, somewhere in 1964; today, the community gathers in Deligradska Street, in the vicinity of the post office and fire station. Around 1970, they were joined by certain believers from Niš, who were gathered into a religious community in 1980 by Čedo Ralević, retiring for health reasons from the position of the full-time missionary worker in Macedonia. As a recognized religious community, the Christian Baptist Church in Niš has existed since 1985 and managed a charity organization called “Love Thy Neighbour”.

In Bela Palanka, there is the only, as far as it is known, Roma Baptist community, led by Bojan Kurtić. In Šainovac near Doljevac, there is a group of thirty Romani children and teenagers, with whom the elders from Niš have worked devotedly for a number of years. In the town of Prokuplje, but also in Berilje near Prokuplje, there are several friends of the church among the Serbs and Romanian Roma, and there are even first baptized believers. There are also several Serbian families of believers in Pirot.

Adventists in the South of Serbia

The Christian Adventist science was first preached in Niš by literary Evangelists and colporteurs from Novi Sad in the now distant 1920 (Ђуришић 2009). The first church was formed in March 1923 and the regular Saturday and Sunday services began; later moving to the house of prayer in 21 Seventh of July street in 1948, which was refurbished and renovated in September 1975. Through the activity of the believers of the church in Niš, two new churches were accepted into the sorority of Southern District churches: the church in Prokuplje in 1994 and the church in Pirot in 2004. The humanitarian organization “Adra” is a recognizable symbol of Adventists in Niš.

In Leskovac, also, there is a Christian Adventist Church, in the vicinity of the former Health Dispensary. For years, the believers of Serbian and Romani nationality gathered together in it, until Roma established their own community in Vinarce, near Leskovac, in 2000. Most often, local village Roma come to the town.

The situation is similar in Vranje. Above the bus station, as early as by the end of the 1970s, there was also a building where believers gathered at first, before moving to a building near where the post office is located today. In the Romani mahala in Vranje, the Roma Adventist Church was built in 2004, to make it more accessible to Roma believers who found it difficult to travel to the centre of the town. Adventists have also existed for several decades in Donje Brijanje, where a church has been raised in the backyard of Života Mirković, where mostly Roma from that one and other neighbouring villages gather. In Dragovac, a village near Bojnik, Adventists have a beautiful new building as well, where believing Serbs and Roma gather from the local area.

Jehovah's Witnesses in the South of Serbia

The believers of the *Christian religious community of Jehovah's Witnesses* in Niš gather into two Assemblies – Niš-South and Niš-North, organizationally connected to the area to which Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje, Aleksinac, Kruševac, Zaječar, Bor, Negotin, and Kladovo also belong. Baptized members and friends have had the opportunity to meet twice a week in the Kingdom Hall in 3 Skopljanska street since 2005. The preaching

service in the streets of Niš is performed by brothers and sisters of Serbian and Romani nationality.

Assemblies of Jehovah's Witnesses also exist in Leskovac (in the unpaved part of Dubočica Street, next to the Trade School) and Vranje, while there are praying groups in Aleksinac, Prokuplje, Bojnik and Pirot.

Pentecostals in the South of Serbia

The first Evangelical Christians in Leskovac, apart from the abovementioned Vera Davidović, were the married couple Mitković, Ćirilo and Miroslava, with Ćirilo later becoming the first pastor in Leskovac. In 1964, a building was purchased in 22 Maksima Gorkog Street, while an old pre-war villa was also acquired in the early 1980s, which was a family house of tradesman Dimitrijević at number 21. At that time, another building in Lebane was bought. The old number 22 building served for Romani worship, before a tent was set up in the quarter "Slavko Zlatanović", a donation from the French Roma Sinti, well-known across Europe as the "Church under the Tent". In 2005, the church was divided into the Protestant Evangelical Church "Community of Roma" and the Spiritual Centre of the Evangelical Church "Light". Since 2007, the Chinese believers have also started conducting their worship in Leskovac, and another group in Niš began its work last year.

Apart from Leskovac and Lebane, communities were also established in the surrounding villages. Today, there are groups of Roma believers, Pentecostals, in Bošnjac, Žitni Potok, Razgojna, and Pečenjevce, as well as Dubovo, near Bojnik. Groups of believers worship God in rented facilities in Vranje and Vranjska Banja. There are also praying groups and missionary stations in Prokuplje, Surdulica, Vladičin Han, Bela Palanka, Pirot, and Bujanovac.

The *Evangelical Church "Good News"* has existed in Niš since 1996, and it has owned its own building in 82 Episkopska Street since 2005. As a separate community, in a mahala at the Jewish cemetery, in 11 Mramorska Street, the Protestant Evangelical Church, the Spiritual Centre "Community of Roma", functions with around thirty baptized believers and around hundred sympathizers.

The impact of protestantization among Roma in the South of serbia

Observing Orthodox and Islamic Customs

Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses are small religious communities with firm moral and religious standards. The "researchers of the Bible" are known for not celebrating any private, state or religious holidays, except observing the Lord's Supper once a year. For the "Sabbath worshippers", only the sixth day in the week bears the halo of sanctity. Therefore, both of them *reject* the celebration of Christ's birth and resurrection, considering them non-Biblical relics. The same relation stands for other holidays in the religious cycle of the Orthodox and Muslims (celebrating the saint's day⁴ and visiting relatives and

4 Getting acquainted with the set of questions considering the religious practice of present believers before the new religious choice, almost all of the interviewees stated that *the celebration of one or more saints was a common practice* in Romani homes. This did not imply observing the saint's day according to the

friends during religious processions, observing Ramadan and Kurban Bayram, circumcision of children, performing prayer five times a day, and so on).

The birth and resurrection of Jesus Christ represent unique holidays in the majority of Christian confessions. In Orthodoxy and Catholicism these are usually days of resting, when one exchanges gifts with their dearest (even exaggerating in food and drink). For Evangelical believers from Leskovac, such a profane celebration, burdened by commercialization and consumerism, represents an illusion of religiosity, since it lacks the establishment of a personal connection with God. That is why they insist on the genuine religious context:

1. Private family celebration with food which is eaten during the fasting period and
2. *Congregating in the church*, in the presence of other brothers and sisters.

Thus, for example, in the “Union Hall” in Leskovac, ceremonies dedicated to celebrating Christmas and Easter have become common in the last few years, including the performance of the youth choir, drama section and children’s group.

Observing Traditional Romani Holidays

In Romani homes where *all family members* have been imbued with the spirit of Protestantism, the new religious and social discipline is observed. Adventists and Witnesses excel in their effort to leave the world behind them and adopt the newly-proclaimed lifestyle, utterly in line with the strict Biblical tenets, where there is no place for old celebrations. However, *lonely and isolated believers*, lacking support from their families and the surroundings, find it hardest to persevere. Although willing to practice self-restraint in the secular areas of life, the power of the traditionalistic collective forces them to participate, even if only mechanically. A special position is occupied by women, who have been organizing the ceremonies from the cycle of customs since ancient times, and carried the burden of submitting to the authority of man without objecting.

Evangelical Pentecostals, contrary to Adventist or Jehovah’s Witnesses’ demands for a fundamental change of the direction of life, express their skill which has helped them to achieve such an explosive progress in almost all corners of the Earth: *accommodation to local tradition or culture of the given ethnicity* (Ђорђевић 2009). They:

1. *Encourage* converts to follow the pious behaviour and demand fuller understanding of church principles, but
2. *Do not insist on the momentary break-up* with the sinful habits and vices, since they are aware that many would fall off the chosen path in that case, without reaching the full range of religious experience.

The Bible teaches that “everything is allowed, but not everything is beneficial”, and it is up to believers to try and stick to that principle. It is not easy to shake off the centuries-old habits from the mahala, especially those upon which the cohesion of the centuries-long survival of Roma is based and put on a “new suit” over night. It is hard to explain to the crying children why there is no quacking of geese, gobbling of turkeys, and bleating of lambs in their backyard, and it is rather rude to welcome guests, even random passers-

Orthodox principles, but a regular celebration of the date in one’s family history closely related to a *survived illness or survived accident*. The saint’s day bread and meal were usually prepared, without lighting the candles or inviting the priest. This practice was abandoned after the conversion to Protestantism.

by, for the “Gypsy New Year” and “George’s Day”. Thus, a compromise has been made, *modus vivendi*, until all conditions are met to break off the shackles of the past and new hosts arrive with new tendencies: *kurban is modestly observed several days before the official date*, and the children are not refused an encounter with at least a number of events, all with the aim of not participating in the central celebration.

The Evangelical elders do not indulge in fiery invitations from the pulpit, calling upon a crude separation of believers from their family circles to undermine the inherited authoritarian patterns and reasoning. On the contrary, they *teach*, especially young women, to respect the reputation of their husbands and fathers-in-law, but also strive to free them from the inner prejudice towards the “new religion”, that is, invite them to visit the well-attended worships themselves, “under the tent” or a firmer roof, any which way. Pentecostals know that they can expect the *full effects of the missionary work* only with the second or third year of converts, children and youth who will pass through the entire machinery of religious work, from pre-school and teenage classes to distributing religious literature in mahalas during the days of evangelization.

Observing the Rites and Beliefs from the Pagan Cycle

Incantations against bad luck, dousing heartburn, fortune-telling and palmistry, reading future from cards or various beans, throwing spells and charming – they are all ancient symbols of the Romani identity, especially of female Roma who perform these tasks in the form of a craft, for money or goods. Respondents from Protestant Romani homes *have all denied* any connection with such phenomena since they got to know Christ.⁵ Pentecostal children are *brought before the Lord* only a few days after birth, while the elders pray for their health.

There are also no stories of fairies, witches, vampires and other supernatural beings, along with the telling of good and bad dreams, relics of yore, used to make the long winter nights shorter and scare children to stay at home. There is also no *kurban* (animal sacrifice) being offered,⁶ nor are Romani or non-Romani cult places visited, as it used to be the case.⁷

Children’s Schooling

The stereotypical image of education of successors dominant among older believers is: *incomplete elementary school*. The youth is much more aware of the need to raise the education to a higher level. By acquiring and using the language of the majority, they

5 Nenad Durmišević, a Pentecostal leader from Bošnjac near Leskovac, was very surprised to learn that one of the sisters, a former follower of the Christian teachings, once known for incantations against bad luck, accepted in her home some worried parents with a child in their arms, begging her to perform her ritual against stomachache. However, she immediately repented for it, Nenad recalled joyfully, asking him to pray for her never to do that again.

6 Vesna Demirović from Vranjska Banja remembered how a man working abroad in Germany caused a disturbance among believers, holding a feast and performing a ritual sacrifice of a ram on his door step, having promised to do that after a dream prophecy concerning him producing a male heir. She, and the rest of the believers from the mahala, did not attend the celebration, despite being duly invited.

7 Perica Kurtić from the Leskovac mahala Podvrce spoke openly of the fact that, for almost three decades, tenants brought earthenware with water and a candle on late Thursday afternoons to a corner in the family house designated as a *tekija*. Once he converted, deacons and pastors from the church prayed above that spot, and he threw all of the props in the river.

qualify for reaching recognized social positions, but also for performing actual roles in religious communities tomorrow (religious teachers, evangelizers, etc.).

Children Getting Married

Underage boys and girls entering early into marriage represent a sore in the general emancipation of Roma, alongside discontinued institutionalized education. The tradition of an imposed norm concerning physically mature, but socially and psychologically unready teenagers entering into marriage, often with no free will, is observed more and more as a *social anomaly*, regardless of its integrative role in the Romani past. The opinion that a subordinated role of women is thus cemented, with their lives potential reduced to giving birth, bringing up children and doing housework, can today be found everywhere.

The newly-adopted religious view offers a different perspective to believers when it comes to evaluating custom and legal norms, namely:

1. *Not supporting* premature marriages,
2. *Making no difference* between male and female children, and
3. *Condemning the practice* of contracting, buying or kidnapping the bride.

The protective relationship towards heirs in their early youth is predominant, with a wish of providing them with an opportunity to enjoy childhood, alongside regular schooling and acquiring at least minimal education. The knowledge of practical crafts, as potentially secure financial sources, is found most adequate.

Believers at a young age are particularly critical towards the relics of ancient habits in the present, and they represent the offspring of the profiled religious relationship towards the unwanted social behaviour. However, the upper limit for entering into marriage is in most cases connected with the *completion of the secondary school*, i.e. reaching adulthood.

The *choice of the heart* is accepted in the selection of the spouse. Christian science teaches that sexual intercourse prior to obtaining the holy secret of marriage is considered *adultery*, letting young people know that risky sexual behaviour may lead to health complications, but also to moral stumbling and bad reputation in the community.

Wedding Customs

Wedding customs have always represented the richest ceremony in the life cycle of Roma. By conducting week-long, common activities, the position of women and men, the economic power of the family, complex relationships among relatives, and other things were presented. Entering into marriage was followed by a number of magical rites dedicated to happiness, well-being, harmony, and increasing offspring. Despite the disappearance and reshaping of numerous archaic folklore elements in the clash with the everyday life, the tradition has been handed down from generation to generation and the picture of the past has been preserved among newer generations.

Entering into marriage among Protestants, especially Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses, represents a *clear cut with the past*. The kidnapping of the bride, illegal marriages, underage marriages, drinking, smoking, and reckless behaviour are rejected as immoral

acts and deviations from the strict principles of being in community with Jesus Christ. It is insisted upon:

1. Additional support to a marriage recognized before a registrar in the town hall with a *church* marriage: the pastor blesses the marriage before God, but only if the spouses are entering into it as virgins,
2. Music not being too loud and secular contents amended by spiritual songs,
3. Decent physical appearance of the wedding guests and appropriate behaviour,
4. Alcohol consumption being reduced to minimum quantities (Adventists reject it altogether).

Both Baptist and Pentecostal Roma take care of the behaviour within the communities they represent, so that members of other religions can make judgements of the validity of the messages delivered during evangelization on the basis of such a behaviour. They are wary of alcohol and they emphasize the fact that God does not ban anything, but that it is upon believers to restrain from all sorts of improper behaviour and exaggeration.

Pre-funeral, Funeral, and Post-funeral Customs

The acceptance of Protestantism, above all the teaching of Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses, carries in itself the *reduction* of religious obligations caused by the death of a loved one:

1. Clothed in new clothes, the deceased is laid in the coffin,
2. The procession comprising relatives and friends follows him/her to the "eternal destination" and lowers him/her into the grave,
3. As the belief in afterlife is no longer present, a great sorrow for the deceased is considered redundant,
4. Candles are not lit,
5. Food is neither offered nor left behind,
6. Graves are not marked with crosses or pyramids, apart from the basic information on the tombstones,
7. The procession is not offered to take their place three times at the previously laid out table,
8. There are no post-funeral meals organized.

The family takes care of the grave, keeps it clean, and if there are no heirs, the church members take on that obligation. Visits to the grave are not prohibited, and flowers can be brought during such occasions. There is no discrimination of Protestants concerning the choice of the grave lot: the deceased are buried at the existing Romani graveyard or at a Serbian graveyard, if Roma and Serbs are being buried together.⁸

⁸ On the last day of February 2009, the commemoration and funeral of Miodrag-Mija Stanković, the founder of the Pentecostal movement in Leskovac and the whole of Southeastern Serbia, was held. The packed "Union Hall" was addressed by the leading religious persons from the entire Serbia, with guest delegations from several European countries and America. Neither cold weather, nor melted snow could prevent almost a thousand citizens from paying their last respect to Mija. It was the author's first live experience of a funeral of a Protestant believer, conducted in the manner described by the respondents during the interviews.

Elementary links with Islam among former members of the Muhammad's faith, most evidently concerning the burial of the deceased, linger on in the Evangelical Christianity, reconfirming the stated ability of the Pentecostals to *adapt to local traditions*:

1. The wrapping of the body in ceremonial linen is retained (even though it is first dressed in clothes),
2. Lowered into the grave, the corpse is protected by diagonally inserted boards,
3. Candles are not lit,
4. If some sweets, juices or drinks are served, they are taken silently, without stating that they are intended "for the soul" of the deceased,
5. Lunch is often served after the funeral, especially for tired travellers who have come from afar,
6. Additional funeral meals are sometimes allowed, but the ensuing abundance is not advised: there is no barbecue for preparing burgers and other meat specialties.⁹

The funeral is conducted in a dignified atmosphere. As far as Adventists are concerned, a small group of believers or an entire choir may sing a few religious songs. A special role is played by the preacher, whose presence is expected. Before the deceased is taken out of the family home, as well as on the graveyard itself, and based on the Scripture, the elder provides words of encouragement and reminds those present of the second coming of Christ. This is also an opportunity to confirm the strength of faith and the correctness of the religious choice made before the non-converted, if there are such people in the audience.

Antisocial Behaviour and Inclination towards Vices

The greatest achievement in the religious Romani homes is the *harmonious human relationship*. Scornful looks, raised voices in conversation, mean words and swearing, physical confrontations on the verge of incident have been replaced by:

1. Agreement between spouses on daily obligations,
2. Decent behaviour towards the neighbourhood and relatives,
3. Love for children, and
4. Family harmony producing prosperity and appreciation of the surroundings.

In the cases of need:

1. Burglaries are not an option and
2. There is no crime being committed.

Conflicts between certain families are:

1. Solved with an agreement with the pastor as intermediary,

⁹ During the conversation conducted with the Pentecostal Perica Kurtić from Leskovac, he complained about his mother, an old lady with a wrinkled face and baggy eyes, who silently listened to the conversation seating next to the burning stove: she was the only one still not converted of all the tenants. And why was that? Because she worried that there would be no one left to visit the grave of her deceased husband and bring out the gifts in food come the significant dates in the year (George's Day, Vasilica).

2. There are no heavy confrontations with bloody conclusion and police intervention.¹⁰

Believers find it especially enjoyable when non-believing Roma meet them in the street or visit them in their homes, *asking for advice* on everyday situations, since they have noticed a change in their reasoning and acting: faith supported by deeds speaks volumes of the correctness of treading the Christ's path.¹¹

Even though they deal successfully with the prevention of major crimes – gambling, drugs, prostitution, violent crime – Pentecostal leaders have their hands full of *petty vices*, which can be seen from the replies of the believers. Moderate alcohol consumption on festive occasions – celebrations, gatherings, weddings – is accepted with understanding, but smoking is undesirable. Pastors recognize the smoking vice, especially in elderly, as the one hardest to fight against.

Conclusion

The fact that individual male and female Roma were shyly joining the communities of Protestant believers in South-eastern Serbia two, and even three, decades ago, did not foretell that it would grow into an unstoppable, large-scale conversion in the meantime. This is particularly true in the case of Pentecostals, who have almost a thousand believers and at least a thousand more friends of the church in the above area. The Romani religious corpus, which has grown in a relatively short period, started worshipping separately in joint temples, and the Protestant Evangelical Church “Community of Roma” from Leskovac has already given birth to several sister *pure Romani churches* in the region. Adventists also have independent Romani prayer homes in great numbers. In them, Roma overcome the religious minority and become the majority of the above minority religions and religious communities. Serbs are counted upon, but their absence from the pews does not produce a feeling of lower value and not being accepted within the observed religious-confessional circle.

¹⁰ The Romani pastor Šerif Bakić proudly emphasized the following during the interview: “The number one, not only in my opinion, but also according to the Leskovac PD and the municipal structure and people in the town, is the fact that crime has been reduced significantly, dropping substantially, as far as crime among Roma is concerned, and as far as fights and arguments are concerned. For there are eight thousand of us Roma in Leskovac, and around five and a half thousand only in the quarter ‘Podvrce’, where I live. (...) Crime is the number one for me. I am so delighted that you can walk through the mahala today, and see groups and groups, it is in the Romani mentality for people to go out, to talk to each other, but without arguments. And even when it comes to that, it is very quickly delineated, so that it does not grow into a fight. I don’t want to exaggerate, but there is at least one child from each family that goes to church. It’s a great blessing, and people respect us immensely. Crime has dropped totally, since I as a member of the ‘Society of Roma’, we went each year to talk with the chief of police and he always showed us: ‘Here, every morning when I come in, there are some twenty complaints lying around: breaking and entering, motor vehicle thefts, brawls... But there are no complaints against Roma any more. And I know well that since the church started influencing Roma, a lot of good things have happened here’. That’s why I’m telling you about all those things that are happening.”

¹¹ Here is how Aleksandar Ajdarević, a twenty-year-old with a tempestuous past, describes the effects of change after his conversion: “As I said already, I was very problematic. But now people respect me and appreciate me more, invite me to prayers with them, something they would have never done before. I feel much better with Christ.”

Yesterday habits rooted in Orthodoxy and Islam (celebrating Christmas, Easter and saint's day, i.e. Ramadan and Kurban Bayram, mutual visits with the majority population during religious processions, inviting Orthodox and Muslim priests to one's own home, circumcision of children, praying five times a day) are completely rejected among Roma Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses. By observing the birth and resurrection of Christ, Baptists and Pentecostals join in the celebration of unique holidays of the other two Christian confessions, albeit with much less pomp, and insisting much more on establishing a private community with God (special sermons, singing Christian songs, children's programmes with Biblical contents, etc.).

The "researchers of the Bible" and "Sabbath worshippers" turn their backs on the former unavoidable dates from the Romani past (Vlasuljica, George's Day, Bibija). The "life according to the Scripture" leaves no space for old ceremonies. Pentecostals show much more sense for adapting to the local tradition. They encourage Roma converts to follow the pious behaviour, but do not insist upon immediate break-up with sinful habits. They teach that "everything is allowed, but not everything is beneficial", and that it is upon the believers to try and follow that principle. Thus, until all conditions are met to break off the shackles of the past and new hosts arrive with new tendencies, *kurban is modestly observed at Vasilica and George's Day several days before the official date*, and the children are not refused an encounter with at least a number of events, all with the aim of not participating in the central celebration.

Improved domestic hygiene and promotion of healthy lifestyles, transformed family relationships and harmonious relationships with relatives and neighbours, giving up on antisocial behaviour, completing elementary school and continuing secondary education, entering into marriage only after reaching adulthood – *these are all measurable indicators of progressed emancipation of Roma from Protestant Religious Communities in South-eastern Serbia.*

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CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Abstract

The contemporary dimensioning of the social passage includes interactive essential principle of all relevant socio-communal components. This pattern roughly sketches the contours of the global framework which gives equal importance as to the sustainable economic development and maintenance of the environment, and to the respect and promotion of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. The syncretism which is a referent of the so-called process – globalization, hence refers to the notation of identity, which one absorbs in one's self the sociological aspects, such as: ethnicity, nationality, and religion too.

The survey's concluding results are significant generally and particularly. They give a general picture of the condition of religious group identity. At the same time they present the legal frame for the position of the religion or the church in Europe, including ours in that group. Following this sociological, refined, descriptive and comparative way, the communal fragments which are important steps of the Macedonia's international road to the European Union, might be achieved. Religious identity realized through the religious rights and freedoms is crucial and indispensable component of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and R. Macedonia shows relatively high global standard harmonization in the field of religion and low internal religious diversity cohesion. This certainly has an impact on social fields such as education, politics, culture, and opens the way for new further research in the sociology of religion and its interactive and interdisciplinary perspective.

Key words: Religion, identity, religious identity, religious otherness

Starting from the discourse for the wide term identity, the focus of the enquiry is directed to the treatment of religion during expression of some groups or collective religious identity in the context of the Republic of Macedonia versus the European Union.

Davie treats the specific of European religious life and his relations with European history and culture in "Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates". In order to make these links, religion is conceptualized as a form of collective memory. This idea was developed by the French leading religious sociologist Danièle Hervieu - L ger, whose standing point is the effort to identify and to direct the necessary conceptual religion understanding tools in the modern world. The answer is achieved gradually by defining religion as a specific belief model. crucial points to grasp in this analysis are:

- The chain which makes the individual believer a member of a community – a community which gathers past, present, and future members – and
- The tradition (or collective memory) which becomes the basis of that community's existence.

Hervieu – Léger goes further than this: she argues that modern societies (and especially modern European societies) are not less religious because they are increasingly rational but because they are less and less capable of maintaining the memory which lies at the heart of their religious existence. They are, to use her term, amnesic societies. Through what mechanisms, then, can the modern European society overcome its amnesia and stay in touch with the forms of religion that are necessary to sustain its identity? (Hervieu – Léger, D. in Davie, 2000: 30-31).

The historical perspective outlines formational factors or motives, which merge in the creation and destruction of the community that we call Europe, and those are: Judeo-Christian monotheism, Greek rationalism and Roman organization. These factors are removed and evolve over time, but their combinations can be seen in forming and reforming a way of life that we recognize today as European. The religious strand within such combination is self-evident. The relations between the political and religious power that distinctively dominated through European history are obvious (O'Connell, 1991).

Collective identity, a sense of group belonging and solidarity are highly ranked value chain in each religious group. To this should be added the mandatory participation activity provided under a group code. Certainly, the sense of obligatory participation in the life of the religious group can be an expression of free will, but is often a tradition. (Cvitković, 2004: 47)

At the beginning of the new millennium, inclusion and exclusion in a new religious group frequently occurred. So everything that is called religious experience doesn't have to be connected with the traditional religion. This creates a so-called "Civilian", "laymen", "world" religion. This is a result of modernization and secularization. Rather than "religious holy", "secular holy" occurs with community secularization.

It is about a religious experience of world performance and values not institutionalized in any particular religious organization, as a cultural worship of the state, flag, coat of arms, the nation, leaders, etc. There are sacral elements within the modern culture whereby one can achieve loyalty and government. The centre of civil religion consists of freedom, responsibility, solidarity, human rights etc.

A characteristic of secular religion is the absence of supernatural, but it doesn't appear in all classic religions. Therefore, in modern trends it is difficult to distinguish between secular and classical religion. Secular religion has also values, taboos, rituals, and holidays: even unbelievers' rites performed in the style of wedding ceremonies, baptisms, funerals.

Sociological research requires suitable and mysterious connection between religion, or the values it propagates, and ways that conduit society implementation, incorporation, and interaction of all latent religious manifestation within an extended society as the European, which changes rapidly, especially now, but whose history is inextricably linked to the emergence and development of Christianity.

Religion in the Balkans at the end of the 20th century is connected with the politics, simultaneously linking and interweaving the identity, but making enormity in a way that national values were presented and used as religious. The return to religion here functions as maintenance of national identity. Ethnic and religious identity emphasized return at the

end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, so as to call into doubt the western humanism ideal of the international values.

The value system suggests complexity in socio-historical context. Human reality is not only a new production, but also a past reproduction. Human and social values aimed at preserving the social system and culture. The value system changes and upheavals entail large and associated changes in culture generally, and is analogous to the religious identity. This is important to stress because the impact and orientation values capacity, through the socialization are accepted as rules (Kokovič, 1997: 97).

- Which are the determination values about what is specific and imminent for the European Union (religious, family, existential, labour and / or others.), and for the Republic of Macedonia, too?

The number of typical answer is 14 responses or 46.7%, satisfactory response rate in the group of most typical responses to contemporary European society in the entire interview, considering the complexity of its structure. It shows that the respondents believe in a certain common perception in terms of specificity and immanence of the Union (such as evaluation of basic human rights and freedoms). This fact is extremely important not only for this study, but generally too, because it latently leads to connection to the European Convention of Human Rights, whose crucial element is certainly religion.

About the same question, for the contemporary Macedonian society, most respondents thought that, although still a transition period is difficult to determine, however, it is simpler in comparison with those concerning the Union. As immanent values, separately enumerated are: existential and traditional values.

Submission of a typical issue is 17 responses or 56.7% of the total respondents' number.¹

Religion affects ethnic and national development. Together with those two components forms the socio-group identity. Religion and language are important ethnic distinctions. In many cases they are of primary importance for formation of the community, so they become dominant for the ethnic identification. If the performance of religious rituals is in another language (e.g., Latin, Arabic, Hebrew) and not in the national language, that can lead to reduction of the national consciousness and universality of the religion. Religion and language establish correlation with the integration between diverse religious and national members. Interesting examples are bilingual and one confessional communities, like Croatia and Slovenia, and communities with practically the same language but different confession, as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

- Whether and to what extent is the relationship between identity at all levels (personal, ethnic, socio-group) and religiosity noticeable in the European Union and the Republic of Macedonia?

¹ Sources are the interviews conducted for the purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The system of religious values in the European Union and the Republic of Macedonia" of MA Hristina Ignatovska under the mentorship of Prof. Dr. Zoran Matevski. Target sample was used for the semi-structured interviews. Criteria for the selection: (been selected) religious issues experts in the Republic of Macedonia: academic elite, religious elite and politic elite.

They typically highlight the fact that religious consciousness often is a motivating factor in people's cultural self-definition, or in ethnic origin, especially in the Republic of Macedonia (as a part of the territory of the Western Balkans, where religion was largely treated as an important political factor) in this direction is generally considered that if their religious or ethnic groups can modulate dialogical relationship, then it will result in a contribution to the stability of the nation, as well as the stability in the future in a wider context, or within the Union. The territory of the Western Balkans, and thus of Republic of Macedonia belongs to Europe, not only physically, but also culturally-historically exactly through shared Christian heritage, which draws a direct connection between identity and religion.

The number of the respondents' most typical responses to the connection of religion with identity at the Union level is 12 or 40 per cents, and for the Republic of Macedonia 20 people or 66.6 per cents, which is extremely highly positive rate and is due to the historical significance of religion in the country.

The religious identity study doesn't mean only the religious-theological side, but scientific too, and also the community legislation instrumentation that allows free implementation. Religion, and religious identity through them always had a huge social level impact. They affect the position of values and norms, but affect different society aspects as culture, policy, economy, stratification, migration, etc. Religious identities take a certain place in the social setting and correlation with the other aspects.

Operationally, the religious identity is measured through the level of religious rights, freedoms, norms (codes), tolerance, cohesion practical implementation. The goal, i.e. determining the compatibility of what happens in the field of religion in Europe relies on the *legislation* in the Republic of Macedonia, on the *directives* and *regulations* of the EU (but on the foreign expended regulations too), and on the conducted semi-structured *interviews* with members of the academic, religious, political and institutional elites.

These currently discussed issues in EU concerning religion such as: Church position in the draft constitution of the EU (Lisbon), with particular reference to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights - Chapter 10; Acts of the Bishop Conference Committee in the member states of EU; Recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly: Recommendation 1202 (1993): Religious tolerance in a democratic society; Recommendation 1369 (1999): Religion and Democracy; Recommendation 1720 (2005): Education and Religion; etc. indicate high level of harmonization with the Law of Legal Status of Church, Religious Community and Religious Group (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 113, from September 20, 2007) and the Law of High Education Religious Community Institutions (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 81/08, from July 07, 2008).

Religious Communities and the Groups Relation Commission have considerable positive recourse on the level of the Republic of Macedonia: State legislation, i.e. Law on the Legal Status of Church, Religious Community and Religious Groups (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 113, from September 20, 2007) and the Law of High Education Religious Community Institutions (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 81/08, from July 07, 2008).

EU devotes special attention to the religious communities as a part of civil societies. Regarding this the Republic of Macedonia according to the high developed country model extended committed and public debate trend among the religious, state, and international elite audience in order to strengthen inter-religious tolerance, emphasizing coexistence, and also highlighting the connection of religion with other segments of society.

National courts of the EU member states can get higher unity importance if pan-European institutions start to conduit this function. The European Court of Human Rights is one such instance. Like many other aspects of pan-Europeanism, it doesn't have a board audience.

De facto ruling of the ECHR is binding only to the signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights. Quite apart from this, the ECHR does not correspond to a strict and fixed geographical gambit – it continually changes, reflecting the expansion of the European integration project. It seems that the ECHR might be moving in a direction that will apply to disputes relating to religion. The reasons are clear enough: increasing public attention is being paid to religious matters in Europe, as similar issues are presenting themselves in different European countries. Common themes underpin these episodes in the sense that almost all of them concern the understanding and application of religious freedoms in a context where expressions of religion are becoming increasingly diverse.

At this point, yet another tension begins to emerge if we turn our attention to the EU: this time between two of the European Union's foundational principles when it comes to matters related to the religion – these are

- the principle of subsidiarity and
- the principle of pluralism (Davie, 2009: 80-94)

As a result, the Union is likely to communicate mixed signals to member states on the issue related to religion. An excellent example of mixed signals can be found in the conflicting interpretation of Article 9 (on religious freedom) of the European Convention of Human Rights. It is nicely captured in an article in *The Economist* aptly entitled “*Welcome to the confused and confusing world of European Islam*” published in 2005. The following extract reveals the problem:

“A Danish supermarket fires a cashier for wearing a headscarf on the grounds that it might get stuck in the till. The German state of Baden-Württemberg prohibits the wearing of the headscarf by teachers, but not students. France bans the garment altogether from state schools, citing Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A British court cites the same article to uphold a schoolgirl's right to wear the much bulkier covering known as a jilbab... This valuable book may also force Europeans to question the self-image of their continent as an essentially secular place. Church pews may be empty, but religion, and the politics of religion, are now an inescapable part of the public agenda.”²

History itself testifies for the manner that European culture is spreading, indicating that there are no institutions which don't need cultural support. Cleavage between culture and the sacral could terminate the European tradition of connectedness between spiritual and world culture, between law and policy. This means, European culture doesn't exist if it is not connected with a legal state and religion. The following was outlined at the

2 Appendix can be found on the following link: <http://www.economist.com/node/5080927>

International European Identity Paris Symposium: “Europe wants to survive its political decline as a cultural”. However, this Europe of cultures has to be built into certain European “construction”, and to create strong unity of European identity, constantly open for other European countries integration (Domenak, 1991: 135).

Western society today suffers from decline in civil life, weakening of social ties, and loss of social cohesion. This is one of the reasons for the present social problems, such as: social deviation, indifference, and isolation. However, solidarity and tolerance are still typical European values. Tolerance is widely accepted as virtue (common good). 70% of the citizens of the European member states want to teach their children on tolerance and respect to other people. Sociologist, also stress tolerance as an important free and open society value: as more people are tolerant for the others rights, the more rights are preserved for all. Undoubtedly, tolerance promotes peaceful coexistence between groups. Actually, being tolerant means that other people’s lifestyle is accepted, even when it the other is not consent.³

Shared Western European religious heritage as a crucial factor is important to be emphasized in a direction of continent development, but probably remains important for its future too, and for the heritage influence on the whole range of the cultural values. Source that reinforces this conclusion is the project European Value Study. Carefully chosen techniques of sample analysis aim to precise social and moral European value replication.

Historical and geographical religious aspect, or specifically Christendom, represents an example of activity (mediation) which through the public proclamation of universal and exclusive faith requires creation of European values and beliefs in the community and beyond. Hence the shared religious heritage based on Christian values can be treated as primary cultural impact that gives the essence of the European civilization, as well as certain European religious identity.

Religion as an integral cultural relations part in a strict social context, and as a satisfying asset of individual and group needs through its values and value system, even though sometimes marginalized, latently performs its crucial common meaning functions. Thus, realizing its values, religion sometimes performs integrative, sometimes disintegrative social roll. Religion took role in the field of social stratification and religious mobility; it took interactive communal role, compensational, and economic and ethnic function.

Integrative religious function in the modern European society should be realized in direction of respect and be applied, which practically means adoption and implementation of communitarian regulations, for the purpose of smooth achievement of religious rights and freedoms. This subsequently results with free manifestation, acceptance, and sustenance of religious identity, according to ECHR.

Thus, experience shows that Christians and Muslims live in different state constitutions and different models of relations between religious communities and states, which means that both Christianity and Islam can adopt to different governance types. Societies that foster confessional pluralism should also foster the separation between religion and religious community and the state. That means separation between religion and politics

3 The data is a result of the international research project, managed by the Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Tilburg, Netherlands. They can be found on the following link: <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/research/themes/society/>

too. There is no developing pluralism in societies of political monotheism. Modern individuals, writes Casanova, don't express desire to believe in many gods, they want to believe that all religions and individuals worship the same God called with different names and in different languages (Cvitković, 2004: 199).

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<http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/research/themes/society/>

<http://www.economist.com/node/5080927>

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MULTICULTURALISM VS INTERCULTURALISM: FROM AN INDIVIDUAL (SUBJECTIVE) VIEWPOINT

Abstract

In general, when a man is in the conglomerate of different cultural facts surrounding him and if he has at any occasion to be inclined to some of them – within the socio-cultural space where he belongs – it is appropriate to find that they have to follow, rather, the result of an individual effort, of an autonomous individual, than to be instructed from above, say, by the institutions of the community, by the state. That would concern not only the possible choices done on this occasion, but the volume (level) in which they would be adopted and so on, so the real dramatis personae on that road would be properly thought out and educated individuals. Then, we have to arrive to an acceptable solution by foreseeing, on the one hand, the educational contents that would apply to all individuals, and then point them out, in principle, and the ways in which such an individual chooses the value of orders for himself.

Key words: multiculturalism, interculturalism, identity, individual, values.

Towards the substantial definitions of a man

A thorough inspection of the aims of this paper will be realized if we accomplish a substantial insight in the question what is a man, bearing in mind that to such a question there are different (schematic) answers – such as opinions, beliefs – and not (unambiguous) “solutions” realized in certain science. Of course, this is what the “first philosophy” (metaphysics) dealt with, still, although man is the only sovereign of the planet, the idea of man, a complete, clear and distinct idea is lost to us, which, finally, indicates that mutual relations between people or people’s communities easily acquire opposite attributes: perverted, inhuman. Organized communities make no educative efforts to provide an effective insight in what human essence or what the power belonging to man really is for the persons they lead in life.

Otherwise, naming things, or names of human beings, known in science as “to define terms”, demonstrates once again our causal and consequent reflection on things, but during this process this problem becomes aporetic. Historically, this was marked by the opposition of “Socrates and the sophists”, i.e. whether the ascribed words (should) have the same meaning for all people – in all centuries, on all meridians, in all circumstances – or are they, in their essence, subjectively marked. As is known, the entire western tradition actually followed Socrates’ pledge, which is that knowledge about sciences has to necessarily be generally applicable, which is arrived at depending on the way terms are defined,

however in present days the need for different particular-subjective approaches becomes evident and explained anew. Of course, least in the exact (natural) sciences, mostly in the psychological and humanities, the question of how to accomplish this in a deliberate manner that will certainly recognize the aforementioned Socrates approach, which was somehow changed into “man as a measure for all things”, still remains to be a problem (Protagoras). It seems that precisely here lies the true solution for all problems of this kind – first of all to find what is (schematically) same for all process, appearances, things and afterwards to add different specific, particular or singular designations, depending on the different cases. This would primarily refer to the establishment of terms, which later would transfer to the truth or falseness of the sentence, i.e., to the different relations (permissible) of succession of one sentence after another.

However, from which point of view should all this be done (followed) so that the accomplished goal won't clash with the existing “objective” theories, but rather be their correction and addition? According to us, first of all we should consider what belongs to man as his vocation, choice, profession, etc. and what in essence denotes his entire habitus, as well as everything that “belongs” to man, as to a human being, in the genuine meaning of that word.

On this occasion we would mention certain general features about such a model of possible human behaviour in the community. Namely, we are talking about human identity which a man never stops “bearing” in front of other members of the community – closer, wider and the widest – and which *in ultima linea* establishes his cultural image, as well as the image of the community itself. This would closely clear up the relations in the field of multiculturalism on a certain ground and their possible promotion to interculturism, i.e., the *plaidoyer* that the parallel (isolated) survival of different cultures is changed by the relations of their mutual interaction and influence. The crucial moment here is the comprehension of man himself, above all understanding the relations of the reasonable and unreasonable part in him, or better yet, man's *choice*, in freedom, to add different meaning to any of them. Of course it is possible for him to lean to a certain (his own) belief, since the entire panorama of history is a testimony of him as the perpetrator of monstrous deeds, and as the creator of the noblest and most exalted in a moral sense. Should he choose, let's say, to lean towards the “universal”, “human”, “altruistic”, etc. he has to necessarily keep in mind that the constant threat to this are the opposing impulses of individuals and groups (egoistic), which ascribes a certain “calculation” in choosing the attitude towards the others, in the sense that man himself will agree on the means he finds the best, which can be justified because this would take him to a higher ground.

However, “what is man”, is a question to which every individual could reach an answer for her/himself, for instance, as a general accepted definition of this term, when the designation which is part of its composition would be “graded”, i.e., expressed “in a quantity” in certain numbers from 0 to 1.¹ These would be individual designations of

1 If we consider “Man is a reasonable animal” as a generally true definition, designated: a-“be reasonable”, and b - “be an animal”, or symbolically - $H = \{a, b\}$, the thus “corrected” definition would be $\kappa H = \{\alpha a, \beta b\}$, where, $\beta \in [0, 1]$.

This simple definition, would have to be complemented by different values, equally essential characteristics of the human personality: his joy, curiosity, passion towards beauty, justice, truth etc.

(Such reasoning is known as *fuzzy*-reasoning, connected with the american author Lotfi Zadeh).

naming something, or one subjective term, which would then comprise complex, also subjective, terms, and later conclusions made on the their basis, etc.

About the philosophy of education

The point in all this is that the primary concern of all individuals, family, schools would have to be a valid “philosophy of education”, which would provide for a clear picture on the character of people, and possibly in the manner of certain gnomes or sentences. This directly points out the importance of this educational science, since it deeply and comprehensibly reflects the terms because it is philosophical, but the point is that this science arrives at least to the basic formulations, which would be general enough to show the way for each individual. Instead of completely neglecting the importance of this question, or the difused and ambiguous attitude towards it, on the other hand, the educational systems of certain countries offers colossal possibilities for acquiring different (exact) knowledge.

Part of the educational efforts here would be the ideas of the identity of individuals: their affiliation to their homeland, affiliation to the nation, to a certain culture. Meaning: what defines them, how is one individual different from others, the nation from other nations, etc. Again, each denotation which determines these terms does not have equal importance for each human being, but rather it should be expressed in the exact fraction, i.e., multiplied by 0 – when it is absent, or with number 1, when it is present in its full size. So, when discussing the human character, its value will be around 1, because it is constant, however if we discuss the cultural features, (relatively) inconstant, lower values would be prescribed to them.

The example with the native language demonstrates this. Because, although it is the constant of every individual experience, dialects, as a rule, soon become changed by literary language, which almost always takes the role of native language for an individual, so it essentially further (equally) determines man. Because of (constant, often) human migration, the fact that mixed marriages exist, etc., we cannot speak of – affiliation towards the homeland, or national affiliation in the case of many individuals, further more since apart from this denotation of identity, man has the need to determine himself in his practical behaviour in community, as a: religious being, being belonging to different classes, to determined his profession, affiliation with a party, gender etc. Furthermore, in different living circumstances, for instance technological development, or global tendencies in the world, there is the need for re-thinking the existing concepts of identities, which contributes for the expressed importance to gain a certain *heterogenous* acces of this notion, the notion of the personal identity.

About identity, about identities

On the broad scale of variability this case, cases of “new communities of people”: the Soviets, Americans, Europeans, etc. only justify what was mentioned above. Let us evoke historical slogans such as: Moscow – the Third Rome, Athens – Jerusalem, Buzantium

– Orthodox Christianity, etc. which after all remained to be futile attempts to establish a certain identity of the broader population. In present times, the attempt to essentially limit the sovereignty of state communities on one geographical area, such as the continent of Europe, and change this sovereignty with a beyond national creation called “European Union”. The member-countries, as well as the candidates, openly accept this and invest huge efforts to realize it, thus “disturbing” a century old dedication of the countries and peoples in history to offer countless victims to the altar of “blood and territory”. It simply shows that one day the time may come (easily) when the ethnic and other homogeneity on a certain territory will be invoked again, it being the true *sine qua non* of the entire community development which has “always” persisted on a certain space.

These (common sense) observations can be found in the basis of many scientific involvements in sociological literature, for instance, Marijana Alfredovna writes: “Z. Bauman speaks similarly of identity in his work “Individualized Society”. According to him, the problem is not so much in the struggle for identity and its acceptance by the environment, but rather in the question which identity to choose and how can another choice be made, once the previous one has lost its sense or its appealing features have disappeared. Furthermore, ethnic identity does not mean that an individual accepts, according to someone else’s will, to become an object of a certain ethnic community, rather it is a subjective choice of this community, an individual accumulation of a given ethnic whole. The individual makes a subjective choice, although he is not devoid of objective grounds, which combine in the process of inter-culturism, during early childhood education, in the specific ethnic environment”. (Альфредовна, 2005: 105). The author stops at the amalgam “subjective-objective”, regarding human identity, however, in principle, the main difficulty here is in the aporia: from which stand should the choices on both sides be made, or better yet: how to “reconcile” the individual with the collective, as these are essentially different?

What do other authors think about this? Victor Sergeevich says: “The word “identity” entered scientific use during the past decades, although it is quite far from being clearly categorized. From the aspect of modern terms such as: “discourse” and “mentality”, in different contexts it can mean practically anything. The content of the term “identity” is identified in its meaning with different terms such as: authenticity, originality, (self)confirmation, self-determination, self-identity”. (Сергеевич, 2005: 57).

However, if these almost synonymous definitions refer to more or less identical contents of a single term, even if we specify further labels that belong to it, the postmodernists will say that the times are past when “in static, social reality the identity was transferred from generation to generation” (*ibid*, p. 58) since now it appears as a substitute for something really essential and important. The essential form, universal and generally accepted transforms in contextual, where the conotation gives meaning to denotation (the denoted), which thus seeks to achieve an autonomous (separate) existence. So, the historical dates of social structure, which bring unity in life, the view on the world, the system of values, are changed by “hibrid” communities, such as “consumer society”, “society of information technologies”, a conglomerate of numerous identities or similar, or in the words of this author: “From such diversion, for instance, grows the contemporary gender problem-

atics, when the essence of the sex transforms into the identity of gender construction², the essence of the ethnos in national identity, while the class essence transforms into something like “life style” (*ibid* p. 59). Finally, in a different manner than this, the problem of identity is (additionally) burdened when various minority groups ask for tolerance, multiculturalism, use consensus for simple political promotion, which in the end, undermines the socio-cultural identity of the state community as a whole.

Thus, in the panorama of numerous minority identities, on different levels, appears the need for their hierarchical order, however the problem arises when trying to find the principle in which this could be realized: is this what is on the side particular or general? Since, it would postulate the primary, above the secondary, first-class, above second-class and less important etc., these are relations of jealousy and annihilation, not peaceful and harmonious diversity. Just as we cannot deny that all attempts of even the great powers (America, Russia, China) to assimilate minority groups- even entire nations- were futile³- i.e. that there is a fierce war for affirming the particularities of every kind: those of the immigrants, religions, sex, language particularities etc. In present times, all subcultures tend to “rise up” to their normative framework, not carrying whether this would damage the socio-cultural core of the society as a whole, and thus weaken this society’s power as macro-identity. So, all over the planet there are opposed processes “towards the centre” (centripetal) and “from the centre” (centrifugal), learned in all variants of minority aspirations for their realization, in terms of self-government, autonomy (cultural, territorial, political), religious etc., in which the question of “balancing” the system remains of crucial interest.

In these circumstances appears the most spread slogan of all relevant institutions worldwide for multi-culturalism, co-existence and tolerance, or for, human and civil rights, minority rights, religious rights, affiliation etc. This is the case with the European Union which in 1993 delivered the “Copenhagen criteria” to the countries-candidates for membership, a criteria that had to be fulfilled as a condition for accession. Or the Maastricht Agreement (1992), the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (1995), and the existing bodies that directly contribute for application of minority rights, such as: the Higher Commissioner on National Minorities, the UN Working Groups on minorities, or the Council of Europe, etc.

However, each of these terms deep inside shares the destiny of: man, identity, culture, etc., hence Lotty Eldering, when talking about education forms in the multiethnic environment of North America, Europe and Australia finds that “comparison between different approaches to multicultural education are hampered by a lack of conceptual clarity and by differences ... on views in cultural diversity” (Eldering, 1996: 315). Because what the authors are inclined to give as a definition to multiculturalism does not convey clear enough picture. So in the words: “The term multiculturalism refers to the process of recognizing, understanding and appreciating cultures other than one’s own.” (Melear 1995: 21), we find that at least each of the *difiniendum* “releases” different degrees in which someone can do what is indicated. Insofar as the concept of multiculturalism in a

2 Such a construction for example is the term “nationality” – instead of national minorities in former Yugoslavia

3 Hence the expression: “a melting pot”.

range of social circumstances is dressed with synonymous terms, and so “multinationality”, “friendship among people”, etc., earlier in the Soviet Union took the meaning of multiculturalism (Lee, 2008: 19). If we approach its definition, we would find that from the very beginning it “gives away” different antinomies, of which speaks Smith. According to him: “Every attempt to identify the final goals of multiculturalism indicated that multiculturalism is nothing but a collection of beliefs ...”. (Smith 1992: 95).

Others. The problem with the other

We pointed to certain problems- difficulties standing in the way of defining the terms: individual, identity- personal, national, cultural. Now, we can discuss more the essential moments: the term *the other*. Because, it is easy to say that without beings similar to him, man can hardly be seen as anything but emptiness, while to be able to determine something usually means to “lighten” it by way of another (“The circle is a line”). Jean-Paul Sartre said: “I have the need for the mediation of another, to be what I am” (Sartre, 1943: 349), while Heidegger: “Each being is only a deficit way of the existence of beings-for-the-other” (Heidegger 1985: 26) etc.

For man, “thrown” into the world, aims to achieve personal happiness, which is a special harmony between desires, possibilities and achievements, and since these three moments are mutually disharmonious, his happiness becomes only an ideal. While trying to “reveal” to himself his existence, he “recognizes” the *other* on his way. The other exists. In a contradictory manner, being at the same time the *same* (the other is *a person* just like me) and the different (he isn't *the same* as me). As such, in his humanity, following the moral law, he awakens respect in us (Cant), the other is our *alter ego* (Huserl), who has the power to “freeze” a moment of our freedom with his eyes. This is where all the obstacles of this freedom arise, in the form of rules and limitations, expressed in moral norms, values, etc. In this shelter human life in the community takes place, so human existence is nothing but co-existence.

Sartre's words for these two realities are “being for itself” and “being for the other”, while the phenomenological description of the mutual “bluff” with the freedom of one in the freedom of the other he discloses in his work *Beings and Nothings*. Few steps into this analysis show this clearly. I sit on a bench, in the park, while a man is walking down the path. But I don't see him as all other things, because I notice he can differentiate between the bench and the trees, just like me. This is how I *lose* the world which I thought was my own and its centre now *moves* towards the other. The other, for now, *continues* to live his life etc. Or: As I sit and write this at the table, someone else is just an individual from a space-time sequence for me, but as he *looks* at me, that look “will change everything”. In that moment I am aware that I have been *seen*, that I *fell* in this world etc., and later I become *ashamed* of myself, i.e. the other has become a *threat* for me, while I am only a *thing* among others. So, my being basically becomes *threatened*, and my freedom *conditioned*, which extends to the famous paragraph: “Hell is other people”. These are the words of Garsen in the play *Behind Closed Doors*, which he says under the looks of others – being condemned to live forever with others.

The dialectical sequence that soon follows requires that the other be constituted as a *subject* from my point of view, hence everyone becomes a *mirror* for the other, but it should be said right away that Sartre's subject – the predicate of fight on two sides remains exceptional till the end, without the possibility for a connecting link – what was according to Hegel a synthesis, an inter-member. However, the conclusions of the philosophy of existentialism are: “Man is condemned to be free”, “Freedom is a source of values”, etc., and from here man, by confirming himself, is not threatened by the other. It would be a condition of such human *commotion* (for loss of words), however it would “generate” true solutions achieved in freedom, on the other side of the relations of repression, violence, manipulation, hypocrisy, affects.

The individual and the system of values

Namely, reality should truly be understood in the meeting of one and the other, one and the many, when different natures “set” in one other, or in the absence of words, inform. It should be known that 90% of the information at a meeting belongs to the nonverbal, because communication between two people, in its essence, is an internal relationship, while the relations between them external. This is an opposition between two states which bring about the correlatives: open-close, independent (free) – dependent, human warmth – affection, sensuality – emotion, etc. so it is worth fighting to achieve that the permanent condition of an individual in society is essentially determined first by its members. Then, “if we dare say” with no hesitation, the “power to understand” will be equally important, since both times there is a possibility on both sides, which thus enters into a full, more comprehensive relation with others. The essence here is that every being has enough potential inside to assess and make choices in his actions in relation to the beings he meets, and be directed only to one *basic* need of every moral (enlightened) individual. The individual builds from the very beginning, **a system of values** for himself, which will help to not “enter” or “leave”, just like Ariadne, from relations with the others, obeying only certain schematic codes of the accepted communication. The informational technology that is abundant these days would only complement the possible “tables of values” for which we plead, since man did not stop being authentic being, a subjective and singular being, but he will rather realize by himself these values, than follow possible philosophical attitude etc. Or, according to Descartes: “I admit that my mind ever since birth was directed thus that it was my greatest pleasure not to listen to the arguments of others, rather to find them with my own means”. (Descartes 1824, X)

Here lies the problem with the other, with co-life, with culture, sub-culture etc., as well as the efforts to at least solve them partly, if they cannot be solved completely. Whereupon the chances that the problem of multiculturalism are solved by the state community itself, within the politics of supporting minority cultures, are significantly smaller than in the case of the distinct attitudes of people towards it. Because, the state is a diffuse, but solid entity where the citizen really exists, rather than in the community to which he belongs, that man can keep his integrity, as he has always done, while state borders are in constant change as they have been in the recent past. Namely, when there are condi-

tions for developments, a minority culture may gain advantage, which can be found at the verge not only of (cultural) autonomy, but secession itself and territorially part from its native country. The case with Kosovo and Metohija only confirms this. Because, while before World War Two there was a demographic balance between the Serbians and Albanians on this territory, the changed reality near the end of the century greatly influenced the independence of the Albanian majority of the region.

So in October 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the youth rally of her party⁴, in the Potsdam (Potsdam) stated that "the German attempt to build a multicultural society as a whole failed" and on that occasion urged immigrants in the country to learn the German language and embrace Christian values. "We are connected by Christian values", she said "and those who do not accept them don't belong here". She had in mind primarily the (numerous) Turkish population and Muslims⁵, only a week after her meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, when they discussed the great reluctance of immigrant groups to integrate in the socio-economic system of Germany to the needed extent.

Thus, this highly developed country of the European Union found itself on the course between Scylla and Charybdis: first, when the other countries of Western democracy proclaimed a harmonious existence of different cultures on the same soil (environment, community) and now the language ("without an accent") and change of religion ("accept Christian values") is almost forcing assimilation. What is referred to as "interculturalism", while - *as the interpenetration of different cultures* - certainly affirms parts of each culture, so a certain intermediate path can exist, but the fundamental aporia of the government of each country is: to what extent should each minority group in the hierarchy be supported (organizational, financial) in order so this ground would not express integrative, but subversive power of the community? What would be least met with objections in tradition from both sides, in a possible dialogue: clothing, music and cuisine, and certainly mostly: the forced marriage, infibulation, covering the face and body. This again shows that it is possible to postulate laws that would apply to all people and ones for each of the minorities in this or that extent etc. In the mixing of cultures and historical heritage through the millennium, for instance the Hapsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, they were not suppressed by linguistic diversity or religious affiliation of the enslaved people. Just as the acceptance of number of elements of other cultures, through out the planet today, passes without visible consequences for national peculiarities. Here we have in mind, for instance, clothing made from denim-fabric, jazz, French fries, gyros, etc. which had long since crossed the borders of the countries where they emerged and spread almost everywhere in the world.

One certainly desirable situation here is that each state should further reconsider and bring final plan (economic, cultural, ...) for development, or maybe the immigrants, experts in various fields and the like could do this. Thus, it would be better known what knowledge (language, technical) is required for each profile, as well as know the cultural needs for those who require them, instead of "migration of people", engulfing the territory of certain countries in their diffuse and almost chaotic form today.

4 CDU (*Christlich Demokratische Union*).

5 There are 2,5 million Turks, i.e., 4 million Muslims in this country.

Finally, at a micro level, in the case of individual members of the community, we can place the optimal approach to individual problems between interculturalism vs multiculturalism, precisely, in terms of what we have said before, and this is: an educated individual, methodical system of values for himself, selecting himself accordingly to what he will accept and reject from other cultures. (Thus, the seller of goods in Istanbul will know, say, the language of the Balkan countries, because it helps in his work, but as a Muslim, he does not have to share Christian values of customer-Christians.) The highest framework that would, in general case, provide this would be:

- efforts, first of all, for the state individual to “find” solid rules for himself in the educational sphere, the efforts of families, schools, rules which would be then followed with highest respect in his relation to himself, his relatives and others and the community he belongs to;
- the individual would, soon enough, recognize the forms of knowledge that he would incline to and develop his profile/profession, but this profile as a whole must be “presented” through the system of **clear rules** that he inevitably had to follow.

In the first case, it is philosophy that mostly contributes to education, a discipline which reflects on the world most thoroughly, or here, *philosophy of education*, because the inevitable marks of every existence: beauty, justice, truth, ... are deeply reflected. In this instance the individual will prepare **tables of values** for himself, which would adopt the standards to be obeyed, which would consistently and unconditionally follow: from his relationship with himself, with the parents, ancestors, in relation to disclosing the required respect in different circumstances (customs, traditions) and respect for the other and so on. Here, the moral questions will be “broken”: the meaning of life, good and evil, virtue and vice, guilt and conscience, freedom and duty, devotion ... and especially those from the relationship towards the way of life (health), toward work, time. And from that point of view the relations in the cultural sphere will be equally perceived, those towards beings with different characteristics (ethnic, religious, language, ...), which will provide for the enlightened individual, following the postulated value system for himself, to decide to what extent and which values to adopt from the members of the other (and different) cultural characteristics.

For example, one can attach the highest importance to one’s own linguistic dialect, native life and customs, or to do this to any degree of a scale between 0 and 1, which “would” enable him to conform to the standard form of language, or rather, to one of the same language group, i.e., the one from quite a different group, and act in a similar case in the second of the two moments (the homeland, customs). In each of them, he would be characterized by awareness of the optimal choice, which would follow arguments such as: speaking two languages in life is *more* than that when it comes to speaking one language, sharing traditions of different environment is *more*, than belonging forever to only one and so on.

However, in the case of education the informatics era today is a true milieu, which would allow curious individuals, first, to make choices on different sides, and then educate himself in each area and in the extent to pursuing to his own (deliberate) interest. There

is certain knowledge here, as general, necessary for every individual, which would “extend” to the knowledge that would be the result of his own choice. He could help himself with a certain “calculation”, following the logical rules that may arise, first, *weight* each of his interests, on a possible scale of 0 to 1. (In the case of 0, if absent, and number 1, when the highest). In the sense that knowledge of the recent past in history is primary from the one from the far past, or, knowledge from the history of one’s own people and neighboring nations, from the knowledge for the history of other nations. Just like *trivium* and *quadrivium*, which were established during the Middle Ages, now we have the need (this time) for the *type* and *level* of knowledge in relation to each individual, which the individual would, in a sufficiently *compact* form, permanently take with him. For even at this point there are our beliefs that the compactness of all kinds of knowledge in various fields allows hierarchical sequences, so we can distinguish primary from secondary knowledge and so on. Thus, an educated individual, truly devoted to his calling, starting from his fundamental interests, would accept or reject values from different educational sphere, in the extent and scope that this individual had deliberated for himself.

Namely, in an environment with more cultures, accompanied by different linguistic expressions, a laborer, for example, accomplishes minimum linguistic resources, basic literacy in dialogues or interpersonal considerations for a harmonious relationship with others in the community. Meanwhile, a highly educated man in a multinational environment would necessarily be fluent in the terminology of his profession in (all) language environment, and those employed in public services, the spoken language (without an accent) of the same languages. To such a “reckoning” would be subjected all other aspects in the sphere of interpersonal relationships within profession and so on.

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ROMANIAN IDENTITY REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE BY SPORT AS A MODERN EXPRESSION OF CULTURE IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

In the European Parliament sport is considered both as a source of identity and social integration and a tool in the fight against discrimination and racism.

The European Union strategy takes the form of discourse well suited to the sportive atmosphere. European Union uses major sporting events to promote its own image and amplify its general discourse. Sports have an important role in identity formation and the effects on individuals' politicization. European Union special campaign of promoting sports events is based on deliberative behaviors - all visitors are urged to talk about Europe, give opinions without fear that they will be put in bad situations or that they come into conflict with certain parties. Through participation in the dialogue a more democratic Europe will be built, and by exchanging points of views and arguments we will learn from each other. Most citizens agree with the establishment, in their own countries, of institutions where they get information and increase their knowledge about the European Union. The paper presents the activities of European institutions to complete the European public space, based on diplomacy and the positive impact of sport.

Key words: globalization, sports, football, European Union.

The processes of globalization and the development of sport as a part of a global system have been examined and considered in their interconnectedness. Special attention has been paid to specific cultural and global trends. (Maguire, 1991: 29-47)

The development of sport is closely linked to the process of accelerated globalization. Important characteristics of this process include: the development of global communication forms, the increase of the number of international agencies, the development of global competitions and prizes, the evolution of standard terms that refer to rights and citizenship, which are more and more standardized on international level. Several aspects of sport development clarify the interconnections of this process and globalization. The last century was a witness of the appearance and spreading of sport, the establishment of international sport organizations and the increase of competitiveness between national teams. In the same period, the rules that control specific forms of sport and global competing manifestation were accepted. These rules refer to the Olympic Games, Football World Cup and other world championships. They illustrate the globalization in sport world.

Elite sport competitions are global mass media entertainment shows. We should only think of the Olympic game, the World Cups and World Championships in football, gym-

nastics and so on. The renowned sociologist Jean-Marie Brohm (1992: 361) considers that the institution of sports *is a state's ideological apparatus*.

Football, the most widely practiced sport in the world, is closely linked with the idea of national identity, it has become the *most serious trifle in the world* (Bromberger, 1998: 17), received *academic legitimacy* (Compagnon, 2006: 6) in the England of the '70, while nowadays it has turned into an articulate object of study and is a means of intercultural dialogue.

Having in view the Football World Championship in 2006 in Germany, the European Parliament's Information Office and the European Commission's Representation Office in Germany, jointly ensured the management of an information center for citizens located in the heart of the capital: *Service-Punkt Europa*, thus exploiting the exceptional character of the football event. Being centred on the campaign of proportions entitled *I am Europe*, carried out by the Information Office of the European Parliament in Berlin, *Service-Punkt Europa* functioned eight hours every day, the campaign consisted of a city-tour on the bus *Europa* in order to better know the European Union's institutions. When the World Championship started, the bus had been running through all the twelve host-towns of the matches in Germany. The World Championships created thus a good opportunity for studying how the European institutions meant to present themselves before the citizens and how they tried to make themselves known to the public in the context of open communication techniques with specific activities and minimal image losses. The target public of this Centre consisted of visitors with a certain degree of allegiance and of individuals who walked in just because they had mistook it for a tourist information centre. In this particular context, understanding the European Union's communication strategy and the way the message would be received represented an extremely important moment both for the wide public in general and for the visitors.

Communication with the help of symbolic constructions

The communication program and strategy was coherent in transmitting the messages placed on the communication axis and in tracing the target groups (Mucchielli and Guivarch, 1998: 16). The scope of the centre *Service-Punkt Europa's* campaign was to disseminate information about the European Union and football was used for the purpose. Besides this, the dominant communication pursued to facilitate contact with the EU by asking a series of questions like: "Would you like to win a genuine FIFA ball? You only have to answer five easy questions about the European Union and football!" Communication through football's superiority was exploited accordingly and put to serve the scope established by the European institution.

The competition organized on European and football topics for a genuine World Cup ball winning-prize confirmed the diversity of the action, managed to bring together over 9,000 participants and counted over 40 winners (nearly one per day) until the final and 15 on the day of the final, 18 of which were women and 15 were living outside Germany.

The communication strategy was effective and resorted to sub-strategies adapted to various target groups and to the context of the major event. The communication campaign

included a master discourse and the phrase "*The values promoted by the European Union are the values of the World Football Cup*". Based on that discourse, the principles related to diversity, fair-play, tolerance etc. were revealed. A short analysis of the discourse as a whole lets us notice that it was presented in a series of addresses on: information about the European Union (institutions, history, policies); questionnaires on the European Union for the genuine World Cup 2006 ball prize-winning competition; answers to the citizens' questions about the EU; EU on young people and adult people (the eight persons winning team of the table-football game received a lather ball in the colours of Europe as a reward); European Union on children (puzzle solving by children, the correct setting of the pieces corresponding to the member states, rewarded with a plastic ball in the European colours – blue and yellow); European Union for fans (tattoos application – one with the European Union flag, another with the favourite team's flag).

Discourses on questions and answers were presented at the Europe Information Centre, while the others were included in the special campaign "World Cup". The actual organization of the campaign indicated that all sections dedicated discourses were inter-dependent. Adults tried to solve the children puzzle, while children played table-football although they hardly reached up to the table edge. Nevertheless, the fans willing to win the genuine Adidas ball tried to answer the questions with the help of the information brochures and the Centre advisors, in order to find the correct answer from the participation form for the competition. The forms contained questions on the European Union and the World Cup like the following: how many members are there in the European Union; how many German MPs are there in the European Parliament; where is the headquarters of the European Parliament; how many European Union member countries participate in the World Cup; which member country of the European Union won the last World Cup etc. Even working on the puzzle until it was completed contributed to interrelating the discourses, since visitors took interest in the presumably missing pieces, such as Switzerland, and thus getting more thorough knowledge about the EU member states. All along the championship, the European Commission's Representation Office increased its personnel and hired advisors willing to stay until late and work on weekends, as well. The European Parliament's Information Office relied on an offer structured on two main aspects: advising on European topics and undertaking special actions and conveying contents about the European Union. All the actions of the two institutions were united and had the growth of their degree of visibility as their mutual goal. The scope of the public communication campaign and the identity construction during the World Football Championships was to convey information about the EU and the European Parliament in a playful and relaxed way and to improve the citizens' knowledge on these institutions via the *Service-Punkt Europa*.

The European Parliament's Information Office launched the larger slogan "*World on Visit to Friends*". Starting from this slogan, which intended to let know the interpretation that the "World" was therefore "on a visit to friends", a smaller one resulted – "*I am Europe*" – meaning "I am a friend", that is "Europe is a friend". European Union assumed the role of educator the moment when "the one to be educated" expressed the willingness to find out and better know the scope of an active and energetic democracy.

Romanian identity by sport

Contemporary Romanian sport with a record 292 medals (including 86 golden, 89 silver and 117 bronze) won by Romanian sportsmen in the summer Olympics, from the first edition in 1924 in Paris to the 2008 Beijing edition, has registered in its golden book names like Nadia Comaneci, the best sportswoman of the twentieth century, Ilie Năstase and Hagi. This is just to mention few who have amplified Romania's image all over the world.

Referring strictly to football, Romania's football representative participated until now in few major international football events - The European Championship final tournament - due to the performance of Romanian players internationally known and appreciated: Băloani, Gheorghe Hagi Gheorghe Popescu, Chivu, Dorinel Munteanu. The presence of thousands of spectators on the football events (but not only) was for the Romanian a good opportunity of presentation and representation of their collective identity and for increasing the popularity of Romanian sports performances.

At the level of the construction of symbolic collective identity, we find relations between the campaigns of European Union and Romania. Since 1996, during the European Football Championships in England, and 2000 in Belgium and the Netherlands tournament, Romania, as a country that expressed its intention to enter the EU, has successfully promoted its image among the public and fans. The special campaign helped both Romania and EU to increase the number of strategies of identity construction.

Romania used the pretext of football and installed during the events in London, Brussels and Amsterdam, Information Centres and booths where they bought flags, shirts, logos, photographs, models and other items promoting its image. Romanian information centre's visibility increased daily and it had many visitors. Active animators with good knowledge of both Romanian and European Union issues raised interest in Romanian and international institutions, sport, football in particular. Fans' presence was allowed and observed in the Romanian centre, through the instrumentality of accessories, clothing and body expression (hair, tattoos, paintings representing the national or Union European' flag) addressed directly to the public and supporters.

They tried to present Romania's image in the context of open communications techniques being created, by installing a screen that presented the country's real image, a family atmosphere for fans without tickets or passes. Romanian journalists initiated discussions about successful Romanians. Through the communication campaigns, authentic values and models to render Romania's genuine image for the country and its inhabitants were identified. They promoted the most important identity elements in the field of sports to enhance and consolidate the image emblem of Romania. The programs pursued self-promotion (through the national football and gymnastics teams), model examples (Nadia Comăneeci, Ilie Năstase) and authentic dimension of Romania (customs, beliefs).

Conclusions

Before the event in Berlin, the European Parliament's members signalled that football may be an instrument in fighting against discrimination and racism and a source of identity and social integration. The paper showed how European Union's image was successfully promoted among the fans at the World Football event. In the common context of football and within the frame of specialized political references related to the EU, the visitors of *Service-Punkt Europa* were required to discuss about Europe and to express opinions without fearing that they might sound foolish. The slogan "*Everyone is conversant in football*" was changed into "everyone's opinion matters" or "any question on the EU may be asked".

On the other hand, sport is the best means of communication between people - it conveys the urge to build a more democratic Europe for participation of the citizens - and about peoples. Sport is not only a reflection of the society in which it is manifested. It is an indicator, too. It can help people imagine the world it could or should become. In all countries, it could be a life, simple and obvious personification of equality, fair-play and everlasting effort, leading to success, widely using intellect, body and soul heading towards opportunity, happiness, pleasure. To a small extent, the international sport family is the one that overcomes the differences (Fircă, and Sturza Milić, 2005: 49).

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THE IMPACT OF THE CONTROVERSY AROUND THE IDENTITY OF THE RUDARI PEOPLE FROM A ROMANIAN VILLAGE UPON LOCAL SOCIAL LIFE

Abstract

In a Romanian village, the majority, represented by Romanians, live together with the *Rudari*, people without a homogeneous group identity (some groups declare themselves as being Romanians, like in the case of the community I researched, others as being Roma/Gypsy persons). At local level, between Romanians and *Rudari* people seem to be no tensions, but, despite this first feeling, there are daily life practices which prove the separation between the two groups (for example, the avoidance of commensalism, of exogamy, or of burial in the same part of the cemetery). The main responsibility for all these separations is the *Rudari*'s dark skin, the Romanians avoiding to become close with a person who has a physical appearance similar to the one of the Roma/Gypsy people. More precisely, the last category of people has a darker skin, even though there are some exceptions. In those extreme situations mentioned above, a *Rudari* becomes a Gypsy person in the Romanians' point of view. The skin color, in the case of *Rudari*, is a first element that can justify the tendency of the local population, observed in certain situations, of integrating the group of *Rudari* into the big category of Roma/Gypsy population. At the common sense level, people operate with this kind of appreciations. The *Rudari* come to be "perceived" as belonging to the same community with Gypsy, and for this reason are exposed, many times, to social exclusion.

Key words: *Rudari*, ethnic identity, self-identification, hetero-identification

This paper is about a group of people from Romania, named *Rudari*, who have a debatable identity. This is a work in progress, and it is part of my future PhD thesis. I included some theoretical data about the *Rudari* people from Romania, in general, and also empirical information, resulted from my incursions in a community from the South of Romania (more precisely, from the Poiana village, Gorj county).

My aim was to find in which way the social life of those people from Poiana village, both *Rudari*, and Romanians, is affected by the manifestation of this self- /hetero-identification process, taking into consideration that three identities are attached to those people: Romanian, *Rudari* and Roma/Gypsy identity. I have focused my attention on the manner in which this group defines itself in relation to the majority, while also taking into account the way they are perceived by the Romanians. I also hope to find the personal implications of this ongoing identity construction, and to find, in addition, in which way the social life, at the local level, is affected by the manifestation of this process.

The feasibility of the field, the availability of the local institutions (city hall, church, dispensary, police) to provide me with essential information for the research, and the consent of some *Rudari* to cooperate as informants, allowed me to plan the research on this group. The information was collected through direct contact with the *Rudari*, by interviewing them, after having assured them that the answers were strictly confidential, and would not be related to their real names. But, just as an observation, the *Rudari* people asked me to mention their real names in my papers, and, if possible, to make a movie about them (“We would like to see ourselves on TV!”).

In Poiana village, there are only a few adult *Rudari* with primary education. One of the reasons for this high absence from the educational system is related to their previously isolated way of life. There were families which, even in the '80s used to live in huts (dwellings that were half buried in the ground), far away from the village, and near the woods. Due to the same reason, many years they escaped from the observations of researchers (Chelcea 1940). In present, although they live in houses, and are connected to the local gas, water and electricity networks, their dwellings are modest. But nowadays, more than 90% of their children are enrolled in the educational system, thus being socio-culturally integrated in the world around them.

At present, in 2011, the number of the *Rudari* people from Poiana village, Gorj county, is estimated at around 200 persons, their birth rate being a significant one (*see the following table*). But in October, this year, in Romania a census was held. As a consequence, all these figures will be soon updated.

Census 2002: 1607 inhabitants (Romanians + *Rudari*)

Romanians	1518 inhabitants
<i>Rudari</i>	89 inhabitants (66 adults + 23 children = 28 families)

Related to the *Rudari* families' geographical placement inside the village, it can easily be observed how they are concentrated in a specific area, but this does not affect the interactions with the rest of the inhabitants. This spatial segregation consists, in fact, of having the houses of *Rudari* placed along the main road, but on one of the extremities of the village. As long as the *Rudari* respect the social distance, the Romanian population is not bothered by their presence in their close proximity, and the problem of resettling them in another place was never put forward. Moreover, there are very few occasions when the Romanians come into conflict with the *Rudari* people. As long as there are, also, disputes among the members of the Romanian community, as a result of their daily contacts, the conflicts between the *Rudari* and the Romanian people cannot be attributed to particular causes. These disputes are short-lived and overcame without the intervention of the local authority (police).

The Ambiguous Past of the *Rudari*

The *Rudari* have an enigmatic past, recounted constantly from different perspectives. Regarding the *Rudari*, the perception of the others, perception which has its contribution

to the outlining of social relations, is not shaped, precisely, because of the oscillations resulted from the manifestation of the self-identification process, in the first place. The data from the censuses are exemplifying in this case. In the official documents of the local administration of the Poiana village, they appear recorded as Romanians, not as Roma/Gypsy people, or as members of another minority, whereas, in other communities, the *Rudari* were recorded as a Roma/Gypsy population. For instance, the *Rudari* from a village in Arges county, a total number of 593 people, were recorded as Roma/Gypsy at the 2002 census (Dorondel, 2002). Therefore, in Romania, the ethnic identity of *Rudari* varies.

Little has been written about the *Rudari* people. Therefore, the text includes references to older documents, which although not up-to-date, they, at least, mention the *Rudari*. Until recently, the *Rudari* did not constitute a particular topic of analysis, and they were mentioned only in relation to the Roma/Gypsy people. Nowadays, due to the increasing number of studies regarding the minorities, and due to the interest in Roma/Gypsy ethnicity, they have drawn attention through certain particularities, raising the issue of their affiliation to this population.

Some historians stated in the past that this population does not have Roma/Gypsy origins, but Romanian ones (Nicolăescu-Plopșor, 1922). To support this affirmation, those elements that make clear the distinction between Roma/Gypsy and *Rudari* were brought into discussion. Thus, the *Rudari* do not speak the Roma language, and there is no proof that they ever did. They wear the same clothes as the Romanians, and they don't respect the Roma/Gypsy rituals, having their special ones. A good example is the ritual of *Corban*, consisting in sacrificing a lamb (see Kovalcsik, 2007: 109-137). *Corban* is the same thing with the *Gurban*, term used in the academic literature. The role of the act is to protect the family from bad events, and to heal a sick person. The participation in this ritual is conditioned by a previously undergone process of bodily and spiritual purification, materialized in washing the body, wearing clean clothes, fasting for three days, and sexual abstinence. The word has its origin from the Turkish *kurban* (sacrifice, victim), the ritual being a borrowed tradition, as a result of the contact of a small group of *Rudari* with Turkish populations from the Balkans. Later, the tradition was adopted by those living on Romanian territory, due to the group of *Rudari* identified as *turcani* (Calotă, 1974). Inside the studied group, such a ritual was celebrated each time the situation had required it, anyone's presence being accepted, regardless of skin colour, spoken language or ethnicity. The only condition for the participants was to go through the stages mentioned above, in order not to profane the ceremony. Romanians from Poiana village had no hesitation to take part in this ritual, since they consider the *Rudari* as being "their own" (but this perception applies to a certain extent, as I will explain in this paper). In the last years, due to the depreciation of their financial situation, no *Rudari* family respected this ritual.

But another explanation has the dialectologist Ion Calotă (1974), or the ethnographer Ion Chelcea (1943), who asserted that the *Rudari* might represent a kind of Roma/Gypsy people (also Stewart 2002), who, presumably, until coming into contact with the Romanian goldsmiths from Transylvania, from the region of Apuseni Mountains, had spoken the Roma language (the term *Rudari* might be derived from the Slavic word *ruda*, which means "ore"). They learnt, from the Romanian goldsmiths their language and the

craftsmanship of extracting the gold particles from the sand in the rivers containing gold. Following the flow of the gold rivers, from Transylvania, the *Rudari* went to the South of the country, towards the Danube, crossing, thus, the border into Bulgaria. From Bulgaria, they continued their journey, some of them reaching the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and some of them returning to Wallachia, bringing with them the *Gurban* feast.

In the meadow, while looking for gold, the *Rudari* discovered the soft wood (willow, poplar, and linden), which they started to process during the seasons when the harsh weather conditions did not allow them to search for gold on the bottom of the water. Although they worked with the same raw material, the *Rudari* people started to divide according to different categories, representing the objects they specialized on: the category of *lingurari* (they manufactured wooden spoons), *fusari* (manufactured spindles, used for spinning wool), *postăvari* (they used to design fabrics from tree trunks), *corfari* (they wove baskets from twigs), *blidari* (they manufactured bowls, dishes and wooden pots), etc. (Achim, 1998). The professional reorientation and, at the same time, the simultaneous practice of these two occupations is recorded in a document from June 22, 1794: "During the summer, they extract gold from sand, and in winter, as the waters are frozen, they manufacture various household objects from wood" (Apud Cherata, 1999: 93).

The *Rudari* Ethnic Identity

When asked about their identity, the *Rudari* from the Poiana village claim they are *Rudari*, and, after this term of self-identification, they introduce a second identity, that of Romanians (they use the term *rumâni*). In order to justify their affiliation to the native population, they point out the fact that they have as ancestors the Dacians, and for centuries they have lived in harmony with the rest of the community. The lack of any serious kind of conflicts proves that they became Romanians, over time. The *Rudari* feel offended if they are identified as a Roma/Gypsy population, and strongly refuse to assume this identity (this way of positioning is quite interesting and atypical, because it contradicts the common idea according to which a majority discriminates a minority. With the example of *Rudari* we, paradoxically, observe the way intolerance and discrimination manifest on an unusual trajectory, a minority being in the position to judge another minority).

In Romania, when we speak about ethnic diversity, we make reference, especially, to two categories: Roma/Gypsy people, and Hungarian people. Those two are the most representative minorities, from the point of view of their number. Often, in Romania, the Roma/Gypsy communities are marginalized, and the stigma of those people has been attached, implicitly, to Romanians, as well. The image of the Romanians, for most of the cases, will tend to be discredited by the permanent references made to the Roma/Gypsy people, as an analogical image. The reason for rejecting Roma/Gypsy is not related to repulsion referring to their ethnicity, but to the way they behave as opposed to the others (Fraser 1998). For this reason, in Romania, the cohabitation model with these people oscillates between accepting the group and partial, or total, rejection of it.

The feelings the main population has towards the Roma/Gypsy local group from Poiana village are of silent revolt, repulsion and rejection of their lifestyle, considering that Roma/Gypsy people have a harmful behaviour for the security of the others. But the *Rudari* are exempt from this rejection, because it is considered that they don't provoke disorder, like the Roma/Gypsy people do. In the case of my research, the Romanians contacts with the *Rudari* are governed by another set of rules, that of tolerance in proximity, acceptance as a "particular group", and cohabitation in territory. The Romanian inhabitants of the Poiana village admitted that the *Rudari* are different from Roma/Gypsy population. Theoretically, Romanians do not confuse the two categories, meaning the Roma/Gypsy with the *Rudari*. The invoked argument is that they have observed certain differences at their behavioural level (especially the fact that they are not thieves and dirty like them).

However, in practice, the beliefs of the Romanians change, according to the peculiarity of each situation. For instance, when they have to accept a *Rudari* person in their family, through marriage, the theoretical discourse is replaced by their common beliefs. According to those beliefs, the *Rudari*, irrespective of how honest these people may be, many times are not desired in a Romanian family, because of the stigma that they would bring with them. To be more explicit, from the point of view of their physical appearance (the colour of their skin), the *Rudari* are identified with the Gypsies, whereas, from a cultural point of view, they are identified with the Romanian people, as they respect the Romanian traditions and culture. Moreover, they speak Romanian language, and the Gypsies don't acknowledge them as being "of their kind", and whenever they refer to the *Rudari* people, they use exonyms such as *kaštale*, *caștari* sau *caștalii* (translated as "woodworker", "carpenter", *kašti* meaning "wood" in Roma language). Obviously, these exonyms are related to their occupation, to their work with wood. Before the communist period, they processed wood, the soft one, which can be easily transformed into domestic artefacts. Later, after communism, their way of making a living by selling their own goods and the wood objects they had made, became inefficient due to the high interest in industrialization. Despite all that, the *Rudari* continued to sell the goods in the rural area, and the Romanian population accepted this form of unauthorized commerce. This phenomenon can be explained by the appeal of the low prices, as their objects were not expensive. Nevertheless, the distances they used to travel on foot, or by ox-drawn carts, were not as big as those covered by the Gypsies with the carriages. The *Rudari* did not practice mass nomadism, but only some of them would leave for short periods of time in the neighbouring villages to sell their wooden products. Usually, they received, in exchange, food products, and rarely money. But nowadays, with the flourishing of the supermarkets, where you can find everything you need, the *Rudari* started to lose their place in the local production. Plastic objects, or objects made by another more practical material, are preferred instead of their wooden objects. And so, the local population started to lose interest in their objects. But it continues to have a work relation with the *Rudari* people, by rewarding them with money, drinks or food in exchange for their help in the agricultural activities.

“Is *Rudar* the Same as Gypsy?”

Among the ethnicities from Romania the *Rudari* ethnicity is not mentioned, but it functions as a local one. The *Rudari* term operates as an exonym, and an endonym, at the same time. As long as this exonym is not used as a synonym for the derogatory “Gypsy” term, the subjects of my research have no rejection for this *Rudari* name, even if they are aware that, in the local social hierarchy, they occupy a second level, after the Romanian position, and before the Roma/Gypsy one (like one of my *Rudari* interlocutor summarized the local reality).

The ethnicity seems to define the social position of the *Rudari* from the Poiana village. It is already proven that the ethnicity factor has always brought about disputes on social level, especially when two communities of different ethnicities had to live close to each other. In this case, it is about an assigned and interiorized ethnicity, and not about an official acknowledged one. Despite the fact that the Romanian people affirm that there are differences between the *Rudari* and the Gypsy people, this statement loses its acuity and honesty in the circumstances of a direct contact with the *Rudari*. Nevertheless, the local people distinguish between a “real Gypsy” and a “*Rudar* called Gypsy”. A “*Rudar* called Gypsy” is the one concerning whom the Romanian population from Poiana village would state that he is not of Gypsy descent, but who is eventually regarded as one because “he is as black as a Gypsy”. Through their malevolent references, the Romanians, indirectly, contribute to the drawing of an ethnical portrait. The ethnicity is reduced, in this case, to a physical detail: the colour of the skin. This tendency generates a whole discrimination process, translated into keeping a social distance on the part of the Romanians.

Furthermore, I would like to insert a few paragraphs from my interviews translation, those which I consider that can emphasize better the manifestation of this auto- /hetero-identification process:

Q: Have you ever been mistaken for a Gypsy because of your dark skin?

M1: Yea, they told me: “Yo, Gypsy...!” I’m no Gypsy, yo, damn you! Call me a *Rudar*. We don’t speak the Gypsy language. We’re of a different kind.

W: If a Gypsy speaks to me in his language, he can curse and smirch me, I won’t know how to answer him.

M1: ...the only thing is that we’re of different skin colour from Romanians.

W: We are all tarred with the same brush. No matter if someone is *Rudar* or Gypsy, they call him Gypsy. Gypsies can wear gold, but, damn it, they’ll never give up their blood and habits. The *Rudari* people are very civilized. Compared with the Gypsies, the *Rudari* is a race more similar to Romanians. You know what bothers me? That they shout at me a great deal: “Hoot you, Gypsy! Damn you, Gypsy!” “Damn you and your mother, I’m not a Gypsy”, I tell them. Call me a *Rudar* (...). Now the Gypsies are civilized, too. It’s not like in the old days, when they used to wear their hair loose, that you’d say they were... (her face expressed the disgust). Now you can’t even tell they are Gypsies. Now they walk around clean and washed, not like they used to roam around, before.

M1: They washed themselves, God damn them!

Q: So, you do mind being called a “Gypsy”...

W: Well, I don’t like it because I’m not one. I asked them: Have I ever come to your

doorstep to sell buckets? So, why are you calling me a Gypsy? Have I ever come with a bucket and told you: “Yo lady, yo lady, wanna buy a bucket?”. Have I ever asked you that? Never. Maybe I came with spoons, but with buckets never...Nor with needles. There were Gypsies who used to sell needles, or knitting needles, or combs.

.....
Q: I’ve heard that your son wants to marry a *Rudar* woman and you don’t approve of it.

M2: No way! I told him not to bring a *Rudar* woman into my house. To go for a girl from around here, and not marry this Gypsy.

Q: Is *Rudar* the same as Gypsy?

M2: No, *Rudari* are different, they are not Gypsies. But, anyway, they are dark-skinned and the people would say I welcomed a Gypsy into my house.

W- Constanța Vlad, 64 years old, *Rudar* woman

M1 – Marin Vlad, 69 years old, *Rudar* man

M2 – 54 years old, Romanian man

Conclusions

The hetero-identification of *Rudari* with Gypsies (even though, for this, the neutral term “Roma” is used), has a strong impact leading to stigmatization. Therefore, like a defence mechanism, the *Rudari* has the tendency to self-define in terms of the main population, Romanians, identifying with them. But the problem of identification must take into account, besides the self-perception, the perception the majority has on this minority, and a reconstruction of the history of these people. In this case, the absence of a reference point makes it difficult to follow the trajectory the *Rudari* had throughout centuries.

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Bashkim Arifi, MA

THE DIVERSITY OF BALKAN COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

Abstract

We are witnesses that we are living in a time of economical and political globalization. Everything what is happening is in the trend of globalization, such as economic developments, economic associations as well as political and geo-political associations of different countries. Balkan countries (including Kosovo) are slowly joining the new modern trends toward more open liberal economy and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Economical and political globalization as a worldwide trend affects the expansion of national economies into a global - world area, in which they slowly but surely eliminate a set of different barriers, in particular political interventions. But the “Jumping” of national economies into Global markets has not only positive aspects but also negative, bringing with themselves the risk, for pure and not enough competitive companies of Kosovo.

There is a **hypothesis** which needs to be verified: “Mutual influence between the diversity in the Balkans and the globalization process is large”. Giving the proper and scientific answer, for the main issue and hypothesis, needs a lot of analyses and methods including statistical and historical data.

To sum up, there are not more advantages than disadvantages of globalization and vice versa. What can be concluded is that the process of globalization is unavoidable. The step globalization has undertaken, while setting new standards and regulations has gone too far to be misplaced. As cloudy as it may seem, the disappearance of various domestic products and the expansion towards a global unity of economic sense might prove valuable for the future generations.

Key words: Globalization, Balkan, DNA-profile.

Introduction

Globalization is a process by which different parts of the globe become interconnected by economic, social, cultural, and political means. Globalization has become increasingly rapid since the 1970s and 1980s as a result of developments in technology, communications, and trade liberalization.

Today one of the biggest questions of humanity is: do we want to preserve local characteristics against the globalization’s voracity? And, if yes, how?

Actual globalization’s era, even in the biggest global cultural exchanges, local, regional and national characteristics survive somehow. But, how is this possible? Are there intrinsic characteristics of human DNA, immutable, or somehow maybe unconsciously, humans tend to preserve their own characteristics? Still the Balkan area has more specificities and more differences – disagreements between each other’s.

From economic point of view, globalization can be seen as a dependency added to the global economy and in this case has waived the part of sovereignty into regional economic integration.

All Balkan countries are in some kind of competition to fulfil all integration criteria, on their way to full membership to European Union Family. Implementation of many projects and bilateral agreements “Sponsored” by the European Union, slow political, economical, social and cultural diversities in their systems are becoming harmonized according to the international modern global rules.

The strong expansion of trade in this region certainly creates a strong competition and that in itself puts the need and necessity for creating innovation - constant innovation to deal with this trade expansion. Some sort of “Mini Globalization” was presented to us, recently in Eastern Europe through free trade agreements and other similar agreements such is CEFTA and some other regional agreements such are Mid Mediterranean Agreement etc.

This part of Europe is ethnically complex and well known for its diversities. However, the Balkan peoples have not simply been the passive victims of history: while trying to carve out their own spheres in the world, they have had a big hand in provoking major international crises in the last two centuries, most recently the Bosnia and Kosovo crises of the 1990s. The western part of Europe was fascinated and sometimes horrified by the Balkans.

There is a need to find answers in many questions, about the advantages offered by the pursuit of integration processes but also the difficulties which they expect the economies of Balkan countries towards an open market of goods, services and capital. The road of integration is a very complex and difficult process that requires a strong commitment of the compatible institutions, first and foremost. This process requires a deep analysis of the economical, political and social aspects.

Dimensions of Global environment – Balkan Point of view

There are several samples of mini integrations which could be used in future integration process. One of these integration intentions was also the establishment of the Free Movement zone in 2010 between four Balkan states. Leaders of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo established a “free-movement” CANADA, between their states as a sign of their readiness for further European integration. They have implemented a “Mini Schengen Regime”, referring to the borderless zone created by 25 European Union member countries¹.

Globalization is a three dimensional term, encompassing political, economical and cultural aspects. The area known as “the Balkans” includes: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Ex Yugoslavian entity (Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Monte Negro, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia).

¹ Bulgaria and Rumania are still out of the Schengen Zone


Research results should give us a clear picture of the dimensions of the global environment dimensions. For each country, which is in the process of integration; the global environment can have stimulating or discouraging impacts.

It's extremely difficult to have an open discussion over a future 'regional identity' on the Balkans, not only because of the political consequences of such a debate, but because of the historical difficulty in defining the 'Balkan identity'.

The main aspects of the Dimensions of the Global Environment appear in the following spheres: Economical; political; socio-cultural and geographical.

All Dimensions of the Global Environments have their historical aspects – dimensions. The picture below shows the best view of the mentioned connections between each other.

Picture no. 1: Dimensions of the Global Environment



Geographical overview of the Balkan Peninsula

The region takes its name from the Stara Planina (Old Mountain), mountain range in Bulgaria and partly in Serbia, commonly known as the Balkan Mountains (from the Turkish Balkan meaning “a chain of wooded mountains”). On a larger scale, the mountains are only one part of a long continuous chain of mountains crossing the region in the form of a reversed letter S, from the Carpathians south to the Balkan range proper, before marching away east into Anatolian Turkey. On the west coast, an offshoot of the Dinaric Alps follows the coast, south through Dalmatia and Albania, crosses Greece and continues into the sea in the form of various islands.

The first attested time the name “Balkan” was used in the West for the mountain range in Bulgaria was in a letter sent in 1490 to Pope Innocent VIII by Buonaccorsi Callimaco,

an Italian humanist, writer and diplomat. An English traveller, John Morritt introduced this term in the English literature at the end of the 18th century, and other authors started applying the name to the wider area between the Adriatic and the Black Sea. The concept of the “Balkan peninsula” was created by the German geographer August Zeune in 1808.

A peninsula of South-East Europe bounded by the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Aegean, Mediterranean, Ionian, and Adriatic seas. Countries whose borders lie entirely within the Balkan peninsula (excluding the islands): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro. Countries that have a significant portion of their land located within the peninsula: Croatia, Serbia. Countries that have only a small portion of their land located within the peninsula: Romania, Slovenia, Turkey.

Picture nr. 2: Balkan peninsula



Historical overview of the diversities of the Balkan countries

Since the beginning of the 1990s two simultaneously occurring, opposing trends have been present on the Balkans: a wave of Americanism and pan-Europeanism on the one hand, and a boom of excessive nationalism on the other. In that sense, I believe the Balkans do not fall out of the established global framework: globalization suffocates regional identity in small states and underdeveloped regions, giving way to ‘cultural imperialism’ of the economically strong actors, and this process only logically brings about a reactionary response.

iGENEA has specialized in the genetic origins of Europeans and can now genetically define numerous historical indigenous peoples. By indigenous peoples, we refer here to people groups from Antiquity who are defined not only by their own language, culture and history but also by their own DNA-profile. What is important is not the common

linguistic ancestry or the historical-anthropological categorization, but the individual genetic characteristics of a people.


Genealogy. What is this?

A DNA genealogical test shows you the haplogroup (going back 60,000 years ago), the ancient tribe your ancestors belonged to and where your ancestors came from 40 generations ago, which takes you back to the 11th / 13th centuries. You receive information about the maternal and paternal lines. DNA genealogy also allows you to locate “genetic cousins,” i.e. persons who share a common ancestor with you. When you exchange information, like family trees, with your “genetic cousins”, you expand your knowledge of your own family history.

The following results for the indigenous people have been gathered for the west Balkan states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro.

The results best speak for themselves and they are as follows:

Picture 2. iGENEA analyses for 6 Balkan countries



Source: iGENEA = Genetic Makeup of Balkan, 2009 BosniaFacts.info

If we compare above the genetic origins of the Balkan Population bearing in mind the actual and previous relationship and the many conflicts between each other it's seems the results are impossible and not true.

From the statistics and results it's seems that there is one harmonic and quite same structure of ethnicities living in different countries.

It's very easy to see that most of the 6 mentioned countries have much more similarities than diversities. As summary of all we can conclude that most of the mentioned countries have genetic origins from the same Indigenous Peoples:

- Illyrian = all of them starting from 10% (Macedonia) to 40% (Bosnia & Herzegovina) and
- Slav = all of them starting from 15% (Macedonia) to 30% (Serbia)

This one fact which us that all these countries have similar genetic origin from two peoples: Illyrian and Slav.

Overview of the Balkan countries in the economic aspects and process of globalization

Ironically, globalization is not a new idea. International trade developed way back, with traders including Marco Polo and discoverer Christopher Columbus. The development of trade and new ways of transport, including frigates and caravels, used while discovering

Northern and Southern America, and even the creation of railroads, are all origins of the revolution. But, to be precise, in accordance to the flow of this assignment, the starting point of globalization of the 20th and 21st century, will be in the post-World War II period and the beginning of the Cold War era.

One very important 21st century challenges, regarding investments are: integration processes, Trade Facilitation and free movement of: Goods, capital and services. The concept of European integration means linking – connecting European countries and peoples. Balkan Countries are pooling resources and shared decision-making within EU institutions (European Parliament, EU Council, European Commission, etc.). European integration has focused primarily on the economy, but their basis has been a political idea of approaching the European countries.

The simplest samples in today daily events and changes in the Balkan area including Kosovo itself are Hyper/Mega/Super Markets that are the main reasons for local food stops or even small business shutdowns; these were not a case some years ago in our areas but it was in EU West markets years ago.

Advantages and disadvantages of globalization

Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology. This process has effects on the environment, on culture, on political systems, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in societies around the world.

Globalization is deeply controversial, however. Proponents of globalization argue that it allows poor countries and their citizens to develop economically and raise their standards of living, while opponents of globalization claim that the creation of an unfettered international free market has benefited multinational corporations in the Western world at the expense of local enterprises, local cultures, and common people. Resistance to globalization has therefore taken shape both at a popular and at a governmental level as people and governments try to manage the flow of capital, labour, goods, and ideas that constitute the current wave of globalization.

From all analyses until now it is very easy to conclude all benefits – advantages and disadvantages of globalism:

a) The arguments for globalization include the following:

- It reduces poverty worldwide;
- It allows access to technology in developing countries;
- It promotes world peace;
- It has benefited women and children's rights;
- It raises life expectancy.

Globalization has several advantages on the economic, cultural, technological, social and some other fronts.

Globalization has become a common expression used to describe the world we are living in. Why?

- People around the globe are more connected to each other than ever before;
- Information and money transactions are flowing more rapid than ever;
- Goods produced in one part of the world are available in all parts thanks to improvement in communications;
- International travel is more frequent and global communication is no longer an insufficiency;
- The possibility of war between the developed countries decreases;
- Free trade between countries increases;
- Global mass media connects all the people in the world.

b) Disadvantages of Globalization:

The most important disadvantage of globalization are:

- The increasing number of loafers;
- Industry gravitated around particular countries. Because of that, these countries became a power in industry;
- Unemployment raised in the other countries. Another reason of the unemployment rise is the need of less manpower. Many workers found themselves suddenly unemployed, as they could no longer compete with machines which only required relatively limited work to produce more product than a single worker;
- Difficulty of competition for national enterprises in international unlimited market. Companies face much greater competition. This can put smaller com-

panies, at a disadvantage as they do not have resources to compete at global scale,

In conclusion, unemployment, social degeneration and difficulty of competition are most important disadvantages on people’s life that based on globalization

On the other hand is the political and economic level, where globalization is the process of denationalization of markets, politics and legal systems. Comments like those allow us to understand that the core sense of globalization is economics.

Statistics and global environment

Moreover, the high level of immigration from the Balkans towards Western Europe again closely relates to the emancipating, multicultural, cosmopolitanism debate. The free flow of information, goods and technology has certainly aided intercultural understanding and has offered a wide range of opportunities to the young generation of the Balkans. Still, the pivotal issue of the restricted flow of people remains unsolved, making us wonder whether ‘a global cosmopolitan identity’ is still only a privilege of the travelling elite of the world.

In the statistical analyses below it is easy to remark that Balkan diversities are not to high – expressed in number of population, density and population growth. There is only Kosovo exclusion because of his higher density per km and its higher population growth².

Best view is from tables below:

Table 1.1. Population and population density

Total population (thousands)							
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU-25	449,540	450,527	451,565				
Bulgaria	8,283	8,230	8,191	8,149	7,891	7,846	7,801
Croatia	4,501	4,554	4,427	4,440	4,444	4,442	4,439
Romania	22,507	22,472	22,443	22,408	21,803	21,742	21,685
Turkey	65,215	66,350	67,420	68,365	69,302	70,231	71,152
Albania	3,061	3,049	3,058	3,063	3,084	3,103	3,120
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	3,725	3,781	3,798	3,828	3,832	:
Macedonia	2,008	2,018	2,026	2,035	2,020	2,027	2,030
Serbia and Montenegro	8,394	8,373	8,343	8,326	8,114	8,153	8,147
Kosovo	2,225	2,264	2,304	2,345	2,387	2,429	2,473

² Kosovo and Turkey have the biggest population growth per year (Kosovo – 1.8% and Turkey – 1.3%)

Total population (inhabitants per Km2)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU-25	118.8	119.1	119.3	119.8			
Bulgaria	74.0	73.8	73.4	71.1	70.7	70.3	69.9
Croatia	79.6	80.5	78.3	78.5	78.6	78.5	78.5
Romania	94.4	94.2	94.1	94.0	91.5	91.2	90.9
Turkey	85.0	86.0	88.0	89.0	90.0	91.0	92.0
Albania	106.5	106.1	106.4	106.6	107.3	107.9	108.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Macedonia	77.9	78.3	78.6	79.0	79.2	78.7	89.2
Serbia and Montenegro	92.0	91.3	91.4	91.2	88.9	89.3	227.4
Kosovo	204.6	208.1	211.8	215.6	219.5	223.3	2,473.0

Table 1.2. Popul. growth (% change compared with prev. year)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU-25	0.2	0.2	0.2				
Bulgaria (1)	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5	-0.5	-3.2	-0.6	-0.6
Croatia (2)	-1.6	1.2	-2.8	0.3	0.1	0.0	-0.1
Romania	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	-2.7	-0.3	-0.3
Turkey (3)	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
Albania (4)	-0.9	-0.4	0.3	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina (5)	:	:	1.5	0.4	0.8	0.1	:
Macedonia	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	-0.7	0.3	0.2
Serbia and Montenegro (5)	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.2	-2.5	0.5	-0.1
Kosovo (6)	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8

1) As of January (2) 1996-2001, as of June (3) Mid-year population estimates.

(4) As of January (2) 1996-2000, population was revised based on the 1989 and 2001 popul. census (5).

Table 1.3 Trading in Balkan and EU**Extern. trade of goods with EU-25**

	Exports to the EU-25 (% of total exports)				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Bulgaria	54.4	58.2	59.3	60.1	58.3
Croatia	69.3	67.6	:	:	:
Romania	69.4	73.2	72.6	73.6	72.8
Turkey	54.3	53.5	53.9	55.1	54.7
Albania	79.3	71.4	:	:	:
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	53.1	:
Macedonia	46.9	51.4	:	:	:
Serbia and Montenegro	48.1	51.3	51.8	:	:
Kosovo	:	:	:	40.7	28.7

Imports to the EU-25 (% of total imports)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Bulgaria	49.4	55.2	55.6	55.3	54.1
Croatia	70.1	71.7	:	:	:
Romania	64.6	66.4	67.4	67.2	64.9
Turkey	50.3	45.6	47.5	48.2	46.7
Albania	78.3	78.1	:	:	:
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	57.6	:
Macedonia	48.7	52.5	:	:	:
Serbia and Montenegro	49.4	51.9	55.2	:	:
Kosovo	:	:	:	36.1	35.6

Source: Eurostat, population in Balkan countries compare to EU

The new means of transportation and techniques of communication, allow consumers to participate in the “immediate information” level of globalization. The present stage of globalization allows people to participate in international trade from their desk, thus directly influencing the world economy, much greater than at the beginning of the century.

Balkan countries through the prism of EU enlargement process

The European Union is an expression used to describe the process of accession to full membership of the new Member States and is one of the most important EU policies. EU enlargement policy objectives are to increase security, stability and prosperity on the European continent. Since its inception, the European Union has undergone five rounds of enlargement.

The Balkan countries, due to the integration processes and contractual agreements with EU have expanded their markets and possibilities. Investing in this part of Europe means investing not only in one single limited market but in one much bigger market and area which includes, apart from the Balkan countries, also the EU if they are part of contractual agreement.

The Gallup Brussels office in partnership with the European Fund for the Balkans (EFB) and LSE IDEAS (a research centre for the study of international affairs, diplomacy and grand strategy at the London School of Economics) hosted an event on “Balkan views of a multipolar world”. Gallup Balkan Monitor survey related to the event’s topic. The most pertinent results of the survey include:

Several types of affiliations emerge:

- The Muslims and Albanians of the region are very positive about Western countries and organisations (such as the EU and NATO) and Turkey;
- The Serbs in the Western Balkans feel increasingly isolated; even the usual fondness of Russia and China is slowly fading;
- People in Croatia are above all protective of their own sovereignty – and are becoming suspicious of major powers;

The situation concerning EU enlargement is:

Candidate countries: Croatia, Iceland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Montenegro, Turkey

Potential candidates: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo.

Identity Problems and Balkan divergences during the European Union Integration

As conclusion regarding identity problems and Balkan diversities during the EU enlargement we have several facts:

- Western societies are pluralistic entities composed of groups with widely different interests and ideologies;
- European Union integration concentrates on the loss and transfer of national sovereignty to the superior authorities and the erosion of the national identity;
- In this globalization era, the local identity is demolished and another new “globalized” identity is created. In this new identity, somehow it is dominated by Western culture. Western culture American or European, is the culture which is leading the world in the last decades.

But it is argued that European Union membership of all Balkan countries will provide a strong guaranty for the development and stability of Balkans fragile democratic regimes.

In questionnaire with the following questions:

Is, in your opinion, Globalization killing local identity³?

- Yes We need to preserve local culture from the voracity of wild globalization
- No Globalization is a way to enrich the world
- **So so**, this is one of the myths of globalization

We got the following answers:

- Yes We need to preserve local culture from the voracity of wild globalization 16.67% (100 votes)
- No Globalization is a way to enrich the world 50% (300 votes)

1. **So so**, this is one of the myths of globalization 33.33% (200 votes)

Total Votes: 600

With the internet connection, the distance between people is getting smaller; the impacts of different cultures is getting stronger. However, in this combination of cultures, people will tend to choose one priority to follow, and in this process some parts of the local identity are killed.

Conclusion

The hypothesis that Mutual influence between the diversity in the Balkans and the globalization process is large was right.

Also we can conclude too, that even there are also many disadvantages of globalization especially for countries from Balkan, it is indisputable that we can't be against globalization era.

The best argument in favour of globalization is a statement from Mr. Kofi Anan that "*Arguing against globalization is like arguing against the laws of gravity*".

Globalization means increasing the interdependence, connectivity and integration on a global level with respect to the social, cultural, political, technological, economic and ecological levels.

The global behavioural trends are going through some major changes as well. If we take a look back at the last decade, it is starting to take different forms, including international trade, as well as a rapid growth of imports and exports, not forgetting about foreign investments, foreign loans and bonds, and many others.

The better side of the medal proves that nowadays people, all over the world, have become closer than ever before. Economically, domestic goods and services have a greater probability of export and promotion in comparison to previous years.

3 Student research 2009, P. Budi College, Prishtina - Kosovo

This particular phenomenon affects the economic business and exerts a wide influence on society leaving the growth of the developing countries as the main cause of globalization and it brings both opportunities and advantages for the future:

- The development of international business is higher than ever seen before;
- There have been many issues concerning communication, cultural differences and marketing which are becoming resolved;
- The number of quotas, tariffs and trade barriers have been steadily declining, allowing an average businessperson, to conduct business abroad, easier than half a century ago;
- The improvement of communication, through the introduction and constant development, high speed and accessibility of the Internet, has allowed international exchange to be done at a click of a button;
- Large corporations as well as smaller companies have decided to take a step forward and spread their operations from the domestic to the international market, in order to find new customers, opportunities and increase in their revenue.

These companies are the ones facing increased pressure from cultural differences, waiting on the market, where a new service, product or marketing campaign will be introduced. In order to meet these global challenges, marketing departments of such companies must be ready to standardize their organization, apply the rules of globalization, respond to local differences and run an in-depth marketing analysis and research of the target foreign market. Omitting any of these goals can result in misunderstanding, miscommunication or other consequences.

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Links:

- <http://www.globalisationguide.org/01.html>
- <http://www.wto.org>
- <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2011/eur/eng/ereo0511.pdf>
- http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-70-05-899/EN/KS-70-05-899-EN.PDF
- <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/3/2089864.pdf>
- www.dogana-ks.org
- <http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/>
- <http://www.mfe-ks.org/>
- <http://www.mti-ks.org/>
- http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/rep2/
- http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/balkans/index_en.htm
- http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en.htm
- <http://www.gatt.org/>
- <http://www.worldbank.org/>
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_European_Free_Trade_Agreement
- http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/index_en.htm
- <http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm>

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IDENTITY AND PLACE: TOWARDS ONE DURABLE INTERPLAY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

Abstract

The question that is central in this paper is linked to the historical interplay between two fundamental concepts in the social sciences and humanities: identity and place. I thereby argue that there are two interlinked developments that have significantly marked the study of the relations between identity and place: (1) the introduction and development of the concept of boundaries and together with it the shift towards considering identity “as a process” and (2) the alteration of the isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities.

Key words: identity, place, social boundaries, identity as a process, conceptual analyses

Introduction

The study on identity, as probably the most important cornerstone since the beginnings of the sociological thought, shifted its macro/micro focus several times throughout the decades: while the classic sociological theories were focused on collective identity and the formation of “we” (Durkheim’s collective consciousness, Marx’s class consciousness or Weber’s *Verstehen*), the dominant work in the 70s was micro-sociological and explored the ways in which interpersonal interactions form the individual sense of self [for more detailed analyses see Cerulo (1997)]. While in the decades after that the focus was mainly on the social-constructivist understanding of identity and its antithesis later expressed by the postmodernists, and significant work was done within both micro and macro perspectives and the most influential works seem to have been done on the linkage of the two.

The interplay between identity and place marked one of the central fields in social sciences and urban studies and contributed vastly to the development of the knowledge on society. One may easily argue that the interest on these matters have been present even in the earliest studies on the city. In the work of the earliest Chicago School scholars, for example, one can locate two, often inseparable, implicit rather than explicit interplays between space and identity: first, those studies link urban spaces to social groups, and second, they link urban spaces to distinct cultures (for more see, for example, Tonkiss 2005). This logic of dividing space and difference in culture and social groups was dominant throughout many decades. Blokland and Savage (2001) give maybe one of the most comprehensive understandings of this isomorphism of space and culture/group. They argue that in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, class and space tended to

overlap as social groups lived separate lives, which were largely defined by the labour market needs; thus, the immobility of the working class and its dependence on rented accommodation and poor transportation meant that workers and their families lived near to where they worked (Tim and Watt 2007: 54).

Yet, the circumstances in which we live today have changed and the contemplation on the link between identity and space has significantly advanced. The question that is central in this paper is, thus, linked to the historical interplay between these two important concepts in the social sciences: what has been the historical link between identity and place in social sciences and which important turnovers have marked their interplay? I thereby argue in this paper that there are two interlinked developments that have significantly marked the study of identity and place: (1) the introduction and development of the concept of boundaries and together with it the shift towards considering identity as a process and (2) the alteration of the isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities. Today we think of this isomorphism between space and culture (and space and social groups), that was dominant at the beginning of the study about the city, as part of the past, part of the way we used to think about the city. Consequently, we think of its alteration as crucial in the development of the urban studies.

The concept of boundaries in the social sciences: a turn towards “identity as a process”

Focusing on the identification processes, rather than the typology of forms of groups and relations, one chooses a more materialist and pragmatic concern with the way people behave and aims to understand what people do to be members of one group. In this endeavour of sociology, the concept of boundaries has become the most important tool for understanding the processes that are involved in generating and maintaining the identity of the group. Introduced by Barth (1969) and later advanced by a vast number of scholars, boundaries have been studied in various empirical studies from the macro levels and the reflection on the role of the state in the production of differences to numerous micro-level works (for comprehensive overviews of the studies on boundaries see Lamont 2002, Cerulo 1997).

The concept of boundaries revolutionized the thinking about ethnic identity, and it offered an alternative to the static and linear theories that dominated until the 1960s that stated that geographical and social isolation are the main factors in sustaining diversity between various groups and cultures, as well as to the more biological definitions of ethnic origin and belonging. Even though the basics of the constructivist model of ethnicity can be found already in the work of Max Weber, the theory of Barth (1969) was particularly important in that moment – in his most influential essay in this field, he rejected the idea that ethnicity is based on shared culture and values and introduced a more relational approach to the thinking about ethnic groups pointing to the idea that the belonging to a group, or the ethnic identity, is defined in opposition to the perceived identity of the other ethnic groups (for other similar perspectives see for example Horowitz 1985). Thus, even though his work was published in the times of the domination of the structural-func-

tionalism in social anthropology, “he was moving away from a structural-functionalism which over-solidified them [the groups] as Durkhemian social facts” (quoted in Jenkins 1996:92). The idea on which his theory is based is that ethnic groups are categories of identification of the participants themselves and are “produced” by people in their social interaction. He argued for an idea of “dialectical” nature of the formation of the ethnic groups and his main suggestion is to look at the processes that are involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups from the perspective of understanding the way differences with other ethnic groups are being formed.

Looking at the actual process of generating the ethnic group, Barth writes that the ethnic groups “persist despite a flow of personnel across them” (Barth 1969:9) as “the ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained *despite* changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories” (1969:10). Barth advances this argument by pointing to the fact that social relations are in fact maintained across such boundaries and they are based exactly on the nature of boundaries to provide the dichotomized ethnic statuses. Thus, his theory is based on the notion that not only that cultural differences between ethnic groups can persist regardless of the interethnic contact interdependence, but also that the social interaction and acceptance are the foundations of the ethnic difference. Thus, Barth describes the boundaries as processes that define the group, not the cultural components that constitute the group, even though in his work he doesn’t neglect the relationships within the boundary – Barth for example emphasizes the importance of shared values for the maintenance of the group. Along these lines, Barth emphasizes that the ethnic groups are based on a continual expression and validation which enable a “dichotomizing” nature of the ethnic boundaries and a situation in which the others can be identified as strangers and members of another ethnic group, a situation which “implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding an mutual interest” (1969:12). In his work, the boundaries that define that group are social boundaries even though they in some situations may have territorial counterparts. He understands them as products of social interaction that are subjects to change and modify with time and they are generated in the interaction between people from different ethnic groups and thus, they can be anywhere or anything. His work has been used in various empirical studies from the macro levels and the thinking about the role of the state in the production of differences [e.g. Starr (1992), for more examples see Lamont 2002], to numerous micro culture-based anthropological works.

Later when revisiting the concept in his essay called “Boundaries and Connections”, Barth (2000) comments on this overly present usage of the concept and recommends that sociologists and anthropologists should understand social boundaries in terms of people’s cognitive inclinations expressed through their social practice and to think about the concepts and mental operations that are used by them to construct their world – he writes that in the vast amount of studies, “‘boundary’ has consistently been *our* concept, made to serve our own analytical purposes” (Barth 2000:34) and it becomes an empirical ques-

tion to understand whether “a concept of boundaries is deployed by *them* to think about territories, social groups or categorical distinctions” (Barth 2000:34).

The work of Cohen (1985), too, made a significant contribution to the understanding of how people experience and express a sense of distinctiveness and common identity. In his work he shows that “community exists in the minds of the people and as such it should not be confused with sociographic assertions of ‘fact’” (Cohen, 1985: 98). His main arguments are that (1) the community is a symbolic rather than a structural construct, and (2) that symbols create sense of belonging and sense of distinctiveness and common identity.

Jenkins (1996, 1997) advances this thinking on social identities and writes that they always represent a dialectic relationship between internal and external definitions – drawing largely on Cohen (1985) he writes that the members of one group must be able to base their belonging to that group on similarities between them and other criteria of community, and drawing largely on Barth (1969) he argues that they must also have criteria of differences with other groups and, moreover, those others must also recognize their internal concept of similarities. Yet, bearing in mind that identity is always a dialectic between similarity and difference Jenkins offers some proposals that alter the basic anthropological model influenced by Barth which dominates the field and which describes ethnicity as based on cultural differentiation and social interaction, as no more fixed than the culture of which it is a component and the context in which it is produced and as a social phenomenon that can be both collective and individual, externalized in social interaction and internalized in the personal construction of the self (Jenkins, 1997: 65). He suggests that this model should be advanced, for example, with a focus on culture and the everyday constitution of ethnicity, during primary socialization and emphasizes the role of the “others” in its formation by stating that “although ethnic identity is socially constructed, it is not infinitely variable, malleable or negotiable. It may be deeply founded in the more than half forgotten experiences of primary socialization. It is constructed and shaped by its necessary dependence upon the categorization of the Others. Its potential is always an imminent emergent property of its cultural content and history. And it all depends upon how much it matters – in terms of costs and benefits if nothing else – to those whose everyday lives are its making, remaking and unmaking” (Jenkins, 1997: 169).

One important contribution of scholars by now is the thinking that boundaries are vastly shaped by context and when they mark differences and similarities they do not all do so everywhere in the same way. Jenkins says that identity is not more fixed than the culture of which it is a component and the context in which it is produced and as a social phenomenon it can be both collective and individual, externalized in social interaction and internalized in the personal construction of self (Jenkins, 1997: 65). In his book on ethnicity he suggests a focus on culture and the everyday constitution of ethnicity by stating that “although ethnic identity is socially constructed, it is not infinitely variable, malleable or negotiable. It may be deeply founded in the more than half forgotten experiences of primary socialization. It is constructed and shaped by its necessary dependence upon the categorization of the Others. Its potential is always an imminent emergent property of its cultural content and history.” (Jenkins 1997: 169). Cultural sociologists (like Lamont 1992, 2000, Swidler 2001) generally centre their attention on the importance of the context in which the boundaries exists and how the cultural meanings and traditions

that the individuals have access to influence the boundary processes and in their research they focus on how the boundaries are loaded with local context and meanings (Lamont 2002:171). This thinking requires a relational approach to the social phenomena – the self is formed differently for the upper classes and for the unemployed poor for example, and moreover, even within one group it is related differently to the various group identities. The comparative research of Lamont, for example, suggests that identity and boundaries are constructed, but bounded by the cultural repertoires to which people have access to and the context in which they live (Lamont 2002). In her book *Money, Morals and Manners* (1992), Lamont analyzed how professionals define worthy people, how they use those categories and criteria to draw class boundaries. Using rich data from interviews with upper-middle class professionals in France and USA, she underlines the context in which that boundary-work happens and specifies the condition under which boundaries create objective conditions for social inequality. In the *Dignity of Working Men* (2000), she goes further in understanding the way the local context influences the content of the boundaries and how they change with the change of the environment by exploring the various criteria used by French and American workers against the poor and the rich, the racial minorities and immigrants. Thus, she shows that boundary-making and identity are tied to the cultural resources that the workers have access to as well as their living conditions, the point which she says is her biggest criticism of Bourdieu's *Distinction*. This understanding of boundaries gives an opportunity to think of identity as a process and not as a given state of affairs, and what is more important, to understand that after having been made up or imagined or created, boundaries have to be constantly maintained, enforced or avoided in all their aspects including the ideas of what they *stand for* in the local context.

Another important contribution of the research on boundaries would include the thinking about the “other(s)” to which the boundaries are directed - are identities defined in opposition to a privileged “Other” or a number of possible “others”? Lamont (2002) suggests that social boundaries are more likely to generate boundaries that are drawn in opposition to one group as opposed to multiple groups. Along the same lines, significant research has been done on the way racial boundaries are drawn in the American society: Kefalas (2003) in her research on how white working class in Chicago place themselves in the American society by denying their marginality and positioning themselves mostly against poor blacks, writes that “class-bound ideologies and boundaries make it difficult for garden dwellers to reconcile themselves to existence of *white* teenage mothers, *white* homeless, *white* drug addicts, *white* gangbangers, *white* single mothers, and poor *whites*” (Kefalas, 2003: 155). Watters (1999) also showed how the Indian immigrants in the USA build strategies of self-presentation while drawing boundaries in relation to the African-Americans; DiTomaso (2000) writes how the lower classes of whites compare their positions in the labour market with those of the blacks (quoted in Lamont 2002) and Young Jr. (2004), for example, researched the identity patterns of poor young black men and the ways they position themselves in the society in relation to the social position of others. Lamont (2002) has, moreover, analyzed the research done on the cross-national boundary-making strategies to understand how countries define themselves in opposition to one another. She points to the research of Lamont and Trevenot (2002) who by analyzing the criteria of evaluation that are present across environmentalism, art critique,

racism and others in France and USA show that there are various criteria such as market principles or certain aesthetics that are present in each nation and region but in various proportion – differences that, as the authors suggest, constitute the basis for diverging national identities (Lamont, 2002: 185). Moreover, as Lamont shows, these differences further serve as a basis for policy making: as (Saguy, 2003) shows, the sexual harassment policy of France is explicitly defined against what is viewed as the American sphere of political correctness (in Lamont 2002:185). Along the same lines, it is important to question the *shifting* of the “other” and the possibility that one locally defined boundary may mark differences with one significant “other” and similarities with another “other”.

The concept of boundaries defined as such and the thinking of identity as a process rather than a given picture made a significant change in the social sciences in general and in the thinking of the link between place and identity in particular. The next section will thereby document how this thinking influenced the isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities.

The shifted isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities

The first influential studies that altered this isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities appeared in the late 80s in the ethnographic works of Appadurai (1988, 1996), Rossaldo (1988), Gupta and Ferguson (1992), Rodman (1992) and others who were concerned with the idea that place should be taken more seriously when studying culture and the social identities of people. The most influential of all, the work of Gupta and Ferguson (1992), as well as Gupta (1992), suggested an urgent rethinking of the, as they call it, assumed isomorphism of place, space and culture (1992: 7). Beside the apparent problems that this isomorphism causes to the border regions and the peoples living there, Gupta and Ferguson noted that a set of problems have arisen by the implicit mapping of cultures onto places linked to the “account for cultural differences *within* a locality” (1992: 7). Their thinking has been one of the first to suggest that the conventional accounts of ethnicity rely on a link between identity and place without truly interrogating that link in a fundamental manner. In a similar vein, Rodman (1992) has suggested that “by joining multilocality to multivocality, we can look ‘through’ these places, explore their links with others, consider why they are constructed as they are, see how places represent people, and begin to understand how people embody places” (Rodman 1992: 652).

The thinking of the scholars on the effect of globalization on the local sense of place and belonging marks the second shift in the relationship between space and social identities. Appadurai (1996) introduced the notion of translocality to best capture the need to alter the isomorphism between territory and identity that Gupta and Ferguson (1992) first talked about: translocality means that the territorial links of identity and community are problematised by modes of practice which reconstitute these communities in places beyond the boundaries of fixed territory. Appadurai argues that places and localities should not only be contexts, but should be seen as active in the identity and boundary-processes. Thus, localities are not given, but are socially produced through processes of boundary definition. Appadurai was vastly influenced by Barth (1969) and Cohen (1985) and in his

work one can locate a very well developed link between boundaries and space: he argued that the global processes and flows allow communities, identities, neighbourhoods to be reproduced as people can differentiate their neighbourhood from the outside. City dwellers encounter many images, places, technologies people from outside which significantly influence the way they redefine their various identities and senses of place.

In addition to Appadurai, a vast number of scholars embarked upon a better understanding of the interplay between place, identity and global processes. Yet, while in the early period globalization theory frequently pronounced the end of local identities and the fatal erosion of place [see Savage at all (2005) for more], the dominant theories since the 90s and until today argue that the attachment to place still remains remarkably important and that to understand place and locality in times of globalization we need to focus on new forms of interplay between place, identity and belonging [see for example Massey (1994), Castells (1996, 1997), Sassen 1991, Smith 2001]. For Ulrich Beck, “globalisation is a non-linear, dialectic process in which the global and the local do not exist as cultural polarities but as combined and mutually implicating principles” (Beck 2002: 17, quoted in Savage at all 2005:3). Savage at all (2005), for example, offer the concept of elective belonging as one of those forms between place, identity and belonging that the scholarship has argued for to capture that “the power of place is defined by a large group of those who ‘electively belong’ to a specific residential location which they can make congruent with their lives” (2005: 203).

The third shift marks the link between the built environment and monumentality and the social identities of the city dwellers. A lot of the central work in sociology and the neighbouring fields that has been devoted to the understanding of how national representations are managed by the state and national and religious elites (for example, Anderson 1983; Herzfeld 1987, 2005; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Wright 1985). In urban studies, too, the major work in the past decades has been concerned with the relations of political and economic power in the formation of urban logics, like Lefebvre’s and Harvey’s theoretical conceptualizations, Soja’s Third Space, Davis’s City of Quartz (Davis 1990; Harvey 1973, 2000; Lefebvre 1991; Soja 1996). Such studies aim to understand and explain why states and national elites are privileging some part of the history and ignoring others in the processes of rediscovering the past in various ways and contexts. These discussions further make it clear that states and state ideologies are not the only points at which the imagination of place is politicised; such oppositional images of place can be found in the ethnic self-determination of minorities or in the anti-colonial national movements (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:12). Bisharat (1992), for example, has shown how the constructions of “homeland” have changed as a response to the change of the political contexts in the Palestinian conflict and how the idea of homeland is central to the Palestinian struggle for national self-determination (in Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 12).

The other part of that metonymic relationship between the built environment and monumentality and the social identities of people is the understanding that urban landscapes are not only an expression of identity but they also shape the identity of the city dwellers that live in them. Pioneered by Barbara Bender (Bender 1993, 1998, 2001, 2002) and advanced by a number of studies (for example, Tilley 2006, Herzfeld 2006), this

thinking suggests that it is not only important to acknowledge that the infrastructure, the monuments and the built environment are endorsed with the ability to *speak* in the context of a particular political and social setting, but also it is important to understand what are they understood as *saying* by the city dwellers themselves.

These three major shifts in the thinking about the link between the spatial locations and social identities significantly altered the approach that there is an isomorphism between space and identity and that cultures are mapped onto places only and cannot escape this duality. Thanks to numerous studies and battles over concepts, today we no longer assume their isomorphism, and consequently, we think of its alteration as crucial in the development of the urban studies.

Conclusion

Alongside the numerous trends in sociology and urban studies linked to political systems, representations, power relations, marginalization, gentrification and many others, there is the thinking of place, promoted mostly by sociologists and social anthropologists, concerned with the study of identity and the role of the place in it. The focus of this paper is the interplay between these two concepts in social sciences – identity and place – and is directed towards a historical analysis of the major shifts that marked it. In this paper I argued that there are two interlinked developments that have significantly marked the study of identity and place. The first is linked to the introduction and development of the concept of boundaries and together with it the shift towards considering identity as a process. Since the times of Barth and his seminal piece on ethnic groups and their boundaries (1969), sociologists became more interested in the processes that are involved in generating and maintaining an individual, group or collective identity rather than, for example, the typology of forms and relations. The second is connected to the alteration of the isomorphism between spatial locations and social identities: today we no longer think that cultures are mapped onto places only and in our thinking we, conceptually and methodologically, escape that duality.

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IDENTITIES AS NECESSARY FICTIONS

Abstract

The paper deals with the theory of identity which was elaborated by a British sociologist and historian Jeffrey Weeks in his book *Invented Moralities – Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty* (1995). Although he primarily discusses sexual identities, his view can be applied in considerations of other types of identity – ethnic, national, religious, class, status, racial, gender, generational, geographical, political in the narrow sense and so forth. As a part of his larger project of *radical humanism*, which puts the spotlight on individual freedom and celebrates the rich diversity of human goals whilst affirming the importance of solidarity among people, Weeks discusses identities as *necessary fictions* – complex, hybrid, heterogeneous and historical social constructions. If they are asserted too firmly, there are dangers of fixing identifications and values that are (always and necessarily) in flux; yet if their validity is denied, there is an even greater danger of disempowering individuals and groups from the best means of mobilizing for social change. Weeks (following Foucault) pleads for a move towards the research of the forms of social relations that would allow our identities to take on more fluid meanings, which would enable the actors to take a more enlightened, conscious and critical look at themselves and at those with whom they come into a variety of interactions. The last part of the paper examines the possibilities and scope of Weeks' conception in the study of post-socialist societies in transition.

Key words: Identities, Historicity, Social Constructionism

And so it comes about that we begin to conceptualize matters of identity at the very time in history when they become a problem.
(Erikson, 1977: 256)

Anthony Giddens, in a book which he wrote some twenty years ago (*Modernity and Self-Identity – Self and society in the Late Modern Age*) spoke, amongst many other issues, of 'the reflexive project of the self'. His basic point was that in modern times 'self' (or identity¹) is reflexively produced or made – it is not inherited or given. Jenkins (2008, pp. 28-36) argues, criticizing Giddens, that reflexive self-identification, far from being distinctively modern, is a *generic* aspect of being human. He offers examples of St. Augustine's *Confessions*, written about 1600 years ago, as a testament to the possibilities

1 A number of sociological dictionaries (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology*, *The Sage Dictionary of Sociology*, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*) have entries 'identity' referring to 'self', or vice versa. Following that, we use the terms interchangeably.

for re-forging the self offered as an example to others, as well as that of Buddhism which can be understood as a project for the reformation of the self. Without going into the debate about dating the emergence of this capacity for reflexivity, we can acknowledge the proliferation of identities in our time. Identities have nowadays certainly become more diverse and less fixed. There is a growing number of people who no longer feel obliged to cling on to the 'traditional' features of the self. To some people this poses a serious problem. But there are others who take joy in this new situation. The attitudes of both groups become a subject of research of social scientists, who, in doing so, use the concept of identity increasingly.

Where does this preoccupation with identity come from? Why is identity such a popular notion? What are the sources of this, it would not be too much to say, fascination with identity? Ravishment with identity, by the way, makes it even more problematic, since 'this concept has not only acquired such a near universal acceptance but it has also become a normative straitjacket' (Malešević, 2002: 195).

Some clarifications regarding the concept

The idea of 'identity', as we know it today, is a relatively new one. It came into use as a popular social-science term only in the 1950s (Gleason, 1983, p. 910). It has filled the role that the three other major social concepts have vacated, notions with equal value charge and 'all explaining' characteristic attached to them: *race*, *national character*, and *social consciousness* (Malešević, 2002: 209).

It has its origins in mathematics, where it is defined simultaneously in two ways:

as absolute zero difference and as relative nonzero difference [...]. The absolute definition of identity relates to 'the unconditional nature of a thing that is not derived from external relation – the product of internal self-similarity', while the relative definition of identity implies 'the conditional nature of a thing, n, derived from the difference between n and not(n) – the product of external other-difference'.
(Malešević, 2002: 196)

To put it a bit more simply (if not in a too simplistic manner): identity is about sameness and difference. Transposed to the sphere of social, '[i]identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others' (Weeks, 1989, p. 88).

Sociologists argue that identities are fluid and changeable, that persons during their life course can take on new ones, this depending on social, cultural and historical context that one finds him-/herself in². Identity is, as stated clearly by Peter Berger in *Invitation to Sociology* (1963) to be 'socially bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed'. Individual agency and structural factors are in a dialectical relation:

Identity is, of course, a key element of subject reality, and like all subjective reality, stands in a dialectical relationship with society. Identity is formed by social processes. Once crystallized, it is maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social relations. The social processes involved in both the formation and maintenance of

² 'Identities are relational, formed through social relations and politics, so that powerful political movements give rise to identity rather than the other way round' (Weeks, 1995: 101).

identity are determined by the social structure. Conversely, the identities produced by the interplay of organism, individual consciousness and social structure react upon the given social structure, maintaining it, modifying it, or even reshaping it. Societies have histories in the course of which specific identities emerge; these histories are, however, made by men with specific identities. If one is mindful of this dialectic one can avoid the misleading notion of 'collective identities' without having recourse to the uniqueness, sub specie aeternitatis, of individual existence. Specific historical social structures engender identity types, which are recognizable in individual cases (Berger & Luckmann, 1967: 173-4)³

There are a few caveats that should be kept in mind concerning the concept of identity. First of all, identity 'is a *process – identification* – not a 'thing'. It is not something that one can *have*, or not; it is something that one *does*' (Jenkins, 2008: 5). It cannot be stressed enough that identity 'is not something tangible, material or visible' (Malešević, 2002: 195), since the casual *reification* of 'identity' could pose a serious problem, rendering the concept totally unusable for scientific purposes. Second, 'identification doesn't *determine* what humans do. Knowing 'the map' – or even just approximately where we are – does not necessarily tell us where we should go next (although a better or worse route to our destination might be suggested)' (Jenkins, 2008: 5). And last, but not the least, identifications are embedded in diverse *power relations* – 'knowing who's who isn't merely a matter of neutral classification. Or, rather, classification is rarely neutral [...]. At the very least, classification implies evaluation, and often much more' (Jenkins, 2008: 6). Interrelations of identities and interests are hard to unravel, and should always be taken into account when considering identity.

Jeffrey Weeks on identities as necessary fictions

British sociologist and historian Jeffrey Weeks gave the most elaborate deliberations on identity in his book *Invented Moralities – Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty* (1995). Although there, as well as in his other writings, he primarily discusses sexual identities, his view can (with more or less success) be applied in considerations of other types of identity – ethnic, national, religious, class, status, racial, gender, generational, geographical, political in the narrow sense and so forth.

To put it most succinctly: he speaks of identities as *necessary fictions*. His view offers a critical view of all identities by demonstrating their historical character and arbi-

3 Classical sociological statement on identity, with an emphasis on the individual-society dialectics, quite similar to the one quoted above, can be found in Peter Berger's writing on 'Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge', where he explains the relation between psychological reality and social structure: 'psychological reality is in an ongoing dialectical relationship with social structure. Psychological reality refers here, *not* to scientific or philosophical propositions *about* psychological phenomena, but to the manner in which the individual apprehends himself, his processes of consciousness and his relations with others. Whatever its anthropological-biological roots, psychological reality arises in the individual's biography in the course of social processes and is only maintained (that is, maintained in consciousness as "reality") by virtue of social processes. [...] Self and society are inextricably interwoven entities. Their relationship is dialectical because the self, once formed, may act back in its turn upon the society that shaped it (a dialectic that Mead expressed in his formulation of the "I" and the "me"). The self exists by virtue of society, but society is only possible as many selves continue to apprehend themselves and each other with reference to it' (Berger, 1966: 106-7).

trariness, debunking their ‘naturalness’, revealing the tentacles of power that ensnare and shape them. It brings identities back to the world inhabited by human beings, who created them in the first place, thus revealing the openness and contingency of any identity. This move makes human agency essential in the battles fought around identities.

This perspective is a part of Weeks’ larger project of *radical pluralism* which puts the spotlight on individual freedom and celebrates the rich diversity of human goals whilst affirming the importance of solidarity among people. There is some ambivalence on his part in recognizing the fictional character of identities, and even their ability to limit, but at the same time seeing the sense of identity as an individual’s personal compass through the uncharted complexity of social relations. Abandoning identity could mean losing a valuable reference point in an otherwise incomprehensible and potentially hostile environment; hence their character of necessity.

This tension must be kept in balance and identity politics becomes the art of maintaining equilibrium between affirming and denying validity of any identity.

If they are asserted too firmly there are dangers of fixing identifications and values that are really necessarily always in flux; yet if their validity is denied, there is an even greater danger of disempowering individuals and groups from the best means of mobilizing for radical change. (Weeks, 1995: 88)

To create an identity means finding a delicate balance between the opportunities of contemporary life and identification with one version of history. In other words, it involves placing oneself in the narrative⁴ of the past, appropriating a particular history and making it usable in making sense of the present – using history in legitimizing contingency.

Weeks acknowledges the influence that the work of Michel Foucault had on him. He continues Foucault’s endeavor of shedding light on the operation of discourse(s) in producing and maintaining identities⁵. To be more precise, what is produced

is not an identity but a propensity. It is the whole series of social interactions, encounters with peers, educational processes, rituals of exclusion, labelling events, chance encounters, political identifications, and so on, which structure [...] identities. They are not pre-given in nature; probably like the propensities themselves they are social creations, though at different levels in the formation of psychological individuality. (Weeks, 2006: 139)

Foucault is following his mentor’s (Louis Althusser) idea of *interpellation*: ideological state apparatuses train people to recognize themselves in a particular way – ‘men [*sic!*] become that as which they are addressed’ (Berger, 1966: 114). So he sees the relationship between symbol and symbolized as not only referential but productive⁶. Discourses of

4 The importance of narrative in sustaining an identity is stressed by Giddens: ‘A person’s identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor – important though this is – in the reactions of others, but in the capacity to *keep a particular narrative going*. The individual’s biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing ‘story’ about the self” (Giddens, 1991: 54).

5 It is interesting to note the absence of the term ‘identity’ (*identité*) from Foucault’s original text (Halperin, 1998: 109).

6 Compare this to Ian Hacking’s contrasting people and things: ‘Except when we interfere, what things are doing, and indeed what camels are doing, does not depend on how we describe them. But some of the things that we ourselves do are intimately connected to our descriptions. [...] all intentional acts are acts under a

power produce subjects by ‘discovering their own truths’. A well-known passage referring to the constitution of ‘the homosexual’ from Foucault’s first volume of the *History of Sexuality* illustrates this:

As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and a possibly mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature. We must not forget that that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was characterized [...] less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species. (Foucault, 1979: 43)

Against the instances of this practice of subjecting people by ‘discovering their inner and eternal truth’⁷, Weeks sets a group of ideas that makes up his concept of identity as necessary fiction:

Identity as essential truth	Identity as necessary fiction
Uniformity	Difference
Fixity (naturalness, eternity, truth)	Fluidity (historical openness, flexibility, temporality, conditional nature)
Myth (agent of stability)	Fiction (agent of change)
Given or assigned character	Choice
Monolithic or homogenous	Complex, hybrid, heterogeneous

For Weeks, identities are less (or not at all) about expressing an essential truth about our being. They are about mapping our different values – of autonomy, relationships, belonging, difference and diversity. Countering essentialism(s), Weeks also sets himself against any kind of fundamentalism, which he sees ‘as a reflex against the rapidity of change, where everything that was fixed begins to seem radically uncertain’ (Weeks, 1989: 97), an attempt to proclaim particular experiences as universal truth (p. 98) with affirming ‘absolutism against relativism, certainty against chronic uncertainty’ (Weeks,

description. Hence if new modes of description come into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence’ (Hacking, 1992: 80-1), and: ‘Who we are is not only what we did, do, and will do but also what we might have done and may do’ (p. 79).

7 ‘The seeking out of a ‘true identity’ is here seen as a threat and a challenge, because it is not freely chosen. It claims to be finding what we *really* are, or should be, and as a result identity becomes an imposition’ (Weeks, 1991a: 74).

2005: 195), while offering ‘security and a sense of home’ and soothing ‘the anguish of individual choice’ (*ibid.*).

The story of identity puts some light on the troubling paradox: people are increasingly aware that modern society is about flux and change, that what they call ‘identity’ is as much a product of language and culture as of nature, but at the same time they earnestly strive to fix it, stabilise it, say who they are by telling of their nation, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, and so on. (Weeks, 1985: 186)

Social constructionist views, which emphasize the role of social relations and historical processes in production of identities⁸, are ‘[b]y their nature [...] less likely to be politically appealing than the pleasing simplicities of essentialism’ (Weeks, 1998a: 136) or fundamentalist versions of moral absolutism:

It is far easier to confront each difficult area of choice with a moral code which tells us exactly, and invariably, how we should live. In a social climate of rapid social – and moral – change, and of the emergence of new social possibilities, identities and lifestyles, it is a temptation to seek once again the security of absolute moral standards, which fixes us in a world of certainty where personal and social identities are given. (Weeks, 2010, p. 145)

Social regulation ‘provides the conditions within which those defined can begin to develop their own consciousness and identity’ (Weeks, 1981: 108). Social categorization and self-categorization offer comfort, security and assuredness, but at the same time social categorization controls, restricts and inhibits by creating the idea of uniformity, that neglects the complexities and differences as prime features of human condition – ‘a crude tactic of power designed to obscure a real [...] diversity with the myth of [...] destiny’ (Weeks, 1991a: 74). That is why some theoretical strands (queer theory being the leading force) argue for a strategy of total obliteration of identities⁹, perhaps getting their inspiration from fragments of Foucault’s opus, like the next one which seems to call us not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit ourselves to its dissipation:

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political ‘double bind,’ which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state’s institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries. (Foucault, 1982: 785)

8 For a good example of social constructionism at work, see an essay by Jeffrey Weeks: ‘The Construction of Homosexuality’ (chapter 6 of Weeks’ *Sex, Politics, and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality Since 1800* [1981], which was later [1996], with minor omissions, reprinted in a reader *Queer Theory/Sociology* edited by Steven Seidman).

9 The dissolving of the ‘unity of the self’ (as the corner stone of identity) started, in the west, with empiricist philosophers’ calling it into question: ‘The unity of the self was not a problem so long as the traditional Christian conception of the soul held sway, but it became a problem when Locke declared that a man’s ‘Identity ... consists in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body.’ [...] Locke and Hume ‘use the word identity to cast doubt on the unity of the self’’ (Gleason, 1983, p. 911).

Heavily influenced by Foucault, Weeks, nevertheless, does not make an appeal for abandoning identities. He follows Foucault in picking a fight ‘against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others’ (Weeks, 1991b: 167), struggling ‘against subjection, forms of subjectivity and submission’ (*ibid.*), with a ‘refusal of imposed definition’ (p. 169). He pleads for a move towards the research of forms of social relations that would allow identities to take on more fluid meanings, which would enable the actors to take a more enlightened, conscious and critical look at themselves and at those with whom they come into a variety of interactions. He states his case of identities as fictions, necessary ones, but nevertheless, fictions, ‘constantly questioned yet all the time assumed’ (Weeks, 1991a: 69).

At the beginning of the chapter dedicated to identities Weeks (1995: 83) quotes several lines from Wystan Hugh Auden’s poem *The Age of Anxiety* (1947) as a motto: ‘Human beings are, necessarily, actors who cannot become something before they have pretended to be it; and they can be devided, not into the hypocritical and the sincere, but into the sane who know they are acting and the mad who do not’. The quality of one’s performance with her/his identity is not to be regarded as naught if the actor/actress knows that it is all just a play, a fiction, but one that cannot be willed away.

But to say that something is a historical fiction is not to denigrate it. On the contrary, it is simple to recognize that we cannot escape our histories, and that we need means to challenge their apparently iron laws and inexorabilities by constructing narratives of the past in order to imagine the present and the future. (Weeks, 1995, p. 98)

Necessary fictions in a time and place of transition

As if he sensed that he might be criticized from he position of the ‘ordinary little man’ who has too much of everyday problems and for whom the musings on identity are hardly affordable luxury, Weeks wrote:

One possible criticism of what I am going to say is that I will be dealing with issues which do not directly relate to most people’s experience. The majority of people on a global scale still have to struggle with getting their daily bread, against the exigencies of extreme poverty, famine, drought, war, authoritarian governments, corruption and violence. Compared to these questions, concerns about sexuality and the body and a sense of self may seem fairly trivial when most people have to struggle just to survive, the worries of the Bien pensant educated middle class rather than the preoccupations of the embattled majority. (Weeks, 1998b: 39-40)

Offering an (aristocratic) ideal of ‘creating an aesthetics of their own life’, of becoming an ‘artist of the self’ to the greatest number of people in the post-socialist countries would be treating them with gross insensitivity, insolence, or contemptuous rudeness. Alex Callinicos, a Trotskyist political theorist, in his *Against Postmodernism: a Marxist critique* (1989) gives a reply to Foucault’s question ‘why everyone’s life couldn’t become a work of art?’:

The answer, of course, is that most people’s lives are still [...] shaped by their lack of access to productive resources and their consequent need to sell their labour power in order to live. To invite a hospital porter in Birmingham, a car-

worker in Sao Paulo, a social security clerk in Chicago, or a street child in Bombay to make a work of art of their lives would be an insult. (cited in Burrell, 2006: 174).

In a world of pleasure and consumption, this kind of ideal could do well as a guide through life, but whatever worlds of transitional countries might be like, those of pleasure and consumption they are not. With very high rates of unemployment, corruption, poverty, organized crime and a number of unresolved political issues they seem to be a fertile soil for fundamentalism and political extremism, which rarely set aesthetics as their highest values.

Yet, there are groups who forge their identities in a way that treasures difference and opts for social change, and, in doing so, present a good illustration of Weeks' theory that was sketched above. One of those are religious LGBT people, whose efforts in constructing viable identities, in spite of the presence of cognitive dissonance, are the subject of intensive research of one author of this paper (see: Jovanović 2008, 2010). Exploration of hybrid identities of religious sexual minorities, more precisely discourses used by religious gays and lesbians in the process of overcoming tensions between religious and sexual spheres of the *self*, highlights the general dynamics (or dialectics, if you will) of traditional and modern in post-socialist societies. Engaging with, and finding a possible solution for the clash of the religious (being on the side of traditional) and non-heterosexual (coming from a distinctively [post-]modern sphere¹⁰) in one's identity construct may serve as a 'map' or 'guide' for elucidating other, more 'ordinary' tensions between conflicting poles in the identities of the people from the countries that belonged to 'the other side of the iron curtain': national/ethnic vs. European, local vs. global, open/inclusive vs. closed/dismissive of others, etc.

The very existence of these 'blended identities' represents an act of resistance against the dominant moral and political regime, and a step in the direction of social change towards the climate of accepting diversity, with, perhaps, far-reaching consequences: 'The self is not a passive entity, determined by external influences; in forging their self-identities, no matter how local their specific contexts of action, individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are global in their consequences and implications' (Giddens, 1991: 2).

The abovementioned research was, in its first instance, conducted in the Serbian city of Niš with 5 participants, 4 of whom identified themselves as Orthodox Christians and one as a follower of Judaism. In the next occasion, one religious lesbian from Niš was inquired, and in the last wave (January 2012) 8 people (4 gays and 4 lesbians) from the Serbian capital Belgrade were also interviewed. They were all asked a set of questions which served as a kind of check-points in the conversation, rather than queries in need of a 'correct' or 'definite' answer (for more details on method used see: Jovanović, 2008: 337-339 and Jovanović, 2010: 76-77).

When answering the question 'How would you define yourself?', the research participants primarily reflected on their psychological and physical traits, features of character, social roles, and only after these (if at all) did they give answers pertaining to their sexual-

¹⁰ 'Sexuality has remained the last social domain which until relatively late period, retained the label of 'natural', and at best a 'personal thing' persecuted and locked up in the private sphere' (Jovanović, 2009: 11).

ity. Although all of the interviewees were part of the stigmatized minority group, none of them mentioned the stigmatized part of the identity as crucial. This could mean that the participants were to a great extent accustomed to their homosexuality, that they took it for granted, as an integral part of their identity and did not have any particular need to accentuate it. So, it seems that they were refusing to subdue to a heteronormative order and bring their sexuality (which, allegedly, ‘defines the truth of their being’) to the forefront. This refusal to be defined by the heteronormative institutional order has similarities with the refusal to define one’s religiosity in accordance with the dogma, i.e. with the dictate of the religious institution.

When asked about their religiosity, all the participants talked about confessional belonging and, all but one, declared themselves as Orthodox Christians. They stated that they were born in Serbia, and were baptized into Orthodox Christianity as children; therefore they could be called ‘geographically Orthodox’. They did not value their confessional belonging very much as, they emphasized, they didn’t choose the time and place into which they were born. The exception is the participant who declared himself as believer of Judaism. Confessional belonging was ‘a very important thing’ to him, since he had a possibility of choice, which he exercised (with his father being Orthodox Serbian and mother of Jewish origin). Therefore, confession was more valued when it is a product of personal choice, and not as socio-culturally given.

The participants emphasized their spirituality as opposed to traditional religiosity. Aware of the social context, which is characterized by the wave of retraditionalization, that is, ‘a return to the good old values’, they notice, in the religious sphere, the phenomenon of ‘belonging without believing’ – conformist behavior in accordance with the new dominant ideology. The behavior, whose authenticity, in a sense of being based on the inner religious feeling, can be questioned. This religious revival in the East differs from the process of desecularization in the post-modern West, and is marked by retotalization and recollectivization – the form very similar to the communist social system.

In connection with such an understanding of spirituality, which emphasizes action of the self, and not that of religious institution, is the phenomenon that Danièle Hervieu-Léger calls *bricolage* (‘bricoler’ – cobble; do odd jobs; potter about; tinker), and Robert Wuthnow terms *patchwork religion* (‘patchwork’ – a collection of miscellaneous or incongruous parts; a jumble) – religion ‘thrown together’ from the beliefs and practices which were at hand (as an object made out of Lego bricks). People are shaping their faith out of elements which are borrowed from traditional and publicly recognized religions, the new (mostly New Age) religious movements, from the folk superstition, profane ideologies and popularized scientific concepts, primarily psychological and especially psychoanalytic ones, where spirituality functions as the ability to make connections between these fields. This kind of religious hybridity presupposes the process of negotiating between different parts of religious identity, as to make them a compatible whole. This process seems to be the hallmark of the modern world, where identity negotiation appears to be unavoidable.

Post-socialist societies seem to be taking make-up exam in religious instruction – institutionally determined religious practices and beliefs are gaining absolute primacy in the religious lives of majority of the people. This may be a necessary step in a tardy

process of modernization, it may be a reaction to the long-term imposed atheization on the part of the socialist state, and it may also be one kind of cultural resistance to the 'godless' and consumerist West and its 'Eurosecularity' (Berger). Whatever the case may be, the form of religiosity found in the participants in the research can be qualified as the vanguard for its social environment, since this form of religiosity is characteristic for the Western, highly developed capitalistic, post-modern/post-industrial societies.

Interviewed gays and one lesbian turned out to be spiritually, and not institutionally, i.e. traditionally religious. This came as a no surprise, having in mind that LGBT people have been discriminated against by the society, and, particularly, by the traditional religions. This may have 'pushed' them to look for the answers to the 'questions of eternity' beyond the tenets of organized religions.

They believed that non-heterosexuality was in accordance with the Christian faith. Gays and lesbians rose above the institutional lines when it came to the shaping of their faith – they put great emphasis on personal religious experience as contrasted to the established Church practices. Specific social situation, that of being stigmatized on the basis of their sexuality, played the crucial role in the shaping of their faith. Respondents showed a high level of criticism towards institutionalized churches, where the credibility of the churches and their dogma on homosexuality were brought into question. Critical interpretation of dogma was carried through socio-cultural relativization of the meaning of the Holy Scriptures, emphasizing the fallibility of the Church as well as acknowledging the lack of informed, educated and goodwill clergy.

Since the Bible is one of the primary sources of the negative attitude towards homosexuality on the part of the Church, interviewed LGBT Christians questioned the accuracy and stringency of dogmatic/institutional interpretations of the Holy Scriptures through highlighting the socio-cultural-political context in which scriptural texts were written. Taking into account the historical and cultural context in the metaphorical (not literal) understanding of Biblical texts was justified by the process of 'sifting' – the use (or reinterpretation) of certain parts of the Holy Scriptures that support the construction of religious identity of non-heterosexual people, and rejection of parts that cannot be used for that purpose. Here we witness an example of fiction (as an agent of change) versus that of myth (as an agent of stability and an instrument of preserving the status quo).

All these activities bear witness to the primacy of the self and low influence of religious authority structures. Belonging to traditional Churches is not absent, but it does not include conformity and acceptance of dogmatic views on the issues of homosexuality declared by the official religious institutions: there is a coexistence of traditions and the self in a sort of a 'creative dialogue'.

The real challenge in Serbian, and for that matter in all post-socialist societies, would be a democratic search for a meaningful life. Not by striving for a new (or 'good old') unitary set of values and retreating into the fortress of the seized identity, but rather by engaging with diversity of values and finding a possible balance.

The challenge is huge. There are many temptations and trials to fold back to this or that model of the past. But that makes the need for invention of viable individual and collective narratives for making sense of new circumstances and new possibilities even greater. Guidelines set by Weeks could be of some use in this undertaking.

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CULTURAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN MACEDONIA

Abstract

This paper concentrates on the development of the model of political culture of the citizens of Macedonia, during the so called transitional period, with a special focus to the issue of ethnic identities and identities in general, as they were determined by the changes of the general value matrix. Data from the latest research done on political culture and identities (June – September, 2010) will be presented and compared to some previous researches. The focus is on the questions: is Macedonian society really multicultural, and if it is, is that a burden or a contribution to its members? The paper analyses the ethnic environment, the ethnic distance and the perception of self-identities of the citizens.

Key words: Political culture, Identities

Introduction

Is Macedonian society authoritarian? If it is, is it a residue of the former system or are there other factors reproducing it? Which model of political culture is dominant? Those are the key questions that have been challenging all analysts working on the case of the political culture of Macedonia.

Within the country, those have been one of the most exploited topics in the last two decades, not only in the political rhetoric and the media, but in the everyday conversations of the citizens as well. The political marketing, especially in election years, is flooded with topics related to this issue, since it is still a rather popular choice for logos and strategies of political campaigns. However, in order to get a clearer picture, all the mentioned issues have to be looked at chronologically.

When political changes in the former socialist states in Europe started, the political rhetoric produced the term “countries in transition”. Those states (especially former Yugoslav) used this phrase to define themselves, recognizing the political transition as a process of advancement, improvement, progress... With regards to the political culture it was meant to imply transformation of an authoritarian into a participative model, in a sense as Almond and Verba described it in their well known typology (Almond G., Verba S. 1989). Reflecting on the issue of ethnic identities it was expected that narrow ethnic boundaries would be abandoned in favor of some more common values; transforming historical burdens and nationalistic mythologies into a broader, future oriented view.

Exceptions are of course more interesting to analyze. Macedonia is unfortunately one of the most interesting examples in this regard. Radical changes in the matrix of the

political culture have taken place in the country during the past two decades. However, they were not following the expected direction of advancement, but moving forward and backward in a rather chaotic manner.

In the pages to follow, some research data which illustrate this, will be presented. They are based mainly on a project “Political Culture and Identities”, conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Legal Research, but comparison shall be made with other researches undertaken in the last 20 years, after the Macedonian independence.

The purpose of this paper is to present some indicators related to the development of the model of political culture of the citizens of Macedonia, during the so called transitional period, with a special focus to the issue of ethnic identities and identities in general, as they were determined by the changes of the general value matrix.

Present Values and Identities

It is impossible for this occasion to present all results from the previously quoted researches, so a summary will be made in order to illustrate this particular topic. The project which was defined as a basis for this analysis¹, was conducted in 2010. It included a face to face survey on a representative sample of 1600 respondents, 6 focus groups (with different ethnic groups) and 20 in-depth interviews.

The following indicators were used in the research.

- Indicators for authoritarian values
- Acceptance of the economic changes (socialism versus capitalism in the perceptions of the population)
- Perception of democracy
- Ethnic and religious distance
- Identities

This essay shall concentrate on the inter-dependence of authoritarian values, ethnocentrism and identities.

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Authoritarianism in this context will not be analyzed only as a key obstacle towards democracy and a participative political culture, but as a factor which directly influences ethnocentrism and through it – the perception (or rather – the creation) of identities.

The widest framework and a general, introductory question used in the research was: Do the citizens have anybody they see as an “authority” and do they need one at all?

According to the responses, it appears that only around one quarter of the population in 2010 does not have such a need. It is interesting that the number of people who declared that they do not need any authority is somewhat smaller than 10 years ago.

However, the ones that do recognize some authority, identify it mainly within their own ethnic or religious boundaries.

¹ The project “Political Culture and Identities” was financed by the Open Society Institute – Macedonia, while the research activities were covered by the team from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, at the University Sts Cyril and Methodius – Skopje.

If we look at the average numbers for the whole population, data show that on the top of the list of authorities is “God, or Allah” with 42% respondents who chose this option. This is the case within every ethnic group included in the survey.

However, it is more interesting to look at all of the answers with regards to the ethnicity of the respondents. In this respect, one third of the ethnic Macedonians had chosen God as their prime authority, while the second one on the list with 20% is the President or the Prime minister (who are both ethnic Macedonians).

Albanians, Turks and Roma chose Allah in a higher number (almost two times more than the Macedonians) , but very few of their answers (with exception of Roma) were related to politicians, as can be seen on the following table:

Table 1. Question: “ Who is highest authority for you?”

	Ethnic background			
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma
President, prime minister	24,1%	3,3%	7,3%	47,8%
Minister responsible for my professional field	2,5%	1,8%		
My boss	8,4%	2,1%	2,4%	
Professors from my University (for students)	2,1%	8,5%		
Leader of my political party	3,7%	6,7%		2,2%
Head of my religious community	0,7%	1,5%	2,4%	2,2%
God, Allah	30,9%	63,8%	76,8%	43,5%
I don't believe in authorities	27,6%	12,3%	11,0%	4,3%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Further in this direction, all ethnic groups agreed (around 70%) that it would be good if “the state was run by only one person who would have authority”. Consequent to the previous answers, they all imagine him/her to belong to their ethnic group. In the discussion on the focus groups, when they were asked why should this person be from their ethnic group, the most common answer was that “only the people from their ethnic group understand the problems of all ethnicities”.

Desiring a concentration of power in such a high percent is obviously an indicator showing that the political diversity and distribution of power are perceived as a practical difficulty (This was confirmed in the conducted interviews).

Additionally, in all discussions, the mistrust towards politicians (or authorities in general) who belong to another ethnic group was evident. The following table gives a small, but indicative illustration of the above:

Table 2. Question: “Ministers in the Government who are Albanians care only about their ethnic group”

	Ethnic background					total
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other	
Agree	80,0%	14,1%	61,0%	89,1%	75,7%	63,2%
Dissagree	20,0%	85,9%	39,0%	10,9%	24,3%	36,8%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

If this question was repeated by referring to the Ministers who are ethnic Macedonians, Turks etc., the answers would probably be distributed in a similar pattern.

The distance (or mistrust) is obviously an obstacle hard to overcome, despite all confidence building strategies applied in the country in the past years. Even if we have in mind the fact that all Macedonian Governments included ministers from different ethnic groups, for quite a long period, it is obvious that the citizens still prefer to identify their interests mainly through the ethnic background of their representatives.

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Very surprising, but related and consequent to the previous question is the data according to which almost half of all ethnic groups perceive “too much democracy as **harmful**”. This has never been the case in the past 15 years. Authoritarians and people who feared democracy appeared in much smaller numbers, not only ten years ago, but even in the time of the former socialist political system.²

Among else, this means that the citizens do not enjoy the contributions of democracy enough. According to the discussions on this subject on the focus groups, the participants often expressed a feeling that their rights were more broken today than before. Mainly they referred to their ethnic rights. It is interesting that the participants, especially the younger ones, explain this situation with an extreme simplification. Summarized it would look like the following: “Democracy means respect of diversity. Diversity leads to doing what you want, which disables the system to function”. Trying to find a way out of this situation, those respondents (around half of them) believe that:

- Obedience is very important (51%)
- Discipline, order are most important (49)
- Sanctioning is the only way to establish order 46%
- Severe sanctions are necessary (including beating of the police, death penalty, etc.) around 30%
- Even censorship is sometimes necessary 39% (“because people do not make difference between right and wrong”)

It may not be a majority, but it is not insignificant that more than one third of the population **shows all** elements of the well-known Adorno’s tested indicators about the authoritarian submissiveness, aggressiveness, and conventionalism.

Compared to previous researches, it appears that those numbers have not changed drastically. The problem is that the changes have obviously gone in the opposite direction.

² Project: “Ideology in the Macedonian Society”, Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical research, Skopje 1986

Instead of improvement, we can speak of a certain deterioration. Compared to ten years ago there is less democratic culture, less participation than before; in one word – there is a process quite opposite to advancement going on in the Macedonian society.

Furthermore, the social groups related to those characteristics have changed also. Ten years ago, such answers were typical for the older, less educated, middle class respondents. Today, such answers were given in a greater percentage by younger, more educated, urban citizens. The difference with respect to the ethnic background is evidently narrowing, on the account of some social characteristics, like social status and education.

Related to this context, it should be pointed that even the ideological identity expressed by the respondents does not match the values declared. If asked how they would define themselves, within all ethnic groups appear four almost equal parts: left, right, center and the ones who do not know. Their attitudes however, do not correspond to the chosen political ideology. (Even the outcome of the elections shows that those people vote for different political parties). It shows that they may be randomly picking an ideological identity, rather than really having one.

Evidently, around half of all ethnic groups believe that the system, the institutions are not functioning in favor of their expectations. They relate it to the political parties and politicians which is perhaps why they reach for religious authorities in such high numbers. But it also makes them vulnerable and easy to manipulate with. Having in mind that both major religious communities in Macedonia – the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the Islamic community are almost functioning like political institutions, the danger of abuse is even greater.

Identities

With regards to those previous questions, the widest gap did not appear between the ethnic groups. They think and experience changes almost in a similar pattern. However, when we reach the question about their perception of identity, as they would declare it, the ethnic differences become evident.

One of the regularly asked questions in many surveys was how do the citizens define themselves (perceive their identity). The following table shows their answers in the past 20 years.

Table 3

	1991	1996	2001	2008	2010
European citizen	4%	27%	9%	6%	5%
Balkan citizen	3%	4%	10%	3%	2%
Macedonian citizen	14%	36%	51%	60%	53%
Member of my ethnic group	59%	12%	17%	14%	20%
Resident of my region	3%	3%	4%	2%	0
Resident of my local community	6%	7%	8%	3%	1%
Just a citizen	3%	11%	0	9%	18%
Did not respond	8%	0	1%	3%	0

The table confirms that the previously presented changes in the political culture do, before all, reflect on their perception of identity and self-definition.

Great differences appear among various groups. The next table shows how the citizens define themselves today, seen from the aspect of their ethnicity:

Table 4. Question: “How would you identify yourself? (2010)

How would you identify yourself?	Macedonians	Albanians	Turks	Roma
European citizen	4%	8%	5%	0
Balkan citizen	1%	0,5%	0,5%	0
Macedonian citizen	67%	13%	42%	78%
Member of my ethnic group	7%	52%	38%	4%
Resident of my region	1%	6%	0	0
Resident of my local community	2%	2%	1%	0
Just a citizen	18%	17%	15%	17%
Did not respond	0	0	0	0

Looking at the biggest differences seen on the table, the one that distinguishes mostly is the Albanian group, such as has been the case in all the past years. To the Albanians, being a member of the ethnic group is far more important than belonging to a nation, indicating once more a rather permanent closing within ethnic borders.

On the other hand, Macedonians obviously experience Macedonia as “their” nation, rarely choosing to identify as “members of their ethnic group”.

However, all groups show a type of “local-level” character of their identity. There is obviously no common feeling of belonging to a nation, and definitely nothing wider than the nation.

In the same direction are the data regarding the acceptance of some symbols, which further illustrate the above table. For example:

- Preferred or “most favorite” holidays for all ethnic communities are the religious ones (each community placing their own on the top of the list). Exceptions exist among people who practice religion which is different than the one of the majority in their ethnic group (like Macedonian Muslims, Albanian Catholics, Roma Jehovah witnesses etc.)
- Even the national flag is not equally recognized and important for everybody. For example, 88% of the ethnic Macedonians define the present national flag as most important to them (the rest prefer an old national flag, resembling Alexander the Great’s symbol). However, only 4% of the Albanians accept the national flag. The rest of them (over 80%) prefer the flag of Albania. The other ethnic groups resemble the answers given by Macedonians.
- All ethnic groups have their own most important historical heroes, who are related to their ethnicity only. Very few of the names pointed, can be described as historical heroes who have importance for more than one ethnic group, as can be seen from the following table (The question in the survey was open, without given optional answers)

Table 5. Question: “Which historical hero is most important to you?”

	Ethnic background				
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	Other
Aleksander the Great	12,8%	0,5%		10,9%	18,9%
Josip Broz - Tito	17,9%	1,8%	11,0%	13,0%	37,8%
Goce Delcev (Macedonian hero)	32,1%	0,3%	1,2%	2,2%	10,8%
Skender Beg (Albanian hero)	0,1%	36,4%	3,7%	2,2%	
Kemal Ataturk	0,2%		26,8%		
Other Macedonian heroes	12,8%	0,5%	2,4%		8,1%
Other Albanian heroes	0,1%	34,1%	3,7%	37,0%	
Present politicians	0,6%	2,3%	2,4%		
Other European historical heroes	8,5%	10,3%	3,7%	4,3%	10,8%
Nobody	15,0%	13,8%	45,1%	30,4%	13,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Obviously, there is not much in common for the different ethnic groups. It especially concerns the younger generations, who go in separate schools (from kindergarten to university), learn from different textbooks, cheer ethnic sports clubs, attend their own coffee shops and restaurants, and become members of ethnic political parties.

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Regarding historical legacies and symbols, a real confusion was created in Macedonia by the latest “introduction” of Alexander the Great as “very important for the history of the country”. Remembering the past, we can say that this hero was absolutely irrelevant to the citizens, until the beginning of the dispute with Greece which included the question “who has the right to claim his legacy?”. At this point, the political conflict between the two countries should not be elaborated further, since it is an entirely different and very complex topic. However, few remarks should be made, due to their direct impact on the values and behavior of the citizens.

This process of reviving the ancient legacy related to the period of Alexander the Great started more intensively in Macedonia in the last 6 years. It was introduced and is carried out by political institutions, so it has a rather “official” manner. The promotion of the importance of “being an inheritor of Alexander the Great” produced irrational, almost humorous disputes about how much are the Macedonians of Slav origin and how much are they Ancient Macedonians? Cities became flooded with monuments and symbols of ancient history. Macedonian population divided again, based on the understanding of their historical genesis.

To illustrate this, we can use the results from this last survey which is analyzed. According to data, 27% of the population thinks that Alexander the Great “is most important, because we originate from him”; 52% said that he is just one of the many historical

figures and 11% say that he means absolutely nothing to them. People that support the idea about ancient Macedonian heritage are mainly ethnic Macedonian, urban population.

However, when Alexander the Great is compared to other heroes who have importance to the citizens, it is obvious that he really is “just one of them”, for the big majority, as it was illustrated in the previous table 5. It could be an indicator that this hero was indeed introduced in a rather artificial way.

The differences among the ethnic groups related to this question are big, as it can be expected.

The following table shows the responses seen from the aspect of the ethnic background of the population.

Table 6. Question: “What does Alexander the Great mean to you?”

	Ethnic background					total
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other	
He means nothing	10,8%	55,4%	43,9%	8,7%	27,0%	23,7%
important, we originate from him	26,8%	4,1%	4,9%	32,6%	16,2%	20,1%
He is just one of many heroes for my people	52,5%	17,9%	30,5%	19,6%	37,8%	41,7%
I do not know	9,8%	22,6%	20,7%	39,1%	18,9%	14,5%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Why was this new mythology introduced, will be a question for many future analyses. At the moment, the surveyed citizens explain it in the following manner:

Table 7. Question: “Why was the myth about Alexander the Great introduced as a very important one?”

	Ethnic background				
	Macedonian	Albanian	Turkish	Roma	other
It is a deliberate creation of confusion in the identity of the Macedonians	20,8%	21,3%	18,3%	21,7%	24,3%
It is attempt to make Greece angry and not to solve the name dispute	19,2%	44,1%	36,6%	21,7%	27,0%
It is finally an affirmation of the real history of Macedonia	40,2%	2,3%	19,5%	19,6%	18,9%
Do not know	19,8%	32,3%	25,6%	37,0%	29,7%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Without elaborating further as to who actually needed such a confusion in the identities, for this purpose it should be pointed only that an additional factor of division within the Macedonian group, and between the ethnic groups was obviously created. It will without doubt reflect on the ethnic distance and ethnocentrism in a negative way in many years to come. It strengthens the need for an authority, especially if the one can be given an ethnic dimension.

Concluding points

The previously presented data certainly illustrate the main topics and questions which motivated this paper. Before all, they confirm that

- The political culture in Macedonia is not advancing from an authoritarian towards a participative model as it was expected.
- There is a presence of authoritarian values among a significant part of the population which provides the dominant color of the picture.
- It would be too simplified to say that those values originate and are related only to the former political system.
- The type of political culture which is dominant (and is stimulated) strengthens the ethnocentrism, especially when identities are concerned.

Tendencies towards ethnocentrism in the Macedonian society (but not only there), constantly feed on authoritarian matrixes. The need for “authority”, obedience, loyalty etc., has always been used as a “necessity” in building cohesion of the groups, especially ethnic ones. It was done regardless the danger that the rigidity towards “the other” can easily be transformed into exclusion of “anything different”. This true *circulus viciosus* suffocates all diversities: political, ethnic, cultural... It simply ignores a very high priority. As Kymlicka points: ‘minority rights should not allow one group to dominate other groups and they should not enable a group to oppress its own members’ (Kymlicka, 1995).

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INTERCULTURAL COMPETENCE AND IDENTITY NEGOTIATION

Abstract

Globalization processes are giving rise to more systematic cultural encounters, borrowings and exchanges. Crossing borders and being in contact with languages, customs and beliefs different than ours, questions the truths we have always taken for granted, and this triggers insecurity and uneasiness. So, the question of identities – national, cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, gender-based – is assuming renewed importance for individuals and groups who see globalization and cultural change as a threat to their beliefs and ways of life.

The development of human culture is made possible through communication. Intercultural dialogue promotes the sharing of ideas and explores different ways of looking at the world. Rethinking our cultural categories, recognizing the multiple sources of our identities, helps to shift the focus away from ‘differences’ towards our shared ability to evolve through interaction. One of the major factors influencing the effectiveness in communicating with people from other cultures is the ability to understand their culture. This explains why intercultural dialogue is largely dependant on intercultural competencies, defined as the complex of abilities needed to interact appropriately with those who are different from oneself.

Key words: culture, identity, intercultural dialogue, intercultural competence

Introduction

As globalization increases so more and more people have contact with people from other cultures than ever before. With the rapid changes in global economy, technology, transportation and immigration policies, the world is becoming a small, intersecting community. One of the main effects of globalization is to attenuate the link between a cultural phenomenon and its geographic location by transporting distant events, influences and experiences into our immediate vicinity. In some cases, such attenuation is experienced as a source of opportunity; in others, as a loss of certainty and identity. In Europe, as in other global regions, awareness is increasing of the potential for conflict — as well as the opportunities for gain—inherent in cultural diversity as experienced in both professional and private settings.

As individuals, as members of social groups and national cultures, we come to intercultural encounters with a wealth of experiences, beliefs, needs, and interests, all of which affect our intercultural communication with others. The complexities of our identities often mean that at particular times or in certain situations, aspects of our identities become either more or less important. Sometimes, we communicate from our gender positions,

speaking as women or men. At other times, our ethnic or racial identity may be important. Also, increasing number of people live “in between” cultural identities. That is, they identify with more than one ethnicity, race or religion. In intercultural situations, our identity positions shape our understanding of the world around us.

Each intercultural contact can bring about identity dissonance or stress because of attributes such as an unfamiliar accent, way of speaking, way of doing things, and way of nonverbal expression. According to Ting-Toomey⁽¹⁹⁹⁹⁾, when strangers encounter one another in a new situation they typically experience identity vulnerability and awkwardness. The term ‘identity vulnerability’ refers to the degree of stress or perceived threat individuals experience in an unfamiliar situation. In any unfamiliar situation or in any situation that involves two complete strangers, identity-based fragility and emotional vulnerability are inevitable. The term ‘identity security’ refers to a sense of confidence or resourcefulness in approaching the unfamiliar situation. While identity vulnerability connotes fear of the unfamiliar, identity security connotes a comfortable sense of safety in relating to a stranger. This is the reason why, most of us prefer to spend time with people who are similar to us, rather than different from us. Among people with similar habits and outlooks, we experience interaction predictability. Among people with dissimilar habits and communication rules, we experience interaction unpredictability. The question of identities – national, cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, gender-based or consumer-based – assumes renewed importance for individuals and groups who see globalization and cultural change as a threat to their beliefs and ways of life. The growing tensions over identity, which are often the result of a culturalization of political claims, are in contradiction with a more general trend towards the emergence of dynamic and multifaceted identities.

Identity negotiation

Broadly defined, identity is a person’s conception of self within a particular social, geographical, cultural and political context. Identity gives the individual a sense of self and personhood and an interpretive frame of experience. (Hecht, Collier, and Ribeau, 1993) Identity is abstract, complex, multidimensional, fluid and amorphous. People have multiple identities: ethnic, racial, occupational, socioeconomic, sexual, gender and relational, which Cupach and Imahori describe as “interconnected cultural identities” (Cupach and Imahori, 1993).

Collier and Thomas (1988) define cultural identity as: “identification with and perceived acceptance into a group that has shared systems of symbols and meanings as well as norms/rules for conduct”. Sarup (1996) further notes “identity is a construction, a consequence of a process of interaction between people, institutions and practices”. According to Yep (2002), cultural identity is a social construction that gives the individual an ontological status and expectations for social behavior; and it can be characterized as political, fluid and nonsummative. About the political characteristic of cultural identity, Yep points out that cultural identity separates individuals on the basis of ingroup-outgroup differences. Further, discussing about people’s solidarity around different cultures concludes that such contrasting loyalties are necessarily associated with political power.

A dominant group, to maintain its status in the hierarchy, will seek to keep others in lower positions. One powerful way to accomplish this is through discursive practices. Cultural identity is also fluid. In other words, one's cultural identity is ever evolving, growing, and changing. It is never static. Explaining the third characteristic of cultural identity, Yep notes that one's cultural identity is not a simple addition of the component parts of one's cultural background.

The communication theory of identity states that: "identity is 'stored' within individuals, relationships and groups and is communicated between relational partners and group members" (Hecht, et al. 1993). Four 'locations', or layers, have emerged as perspectives for understanding identity. These four layers illustrate identity as being problematic as they push and pull each other toward adopting a number of different identities. The 'personal layer' focuses on one's self-cognition, spiritual self, self-concept, and sense of well-being. The 'enactment layer' deals with how messages express identity. The 'relational layer' deals with how one's identity emerges through one's relationships with others and how relationships themselves possess their own identities. The 'communal layer' involves an identity that is shared among a certain group of people or a particular community. The premise of communication theory of identity is that interaction is central to the identity process. Several propositions show how communication and identity shape each other: identity is formed, maintained, and modified through social interaction; identity influences interaction through shaping expectations and motivating behavior; identity is enacted in social interaction, and the conditions of interaction influence identity enactments; identity is an individual and social event (Hecht, et al. 1993).

The identity negotiation theory emphasizes that identity or reflective self-conception is viewed as the explanatory mechanism for the intercultural communication process. Identity is viewed as reflective self-images constructed, experienced, and communicated by the individuals within a culture and in a particular interaction situation. The concept 'negotiation' is defined as a transactional interaction process whereby individuals in an intercultural situation attempt to assert, define, modify, challenge, and/or support their own and others' desired self-images. According to Ting-Toomey identity negotiation is, at a minimum, a mutual communication activity. At the same time, the communicators attempt to evoke their own desired identities in the interaction, they also attempt to challenge or support the others' identities (Ting-Toomey, 1999).

The role of intercultural dialogue in identity negotiation

The core processes of individual's reflective self-conceptions are formed via symbolic communication with others. It is through communication that we acquire our generalized views of ourselves and others. The term identity in the identity negotiation perspective is used as the reflective self-conception or self-image that we each derive from our cultural, ethnic, and gender socialization processes. It is acquired via our interaction with others in particular situations. Yet national identity is to some extent a construction, grounded in a sometimes reconstructed past and providing a focus for our sense of commonality. Cultural identity is a more fluid, self-transforming process, to be seen less in

terms of a past inheritance than of a future project. Cultural identities are co-created and re-created in everyday interaction. According to Yep (2002), we create our identities with those individuals with whom we interact (co-creation) and in the context of specific communication episodes and encounters (re-creation). But, the process of co-creation and re-creation of identity can only occur through dialogue.

The word 'dialogue' means speech or conversation between two people. But it can be considered as more than a conversation between two individuals. 'Dialogue' can refer to interactive communication between individuals, groups or larger communities and can involve a wide range of actors from international organizations to government bodies, arts and media organizations or networks. Freire (1970) writes: "dialogue is the encounter between people, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world, and those who do not wish this naming." Open dialogue or encounters are to go beyond a mere 'tolerance of the other' and can involve creative abilities that convert challenges and insights into processes of creative transformation and innovation and then into diverse cultural expressions (Sharing diversity, 2008). Dialogue should be seen not as involving a loss of self but as dependent upon knowing oneself and being able to shift between different frames of reference. It requires the empowerment of all participants through capacity building and projects that permit interaction without a loss of personal or collective identity. But dialogue does not translate individual identity and character alone. It operates within collective identity as well, since social belonging, ideological inclinations and cultural affinities are present and expressed in the communicative relationship. For this reason intercultural dialogue plays a fundamental role in identity negotiation. In the Council of Europe's White Paper (2008), intercultural dialogue is defined as: "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other's global perception." Globalization processes are giving rise to more systematic cultural encounters, borrowings and exchanges. These new transcultural links are potentially powerful facilitators of intercultural dialogue. The promotion of intercultural dialogue converges significantly with the 'multiple identities' approach. Rethinking our cultural categories, recognizing the multiple sources of our identities, helps to shift the focus away from 'differences' towards our shared ability to evolve through interaction. Awareness of history and understanding of cultural codes are crucial in overcoming cultural stereotypes on the path to intercultural dialogue (UNESCO World Report, 2009).

According to Yep (2002), to co-create and re-create identities, we need to participate in the process. The negotiation of identity, Freire describes as a "process of liberation" in which both the oppressor and oppressed find freedom. Put in another way, co-creation of identity cannot occur when there is an attempt on the part of one of the communicators to, consciously or unconsciously, dominate the other physically or symbolically. Fundamental in dialogue or dialogical action is cooperation. The main prerequisite to establish a dialogic climate is the attitude that no part/side in the dialogue stays in the centre of the world or in an absolute position. On the contrary, the "centre" must be emptied for the sake of dialogue in order for the majority – minority discourse to be overcome. It is, in fact, a "shared space" which may be physical or virtual. Intercultural dialogue is not a

specific legal category that is regulated by international, European or national law in the strict sense. It is argued, however, that intercultural dialogue can only take place in an environment where a person is guaranteed safety and dignity, equality of opportunity and participation, where different views can be voiced openly without fear, where there are shared spaces for exchanges between different cultures to take place (Sharing diversity, 2008).

The need for intercultural competence in identity negotiation

Intercultural dialogue is an opportunity to contribute to and benefit from a diverse and dynamic society; and is largely dependent on intercultural competencies. Acquiring intercultural competencies becomes part of an overall political vision addressing widespread collective ignorance of “others” and “otherness”, and are expected to produce long-term changes in a person’s knowledge, attitudes, and skills to enable positive and effective interaction with members of other cultures both abroad and at home. Promotion of intercultural competences is important because they give us ability to communicate successfully with people from other cultures. They allow us to think without any prejudices and to understand other cultures (Wilk-Wos, 2010).

The fundamental basis of the identity negotiation theory posits that individuals in all cultures desire to be competent communicators in a diverse range of interactive situations. They learn to be competent communicators within their own cultures through repeated practice. They also learn to deal with others appropriately and effectively through habitual routines. Ting-Toomey further notes that while some individuals are relatively mindless, or act on “automatic pilot”, about the identity negotiation process, other individuals are relatively mindful about the dynamics of that process. She describes mindfulness as, moreover, a learned process of ‘cognitive focusing’ with repeated skilful practice. In the context of this theory, one of the critical goals of mindful identity negotiation is to explore ways to obtain accurate knowledge of the identity domains of the self and others in the intercultural encounter (Ting-Toomey, 1999).

Definition of intercultural competence

The research field of intercultural competence is highly characterized by its multidisciplinary approach. Defining what intercultural competence is about, starts with the many attempts in literature that are undertaken to map out what culture, cultural differences and the impact of culture on interaction is. In the latest decennia the different concepts converge to the concept of ‘intercultural competence’; such as intercultural communicative competence, intercultural competence, generic cultural competence. Not only the concepts but also their content seems to show similarities. At the same time the different backgrounds of the authors (Foreign Language Teaching, business life, social sector, etc.) lead to a different focus on the central features of their approach to intercultural competence (Simons and Krols, 2010).

When analyzing scientific literature, different definitions of intercultural competence are encountered. In the most common meaning, intercultural competence is construed as individual's ability to communicate and interact with individuals of other culture/group/community. Intercultural competence is also described as the set of attitudes, approaches, special behavioural and reflection abilities facilitating integration in intercultural situations (Deardorff, 2006); attitudes, knowledge, skills (to interpret, relate, discover, interact) and cultural awareness (Byram, 2000); "a complex of abilities needed to perform effectively and appropriately when interacting with others who are linguistically and culturally different from oneself" (Fantini, 2006). Thus, intercultural competence is multi-layered and the dimensions of intercultural competence expressed in various models suggested by scientists, therefore, depend on its notion.

Although there is still some disagreement among communication scholars about how best to conceptualize and measure communication competence, Lustig and Koester (1993) point out that there is increasing agreement about certain of its fundamental characteristics. They draw heavily on the work of Spitzberg, who defines communication competence as: "interaction that is perceived as effective in fulfilling certain rewarding objectives in a way that is also appropriate to the context in which the interaction occurs". The literature treats intercultural communication competence in much the same way as it does communication competence in general. The only difference is, in addition to looking at communication competence as effective and appropriate interaction, intercultural communication scholars place more emphasis on contextual factors. They conceive of communication competence not only as effective and appropriate interaction between people, but as effective and appropriate interaction between people who identify with particular physical and symbolic environments. This orientation resembles that of communication scholars who emphasize competence as a context-specific behaviour (Spitzberg and Cupach, 1984).

Two concepts have long been applied in discussions of communication competence: effectiveness and appropriateness. Effectiveness refers to an individual's ability to produce intended effects through interaction with the environment. This ability is treated either as a basic human skill that is obtained through learning and socializing processes or as an acquired ability that is related neither to personal intellect nor to education. In either case, it is understood that ability increases as the individual's awareness of relevant factors increases. In addition, ideally, competent communicators should be able to control and manipulate their environments to attain personal goals. In order to maximize such goals, individuals must be able to identify them, get relevant information about them, accurately predict others' responses, select communication strategies, implement those communication strategies, and accurately access the interaction results (Chen and Starosta, 2008).

Whereas some scholars conceive of communication competence as a function of perceived effectiveness, others look at it from the viewpoint of appropriateness. Wiemann and Backlund (1980) explain appropriateness in the communication process as follows:

Appropriateness generally refers to the ability of an interactant to meet the basic contextual requirements of the situation—to be effective in general sense, etc. These contextual requirements include: 1) The verbal context, that is, making sense in terms of

wording, of statement, and of topic; 2) the relationship context, that is, the structuring, type and style of messages so that they are consonant with the particular relationship at hand; and 3) the environmental context, that is, the consideration of constraints imposed on message making by the symbolic and physical environments.

According to Spitzberg and Cupach (1984), the fundamental criteria of appropriateness are that the interactants perceive that they understand the content of the encounter and have not had their norms and rules violated too extensively.

In the recent work of Darla K. Deardorff (2006), twenty-three top intercultural experts primarily from the United States – including those with doctorates in a variety of disciplines and all known nationally or internationally in the intercultural field, including two of the top three most influential scholars in the field of intercultural competence – were asked by means of a Delphi-Process to generate and submit definitions of intercultural competence, refine those definitions, and to reach agreement on key elements of intercultural competence and appropriate assessment methods. When asked to define intercultural competence, the experts put forth seven definitions upon which there was more than 80% agreement. The top-rated definition was one in which intercultural competence was defined as “the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately in intercultural situations based on one’s intercultural knowledge, skills and attitudes.” In regard to specific components of intercultural competence, the intercultural experts seemed to feel strongly that one component alone is not enough to ensure competence i.e. knowledge or language by itself. Eighty percent or more of the intercultural experts and administrators participating in this study were able to reach consensus on 22 essential elements of intercultural competence: understanding others’ world views; cultural self-awareness and capacity for self-awareness; adaptability/adjustment to new cultural environment; skills to listen and observe; general openness to intercultural learning and to people from other cultures; ability to adapt to varying intercultural communication and learning styles; flexibility; skills to analyze, interpret & relate; tolerating and engaging ambiguity; deep knowledge and understanding of culture (one’s own and others’); respect for other cultures; cross-cultural empathy; understanding the value of cultural diversity; understanding the role and impact of culture and the impact of situational, social, and historical contexts involved; cognitive flexibility – ability to switch frames from etic to emic and back again; sociolinguistic competence (awareness of relation between language and meaning in societal context); mindfulness; withholding judgment; curiosity and discovery; learning through interaction; ethno-relative view; culture-specific knowledge/understanding host.

One of the most difficult issues in intercultural competence is the measurement of acquired intercultural competence. According to the identity negotiation theory, satisfactory outcomes include the feeling of being understood, the feeling of being respected, and the feeling of being supported. Together, they serve as the identity outcome dimensions. The accomplishment of a satisfactory identity negotiation process is contingent on the perceptions of the communicators in the interaction scene. It also depends on our willingness to participate mindfully in our interactions with dissimilar others. To the extent that communicators perceive that desired identities have been mindfully understood, accorded with due respect, and are supported, the involved parties should experience a high sense of identity

satisfaction. To the extent that the communicators perceive that desired identities have been mindlessly bypassed, misunderstood, or insulted, the involved parties should experience a low sense of identity satisfaction. Thus, the construct of identity satisfaction acts as an essential criterion of intercultural communication competence (Ting-Toomey, 1999).

Conclusion

In a globalizing world, cultural identities often derive from multiple sources; the increasing plasticity of cultural identities reflects the growing complexity of the globalized flows of people, goods and information. Increasingly, individuals decline to be limited to fixed categories (whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, political or otherwise). This is an opportunity to be turned to account. The growing number of potential points of encounter between individuals can reduce the obstacles to intercultural dialogue, and the plasticity of identities can create a dynamic of change conducive to innovations of all kinds and at every level. In a globalized world in which the contacts between cultures are expanding rapidly, it is necessary to combat the spread of cultural illiteracy. Indeed, the ability to accept cultural differences, to welcome them without being unsettled by them, calls for intercultural competencies that some societies have learned to develop in particular contexts but which can sometimes appear sorely lacking at individual level. Helping to equip individuals or groups with the tools they need to manage cultural diversity more effectively should be the new concern of public and private decision-makers.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF SELF AND ADHERENCE TO VARIOUS SOCIAL CATEGORIES AMONG THE STUDENT POPULATION IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Abstract

Pluralistic society adopted the discourse of identities on a large scale. Identity is considered a modern phenomenon with its origins in Western individualism, and the problem of how to reconcile the relationship of self-identification and the existence of the “other” in order to answer the question “who am I” and “Where do I Belong” is becoming more scientifically and practically exploited.

The Republic of Macedonia in terms of its plurality and in terms of crises in various fields, is a challenge for researchers of identity. Thus, in spring 2011, the research team from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted research within the scientific research project *Perception of identities among the student population in Macedonia*. One of the primary goals of the scientific research project was the identification of self-identity of students and its relation to the sense of bonding with different social roles, groups and affiliations.

The results showed the complex relationship between personal and social determinants of identity and the various roles that “I” play in everyday life, and indirectly confirmed the need of society to care about identity and its relations with the “others” among its citizens.

Key words: self-identity, personal identity orientation, social identity orientation, perception of identities

Introduction

Changes in values and social change taking place in the last decade of the 20th century bring to the fore the complex problems of identity. Actually, discourse on identity is a modern phenomenon, having its origin in the Western individualism, because only in a pluralistic society does a multiplication of identities come into being. Hence, the problem emerges of how to reconcile the relation of self-identification and the existence of the “other” in order to answer the questions “who am I” and “where do I belong.” The identity problem did not exist in a traditional society due to the fact that in such a kinship society the social status of individuals is strictly fixed. In contrast, modern people are confronted with a variety of choices, as a result of which there is instability of identity because the principle of ascription, characteristic of a traditional society, is replaced by

the principle of achievement. Identity versus societal roles has been topic of interest in this research. Having in mind that identity represents the unique shaped human being, this research challenged the intensity of acceptance societal roles and the nature of social roles according to the characteristics of personal and societal identity.

The concept of identity is a modern one. It appeared in the 18 century when the conflict among individuals and society raised. In the 19 century, the accent was on the process of individualization. That is the process of transformation from heteronymous to autonomous locus of control was processed on ontogenetic and also phylogenetic level. In a modern society there is multiplication of identities as the society structure multiplied itself (gender identity, national identity, political, religious... and many more). Traditional society does not have the problem with multiple identities. In traditional society, social status of individual concepts is fixed. In a modern society, individuals have been faced with many choices. The problem of identities is a relevant field of research in modern society, having in mind that there is a tension between singular and plural identity on individual and collective level. Other issues concerning identity arise with the extension of the process of globalization. The tendency of global society is to construct one general model of identity which will be released from any type of history member of collective memory (Golubovic, 2000).

The concept of identity

Human is personal and societal being at the same time, so, the concept of identity is connected with the question of interconnection between the individual and collectivity aspect.

Identity, as it was defined in a Psychological vocabulary is *the feeling of sameness in important determinant attributions*. In psychology, identity of personality has two basic directions: first, similarity and differentiation with other persons and second as a subjective feeling of sameness beside relevant changes of personality in time framework. Personality itself has the feeling of personal and relatively persistent sameness (Krstic, 1991).

Laing in "Self and Others" clearly accented the interconnection of personal identity and others. According to him, integration and construction of identity suppose somebody else. Namely, there is complementarity between "me" and the "other" and that means that every relationship consumes definition of "me" from the "other" perspective and definition of the other from the side of "me" (Laing, 1961).

Identity as we now in psychology is known and derives mainly from the work of psychologist Erik Erikson in the 1950s. Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development is one of the best-known theories of personality in psychology. Much like Sigmund Freud, Erikson believed that personality develops in a series of stages. Unlike Freud's theory of psychosexual stages, Erikson's theory describes the impact of social experience across the whole lifespan.

One of the main elements of Erikson's psychosocial stage theory is the development of **ego identity**. Ego identity is the conscious sense of self that we develop through social

interaction. According to Erikson, our ego identity is constantly changing due to new experience and information we acquire in our daily interactions with others. In addition to ego identity, Erikson also believed that a sense of competence also motivates behaviors and actions. Each stage in Erikson's theory is concerned with becoming competent in an area of life. If the stage is handled well, the person will feel a sense of mastery, which he sometimes referred to as **ego strength** or **ego quality**. If the stage is managed poorly, the person will emerge with a sense of inadequacy (Fulgosi, 1987).

Shaping the identity is a process which is pretty much connected with the experiences considering the societal world. During this process many aspects of identity become differentiated. So we have: national identity, gender identity, political identity etc. But in this process of identity differentiation, there is always the feeling that there is the core, the unchanged feeling about itself sameness during the time and experience. This concept has been derived by Arieti's theory of personality. Arieti distinguished two types of personality: the generalized one and the specific. The first one has been characterized by the belief that the self is independent on specific incarnations: belief such as "I am a teacher, but if I were a doctor or a farmer, I would be the same person". The specific type of personality anchors the inner self to specific aspects of one's personality and adheres to beliefs such as "I cannot imagine having a different ethnic identity and remaining the same person" (Arieti, 1967)

This Arieti's theory nicely fits with the centre - periphery model of beliefs given by Rokeach. Rokeach found that our core beliefs are more difficult to change than those that are peripheral (Laponce, 2004). The core beliefs of the generalized personality are that the self is multiform and not permanently anchored in any one of these forms, while the specific personality has a core belief of anchorage in some exclusive and non-changeable identity.

The start point of this research was Arieti's personality theory and Rokeach's concept of core and peripheral values. The main interest in this research was to find the interconnection among "the core" presented by personal and social identity and identification with some societal roles.

The ideas about researching societal roles rose from the Laponce research, which considered the intensity of the attachment and identification of the self with some societal roles. Laponce has a tendency to explore the minority effect and societal roles. His hypothesis was that respondents who are minority in the country where they live, will be much more attached with their ethnicity.

How can we define personal identity? From own personal experience and self-awareness we know that it is there, in side of us. It's a fact of conscious life, as common as the word "I." But it is hard to define it.

Personal identity means - seeing the self as distinct and different from others. The person is guided by her/his own goals rather than the group's goals (Stets & Burke, <http://wat2146.ucr.edu/papers/02a.pdf>).

Social identity usually is determined as sets of meanings that an actor attributes to it while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. Social identities are at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine 'who I am/we are' in a situ-

ation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations” (Wendt 1994).

Research has been conducted among students, so it is important to notify some developmental tasks regarding this period of lifespan. According to the developmental psychology, students are in a period of *early adulthood or period of decision years*, they are the youth. Youth is an “optional” period of development in which an individual is legally an adult but has not yet undertaken adult work and roles.

According to the developmental psychology, main developmental tasks for this period are achievement of independence from parents, identity stabilization, intimacy, and emotional stability, responsibility for self and others, and also establishing citizenship responsibility. This period is marked with the final preparation for adult roles. Youth attempt to crystallize their vocational goals and to establish sense of personal identity. Their needs for peer approval are demised and they are largely psychologically independent from their parents. The shift to adulthood is nearly complete (Gormly & Brodzinski 1990).

Goals of the research

The primary goal of this scientific research project was to identify the hierarchy of different societal roles among students and the intensity of bonding with different social roles, groups or affiliations.

Another goal of this research, besides identification of hierarchy of societal roles among students was, identification of inter connection between societal roles and identity.

Research framework

In spring 2011, the research team from the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted research within the scientific research project *Perception of identities among the student population in Macedonia*. The survey included students from State Universities in the Republic. The sample counted 451 subjects, 156 male and 295 female; age from 18 till 25 years; Ethnicity: 234 Macedonians and 201 Albanians. The sample was occasional and the research was applied collectively on the classes.

Instruments

To achieve the research goals two instruments were applied.

- AIQ Aspects of Identity Questioner (Cheek & Briggs, 1981, 1982). This instrument has many versions. Some of these versions, beside a scale for personality identity orientation and social identity orientation scale had few more: collectivity identity scale and relation identity scale. In this research we included two scales:
 - ❖ Personal Identity Orientation. This scale contains 9 items on a seven point Likert scale;

- ❖ Social Identity Orientation. This scale contains 6 items on a seven point Likert scale.

Cronbah's alpha for Political Identity Orientation scale is 0,84 and Cronbah's alpha for Social Identity Orientation scale is 0,80. This findings show that both scales have high consistency. The Cronbach's Alpha for the Questioner (two scales together) was 0,83.

The other instrument which was used was *Questioner for attachment to different social roles* (Laponce 1996). Laponce determined the personality as a bundle of roles: fathers, sons, teachers, non-voters and so on. According to him, *the self is a theatre where the roles are the actors and, on the stage of the self, specific selves play their roles either one at a time, or by two or three or more, but rarely with all of them holding hands, as for a curtain call.*

- The 13 roles, identities, or characteristics of self were run through a grid of 4 scales (the equivalent of 4 acts) used to locate each role between polar opposites on a seven-point Likert scale. In the order in which they presented, the scales measured:
 - ❖ The level of common interests
 - ❖ The level of solidarity
 - ❖ The psychological difficulty of envisaging a change of the identity concerned: change of religion, sex, nationality, political party....
 - ❖ The importance attached to each role or identity

The roles which were included in the research were the following: gender, age; nationality; profession; religion; preferred political party; state or province of birth; city of residence; university; ethnic group; class; family and close friends.

Hypotheses

General hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity orientation will determine the level of attachment to different social roles.

Given that the connection to the various social roles is defined by four aspects such as common interests with others, a sense of solidarity with others, attitude towards changing the social roles and significance (importance) of the specific role of individuals, we can single out four specific hypotheses:

First sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity orientation will determine the position of their common interests with people belonging to certain social groups (13 according Laponce)

The second sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the sense of solidarity towards people belonging to certain social groups.

The third sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the possibilities and difficulties of changing certain social roles.

The fourth sub hypothesis: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the importance of certain social roles for individuals.

Results of the research

AIQ (Aspects of Identity Questioner) in its original form has a few subscales (this depends on the type of this scale modification). In this research we included two subscales: Personality Identity Orientation Scale and Social Identity Orientation Scale. **Personal Identity Orientation** refers to the orientation toward its self, which depends on personal attitudes and values. Self is an object of attitudes formation. **Social identity Orientation** refers to the orientation toward its self, which is determined by other attitudes and values.

Correlation between the two subscales showed high positive value 0,297 ($p < 0,01$) which means that personal and social identity orientation are positively related.

Table 1 presents the percentage of respondent’s answers according to Personality Identity Orientation Scale.

Table 1. Percent of respondents on Personal Identity Orientation Scale

Personal identity orientation		
High	Middle	Low
81.9%	17.6%	0.5%

As it can be seen from the obtained data, the highest percentage of respondents had high scores on Personality Identity Orientation scale, which means that highest percentage of respondents highly evaluated their personal values, personal goals and hopes, personal thoughts and ideas etc. for the sense of who they are.

Table 2 presents percentages of respondent’s answers according to the Social Identity Orientation Scale.

Table 2. Percent of respondents on Social Identity Orientation Scale

Social Identity Orientation		
High	Middle	Low
62.9%	32.6%	4.4%

The highest percentage of respondents belongs to the group with high scores on social identity orientation scale, which means that the highest percentage of respondents highly evaluated their popularity, physical appearance, reputation etc. for the sense of who they are. But, it can be seen also that there is a significant percentage of respondents which belong to a group on the middle level on the social identity orientation scale. These findings suggest that respondents (in comparison with the previous data presented in table 1), have evaluated their popularity, physical appearance, reputation etc. (social issues) lower for the sense of who they are in comparison with personal issues like personal values, personal goals and hopes, personal thoughts and ideas etc. For the students, personal issues are more important than social issues for their sense of who they are.

Results for the hierarchy of social roles

Hierarchy of roles have been detected according to following questions (given in Laponce Questioner)

1. Common interests (with which societal roles one feel to have common interests);
2. Solidarity (the level of solidarity toward each of the offered societal roles);
3. Role changes difficulties (how hard will be to change each of the offered roles);
4. The importance of a role for the personality (how any of offered roles are important for the respondent).

Table 3 presents findings according to the estimated hierarchy or roles according to the respondent’s answers on Laponce’s Questioner.

Table 3. Hierarchy of roles according to the four different questions (common interests, solidarity, role changes difficulties and importance of the role for the personality)

	Common interests	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of role for personality
I.	<i>Family</i> (M=5.71)	<i>Family</i> (M=6.44)	<i>Family</i> (M=6.56)	<i>Family</i> (M=6.60)
II.	<i>Close friends</i> (M=5.57)	<i>Close friends</i> (M=6.21)	<i>Gender</i> (M=6.19)	<i>Close friends</i> (M=6.36)
III.	<i>Gender</i> (M=5.44)	<i>Profession (student)</i> (M=5.64)	<i>Close friends</i> (M=5.94)	<i>Religion</i> (M=5.91)
IV.	<i>Age</i> (M=5.21)	<i>Gender</i> (M=5.51)	<i>Religion</i> (M=5.83)	<i>Profession (student)</i> (M=5.86)
.....
XIII.	<i>Political Party</i> (M=3.83)	<i>Political Party</i> (M=3.64)	<i>Political Party</i> (M=3.06)	<i>Political Party</i> (M=3.23)

Results show that social roles with which the students are mostly bound (roles that students see the most common interests with, roles with which they feel great solidarity, roles which are hard to change and roles that seem most important for the students), expectedly are: family, close friends and gender. But in the first four positions religion, profession (student) and age emerged also. Preferred Political Party is the role that students least bound with. The remaining six roles are somewhere between the mentioned roles.

The first three tables give general input in the research’s findings. These tables give description of the estimated scores achieved on two scales and the general hierarchy of roles. Hierarchy of roles refers to the importance which students give to any of 13 appointed societal roles.

The next findings refer to the clarification of previously pointed research hypothesis. The general hypothesis challenges the interconnection between the level of personal and social identity orientation with the level of attachment to different social roles.

To explore this interconnection statistical test which was used is regression coefficient. Regression coefficient was calculated for all the 13 roles and for scores of two

scales (personal identity scale and societal identity scale). Table 4 shows results for determination of the roles acceptance according to the social identity orientation and Table 5 show results for determination of the role acceptance according to the personal identity orientation.

Table 4. Regression coefficients (societal identity orientation and roles)

SOCIAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION				
<i>Standardized B coefficient</i>	Common interest	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of the role for personality
Gender		0,110*		0,124**
Ethnicity	0,149**	0,166**		
Religion	0,153**	0,175**		
Political party	0,141**	0,165**		
Place of birth	0,121*	0,125**		0,101*
Place of residence	0,168**	0,165**		
Class (social)		0,150**	0,167**	

*= p < 0,05; **= p < 0,01

Students with high social identity orientation feel solidarity for 7 from 13 social roles, they see common interest with 5 different social roles, 2 social roles are important for them and with only one social role they would have difficulties to change it. Namely, highly developed social determinants of the personality (individuals with high social identity orientation) will contribute to the development of:

- position on larger common interests and a greater sense of solidarity to the people of the same ethnicity, same religion, political party, place of residence and birthplace;
- greater importance and greater solidarity to the people of the same gender and birthplace
- greater solidarity to the people of the same social class and attitude about the difficulties of changing the class to which they belong. (Table 5)

Students with high developed personal identity orientation feel solidarity for almost all 13 social roles, 12 social roles are important for them, they see common interest with 4 different social roles, and with only two social roles they would have difficulties to change them. Namely, highly developed personal determinants of personality will contribute to the development of:

- great sense of solidarity for all the social roles except political party;
- greater importance for all the social roles except political party and religion;
- Family and Close friend are social roles that students see common interest with and would have difficulties to change.

Table 5. Regression coefficients (personal identity orientation and societal roles)

PERSONAL IDENTITY ORIENTATION				
<i>Standardized B coefficient</i>	Common interest	Solidarity	Role changes difficulties	Importance of the role for personality
Gender		0,186**		0,164**
Age		0,168**		0,209**
Nationality		0,231**		0,210**
Ethnicity		0,223**		0,175**
Profession (student)	0,204**	0,153**		0,179**
Religion		0,144**		
Political party				
Place of birth		0,149**		0,182**
Place of residence	0,113*	0,224**		0,201**
University		0,136**		0,165**
Class (social)		0,168**		0,253**
Family	0,148**	0,155**	0,156**	0,183**
Closed friend	0,125**	0,280**	0,288**	0,286**

*= $p < 0,05$; **= $p < 0,01$

Discussion and Conclusions

The survey started in order to clarify the relationship between self-identification and the existence of the “other”. It meant a response to the question of the relation between “Who Am I” and “Where do I Belong”. The results first described the students “What are they.” The Tables 1 and 2 showed that most students are individuals with highly developed personal and social identity orientation, which would mean that when they define themselves- personal determinants (like personal ideas, thoughts, morals, desires ..) will be important, but also social determinants (their popularity among others, their physical appearance, attractiveness ..). However, comparison of the impact of personal versus social determinants- show that personal determinants are more important in creating the image “Who am I”. Furthermore, Table 3 shows the social roles that students are most connected with and thus answering the question “Where do students belong.” Predictably, the most important social roles for students are: Family, Close friends and Gender, but also Religion, Age and Profession (as student). The results of Tables 4 and 5 have proved the general hypothesis which stated that the personal and social determinants of self (core beliefs) will determine the relation to various social roles (13 in the survey). But this relation is very complex.

If we consider individual hypotheses separately, we can say that:

The first sub-hypothesis predicted that: The level of students' personal and social identity orientation will determine the position of their common interests with people belonging to certain social groups (13 according to Lapons), and we can say that this **is partly confirmed**. Social identity orientation (Sio) will affect the intensity of common interest of 5 different social roles, while Personal identity orientation (PIo) will affect the intensity of common interest of 4 different social roles.

The second hypothesis predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine the sense of solidarity towards people belonging to certain social groups-it **is confirmed**. SIo will determine the sense of solidarity with 7, and PIo with 12 social roles.

The third hypothesis predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine position on the possibilities and difficulties of changing certain social roles-can say that **it is not confirmed**. SIo will determine difficulties for changing only one social role, while the PIo will determine difficulties for changing only 2 different social roles.

The fourth sub-hypothesis that predicted that: The level of personal and social identity will determine the position on the importance of certain social roles for individuals- **it is partly confirmed**, only in the case of PIo. SIo will determine whether only two roles are important to students, while PIo determines whether 11 roles are important to students.

Conclusions

- Except for the political party, students are bound for almost all offered social roles- the average score for all 12 social roles were above 4. This finding perfectly fits, actually corresponds to the life stage where they belong. The top four were: family, close friend, profession and religion;
- Almost 82% of the respondents have high scores on the scale of Personal Identity Orientation (persons who have positive attitudes and values toward themselves) and almost 62% of the respondents have high scores on the Social Identity Orientation Scale (persons who valued social acceptance for their own self acceptance);
- The personal identity orientation and the social identity orientation are not unrelated. If someone has a highly developed personal identity orientation- it means that he or she has a highly developed social identity orientation. The correlation coefficient is highly significant;
- The personal and social determinants of self (core beliefs) or Personal and Social Identity orientation of the students will determine the relation to various social roles (13 in the survey). But this relation is very complex, multidimensional and different depending on different social roles and different aspect of relations to social roles. Persons with high personal orientation give importance to many more social roles, and they feel solidarity with more social roles in comparison with persons with high social orientation. With one word, personal identity orientation toward self more than social identity orientation determine the attachment to social world of the personality: high personal identity orientation causes stronger attachment with many social roles. Family

and close friend, which appear not to depend on social identity orientation, now, in the case of persons with personal orientation- are the most important social roles in every aspect.

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RE-THINKING THE IDENTITIES - THE MEDITERRANEAN

Abstract

Identity is defined as a concept that takes into consideration the issues of the complete entirety of the accepted and marked practices, beliefs and commonly focused continuity in time and space. Cultural identity helps us recognise and “describe” ourselves in our own distinctiveness in regard to the manner of existence of the “others”.

The contemporary identity policies (including the one of Western Europe) serve the demonstration of power that manipulates, labels and discriminates even when it advocates equality of the identities. In the overall discourse of its stratified and controversial existence through centuries, the Mediterranean, the South and its civilisation circle is a victim of such policies that create stereotypes, divide and assess its quality through the arrogance of wealth and the order of civic culture.

Key words: identity, cultural identity, the Mediterranean, identity policies

The obsession of the contemporary discourse of social and humanitarian sciences with the phenomenon (and the concept) of identity, seen as a one of the fundamental criteria for characterising the particularities of certain social groups, individuals, socio-cultural complexes, aspects of elements of the differentiated types of human action, interaction and communication outside their epistemological foundation and necessity, becomes more seriously and more intensively and ideologically postulated matrix that is deeply obsessed with the tendency for social engineering.

The prominent need to mark and establish the focused features and distinctive elements of cultures, ethnic groups, religions, policies, economies, gender distinctiveness, art forms, scientific and ideological systems, local communities, geopolitical landmarks just like always in the course of history, offers us the possibility for orientation, classification, comparison and differentiation. On the other hand the identities (or the differences of the “marked”), as the contemporary scientific knowledge and especially the social and primarily political practice have shown, represent a fine or a brutal model for building stereotypes, prejudices, emphasised social control, discrimination or biased hierarchy (as a privilege of the “marker” and the “assessor”).

One relatively complete system of values, shared traditions, integrating practices, attitudes and actions that unite the members of a defined socio-cultural matrix, enable different and controversial processes of interaction and provide space for integration or disintegration of the social space. If the identities are the “nucleus” of social existence, then the nature of the context in which they are placed establishes the meaning, the potential,

the status and the possibility for interconnection and cooperation of identities. The structure of the social discourse, the order of its institutions, the division of power among the social players is greatly linked to the “managing” of the identities that exist in that context, and thus to delegation of the possibility for manipulating “some” with the “others”.

In the academic circles, the knowledge that every society (especially the complex ones) is faced with the existence of various identities is greatly shared. Those identities, more or less, depending on the character of the social model (traditional, modern or post-modern, open or closed) are inclined to changes, development or interaction with another type of identity on the level of individuals and social groups and phenomena (sharing, mixing or “syncretising” the identities in building the only identity of the individual or the distinct group identity). Bearing in mind that each landmark of the human being inside the society and culture goes through the “purgatory” of time, space and content of the formations of its manifestation or of which she/he is a player, undoubtedly it is distasteful for the identity (just as it is the case with all the other constructs of thought or landmarks of practice in real life) to be treated as rigid, non-dynamic and single-linear product of existence inside the borders of the human world. Increasingly it is becoming evident that the rethinking of the insignia as well as of the potentials of every kind of identity, represents the only possibility in its social, cultural, economic and political activity for the human being to look for fresh perspectives of social restructuring. Simultaneously, this approach contains more elements for equal and “equitable” treatment of individuals and groups, of local, national and regional communities as well as their creative and free involvement in the social design i.e. social action. Changing, upgrading, interacting of the identities represent the key elements of their involvement in new actions, activities, statuses and roles. This comprehension of the identity dynamics reduces the possibility for manipulation and regulation of identities inside the social systems, thus making them less susceptible to manipulation and discrimination. This is especially important for a global and at the same time divided world that is burdened by the conceitedness of universality, seen as a unification of values. The established bi-polar matrixes of marking (branding, labelling) of social and cultural models (such as North-South, East-West, centre-periphery, developed-underdeveloped, rich-poor, authoritarian-democratic, etc.) implement successfully the “policy” of directing identities via absoluteness and exclusiveness of the centres of power.

If one has in mind that definition and dynamics, multi-stratification and contradictoriness, complexity and history, development and consistency represent components of the frequently controversial, cultural identities that establish the “limit” and the place of human communities, shape their individual and collective existence, the issue of cultural identities “game” becomes a more serious problem. This type of identity refers to the entirety, mutuality, continuity of the given and symbolic mediated features in a defined way of living of the group and at the same time it makes it different from (but not necessarily opposite to) some other group. It could be seen as: “...*the self consciousness of the members of a given group that historically came to existence and developed depending on the criteria that the group established in the relations with other social groups*” (Stojković and all., 1999:22). According to Goffman, the cultural identity enables in the

contacts among the social groups for them to: self-determine themselves; to define the other groups; and to establish the attitude towards them (Goffman, 1970).

One of the many possible narrations for the identities game, inside and outside its regional context (geographically real, cultural, social, historical as well as mythological and imaginary) is the one about the Mediterranean, as part of the South, part of Europe and finally, but not by accident, an important part of the global cultural map.

The myth about the Mediterranean, just like all the other myths that have evolved from it is still present in the spiritual horizons of Europe and the Western Civilisation. Indirectly, via the "missionary" role of the European culture it is also present on the other global meridians. However, the change in the social, historical and cultural position of the countries in this geographical, but also in its own way rounded civilisation area, as well as the new historical significance that the rest of the European countries gained changes the meaning of the myth(s).

Some of the myths still live only in art; some of them are recognised in the structure of sciences, religions and ideologies. Even in these spheres the real dimension of knowledge, feelings, symbols, values, perceptions contained in these myths is changed, modified, vulgarised or just hinted.

The very myth about the Mediterranean as the cradle of the European civilization has lost its essential nature as the inspiration and instigator of the contemporary civilisation that we sometimes remember with a feeling of nostalgia. The interest of science, primarily the humanitarian thought that now is turned towards the Mediterranean remains as a field of interest, not only because of its historical significance, but as a syndrome of cultures which specific survival and internal interactions are interesting for study. This is especially due to the prominently changed role of the countries of the Mediterranean basin and its subculture, both in regard to the European Continent and in regard to the world in general.

(Petkovska, 2009:129)

The Mediterranean "syndrome" is not a unique, monotone and once and for all given discourse. It is provocative and controversial in the overall richness of one's own controversies, which are not built only in geographical and climate sense. The Mediterranean was built out of the elite cultural symbols, but also of the "plebeian" practices that are equally important for its cultural context. The plurality of its society and cultural essence, which historically and locally is equally connected just as it is divided, is not an obstacle for recognising some of its basic landmarks such as: ancient civilisations (Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Assyro-Babylon); Judeo-Christianity; the Byzantium Imperial model; Humanism and Renaissance; the Middle Eastern Oriental cultures; the Islam: the Ottoman Empire, etc. The Mediterranean civilisations according to Boris Petkovski

... have millennium long layered past: the syncretism of cultures since pre-history up to date is its main feature ...the Mediterranean by overcoming its current political divisions today is represented (according to F. Brodel) by three cultural communities, three huge and alive civilisations, three cardinal ways of thinking, evaluating and living: firstly, the part that belongs to the West or better said to Christianity, i.e. to Catholicism with all the traits of its reflection in fine arts and literature; the second universe is the Islam that is an integral part (just like Byzantium) of the Mediterranean complex and which also has left its creative print on it; the third one, and today the most complex one is the universe of Orthodox Christianity.

(Petkovski, 2001:39/40)

The game of multiculturalism in the Mediterranean area has survived historically in the abundance of religions, art styles, philosophic discourses, development of sciences, various levels of civilisation achievements. Regardless of the fact that many cultures met, but also fiercely clashed in the area of the Mediterranean, the “imagined” general attributes still live on, continuously following the idea of it. Hence, on one hand the narratives of the Mediterranean are linked to humanism, hedonism, openness and thirst for knowledge, warmth and closeness of communication, passion and “aesthetics” of existence, and on the other hand it is also recognised as the place of obscurity, violence, “sluggishness” and “slowness”, ethnocentrism, misery and laziness. Certainly, these characteristics, even those with a romantic notion inexorably postulate the path for the infiltration of stereotypes and prejudices (as well as for auto-stereotypes), especially when the Mediterranean identity (among others also an identity of the South) is compared with the contemporary identity policies in Europe’s theatre (specifically Western Europe).

Franco Cassano in a brilliant manner deals with the improper and arrogant reading of the nature, temperament and particularities of the South and the Mediterranean, however, he also strictly refers to severe “self-criticism” of the cultures of that very South by noting:

The Mediterranean thought basically denotes the following: to reinstate South’s old dignity as the subject of contemplation, to put an end to the many years during which it was re-thought by others. All this does not mean giving in to localism, that smouldering game with one’s own vices due to which the South absolutely rightfully was called the “hell”. On the contrary the task of the Mediterranean thought is to re-think the South in a stricter and more serious manner. Its duty is to see and fight iuxta propria principa against the destructive public sale that the very people of the South organised for their countries. At this public sale, during this transformational attack on modernity two faces of the South have been proclaimed dominating to this very day: heaven for tourists or mafia nightmare (or maybe whirlpool of ethnocentrism and violence, remark by the author). These two at first sight opposing faces, as a matter of fact are complementary because they represent the legal and the illegal face of South’s subjugated joining the general development i.e. its margins where the seducing models illuminated by the north-western metropolis are being dismantled until they lose their shape. The Enlightenment impulse that believed that it could equally spread the industrial civilisation to the south was exhausted twenty years ago (the book was published in Italian in 2003, note by the author), so in the period that followed we were simply witnesses of the process in which the South was brought down to marginal supplementing of development.

We are being marginalised by putting ourselves up for sale thus making the vulgarity systematic: we prostitute our territory and environment, the public spaces and institutions. The social mobility was exercised in perverse forms with the growth of crime and mafia activity that took the newly created élites to places which wealth could not reach legally. This destiny is common for all the peoples in the South of the world that pay for their (when we are able to talk about) entrance in the fragile and dirty areas of wealth with authentic prostituting of a significant portion of their population.

(Cassano, 2011: 10/11)

It is a perverse fact that the European civilisation links its original and most important values to those that come from the “yield” of characteristics of the Mediterranean’s cultures (and not only the European but also of the “other” Mediterranean cultures) in order to treat the other contemporary Mediterranean identities with the perfidy of a cultural policy that recognises its roots, but treats them as a lazy and immature child. Hence, it uses different standards for different countries, those that emerged from the criteria of terror of the material, consumption culture. Basically, Europe is overwhelmed by the unified values of the receding Western civilisation and smothers the colourful and specific cultures of the South and of the Mediterranean, which is poor, struggling really hard for its integrity and existence, on one hand sinking in its servility to the power of the Western economy and politics, and on the other hand fighting hard and sometimes violently for its identity and possibility to develop freely and in accordance with its inner capabilities and not under the influence of the sterile domination of the civic culture. The policy *divide et impera* that the Western civilisation learned from the very Mediterranean history, today is unscrupulously applied against the Mediterranean using the disbalance in its social development as the basis for its policy of “damned identities”.

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RESHAPING IDENTITIES: ROMANIA, BORDERLINE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Abstract

The European construction is about to redefine and complete its structures in a globalisation era. In this world of movement, digitalisation, rapid means of transportation, European integration, to what extent do we know what is defining for a people/country/nation? The concept of European identity still remains blurred. EU, and globalization in general, have had unexpected effects when it comes to identity matters. The umbrella paradigm inevitably limits or simplifies national identities. Each Member State is undergoing a process of reshaping in order to transform its national identity into an EU “brand”, in other words, some aspects of the national substance are threatened to be lost in favor of a simplified and easily recognizable image.

As several scholars already mentioned, Romania is a complex country, difficult to define using only geographic criteria. The frontier metaphor fits Romania as both historically and culturally, it was the borderline of several empires: Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Several civilisation models crossed the country leading to the formation of a diverse and complex identity. The aim of this research is to capture, by means of oral history techniques, the Europeans’ perceptions about Romania. Today, we are facing another identity challenge: Romania, borderline of the European Union.

Key words: Romania, representation, European identity, oral history

Introduction

The present paper is the result of an oral history research carried out in the European Union environment, more precisely, in the European Parliament (EP). By means of an open interview, elected Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and European civil servants were asked to share their views about Romania, its role in the European history, culture and civilisation and its present role in the EU.

Another aspect of my research relates to the representations that Europeans have about Romania, about the historical, political, cultural figures that the interviewees know and remember and, last but not least, about their image about Romania and its inhabitants.

While trying to identify the representations that Europeans have about Romania, I will also address some conceptual challenges such as: identity, otherness, European identity, oral history, stereotypes etc. These concepts are significant when analysing the results of the research.

Identity and the “*otherness*”

Before diving into a more detailed analysis about national and European identity, a clarification of terms can be welcomed. Identity is built as a relation between the self and the other. Also, in order to speak about identity, there is the need to have a subject, meaning a social actor, a person, a group or a nation. Identity is formed in relation with social action and can't exist independently of society.

Identity has a projective and narrative dimension. In order to build an identity, self-reflection and self-recognition are required thus creating a projected image of oneself. This image is brought to life and becomes colourful through a narrative process. The characteristics of oneself (person/group/nation) are built based on a story about oneself, a story that gives the person/group/nation the feeling of belonging and continuity of existence. As already noted before, *alterity* is the key element in shaping identities. Only when it is threatened by a possible alter ego, by the *otherness*, does one's identity actually become clear.

National versus European identity

The national identity is linked to the concepts of state and nation. After the American and French Revolutions, after the liberalism, romanticism and 1848 revolutions etc., we can acknowledge the rise of nationalism. It led to world wars, ethnic conflicts and cleansings and the emergence of new states, thus to the need to build national identities. This is a long process where culture is nuanced. History becomes a narrative that legitimizes the state's existence while differences fade away.

Unlike national states, the European Coal and Steel Community was designed to prevent war and enhance trade and wealth. It later became the European Union that brought upon the challenge of European identity.

Is there such thing as European identity? What is it based on? Could it exist like a product *per se*? Europe can be described as a geographically, historically and culturally delimited area, even though, one might argue that it is rather an intellectual discourse (Varenne 1993: 225). Its borders are still under debate as there are open questions regarding what is actually Europe. Should Europe be defined on the basis of Greek and Roman legacies, on Christianity?

Europe is more like an imagined space where people share the same ideals, goals, values, rights and obligations (McNeill 2004: 13). But, does every state in Europe share the same ideals? Do they share the same values? Europe is a diverse space consisting of individual countries that had different historical paths: there is the Occident, the Balkan area and the Central Europe in between etc.

The European identity is still in the process of crystallisation. It is linked more to the concept of citizenship than to the concept of culture, tradition, history, like in the case of national identities. The European Union expressed its desire, throughout its defining texts and treaties to develop a European identity for a better management and in order to avoid possible fragmentation or conflicts. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty mentions the

idea of European identity in the common military defence context. Also, Article F of the Treaty states that the “*Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States*”. Together, these aspects set up a segmentary-type model of belonging, thus failing to bring some conceptual coherence.

Empirically speaking, the adoption of European identity or citizenship is perceived as a threat to national identity by some Member States. EU sees the answer in enhancing community values: culture, youth, education, social welfare, tourism etc.

When we speak about enlargement, the situation becomes vaguer. “*European*” states may apply to EU membership provided that they fulfil some political and economic criteria and that they share common cultural and historical values. But, if we define European identity as Greek-Roman legacy (law and civilisation), Christianity, Renaissance, Enlightenment and Western democracy, aren't we excluding some European states that don't share the same values? Let's take Christianity: can we argue that Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, or more recently, the controversial Kosovo or Turkey, are not European states? And what can we say about the Byzantine or Arabic influences to Renaissance? Can we deny the fact that early Medieval Renaissance figures were more focused on studying Greek and Arabic works of natural sciences, philosophy and mathematics, rather than cultural Western European texts? Moreover, most of the present EU Member States were once part of empires that had territories on other continents. After the colonial decline, people from these colonies returned to the newly adopted homeland. Can we totally ignore the historical migratory waves and their influences on modern culture (McDonogh 1993: 146)?

The European identity is a mix of identities, sometimes contrasting ones, adhering (at least in a declarative manner) to common ideals. The EU, and globalization in general, have unexpected effects when it comes to identity matters. The umbrella paradigm limits or simplifies the expression of national identities, for the sake of integration. Each country must choose which national characteristics are the most representative and promote them through a “*unique selling proposition*” (marketing concept). In this process, the national substance may be scarified in favour of a more easily recognizable image.

The European Union and the globalization process have some inevitable consequences on the definition of national identity both in terms of how each state defines itself and in terms of “*the others*”. This phenomenon causes a chain reaction, most often indistinguishable, because each country/nation/people's identity is defined in relation to *the otherness* and in this European context, needs reshaping. If “*the other*” changes, national identity may sometimes become blurred. In some cases “*the others*” understand better this process from the observer position. This is why an investigation about how others see Romania is relevant in the European trend of reshaping identities.

How do Europeans see Romania? - Case study

Romanian identity was altered several times in history. More recently, during communism, history was rewritten and tailored to serve the interests of the ruling party. The historical and cultural link to the West, which was enhanced in the interwar period, was

interrupted. Communication with the rest of the Western world was suspended and only the ties with the Warsaw Pact countries were kept. The actual cultural development came to a standstill or went underground as only the artists committed to the communist cause were promoted. After 1989, Romania has gone through a rough transition, a re-Europeanization process and the rebound with Europe which culminated with the European Union integration.

For Romania, the perception of others always mattered. To a large extent, this attitude is hard to understand. As a country that endured history's tides, situated at the borderline of former great empires and political alliances, it is only natural to at least want to know how the "others", the same ones that helped build Romania's identity, see "us".

As mentioned before, in order to draft the present paper, I made this research aiming to capture by means of oral history techniques the perception of Europeans about Romania. Some details about oral history and the actual research that lies as the basis of this paper can be interesting and are to be presented as follows.

Oral history

Novel history is sometimes risking being lost as it is generally based on oral sources. In order to preserve aspects of folklore, representations, images, oral history and its specific tools are needed. The positive aspect of the oral history is that it provides new information about the past, while contributing to the widening of the historical research spectrum through new interpretation models. The most important asset of oral history is that it completes the societal landscape of a certain era with unique information.

Oral history offers a link between a historic event and the experiences and perceptions of a person about that event. By means of an interview, the researcher collects authentic registration of the way people perceived things at a given moment. The researcher has a very important task, that of filtering, listening between the lines in order to capture the attitude of the interviewee about the research subject.

While oral history represents a unique historical source, it has its limits. Among these, we observe that people have the tendency to point out or to avoid certain aspects of the narrative not to offend the interviewer. This aspect was confirmed throughout my research. Asking about Romania and its role in the European history, culture and civilisation, few individuals had the "courage" or the honesty to say what they really mean, answering with hesitation or ambiguously. With all the acknowledged limits, the answers collected through the oral history research prove how important it is to gather the opinions, testimonies and perceptions of an individual relatively to a certain subject. I will try to prove this point in the following part of this paper.

Capturing European's views on Romania

In order to capture the views on Romania, I drafted an interview guide structured in two parts. The first one seeks to register the general knowledge that the interviewees (Members of the European Parliament and civil servants) have about Romania: from a

geographic-demographic point of view, economic profile, cultural figures, ethnic minorities, and the Roma issue. It also asks questions and details about their first contact with Romania, if EU accession made them modify or enrich their opinions. The second part of the interview focuses on their views about Romania's role in the European history and the image of Romanians.

What do Europeans actually know and think about Romania

This section is dedicated to the research findings and aims to present MEP's and European civil servants' answers to the interview.

The first results of the interviews highlight the little knowledge Europeans have about Romania. One MEP explained this phenomenon. There is no more news about Romania except about corruption and the Roma issue. There was an extended flow of information when Romania was in the accession process. After 2007, the information level and frequency decreased.

When asked about Romania's location, most of them answered with South Eastern Europe and some of them mentioned the Balkans. Several scholars still include Romania in the Balkan area. The term Balkan comes from the Turkish word for mountains. The Balkan Mountains that led to the Balkan Peninsula's name are Stara Planina (Old Mountain) in Bulgaria and partly in Serbia, which are commonly known as the Balkan Mountains. Romania is among the countries that have only a little part of their land located within the peninsula (like Slovenia and Turkey). The debate about the Balkan states is still not settled.

As Lucian Boia (2001) mentioned throughout his work, Romania is a complex country, difficult to define using only geographic criteria. Even to this day, people have difficulties placing Romania on a symbolic map. They oscillate between Eastern Europe, the Balkan region or Central Europe. Regarding the Balkan legacy, Romania, even though located on the north of Danube, is still linked to the Balkans culturally and historically.

The frontier metaphor fits Romania very good as, historically, it was the borderline of several empires: Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Several cultures and civilisation models crossed the country leading to the formation of a diverse and complex identity. Today we are facing another identity challenge: Romania, borderline of the European Union.

Moving along with the analysis of the respondents' answers, the most known Romanian figures among the MEPs and civil servants are: Ceaușescu, different sportsmen (Nadia Comănechi, Ilie Năstase, Ilie Țiriac, Georghe Hagi and other football players). These answers are very interesting. Few respondents were able to name other Romanian figures than those linked to communism. There were just some that mentioned Ciprian Porumbescu, the musician, Eugen Ionesco etc.

The almost standard answers were Ceaușescu and Nadia Comănechi. There was another type of standard answer to the Romanian known figures question: Vlad the Impaler. As this is a stereotype image, I will elaborate on this subject in the section dedicated to these customary patterns.

When asked about the language category that Romanian language belongs to, most of MEPs knew that Romanian is a Romance/Latin rooted language. However, some of the respondents were caught up the misconception that Romanian and Russian languages are similar. It is not the only case when stereotypes were used for answering the questions of my interview. For this reason, I will dedicate the following part of the paper to these clichés.

Do we really need stereotypes?

When we analyse representations and images, especially when talking about countries or larger groups, stereotypes arise. One may notice that stereotypes are internalised by our interlocutor and brought forward in a narrative way as if these are their personal beliefs. The same principle applied while conducting my research therefore some ideas dedicated to the stereotypes and their inception are not redundant.

How would the world without stereotypes look like, a world of individual cases in which every idea is analyzed independently without being placed in categories? One must admit that such a view would make the world more complex, difficult to grasp, unpredictable. The fear of the unknown and the desire to predict the future, the potential interactions and their outcome has led people to invent categories. They facilitate the “reading” of the outside world and sometimes help decipher frequent patterns. Categories, patterns based on previous information or experience facilitate the ability to understand the world, file and store social details in a more efficient manner. One of the ways of compressing social complexity is by creating and using stereotyping.

Derived from the Greek words *stereos* (strong, solid) and *typos* (impression), the term stereotype was brought forward in the ‘20s by the American researcher, Walter Lippmann who defines it as an image shared by a group about another group or category. Mental images of a group are assumed without prior processing and because of insufficient information (Lippmann1991).

As demonstrated, categories and stereotypes facilitate human existence and interaction. The capital sin of the stereotype is that it generalizes and simplifies the picture based on a subjective reality, independent of the nature or actual state of the stereotyped subject.

Another feature of stereotypes is that they have in most cases a negative connotation. Another drawback is that once put in use, stereotypes are hardly removed from the collective mind. Last but not least, the reductionist and generalisation aspect of stereotypes favour their use in a manipulative, demagogic and populist purpose. The most dangerous effect is that stereotypes are created mainly on ethnic or religious grounds thus threatening the state of harmony between different ethnic groups in the society (the danger of discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism).

False images about Romania

What images do Europeans project when thinking of Romania? As previously demonstrated, the easy answers are to be found in the press, literature and public political

speeches. These images are common stereotypes, mostly unfavourable: corruption, poor and backward country, gypsies, orphans, communism, or references to Transylvania, Dracula and vampires. While doing my research, I sadly often noticed that the same stereotypes were used by most of the interviewees.

Vlad the Impaler versus Dracula

Although there are neither physical nor historical traces of vampires in Romania, the legend attracts enough tourists interested in the story of Bram Stoker. Octavian Paler noted in his book *“Don Quijote in the East”* that Dracula is for the Romanians as exotic as Snowman (Paler 2010, p. 259), the myth being imposed upon them by foreigners. Although he has never visited Romania and maybe had little knowledge about the existence of Vlad the Impaler, Stoker created a fiction that overlapped with a real historical character, leading to the never-ending fame that Dracula enjoys. So-called Vlad the Impaler was indeed a tough man but had nothing to do with the vampire story. Back then, the Romanian principalities lived turbulent times, characterized by internal turmoil and imminent Turkish attacks. Vlad the Impaler’s strategy to display corpses was successful in 1462, when Mehmet II gave up his conquest attempt and returned to Constantinople. It is not necessarily a reason to be proud of, but in the context of that era, when common successive betrayals were customary, Vlad’s bloody strategy was successful for a while, assuring his throne in the years 1448, 1455-1462 and 1476.

Russian Romanians

Although coming from a country geographically located in South-Eastern Europe, surrounded by Slavic-speaking countries, Romanians do not speak nor understand Russian except for those who have studied it or the Romanians across the Prut River (Republic of Moldova). I often observed a shock on my interlocutors’ face when I explain that Romanians do not feel flattered by their attempts to list the few words they know in Russian. I cannot wonder where this confusion comes from and how it was turned into a stereotype. Asking a Spaniard if he understands any word when I speak Romanian, the answer *“No!”* was accompanied by the observation that it sounds more like Russian. There are indeed Slavic words in Romanian vocabulary, about 10% of the modern language (up to 20% are archaisms not used in the common language), but we can not say that they form the essential background of Romanian language.

I think the Romania-Russia association originates in the common communist experience. Perhaps there is also a link to the fact that, unfortunately, even today there are still some noticeable physical differences, rather in clothing than mentality related between eastern and western Europeans.

Roma-nia

When speaking of stereotypes, we inevitably come to the Roma chapter (it is no longer politically correct to use the derogatory term “*gypsy*”), more specifically to the confusion that Rome and Romanians are synonymous. For starters, Roma ethnic minority in Romania is represented by only 2.5% of the population (census 2002, with the standard error that many Roma do not declare their ethnicity, preferring to identify themselves as Romanians). Perhaps the confusion started from the similarity between the names designating members of this ethnic group and Romanians. The term Roma in Romani, a non-Latin language, means *man*, the plural of this noun being *Roma*. Fortunately for Italy, the capital is geographically far from a condensed Roma presence to have the same confusion. Do not think I am not being politically correct or that with the above statement I mean any negative reference to the characteristics of the Roma. It is equally frustrating for both Roma and for Romanians to observe that the ethnic stereotypes are negative and often rather similar: thieves, lazy, etc.

Stereotypes, true or false?

To conclude, the stereotype is an exaggeration, a distortion of reality that occurs out of ignorance, racism, etc. A possible solution to escape the stereotyping trap would be openly criticizing them and applying a falsifiability test. A researcher has the duty to assume the shortcomings of stereotypes when working on a rigorous research.

What happens when stereotypes are consistent with reality? For example, “*coloured people*” or *Africans have special musical and dancing talents*. First, the embarrassment of using the term “*coloured people*” is overwhelming. In the XXI century, where human rights and anti-discrimination are en vogue concepts, we cannot describe in such way the ethnic characteristics of certain people. Surpassing the differendum offense - “*Political correctness*”, is there any truth in the abovementioned statement? Statistically speaking, the statement can be sustained. Should we conclude that stereotypes can only be acceptable to the extent that they contain assessments? Such an approach would still be inopportune.

But what happens when you do not feel represented by the ethnic stereotypes or implanted stigmas? What happens when by simple observation we don't identify with the same characteristics in people with a common ethnic background? The identity of an individual exceeds the limits of the ethnic and stereotypical. It is said that “*the British are mannered and have a sense of humour*”. However, how mannered are the football fans in the Premier League? An individual can belong to several social groups and can have multiple identities independent of each other: one can be simultaneously an Englishman, Liverpool supporter, fan of electronic music, liberal, father, college student, and examples could continue.

With the help of these questions we can really understand both simplifying role of stereotypes and their limits. In order to overcome ignorance, very popular in modern so-

ciety, the researcher must filter all information through his/her own system of values and knowledge, using confidently both criticism and self-criticism.

Identified attitudes

Four types of attitudes could be identified during the research. The first one is that of interviewees who are not interested in Romania, considering it as a country that does not belong to the leading European elite. For this reason, they do not consider that they need to enhance their knowledge about this country. Another type of attitude reflects the respondents who do not know but are interested (at least in a declarative manner) to find out more about Romania. The most common situation is of the people who have media based and stereotype images. The most frequent answers mention communism, Ceauşescu, Vlad the Impaler, the Roma and other prejudices disseminated by society. Last but not least, the most interesting type of respondents are the ones who prove to have more knowledge about Romania, either because they are interested in the country or because they have had direct experiences with Romania and/or its inhabitants. Some of the interviewees of this last category expressed their intrigue about the history, the strategic location and Latin origins of Romania.

When it comes to the people, Romanians' image is not that dramatic. Europeans from the EP seem to like them. The answers to the question about how would they characterise Romanians were diverse: nice people, not proud enough, hard working, hospitable, "*Europeans*", not knowing foreign languages versus talented in learning them. Even though not explicitly said, people are afraid of Romanians for being thieves, for their immigration "*potential*" and sometimes even because of their Orthodox tradition.

Within the European Parliament, there is a tacit classification of Member States. France and Germany are perceived as first class countries that contributed to the creation of today's European Union. Second class countries are the ones belonging to the Euro zone and the United Kingdom. The last category is what they call "the rest", third class countries that burden even more the smooth running of the Union with their corruption and incomplete democracies.

Unfortunately for Romania, its image in the European Parliament is not very bright. To give an example of the topics of the plenary agenda that mention Romania, they are mostly negative. Looking at the topics on the EP plenary agenda, one would see that the ones that concern Romania are mostly negative. For instance, in the 2010 Roma scandal between France and Bulgaria and Romania, the situation was closed relatively fast in favour of France as these countries failed to provide sufficient protection to their Roma minority thus the exodus towards the West. And then, who wanted to become France's enemy for defending a country like Romania? The Schengen accession stirred a big debate. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria is being delayed by some Member States, even though these countries have fulfilled all the required technical criteria. New criteria are requested and they include corruption level, the possibility to cope with trafficking etc. Introducing new criteria while the game is being played is neither fair nor legal but the powerful countries consider that Romania and Bulgaria entered the European Union

too soon, when they were not ready. In an interview, a MEP even mentioned that the 2007 enlargement has an enormous influence on the EU decisions concerning the Western Balkan countries, meaning that the Union is not ready to make the same mistake and accept countries that do not fulfil all the Copenhagen criteria. To my mind, Romania's scapegoat image is exaggerated but little can be done to immediately change people's views. Time and efforts are needed, so are further research on these topics.

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IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS. THE CASE OF HUNGARIAN AND ROMANIAN STUDENTS FROM “BABEȘ-BOLYAI” UNIVERSITY, ROMANIA**Abstract**

This article offers an anthropological analysis of how identities are constructed in the Transylvanian case, and more precisely at the “Babeș-Bolyai” University, between the Romanian and the Hungarian students. Firstly, I will try to find a proper definition for identity because as there are so many meanings or, on the contrary, not enough, we could arrive at a so called “identity” crisis (Brubaker, Junqua, 2001). Secondly, I will use the constructivist approach to analyze the ways in which identities of Romanian and Hungarian students are constructed within the frame of the “Babeș-Bolyai” University, and out of it, taking into account three factors: Time (Memory and History), Space and Language.

Key words: Identity, Time, Space, Language

The constructivist approach says that identity is a social construction which can form only in the presence and dialogue with the Other; it implies the existence of another to which the relations of assimilation and differentiation are connected (Mengue, 2008: 35). Looking at the first factor, Time, composed of History and Memory, I will try to clarify what is the relationship between the two elements using different views of anthropologists, historians and philosophers. “Memory” is a notion which, like “identity”, has become increasingly important in many disciplines, especially since the late ‘70s. Generally, memory defines the mechanisms of reminding and recollection, of rereading collective social representations, which are closely related to the matter of present identities (Baussant, 2007, p. 389). Speaking of memory, different authors use notions like history of mentalities, collective memory, individual memory (Confino, 1997), or just memory (Abel, Castelli-Gattinara, Loriga and Ullern-Weit , 2006).

To exemplify the relation between memory and history, the philosopher Paul Ricoeur is using a circular analysis, where memory appears twice: once as a matrix of history, if we take the point of view when the history was written; the second time as a channel of retaking the historical past as it is reported in the historical proceedings (Ricoeur, 2006: 21). The one I will emphasize on is the latter. The function of the memory is to recognize:

the past is recognized as having been there. Hence, the memory is the only one that can convey this function to the history (Ricoeur, 2006: 21).

The anthropologist Joël Candau outlines the differences between memory and history, but also their interdependence. Both are past representations, but the purpose of history is the exactitude, while of memory the plausible character. History imposes order in the link of events, but memory contains the feelings, the affects, the passion of the events (Candau, 2005: 58). Joël Candau also speaks of the generational memory (the most important in our case), a memory both horizontal and vertical, intra-generational and which is not intended to be transmitted (Candau, 1998: 6). With regard to Transylvania, generational memory can be divided into the communist and the post-communist period. However, for the students with whom I discussed, the post-communist is more perceptible.

Speaking of memory and history, Maurice Halbwachs highlights especially the distinctions between the two. It presents history as a collection of facts that have occupied the highest place in people's memories, but going through a change when they are read in books, thought and learned in schools, as past events are selected, classified and reconciled. In general, history begins when memory stops. As the memory remains, there is no need to fix it in writing, or even to fix it at all (Halbwachs, 1997: 130). The anthropologist Maurice Bloch introduces another notion: autobiographical memory. It refers to the memory of the events that the subject has experienced, and that seems to oppose to semantic memory-which expresses the fact that the subject has learned through other people -it is also called historical memory (Bloch, 1995, p. 61). But, the author argues that when we start to study memory in the real world, we see that autobiographical memory and historical memory meet. It shows that memory which has its origins in the stories may take the form of autobiographical memories and vice versa, and that story is not stored in memory as a narrative, but as a re-representation of sequenced events, similar to the sequences that happen to us in real life (Bloch, 1995: 71-73). This is a point of view applicable to the Transylvanian case, including the relationship between Hungarian and Romanian students. The anthropologist Kevin Yelvington (2002) brings another perspective: memory is "intersubjective" and relies on the process of transmission. Intersubjectivity is specific to memory, and not to history.

But, if we note the opinion of the historian Pierre Nora, we can see that there is a clear distinction between the two: memory is alive, carried by living groups of individuals, and constantly changing. It is rooted in the concrete, in gesture, in details. History, on the contrary, focuses only on the temporal continuity, on the developments and the relations between things; it belongs to all and to nobody, it is universal. History is an anti-memory, and memory is anti-history (Candau, 2005: 59).

In our case, "memory is the present of the past" (Martin, 2010: 54), that is to say, it takes what is discussed, selected, reworked by actors of the present according to their projects. In Transylvania, history and memory are linked, history playing a very important role in the construction of memory and vice versa. As for the students, we can observe that among them there are some who make no longer the difference between history and memory. The main reason is that nationalistic history developed especially during the communist period. Based mainly on the negative feelings of memory, the Romanian state has built during that period a history directed against the Hungarians, which contrib-

uted to the maintenance of the Romanian-Hungarian conflict. As Boujou says, societies choose their ancestors, and among the events realized by the ancestors, those which are important to keep in memory in order to legitimize the positions of domination historically acquired (Candau, 2005: 103).

Ioan Aurel Pop, contemporary Romanian historian, observed a shift towards exaggeration in Romanian historiography before 1989. He also says that the Hungarian historiography didn't show too much objectivity either (Pop, 1996: 5). If we take a look into the history written in the communist period, we can observe the strongly nationalist and subjective approach. For instance, David Prodan (2002), Romanian historian, presents in his book "Transilvania și iar Transilvania" the basic thesis that separates the history of Romanians and Hungarians in an ironic way, basing his thesis on different readings of Hungarian nationalistic historians.

The first event often discussed by the two groups is the period of the IX to XII century. Here there are two theories are used for political and nationalistic purposes, but which are also incorporated into the collective memory of people. Romanian historiography sustains the theory of continuity which says that after the withdrawal of Romans from the provinces of north Dacia located north of Danube, much of the population remained there (on the territory called nowadays Transylvania); Hungarians, on the contrary, sustain that much of the population migrated to the south. Conflicting interpretations of history continue to develop today and influence current inter-ethnic relations in Transylvania. For most of the Hungarian and Romanian students with whom I had discussed the matter, this subject is still vague, and they are not fully accept either of the two theories.

However, the moment-origin is not enough for memory to hold the representations of identity. It takes a time axis and many events, which the history of Transylvania does not lack. All these events, which make part of history, but also of memory, enter in the state's game of power. Paul Ricoeur brings the notion of "just memory" to discuss the issue on the memorial uses and abuses. Attempts to integrate different experiences in national memory still do not amount to a real historical recognition, highlighting the difficulties to include in an official narration a loss that affected the social ties (Baussant, 2007: 390).

Memory always brings in discussion the question of forgetting, usually by opposing it (Augé, 2001). Forgetting is considered necessary for the individual and for society as well. But what should we forget? Talking with Romanian students about the history of Transylvania, there are always some events that are recalled by them and which seem to be forgotten by Hungarians: the period between 1867-1918, when Transylvania was incorporated in the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and its assiduous politics of magyarization. For the Hungarian side the Treaty of Trianon, when 33% of the Hungarian population passed beyond its borders was a traumatic event. Hungarian students often speak of it, but for Romanians students, this event is seen as quite natural, as something that was always wished for and was finally achieved. Another event that should be signalled is the Horthy period (a very difficult period for Romanians under the Hungarian regime) always remembered by Romanian students and forgotten by Hungarians.

So history and memory are closely interrelated in our case and both have shaped and transformed over the centuries our two subjects in function of their aims. As Time, identity is constructed sometimes in opposition and reflection: speaking of the Hungarian

identity, we can speak in fact of Romanian identity and its attitude towards Hungarians. Moreover, to construct an identity, Time uses memories and “omissions”, according to the needs of the present.

Identity reflects a desire for continuity (in time), but also for expansion (in space and in society) (Di Méo, 2004, p. 350), or rather for maintenance. Most identities show a geographic component, a spatiality that strengthens and makes them more pervasively present. They are expressed so often by the mediation of social and spatial forms as places, areas, landscapes and so on (Di Méo, 2004: 339). Denis-Constant Martin (2010: 64) simplifies the definition of space, saying that space is an emotional building in the head. Personifying the community and its territory, we attribute automatically the properties of human individuality: unity, cohesion, continuity in time etc. By reciprocity, this group personification promotes the identification of the individual to this one (Di Méo, 2002: 177).

The construction of concrete spatial limits, determining an inside and an outside, follows closely the process of definition of “I” and the “Other”. The continuity of occupying the same space permits the transmission of values and of meanings locally referred, assuring the perenity of collective representation of “I” and the identification with the place (Jolivet and Léna, 2011: 8-9).

Naming the space is both to give it an identity and to mark a possession. In the past, group names were confused with the names of places (Martin, 2010, p. 66). During the communist period, a policy of nationalization began, affecting the symbolic geography of the city: the names of streets and squares were renamed with Romanian historical figures, statues of Romanian heroes were built etc. But, since the fall of communism, the university took both names, Romanian (“Babeş”) and Hungarian (“Bolyai”), an action that contributed to its multicultural politics.

Cultural identity and geographical identity are based on the same space and give rise to the territory (Bonnemaison, 1999: 11). Going further, Edmond Bernus (1999: 33) says that territory represents the emotional bonds that unify a community with a space. It is the place rather than the territory that abolishes the distance. Its sensible and tangible reality reveals from its closing, from the continuity of its elements, the co-presence of human beings and the things carrying a particular social-spatial sense. It’s a space of social distinction (Di Méo, 2002: 178-179) represented in our case by the Hungarian bars frequented especially by Hungarian students. In these bars, there are few things specifically Hungarian: it can be the name of the bar, the music, the menu or posters written in Hungarian and all the servants who speak Hungarian. But, most of the Hungarians say they go there because it is their friends decision. It’s a kind of local tradition they receive and respect and it could also be a way of distinction as Hungarians. They consider it natural to go in a Hungarian bar as they are Hungarians.

As the places of individual practice and places represented and appropriated had multiplied, geography offers today a variety of expanded choice of possible identities (Di Méo, 2002: 178-179). Everyone moves around different themes of identities: geographical, professional associations, etc. with friends and family. But, plural identities can begin a controversy, as is the case of Hungarian students: in Hungary they are perceived as Romanians and in Romania as Hungarians. They identify themselves as Hungarians from

Romania, or, sometimes, they prefer to adopt a regional identity: they are Transylvanians, or Clujeni etc. As concerning the Székely (an ethnic group, which speaks Hungarian, considered by most historians a Hungarian ethnic group), the situation is further complicated because they may feel as Székely sometimes, and Hungarians at other times, in terms of context.

In the constructive process of a collective identity, there is often a mobilizing myth that gives a clearer picture of the group territorialized which then takes the appearance of a unified whole. In this approach, the territory is still playing a major role. The area provides an opportunity for the political power to assert its political legitimacy (Di Méo, 2004: 347). For example, for many Romanian students, Transylvania has always been part of Romania, but in fact, we can speak of the Romanian nation, including Transylvania as well for only a century. The explanation relies in the way history has been written.

The memory is rooted in space, it gives meaning to space and is particularly used to support claims of right to land or territorial claims. An example is the regionalization requested by the Hungarian side, which means that the two departments Harghita and Covasna would have formed a single region, with political and economical rights as in the past. This event raises reactions among students too, especially among those members of the Right Organization, Noua Dreaptă (The New Right), a young right extremist group, inspired by the so called "legionari" (an anti-Semitism organization from the interwar period).

If there is a memory of space, the space is also a memory; it is a living memory (Martin, 2010: 59). Here's an example of a manifestation of the living memory: in July 2007, "Hungarian radicals", as the Romanian media called them, of the Bolyai Initiative Committee asked the exposure of busts of the Austro-Hungarian rulers at the University (Newz, 2007). It was a reaction to the education authority who had installed the busts of King Ferdinand I and Queen Maria, the sovereigns of Greater Romania. The Hungarians believe that these busts of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor and Empress would have represented an act of historical reconciliation for everything that happened between the Romanians and Hungarians, as the Queen Maria and King Ferdinand I have governed the Great Romania, and the Empress Elisabeta and the Emperor Franz Josef ruled the Great Hungary. Their request was refused and most students did not know about this last "conflict", but they show suspicion about it. Yet, there is a Hungarian who knows about the event. He considers that some attention to "details" would improve the Romanian-Hungarian relationship in both the teaching staff and students. Students were not involved in this event and that is why they think it is not representative for them. A similar attitude can be noticed among Romanian students who have left the "conflict" outside their relationships with Hungarians, considering that they are not involved in the event or simply don't have the courage or the will to resurrect the old conflict.

Therefore, Space plays a basic role in the construction of identities for the Hungarian and Romanian subjects. But because of its features as unity, cohesion, continuity, possession etc. subscribed in two different Times, Space often contributes to the creation of these identities by opposing them.

The part of the cultural identity that affects most of the Hungarian minority is the linguistic identity. It is also the most obvious manifestation of cultural identity. Accord-

ing to Lagarde C. (2008: 59-62), languages are untranslatable and the revindication of linguistic identity passes by the revindication of roots, a fact proved by the behaviour of the Hungarians in Transylvania. Thus, if each language is a different “world view”, each is irreplaceable and therefore it is unacceptable that any of them disappear. That is why all languages are equal, they can all express in the same way the human knowledge, they are entitled to official recognition, and they must be protected, because to lose one’s language is to lose one’s roots and culture.

Language is the medium of speech, with which a group communicates. It expresses the “real world of everyday life” that the sociologist Alfred Schutz indicates as the primordial social reality, the representations, the values and even the history of the group (Pioch, 2000: 14). That is why very often the problem of the minority language is a cultural problem (Pioch, 2000: 14). The demand for a linguistic identity often refers to its roots. This means that the linguistic community highlights its presence, preferably as far as possible on a given territory, and prevails over it as primordial. It is presented, as well as its language and culture, as part of transhistorical continuity not only unbroken, but unalterable.

Since its foundation, the “Babeş-Bolyai” University was a nationalist tool used by both sides, Hungarian and Romanian, to show their authority. Thus, during the communist period, “Babeş-Bolyai” continued to be a nationalist institution and many of the Hungarian specializations were abandoned. After the communist period, more specializations in Hungarian language began to be created. Yet occasionally there are problems of “language” that arise.

For example, in September 2006 a “panel conflict” took place, triggered by two Hungarian professors of “Babeş-Bolyai”. The conflict began when the two teachers dressed up 40 panels with the signs “No Smoking”, “Academic College” and “Board of education” in Hungarian. But as they did not have the permission from the administration, they were dismissed. This has been interpreted by most Hungarian students with whom I spoke as an unnecessary conflict, perhaps absurd. The students I considered to be called “assimilated” (because they use the Hungarian language only in the familiar surroundings, most of their friends are Romanian, and feel more attached to the Romanian culture) say they are indifferent to this conflict, it’s a question that begins from upper power and must remain there and not influence the simple Magyar-Romanian relations. In addition, they do not feel the need for panels in their native language. Other students see the situation differently: if the university calls itself multicultural (as “Babeş-Bolyai”), it’s quite normal that there should be also Hungarian boards, and perhaps in the other languages that are studied. They do not feel the need for these panels, but they do not understand the stubbornness of the administration of “Babeş-Bolyai” to mount the panels. It is a symbolic conflict concerning a few Hungarian words, which means more than mounting panels: the visibility of the Hungarian presence in the university and its importance. These discussions appear to be insignificant and absurd, but still have the power to bring back the old ethnic conflict or even to give birth to new ones. On the other hand, among the Romanian students who have experienced this “conflict”, there are some who say they have nothing against the installation of these panels, but they also want panels in other languages (German, English etc.), just to show the multiculturalism of the university and

not the bilingualism. So, they would like to place the Hungarian language on the same footing as the other foreign language. If nevertheless this type of conflict does not affect many students, there are situations where they feel their linguistic identity and culture are put under threat. These are veiled moments of conflicts, where Hungarian students feel the reluctance of their Romanian colleagues. For example, when they speak Hungarian in a Hungarian group, sometimes they are given mischievous looks from their Romanian colleagues or they are even asked to speak Romanian. They believe that Romanians do not understand the fact that the Hungarian language is their native language for them, in which it is easier to express themselves, while Romanian is a foreign language. Then, they may sometimes be affected when they have to speak Romanian in public, because their Romanian colleagues correct their mistakes in an offending manner and ask for "the perfection of the language". This sometimes makes them reluctant to speak Romanian in public spaces. In the middle of the Hungarian group, there are also inconveniences in relation with Székely. Székely fail to recognize the identity of their Hungarian colleagues, because they say that those ones speak Hungarian with a Romanian accent, so they consider them Romanians. This happens especially in the faculties with Hungarian specialization, where there are many Székely who interact more rarely with other ethnic groups and even with Hungarians.

So, this is how the linguistic identity functions: it brings together Hungarians, as they speak the same language, and at the same time it separates them from Romanians, who do not speak Hungarian.

In conclusion, cultural identity means for most of the Hungarians and Romanian students belonging to a specific history and culture and it manifests itself most visibly by the language. This is why symbolic conflicts, such as the panels one mentioned above have so much resonance. Also geographical space, as a manifestation of memory and history, contributes to the construction of our two subjects, Romanian and Hungarian, sometimes by opposing them, other times by revealing their similarity.

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ANSWER OF THE “SMALL” CULTURES TO THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

Culture as a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic human development and as a dominant way of life in one group, an ethnic entity, society, manifests its duality as a part and as a determinant of individual and collective identity.

As much as self-conscious individuals intend to protect their spiritual personality, each community, aware of their own spiritual horizons and their new spiritual needs, always finds itself between gender uniqueness and universality. Possible attempts of resolution of these apparent contradictions range from conflict, isolation, sublimation and synergy, to depersonalization.

In this paper will be singled out many attempts to be sought to preserve, or break down, cultural identity in this region. It will indicate to the destructive role of politics and media, and the ability to overcome the consequences resulting from such processes.

Key words: culture, identity, spirituality, media, ideologies.

Introduction

If we accept the widely held opinion in philosophy and sociology that culture contains the entire spiritual activities of men, or as Raymond Williams has comprehended culture, on the one hand as a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development of the individual, and on the other hand as a way of life which is dominant in one group, society or in an entire epoch, than culture is *quinta essenta*, not only of the spiritual but also of material life of people. Certainly this unconditionally includes, first of all, that man, although being of matter, still his overall world (material and spiritual) is created from its own spirituality and idea. Consequently, his identical needs (for food, housing, love, music, etc.) can be satisfied with various actions. In other words, in the nature of man is a need for belief in God, but this need can be satisfied in many different ways. However, the world of human beings was always moving between the poles of total centralization and autochthonous and authentic variety. With the occurrence of the mass concept of life, the mass culture took over patron role over all forms of culture, respectively in one specific form, as a media culture, and today has occupied all areas of the modern world. What culture launches and offers is impossible to discover without a lump familiarization of its anatomy.

Global communication or ego imposing

All media of mass communication, up till the half of the XX century were used only on local (national - state) level. On July 10th, 1962, the satellite *Telestار I* (first of its kind among telecommunication equipment) was launched into the orbit and began the era of international (planetary) communication. Thus, powerful media diffusion caused a rapid transformation and reorganization of the media. (Dalglish, 1989: 3-4) In the most powerful country of the world media (*USA*) were formed large media corporations, with an extremely strong capital. This is where mutual and merciless war for control of global media coverage began. Today this process of concentration of media power is performed in a form of multiple globalization in media. More accurate as globalization of: media infrastructure, property and media contents.

One owner, or a number of them, possesses media on several continents and in the ownership structure participate stockholders from all continents. Thus, for example, *CNN* broadcasts its programs with more than 14 satellites and covers territory of 208 countries, where more than half billion inhabitants live. Many other corporations function in a similar way, such as *MTV*, *Globo*, *The Chinese National television*, *Asien*, *ABC*.

In the United States all the important media centres are in the ownership of nine large corporations. These media centres are formed as *monomedia* (media centers with identical or similar media, for example, only television) and as *multimedia* (combination of different media: television, computer program producers, film companies, publishing houses, etc.). Only the *News Corporation* in ownership of *Rupert Murdoch*, with capital in real estate worth 25 billion dollars, includes production and distribution of newspapers, magazines, books, radio and television programs, films and computer data on four continents (Kunczik – Zipfeld, 1998: 204- 215).

Something similar happens on the European continent too. Thanks to the *European Organization* for satellite communication, European people are able to watch more than 150 television channels and listen to hundreds of radio stations. Also, the *Bertelsmann AG* corporation, which is oriented towards production of films, music, video spots, television programs and publications in *Europe*, *USA* and *Australia*, has a wealth of 7 billion dollars and annual revenues of half a billion dollars (Ibid, 199).

Therefore, on October 28th, 1980, *UNESCO* adopted the *Resolution DR 8* which was to be the basis for a new world information order. This resolution insists on free flow information, freedom of journalists and media, respect of different cultural identities and particularly emphasizes prevention and elimination of negative consequences from the information monopoly (Ibid, 183).

Within the process of denationalization of the media, the processes of *standardization*, *unification* and *commercialization* of programs was carried out. Programs are no longer prepared exclusively for one market or autochthonous cultural areas, but for the global area, which changes the whole media perception and the cross – cultural communication. **Large media corporations with their aggressive offers suffocate small media and try to impose their cultural and ideological patterns in all areas of the globe. In that way, the process of *acculturation* (cultural permeation) has been transformed**

in the process of cultural domination, and cultural diversity has been reduced to a multitude of identical.

All this has emphasized the *Foreign Images* study, which was created in the spring and summer of 1979 by UNESCO and in this study were included 29 states. True, it is stated that for news for foreign sources first were consulted the national agencies, but latter as an information source were used four big Western agencies, still nevertheless it was established that less developed countries possess very little information about such or similar countries. When it comes to such countries, large agencies report about them through stereotypes which are adapted to the prejudices of the urban and developed world. In addition, the data shows that in September, 1995, the most watched television series in the world was *Baywatch*. The series was sold in 103 countries outside the *United States* and watched by around 2.3 billion viewers (Ibid, 189).¹ Mega international audience is characteristic for *MTV* too, and:

"there are approximately one billion young viewers, who are watching and listening to this program in average an hour a day" (Kuncik - Zipfel, 1998: 195).

But if support and encouragement of diversity is one of the basic principles of democracy, than the world in one peace – time media aggression, finds itself facing serious disavowal of the stated key principle of democracy. France is trying to resist such mega – corporation dictation of media, but in fact it is quite lonely in that process. On the other hand, uniform and commercialized, easy made programs, lower the intellectual level of the audience and organize individuals and whole societies towards models of imposed forms, and through exploitation there is a process of thought control of mass audiences.

At the same time, the state, as a former tutor and controller of media, more and more is repressed from the media sphere, and its ideological role is replaced with legislative. Straitened between large global corporations, on the one hand, and the privatization of media, on the other hand, the state is given an opportunity to provide only legal conditions for unhindered function of the media. This process affected *Italy* in the seventies of the last century and the national public radio – television (*RAI*) faced competition from around 3,000 radio and 1,600 TV programs.

The fruits of populist self – sufficiency

Intercultural communication implies a special relationship of understanding and cooperation among the entire variety of cultures and cultural heritages. However, any form of cultural link and cooperation is not possible if different cultures are *not interested* in mutual contact. This includes, not only *opening* the different cultural treasury but minimum direct *common interest*, where positive experiences from the past provide good prospects for cooperation now and in the future. Certainly these postulates are irrelevant where there is not tolerance for different values, attitudes and needs. But:

¹ More about this in Michael Kunczik – Astrid Zipfel (1998), *Uvod u publicističku znanost i komunikologiju*, Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich Ebert

"True, critical point at which communication exceeds from (within culture) in intercultural, it is difficult and even impossible to determine because it is a discontinuous line of homo – hetero" (Stojković, 2002: 19).

In order to improve the processes of cultural cooperation it is necessary to get familiarized with the main features of the processes which oppose the above stated.

Cultural isolation, or confinement, as an opposite pattern of cultural cooperation, by contact and permeating, practices those social communities which are afraid that their own spiritual identity might be violated, or do not want to be exposed at risk their political and ideological model. Such closeness is expressed as **autism**, more precisely as a type of spiritual isolation and rejection to participate in any activity of the outside world: or as **xenophobia**, in which uncertainty in one's own values and the baseless principles turns into fear from others, another and different. Such fear, in a form of a collective complex of one's own values, more or less, easily turns into hatred for everything that does not belong, or it is believed not to be proper for one's own cultural heritage and one's own contemporary cultural context. In that case, social communities slowly turn into more radical, or choose selective forms of cultural isolation. Thus, for example, the *Republic of Albania* once completely shut down its own real and spiritual boundaries for all European countries, regardless of which political organization they belonged to. Also, *Cuba* now practices a kind of selective cultural isolation, which is directed primarily towards countries whose politics is considered not to be complementary with their ideological pattern. Differences are and can be found in the ethnic particularity in the "concern" that different influences might violate the spiritual monolith and identity of the community. Michael Löwy described and called this process as **anaculturation**. Today this term is used by the scientific public when it comes to cultural differences based on national particularities and it played an important role during the breakdown of *Yugoslavia*.

Although spoken with a lot of ideological passion, also now it is believed that Serbian hegemony was the main culprit for the collapse of the *Yugoslav* community, still any serious analysis, based on scientific objectivity, will present quite different results. In fact, what Serbian hegemony presented in military and political sense, is difficult to equate with something which falls under **cultural domination**, respectively, with relationship in which disadvantaged position of two or more cultures was established, and where one of them imposed itself as more superior to the others. A good example of such relationship today is the imperial invasion of the American mass culture to the cultural patterns of other communities. It is reflected, on the one hand by imposing its own lifestyle models, and on the other hand in marginalization of all that opposes the concept of such culture, or escapes its control. The mass culture of the largest Yugoslav national entity (initially exposed as newly composed music, than as a turbo - folk) is easily met with rejection by one part of the Yugoslav republics.

"This music is most accepted in the eastern parts of Yugoslavia: from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, to Macedonia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, and culminates in southern parts of Serbia. So, it affected newly urbanized and rural environments which were in their initial development. Far less, this music can be felt in Dalmatia, Croatia in general, as well as in Slovenia. For basic orientation, according to data from 1969, in the Belgrade TV – studios (which means primarily

in the Republic of Serbia) one show of folk music has up to 500,000 viewers, while shows with classical music have ten times less viewers“ (Lukić, 1972: 54).

These facts show that in *Yugoslavia*, the process of anaculturation, at the beginning was latent but latter open, and more or less all *Yugoslav* national communities participated in it. Where the linguistic and ethnic intricate was higher (between *Serbs*, *Bosniaks* and *Croats*), this process was evident and was less expressed in ethnic communities that were territorially peripheral and with autonomous culture (*Slovenia* and *Macedonia*). This context excludes *Montenegro*, as a community that has entered into such processes when they were already completed in other parts of *Yugoslavia*. *Kosovo* is also excluded because in multicultural *Yugoslavia*, persistently and quite successfully it raised a concept of self isolation. When the national oligarchy and polycracy, "quasi-intellectual" and for decades privileged elite joined the tendencies of anaculturation, and once the joint media split in chauvinistic perpetrators, the expected happened in *Yugoslavia*. It seems that Čiževski is right when he writes:

"The problem is in Yugoslavia itself, in its seventy years of hypocritical history, with the religions and national tensions, which were suppressed by force by the royal dictatorship or by the communist regime“ (Čiževski, 2010: 134).

In the most populous *Yugoslav* republic, *Serbia*, which was developed under sudden bumps of industrialization, modern forms of culture did not stratify the myth of agrarian superiority but on the contrary, they were strengthened in form and content by the newly composed cultures. Traditional collectivism, fuelled for decades by the communist ideology, its new – old figure found in populism and nationalism, was not able to separate the social from the national and the state.

"It is, among other, about a win of one cultural pattern headed by a half intellectual, who was described by Slobodan Jovanović as a man with a school diploma but without cultural and moral education. On the pages of Politika, during the anti - bureaucratic revolution, he spread hatred and established war policy. For the first time, he ended the never overpowered but in the political culture of Serbia always present western European orientation, and proclaimed the self – sufficiency of Serbia“ (Perović, 1996: 129).

That is how cultural anorexia in all republics of *Yugoslavia*, was abundantly reimbursed with ideological–political egocentrism, which spawned everyday on the surface a populist megalomania opposite to the cultural subtleties. And:

"The involvement of the University, professors and students in the populist movement gave to it a new strength. This kind of strength could not give any Church or Academy because they did not have "available tens of thousands of people ready for "direct action“. The effect was even greater as the populist wave was powerful to intimidate and silence those who had different opinion and attitude from the current events“ (Popov, 1996: 358).

When one culture disputes, challenges, denies or even destroys other cultures, a kind of a **cultural assimilation** occurs. This kind of cultural assimilation can be implemented aggressively through processes of direct and open attacks on the spiritual values of other

cultures and communities² and through slowly, imperceptibly and progressively imposing one's own cultural model. Assimilation can also be some kind of self decision of certain ethnic groups, their parts, or individuals who in this way, try to fight for existential survival and a better social position.

The aggressive nationalist and populist culture matrix in *Serbia*, dominant in the nineties, last century was defeated with the war but after that has progressively transformed into unconcealed cultural assimilation (transformation) of minorities (ethnic, gender, religious,...), also in latent culture, and any other, nationalism in relation to small but now independent national entity (*Macedonians, Montenegrins, Bosnians*).

Outlines of a new cultural reality

Multiculturalism and *interculturalism* are more recent terms but represent phenomena and processes that are necessary to distinguish, precisely in a way which *Stojković* does in his book *Identity and communication*. Respectively, interculturalism, according to his observation means:

"cultural policy that assumes reciprocity, equality and full exchange between all the cultures that are in contact. Unlike multiculturalism or cultural pluralism, which is basically static, focused on parallel coexistence of the cultures, interculturalism is dynamic" (*Stojković, 2002: 42*).

Although multiculturalism has not yet been clearly defined term, it has already received a significant role not only in the theoretical structure but also in the political practice. Despite the possibility of denying the existence of this term by the representatives of those concepts that they do not see a variable and developing category in ethnos, this term refers to:

"simplified, in terms of recognizing the facts of cultural (ethnic) pluralism and the rights of different social groups (primarily new immigrants) to retain its own cultural specifications" (*Mesić, 2006: 67*).

However, *Milan Mesić*, who is well acquainted with this field, in his book, *Multiculturalism*, proposes strict distinction between the terms multicultural, multi – cultural and intercultural, and:

"The first should simply mean an empirical determinate fact for the existence of different cultural (ethnic, religious, linguistic) groups within the country, and the other term should mean – positive and active orientation (normative, ideological, political) of its decisive governing political power" (*Mesić, 2006: 67*).

"Contrary to (such) multiculturalism is placed the concept and the policy of interculturalism, which seeks open models of culture, stimulating their contacts and permeation, and in radical cases, even transculturalism". (*Ibid: 67*)

Thereby:

2 During the Yugoslav wars, in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 150 Orthodox churches were burned, about 170 were damaged and over 5,500 icons were destroyed. Certainly, the other side was also not immune to destroying of religious and cultural characteristics. These wars have demonstrated not only nationalist madness but also abolishment of the multicultural characteristics of the former communities. The **aggressive cultural assimilation, which led to the scale of cultural genocide**, occurred also in other parts of the world. It is reported that in the time of the USSR, within that geographical area, many small cultures were completely erased. Something similar happened in South America, where with the disappearance of individual cultures, disappeared entire nations.

"true cultural dialogue occurs on the surface of public things, and not from ideologized unity, not from political consensus (...)" (Čiževski: 2010: 113)

These requirements arise because:

"a certain ethos, certain specific spiritual attitude, through which man is present in the world. The culture of dialogue is openness to the Other; it is constant dialogue with the Other; it is identity whose inalienable component is the difference of the Other; **it is the Other, without whom I cannot become what I am**" (Emphasis added – Z. J.) (Ibid.).

In this attitude is implicitly stated the essence of *identity* (Latin: *I go*, which means the same). Therefore, identity is build on sameness (uniformity) of all those who belong to one national, religious, cultural, historical, etc... corpus but only where there is another and different. In other words, WE exist only as a unique and recognizable entity in relation to THEM.

Referring to the views that *Branimir Stojković* emphasized in his book *Identity and communications*, *Fikret Bećirević* in the text *Roots of the Bosnian – Herzegovinian plurality*, he clearly defines the characteristics of interculturality which act as a critique of multiculturalism, on the one hand trying to overcome cultural relativism, illustrated in a form of cultural synthesis without real understanding of the specifics of particular cultures, and on the other hand opposing the reduced, static functionalism, that draws towards isolationism, i.e. through interpretation of cultural differences as ethnic autonomy, which confirms impossibility of a multicultural society, promoting process of anaculturalism, or a matrix of cultural and social disintegration.

Interculturalism in its consistency is going into *transculturalism*, a process when one culture transfers and takes over cultural values of other cultures. Transculturalism is available as horizontal, when the existing cultures are interweaving, and as vertical, when cultures through out different historical periods have exchanged values with each other. Examples of historical culture interweaving are evident in *Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, Rome*, etc. Because of their interconnections and addition of one cultural model with other cultural form, today it is difficult to say with certainty to which ancient culture belong certain artistic creation, myth, legend, and many gods. Especially since the interculturality (mixing and exchange of different cultures) easily transforms into *enculturation* and *acculturation*, respectively in the processes in which cultures give their own spiritual gifts, but at the same time, other cultures take and adopt their cultural motives which in conjunction with the parent culture, form new cultural values, concepts and forms. While in eculturation, an individual (for example: a poet, writer, musician, philosopher, composer, teacher, student, etc., who is away or on specialization) establishes contacts with other cultures, and at the same time influences them, and on the other hand accepts their impacts, in the acculturation; this process takes place in the field of all social communities.

People's testimonies of cultural connections, mainly speaks of spiritual richness and diversity, as well as the fact that this kind of communication contributed to a better understanding between different social groups, communities and entire nations and that their co-existence was more bearable, fruitful and meaningful. All this confirms Adler's (Alfred Adler) thought that sometimes the hardest way, is in fact, the shortest and the best way. Therefore today, some theorists, such as Carley Dodd and Fred Casmir, speak

of a third culture, which is located at the poles between the autochthonous and global culture. The third culture builds its authenticity on the basis that members of different cultures all together discover new and possible meanings of old meanings. In this way, the old, ambivalent and once accepted meanings are seen as new, shared and open, and the cross-cultural communication is understood and practiced as constant negotiation between them. The concept of a third culture, leaves no autochthonous culture confined in its unchangeability, nor allows the global tendency to destroy this culture beyond recognition, but builds new cultural patterns and forms, which only confirm the old truth that culture is not uniform and monolithic, but divided into those kinds of cultures in which each of them can find their field of life and action. This way, apparent paradox occurs, that the new (third) culture, actually keeps all that culture has been and wants to become (Dodd, 1997: 6-10).

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THE GLOBALIZATION OF MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CULTURAL IMPERIALISM

Abstract

In addition to the numerous definitions for globalization, most of the authors collectively agree that *it* represents the increasing trend of the world countries to bond on an economical, social and cultural level. However, social sciences often conclude that the concept of globalization is a disputable one because even if the definition is accepted as true, the dilemmas whether globalization brings more positive or more negative implications would still exist. Today globalization is also perceived as “americanisation” or more precisely as an effort of the USA to impose not only their economic, politic and war power but their attitudes and values as well.

The fact that the countries nowadays are considered as main factors in shaping the foreign politics results from the fast development of transport and communication technologies. The growth of nations and national ideas in the 18th ad 19th century increased the ever so great differentiation between the societies of different cultures and identities.

The wish to mix and share different cultures was welcomed with eagerness among the supporters of globalization. Another dimension of the cultural but also of the media globalization is that, globalization allows for various encounters, i.e. getting acquainted with the “other worlds”. On the other side, even though these benefits of globalization are publicly acclaimed, there is a stream of opinions which propagate the development of national, regional or even the local belonging, acknowledging the turbulent changes of globalization as a threat to the former.

Key words: globalization, culture, culture imperialism, media

What is culture?

The vision of Marshall McLuhan for a global village is very well reflected in the media. Media are a key factor in shaping and building the value judgments and opinions (not underestimating the other factors like family and school).

Media theoretician, Prof. James Carey, who is considered the founder of the cultural approach in media studies, acknowledges and offers a cultural definition of communication. He says that communication is a symbolical process where the reality is produced, maintained, improved and transformed (Carey, 1989).

Culture is a habituated behaviour of members of a given social culture. Different authors have defined it from their own perspective, but here we will mention only three given by anthropologists, and one given by art critics.

- a. Culture is learned and socially acceptable behaviour of members of the society, including their formulaic, repetitive way of thinking, feeling and acting;

- b. Culture gives meaning to the human experience by selecting and organizing it. More specifically, this is related to the forms through which humans give their life meaning, like visiting a museum or going to the opera;
- c. Culture helps individuals to survive. Nothing is free from the influence of culture. Culture is the key to the door of civilization and it is a medium which life events must pass through;
- d. Culture signifies historically transferred meanings which are united in symbolical forms with human thoughts which humans use to communicate, convince each other and transfer their knowledge regarding their personal opinions.

Hence, the idea that media technologies go hand in hand with cultural imperialism is ever so present. A common thing for all definitions of culture is that culture is something that is learned. This is the reason why communication channels should open their spaces for variety of contents. When we talk to our friends, when parents look after their children, when religious leaders encourage their followers, when teachers teach, when politicians lead campaigns, when media produce contents, then we read, listen, see while the opinions are shared and thus culture is created.

That is why we say that culture teaches us on traditions, on thinking, feeling and behaving. Culture limits our options and ensures useful guide for our behaviour. While communicating we learn what culture expects from us. For example many countries value slim women more than overweight women. Throughout the years the Barbie look has been extensively promoted. How many women worldwide subject themselves to various diets and how many young teenage boys and girls are unsatisfied with their physical appearance? Yet, this is not something that their parents or society have taught them. On the contrary, this image is created by the media, where the leading roles are slim and tall, and the negative roles are short and overweight. Disney's characters like Cinderella, Snow White, Pocahontas and the famous Barbie doll send a clear message to every child. It is more than clear that the Barbie producers should have increased her body proportions in order to give her a more natural look.

In pluralistic societies like ours, the dominant cultures are often confronted with other value norms. People admire events or people that are part of the regular norms like Oprah Winfrey for example, who does not cherish a look according to the regular standards of beauty. Nevertheless, she has an immense influence and power in the television world. Our desire to free ourselves from restrictions offers a possibility for practicing and accepting new cultural examples in order to challenge the old models and accept new ones.

Culture and the media

If culture defines our reality, then who contributes to its creation and design? Can it affect the formation of people's opinions and judgments? How are messages transferred? These and many other questions justify the need for research in the sphere of culture and media. With the emergence of the first newspapers, media theoreticians have been discussing the influence of media on culture and on the entire life as well. This discussion has taken three directions:

1. Effects at micro versus macro level;
2. Administrative versus critical research;
3. Transmission versus ritual perspective.

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Do media trigger violence, criminal and alcoholism? There are many studies which offer a positive answer to these questions, but some offer a negative one as well. As an example for this we can take the public debates which had risen after a series of violent events in one USA high school, where the students thought that the media were responsible for the events. When defending the media industry, its spokesman had said that millions of Americans watch movies, criminal TV series, cartoons on a daily basis, but none of them goes out on the streets to shoot. This can only be explained with the fact that for most of the people media exhibit several direct effects on a personal or *micro level*. The hidden but by far more important influence of media is the one seen on *macro level*. According to this approach, the violence we see on TV contributes to the creation of a climate in which violence is more acceptable. The concept of macro level gives a great importance to the TV violence because it influences the formation of cultural climate.

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For many years, science (but also media industry and regulators and people) accepts the effects of media which are only of direct and obvious nature. Paul Lazarsfeld (father of social research), who is one of the most influential researchers of all times in the mass communication sphere, warned about this rather restricted approach (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). He supported the critical research methods, asking questions like: what kind of nation do we create? What kind of people do we become? Will we serve our culture in a better way? Therefore, the administrative approach focuses mainly on reasons and resulting effects, while the critical approach seeks to find answers on a rather broader spectrum of questions.

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The transmission perspective sees media as message senders trying to exhibit control. The ritual perspective does not see mass communication as information giving event, rather as representation event through which believes are shared. For example, what does a single beer commercial tell us – can we control buying or not with it? (This is a transmission perspective). Nevertheless, what happens with the message which alcohol is advertised with – can young people socialize in this way? The ritual perspective conveys the message which has to be observed in the overall cultural context.

Media- possibilities and responsibilities

The influential professor James Carrey emphasizes that due to the fact that we see in every development of the communication technology a chance for politics and economy, we have mainly dedicated the media space to the government and business. Rarely does

anyone grasp it as a platform for ideas and experience exchange. In order to understand the possibilities and responsibilities that result from the process of mass communication, we should embrace the media as cultural story-tellers and as forums.

Media as narrators

The value norms and judgements often find their place in the media stories. They help us shape the way we think, feel and act. Narrators have an enormous possibility to shape culture but they have to do this in a professional and ethical manner.

At the same time the audience has a right and responsibility towards the media stories. That means that the media contents do not only serve as fun, but also have the purpose to educate us for the world around us so that we can understand the values. Therefore, the consumers of any media story have the right to ask and think how those stories influence their life. Unless they do this, they miss the opportunity to form an opinion on their own and in this way to actively participate in the other stages of the formation of public opinion.

Mass communication as cultural forum

The media, and with that mass communication, are the main forum for debate and discussion. Those who are very skilful in enunciating their opinion usually are the same ones who shape public opinion as well. Consequently, one may ask where this strength is coming from – from the media or from the public? If the media are the ones who mainly shape the public opinion, then they should be honest and responsible (which is already very difficult taking into consideration the interests of the media owners). If, on the other side, the public is the main force who shapes the public opinion, then we should assess the individuals as reflective and critical beings. Therefore, the forum will be as good and honest as many individuals contribute to it in this way.

There are many discussions on whether the medium reality exists or it is a reality in the general sense of the word. The opinion that there is a separate medium reality is questionable because it implies that there actually is objective and unreal reality which the media produce. Namely, each of the subjective “realities” also entails valuable interpretation, and yet the reality itself can be denoted neither as real nor as unreal. Therefore, it is not only about different interpretation, but also the fact that things are seen and perceived in a different way. The double media reality often is justified with the fact that the events and their contexts are often modified. This leads us to the core of this work, namely globalization as introduction to cultural imperialism.

The construction of medium reality includes everything that is happening inside that line, i.e. the processes that are going on between the carriers of that reality, which are also the source of information. Each one of the carriers comes from the common world and everyday life and goes back to them. This transfer from one to another sub-world makes us think differently about the same things.

The medium construction refers to locating medium reality in the world of the common living. These are processes of the medium contents that act on the individual reality. Nevertheless, the crucial dilemma is whether the media in all societies serve to the public interest or to the general will and if they trigger considerable changes in the society. These

postulates mean that the media cannot be treated as any other industry but they have to take care of a wider set of benefits in the society even though those that hold a different opinion of the one promoted by a given media use the media as a business target or a way to make a profit.

In order to promote the public interest, it is very easy to say that in democratic societies there should be a certain basis regarding which values and under which circumstances the media will inform about. Although, the definition of public interest can be a controversial one, public interest is defined as *the interest which serves the entire society and not only parts of it* (McQuail, 1991). Nevertheless, without determining the main postulates it is impossible for both, the media professionals and those that regulate media to work. Once made, these criteria are needed and useful because they establish relevant conditions that allow contents of general interest to be produced. These formulations are sometimes endangered by the pressure of free market although almost all countries these days have strong public radio broadcasting system. Fortunately, the discussions about media performance are not universal and free and the basic principles coincide with the values of western societies like freedom, justice-equality, order and solidarity (which are known from the time of the French revolution).

Freedom as a value in the public society in terms of communication is defined as freedom of speech. The most disputed principles of this freedom are those which concern the identity and integrity of the person and her rights of self-expression. Therefore, there are legal acts which ensure the freedom (i.e. article 10 of the European Convention on Human rights).

Equality corresponds to justice. The ability to communicate and receive messages is a universal social good and although not equally, it is widely available. Thus, given that the democratic political process is composed in order to increase the social good this means that equality defines the use of public media channels for communication. This is completely reflected on the idea about well-informed citizens who are prepared to participate in a public debate. If we assume that we do have the right to communicate, than this also means that we do have exactly the same right to listen, but to be heard as well. The fact that many of the modern media have monopolized a considerable part of the real possibilities for public communication does not diminish the right of citizens to take an advantage of media.

Order, as a third value, is defined by more definitions than freedom and speech are. In the 19th and 20th century “order” was a key term for solidarity with workers and condition for every organized and civilized society. The order is a central communication value: interdependence and collective life seen in a society or community result from or are dependent on the communication process, allowing expressing one’s identity and belonging. The social order even if it is not based on the freedom of speech and equality may be realized only through the process of communication. Nevertheless, “order” is sometimes contradictory term because it is also associated with control, hierarchy and inferiority.

It is impossible to look at media cultural dimension outside of these assumptions. In the media language, culture is a group of symbols organized through language which gives a meaning to things. Therefore the culture can be located as:

- a. characteristic of people who are united in language, sex, class, ethnicity
- b. group of activities (work, politics, sports) and
- c. culture represented through artefacts (books, movies, and different performance types).

In practice, there is a distinction between the official or dominant culture and the group of activities which form the so called sub-culture. The artefacts which are confirmed by the institutions of the system are privileged and compared to the alternative cultural values.

In order to talk about media globalization without which the media globalisation would cease to exist, it is inevitable to investigate the media effects and how they affect the audience. Nevertheless, this is a broad field attempting to define certain terms in various ways.

Therefore embarking upon media and especially on their ideological influence is a story filled with mysteries. Certain media researchers assign television too much strength, but reality is different or as Conrad Lodziak would say “the main effect of media is not creating a consciousness, but monopolizing the free time” (Lodziak, 1986).

Media effects

Therefore, speaking of media effects or the condition which the audience is found in one can ask the following question: if the effects are of long-term nature, how can they be measured in short periods? We did not make up the way which we clothe in, behave in and think in. We are simply a product of our environment. The element that complicates these things is the capacity we have to create our thoughts and to deal with the social and material environment. We may not be free in creating our destiny but we are active in our personal moulding.

The problems which arise when interpreting problems have diminished the illusion of media researchers and they have started looking for new questions and answers. The theory of “uses and gratification” which has been created in this way, asks what people do to media but not what media do to people? The audience consumes the TV contents in order to fulfil its own certain needs. It decides when, how and which medium it shall use for its own pleasure (McQuail et.al., 1972). Using this model, Blumer and McQuail concluded that there is a difference in the ways people watch television and that this determines the effects on them. In this way, we may think about *thinking* and *the communication of thinking*. Why some messages are more convincing than others? The equation *message + viewer = thinking* encourages us to dwell on the numerous relationships between the intertwined sounds and pictures (carriers of messages) which have the capacity to encourage us to think. The “use and gratification” theory makes this equation one-dimensional. The consumer is reduced to “needs” and the message to “gratification”. Consequently, we have only single thinking approach: *the message is gratification*.

It would be difficult to develop this point of view without explaining some principles of semiology in this equation:

Watching TV (and the use of other media) may trigger different ways of thinking. Lodziak suggests that, watching TV leads to inertia, and Morgan thinks that it has an active role (Lodziak, 1986; Morgan, 1989). Television does not distract us from other activities but promotes a depoliticized view on the world where public pools become irrelevant.

These analyses as well as the theory of use and gratification focus on the fact that media have strong ideological function in modern society.

In order this function to be understood we should discuss whether media industries know themselves and how aware they are of their influence on the public. This is crucial because once programs and newspapers are released out of the media houses they enter an unknown territory. It may sound cynical, but it is important for producers to have their shows watched and their newspapers sold. No one cares about anything else until this point is reached. Especially the commercial media have profit in their imperative ignoring of the public opinion of their product.

Media and semiology

In this context we should one more time take into account the semiology because its basics have great analytical importance which sometimes are underestimated from the mass culture products, but can be translated in the next formula:

$$\text{Signifier} + \text{Signified} = \text{Sign}$$

According to this formula the signifier is an object before assigning a notion to it and it can be anything (a word, a sound), but it has a material nature. Its presence can be ascertained via our senses: we can hear it, touch it, and smell it. We can use the word clock to signify something which we measure time with, but then again we can also determine that it is something hanging on the wall showing us what the time is.

The meaning comes into existence via the signified. This is a concept which we interpret the signifier with. The signified (or assigning) is never material but it is a process in our heads and it is difficult to explain. Since communication always is carried out on a material level via using language, it is difficult to believe in some things which we cannot experience. For example what happens with the tree in the forest which falls down but no one has ever seen it or heard of it? Has it really happened? If we please to be cynical we will say, witnesses of its fall are the birds and animals in the forest. Therefore, if we accept this fact on the level of signifier, the answer would be – yes, the tree has fallen down because objects need thinking in order to exist.

On assigning level, the answer to the same question would be negative: or to be more precise, its occurrence has no meaning. Semiology allows for these kinds of philosophical principles.

Due to practicality, it is difficult to consider the signifier without assigning. The two things go together in this way defining the third term – the sign. It unifies the two categories giving the material objects a meaning. According to Ferdinand de Saussure (the father of semiology) assigning a sign to something is like a piece of paper, we can distinguish between the two sides, but we will never separate them (de Saussure, 1974).

These principles of semiology are important for audience studies because signs exist only if the public assigns them with meaning. Without an audience, the signs would only exist at the level of signifier. This does not mean that the audience can formulate an opinion for everything even if it wants to. It depends on the semiotic environment where a key figure is the message. Therefore, Umberto Eco would ask: When I send a message what do different individuals who are in different surroundings accept? Similar messages? Totally different. Questions of this kind are similar for all researchers of human communication, but more specifically they pertain to the field of mass communication (Eco, 1972).

The most influential study regarding coding and decoding was developed by Stuart Hall and David Morley. Their model regards the production as coding while the consumption of media contents is a process of decoding which suggests that there are two different semiotic processes. The TV programs (by analogy the contents of other media as well) are not a mirror of reality, but are highly codified meanings as a product of specific esthetical, political, technical and professional ideology. They are restricted by the message and their ideological world (Hall, 1980).

Conclusion

Nevertheless, despite the different cultural conceptions and views, we can assert that there is a consensus regarding some traditional values like peace and security, economic prosperity, human rights protection and environment protection. The media contribute to the overall situation where these values are constantly undermined, because the news are filled with events like terrorism, extremism and generally messages projecting hatred.

The globalization of media would have been impossible without an adequate technological progress which decreases the differences between economical, political and informational systems. If once we were witnesses of a gap between the poor and the rich, this gap nowadays is mapped on the information-literate and information-illiterate population. For example, some of the criteria of development and progress of a country is the use of internet. Consequently, the vision of a cosmopolitan view on the world nowadays is possible and needed only if it is based on cooperation principles but not assimilation. Therefore, the global citizen societies have to work even harder if they aspire to embrace the benefits coming from globalization.

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GLOBALIZATION AND THE LANGUAGE - special review on the Republic of Macedonia -

Abstract

In this study we tend to place the issue of globalization and the language in the Republic of Macedonia in a sociological context. For that purpose, the research was focused on assessing the opinion of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia on the presence of public signboards and company names in the Republic of Macedonia written in a foreign language; the problems related to the understanding of the meaning of the public signboards and company names written in a foreign language, as well as their opinion on the appearance of the public signboards and company names written in a foreign language.

Key words: globalization, culture, changes, language.

Introduction

One of the key issues which is directly related to the identity in terms of globalization is the language issue. This is a very complex issue and holds an important place in sociology, as well as in other social sciences such as: socio-linguistics, cultural anthropology and many other which approach this issue from their perspective. The interest for the issue of the relation between globalization and the language among the sociologists and other social thinkers intensifies in the last few decades. A large number of authors, let us state only the most famous, such as, Ranko Bugarski (Bugarski, 2001; Bugarski, 2005), Manfred Stegar (Stegar, 2009), Peter Berger (Berger et al, 2002), tend to explain the complex nature of this relation from a different theoretical standpoints. Therefore, in this study we focused on the relation between globalization and the language in the Republic of Macedonia. In our analysis, we started from the assumption that the intensive processes of globalization have a significant affect on the Macedonian culture, the opinion of the local people, the use of the language in public signboards and company names. In addition, we considered the approaches of the relevant linguists Ranko Bugarski (Bugarski, 2001), Joshua Fishman (Fishman, 2006), Manfred Stegar (Stegar, 2009) who deal with this issue. Their approaches are based on exhaustive empirical inquiries on the contemporary trends in language. According to those trends, they define the language state as: 1. state within the language and 2. language status in society. Under state within the language they define the internal structures of the national language, whereas, under language status in society they define its position (status), which depends on the social

terms upon which that language functions. Those social terms upon which the language functions, are of an exceptional importance for our analysis since they are in direct correlation with the globalization processes, which emphasize even more the multilingualism as a model according to which the public communication is carried in many countries in the world, among which is also the Republic of Macedonia.

In that respect, Macedonia is a country in which, public communication is carried according to the model of multilingualism (one or two official languages) and simultaneous existence of one global language which, due to its functionality appears as a “third language”. At the same time, we take into consideration that up until few years ago, this condition was less known, but today, it is constantly perceived and it accordance with the contemporary processes in the world. When talking about that condition, the inquiry focused more precisely on the following issues: What is the opinion of the citizens on the presence of public signboards and company names in the Republic of Macedonia written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)?; How much is the foreign language present on the public signboards and company names compared to the mother tongue? - Do the citizens have problems related to the understanding of the meaning of the public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)?; What is the opinion of the citizens on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language? and What is the opinion of the interviewees on the status (position) of the Macedonian language in relation to the English language used in the public signboards and company names?

Methods

The subject of inquiry was analyzed on a theoretical and empirical level. On a theoretical level, the subject is analyzed by the theoretical approaches referring to the globalization and language, and on an empirical level by a questionnaire serving to measure the opinion of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. *The Sample* used for collecting data by a questionnaire belongs to the group of samples chosen by the principle of improbability¹, to be more precise a *deliberate quota sample*² was used, which covered 671 citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

Results

The survey confirmed the assumption that the interviewees think that the presence of the globalization processes in the Republic of Macedonia, significantly affects the Macedonian culture, as well as the language used in the public signboards and company names. For that purpose we asked the interviewees to answer the question: *Have you noticed that in your residence area there are public signboards and company names written*

1 The basic division of samples is in two parts. Samples chosen by the principle of probability and samples chosen by the principle of improbability (non- probability sample), (see: more extensively Бешка, 1999: 54-85, Brayman, 2008:164-189).

2 (see: more extensively Бешка, 1999: 74-78, Brayman, 2008:164-191).

in a foreign language? (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment). The answers are presented in Table 1.

According to the given answers, 84.5% of the interviewees noticed that in their residence area there are public signboards and company names written in a foreign language. Small part (12.2%) of the interviewees answered that they haven't noticed such type of signboards in their residence area. Only 3% of the interviewees answered that they cannot estimate that in their residence area there are public signboards and company names written in a foreign language. The inquiry data confirm the presence of awareness among the interviewees of the significant concentration of foreign languages in the public signboards and company names in our society, and hence, the presence of globalization in our culture.

Table 1. Presence of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Presence of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language?	% (n)
yes	84.5 (567)
no	12.2 (82)
I cannot estimate	3.3 (22)
Total	100.0(671)

Nevertheless, many times this type of signboards and company names are problematic for the citizens, since they are written in a foreign language, most often in English language. As a result, they create for the interviewees problems related to the understanding of their meaning (Table 2).

Data shows that a significant part of the interviewees (65.6%) answered that they do not have any problems understanding the meaning of the public signboards and company names written in a foreign language, whereas, 34.4% of the interviewees answered that they do have such problems.

Table 2. The opinion of the interviewees on the problems relating to the understanding of the meaning of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Do public signboards and company names written in a foreign language create a problem for you in relation to the understanding of their meaning?	% (n)
yes	34.4(231)
no	65.6 (440)
total	100.0 (671)

By intersecting the answers with the *age* variable we can see certain differences among the age groups. The data is presented in table 3. Problems relating to the understanding of the meaning of signboards and company names written in a foreign language are presented by the interviewees of the age group above 55 (59.6%). Close to them are the interviewees from the age group of 45 - 54 (45.1%). Then follow the interviewees from the age group of up to 44 (37.4%), the interviewees from the age group of up to 34 (20.2%) and the interviewees from the age group of up to 24 (19.3%). Those that do not have any problems with the understanding of the meaning of signboards and company names written in a foreign language are the young, more precisely people of up to 24 years of age (80.7%). Identical answers gave the interviewees from the age group of up to 34 (79.8%), then right behind are the interviewees from the age group of up to 44 years of age who estimate that they do not have any serious problems in understanding the signboards and company names written in a foreign language. These indicators confirm that the older interviewees have problems in relation to the understanding of the meaning of these signboards and company names compared to the younger interviewees.

Table 3. Connection between the age of the interviewees and the problems related to the understanding of the meaning of the public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Age groups	Do public signboards and company names written in a foreign language create a problem for you in relation to the understanding of their meaning?		total
	yes	no	
15- 24	19.3(40)	80.7 (167)	100.0 (207)
25- 34	20.2 (23)	79.8 (91)	100.0 (114)
35- 44	37.4(46)	62.6 (77)	100.0 (123)
45- 54	45.1(41)	54.9 (50)	100.0 (91)
55+	59.6(81)	40.4 (55)	100.0 (136)
total	34.4 (231)	65.6 (440)	100.0(671)

$$\chi^2= 74,259; \text{ s.s/4; } p= 0,00; \text{ CC}=0,3 ; \text{ theoretical } \chi^2= 13,277$$

Concerning the *level of education* variable (Table 4), the expectations are that it affects the problems resulting from the understanding of the meaning of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language. Indeed, as we expected, the interviewees who have negative attitude toward globalization, also, in this case stated that they have the most difficult problem in understanding these public signboards and company names (55.8%). Those are interviewees with elementary education as opposed to the interviewees who have secondary and a type of higher education (34.7% and 28.1%). On the other hand, the interviewees who stated that have a positive attitude toward globalization answered that they do not have problem with this type of names.

Table 4. Connection between the education of the interviewees and problems related to the understanding of the meaning of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Level of education	Do public signboards and company names written in a foreign language create a problem for you in relation to the understanding of their meaning?		total
	yes	no	
primary education	55.8 (43)	44.2 (34)	100.0 (77)
secondary education	34.7 (111)	65.3 (209)	100.0 (320)
types of higher education	28.1 (77)	71.9 (197)	100.0 (274)
Total	34.4 (231)	65.6 (440)	100.0 (671)

$$\chi^2 = 20.511; \text{ c.c.} = 2; p = 0.00; \text{ CC} = 0.17$$

Therefore, we asked the interviewees to assess their personal opinion as either positive or negative on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (Table 5).

Table 5. The opinion of the interviewees on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Your opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names in your environment written in a foreign language?	% (n)
positive	45.0 (302)
negative	55.0 (369)
Total	100.0 (671)

According to the given answers, the interviewees present uniformity in relation to their opinion: 45% answered using the modality “positive”, and 55.9% using the modality “negative”.

Data for the variable *age* of the interviewees shows that it affects the opinion of the interviewees toward the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language.

Table 6. Connection between the age of the interviewees and their opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language (not Macedonian language nor one of the languages used in the local environment)

Age groups	Your opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language?		total
	positive	negative	
15- 24	55.6 (115)	44.4 (92)	100.0 (207)
25- 34	57.0 (65)	43.0 (49)	100.0 (114)
35- 44	47.2 (58)	52.8 (65)	100.0 (123)
45- 54	31.9(29)	68.1(62)	100.0 (91)
55+	25.7(35)	74.3 (101)	100.0 (136)
Total	45.0 (302)	55.0 (369)	100.0 (671)

$$\chi^2 = 42.934; \text{ c.c.} = 4; p = 0.00; \text{ CC} = 0.24, \text{ theoretical } \chi^2 = 13.277$$

In general, and in that respect the data shows that this opinion of the interviewees, largely depends on their age. From the data presented in table 6 it can be noticed that positive opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language have mostly interviewees of up to 34 years of age (57%), as well as those of up to 24 (55.6%). In the other age groups it is obvious that the percentage decreases and it is at the lowest level among the interviewees of above 55 years of age (25.7%). But, the interviewees of this age group (74.3%) state that they have negative opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language. Such tendencies are also noticeable among the interviewees of up to 54 years of age (68.1%), as well as among the interviewees of up to 44 (52.8%).

Discussion

Data gathered from the questionnaire clearly indicates that the globalization processes have a significant affect on the use of the language in the public communication and on the opinion of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The analysis has showed that the interviewees are aware of the presence of the Anglo-Saxon culture in our context, more precisely for the presence of the English language in the public communication. Therefore, the interviewees of the age group above 55 and those with primary education stated that they have problems understanding the meaning of the signboards and company names written mostly in English language. Due to this, 55.5% of the interviewees stated that they have negative opinion on the appearance of public signboards and company names written in a foreign language, and 45% of them have positive opinion on this type of signboards. Negative opinion dominates among the older interviewees, and positive opinion dominates among the younger interviewees. It can be concluded from this data that despite the resistance present among the interviewees toward these global processes,

individuals within their identity, have the opportunity to belong to several lingual communities. Beside the language that individuals identify with, they should establish relations with other languages and cultures in order to be able to face the challenges of the modern society.

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THE DOMINANCE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE EUROPEAN MULTILINGUAL MOSAIC THROUGH THE PRISM OF LINGUISTIC IDENTITY

Abstract

The last few decades marked the expansion of the English language and its promotion into a world lingua franca, i.e. language of international communication, within the process of linguistic globalization. It has become official language of numerous international institutions and organizations which inevitably imposed its knowledge as a precondition for interaction on international level. This dominant position of English can be viewed from two aspects. On the one hand, it satisfies the need of world-wide speakers for using a mutually intelligible language that would facilitate communication and make it more efficient, while on the other hand the supremacy of a single language may seriously threaten linguistic diversity and the status of “smaller” languages whose inferior position may eventually lead to their loss of functions and domains of use.

The paper focuses on the implications for the multilingual balance in Europe arising from the dominant status of English, bearing in mind the significance of language as symbol of identity particularly for members of smaller language communities. It is the authors' view that the spread of English might affect the linguistic map of Europe and that only through fostering and maintaining a multilingual environment the existence of individual linguistic identities and their mutual recognition and affirmation as well as celebration of linguistic differences and intercultural understanding can be achieved.

Key words: language, identity, multilingualism, lingua franca, linguistic globalization

Linguistic identity as a fundamental component of cultural identity

Numerous prominent theoreticians of globalization point to the three fundamental directions through which this universal world phenomenon is manifested: economic, political and cultural globalization, the so called “three axes of globalization”. If economic globalization is considered as its “engine”, or driving force, political globalization as an institutional mirror of the processes of global unification, then cultural globalization is surely its Janus face in the form of glocalization, with its unifying and leveling, but at the same time separating and divergent characteristics. These opposing factors, processes and consequences of living in the era of globalization can be observed through the very example of the complex contemporary European multilingual reality.

The contradictions related to cultural globalization are most visible through the changes in linguistic identities which are one of the most distinguishing segments of cultural identities in general. Moreover, we could freely say that through the changes in the sphere of linguistic identities we can see all those acculturation processes which, in the time of intense global social interaction create linguistic hybrids, complex linguistic and cultural influences and borrowings expressed through sociolinguistic and cultural and linguistic dominance or subordination. By watching what happens to languages and language communities, we are actually witnessing all the contradictions of the time we live in, which all occur at the expense of identities, and are issues which gained their importance in the era of globalization and are considered the best reference framework for studying globalization according to the undivided opinion of theoreticians of globalization.

What does linguistic identity basically represent? This question has always intrigued linguists, but also sociolinguists, sociologies and anthropologists, mainly due to the very subtle processes which lead to the creation, reshaping or loss of linguistic identities. Linguistic identity, as a fundamental component of cultural identity of a particular community, comprises two contrasted, but at the same time central elements of identity: uniqueness and distinctiveness. Identity refers to the organized and unique group of similar or identical relatively stable features related to a particular occurrence in reality, defined by a sociocultural group or community. As noted by Françoise Heinnar, identity is both a process and a system at the same time, dynamic by its nature, but at the same time striving to achieve balance (Stojkovic, 2002: 24). In that sense, linguistic identity is a set of linguistic features characteristic for a particular community of speakers, which are in the function of mutual linguistic recognition and interaction, and differentiation from other sociocultural groups. Thus, linguistic identity for the members of the language group plays the role of a factor of unification, definition and stabilization of the distinctiveness and uniqueness, while in relation to other linguistic identities it is a factor of their differentiation, separation and assertion of their distinctiveness. In fact, linguistic identities, as other identities in general, play a double role in asserting the uniqueness within one's own sociocultural group and asserting the distinctiveness from other sociocultural groups. This is the universal postulate of the sociocultural life and its dynamics expressed through sociocultural interactions between elements of social structure. So, linguistic identity as a fundamental segment of cultural identity of a given sociocultural group or community is, above all, a sociocultural product of social interaction and acculturation (interaction between different cultures in multicultural environment), but it also has a reverse influence on various forms of interaction in the continuous process of defining, reassessing and redefining identities, particularly linguistic identities. In this sense, the question of defining linguistic identity in theory is closer to the sociological, rather than psychodynamic theoretic tradition according to the classification of the British sociologist Gordon Marshall (Marshall, 2004: 155).

The whole contradiction and the kind of a paradox of linguistic identities and identities in general, particularly in the era of globalization, is very skillfully expressed by Amin Maalouf, who states that "my identity is what prevents me from being identical to anybody else" (Maalouf, 2001: 14). We would add, sufficiently identical, same to oneself

or one's own, so as to be sufficiently different from the others. The sameness and the distinctiveness must a priori be incorporated into identities, otherwise it would be impossible to define the very notion of identity. For example, English linguistic identity is English only when contrasted to other non-English linguistic identity – French, German, Russian, Macedonian etc. Hence, the existence of a single linguistic identity in a given time is a historical impossibility, so the fears of a complete elimination of other languages in the world by a universal and dominant language in future are antinomic (logically and practically impossible and unattainable).

European multilingual mosaic and linguistic identity in the era of globalization- between English lingua franca and linguistic diversity

Today's European multilingual mosaic is a reflection of the complex state of affairs where the European cultural and linguistic identity exists. In essence, it is basically shaped by two multi-layered and contradictory factors: globalization and tradition. We are still lacking a more precise definition of European cultural and linguistic identity, because, like nowhere else, on the territory of Europe there have been clashes of cultural influences since ancient times, between numerous civilizations and cultures, some of which outside European continent, particularly from Africa and Asia. However, we can define European multilingual mosaic as a space with a growing tendency for the dominant presence of the English language as the lingua franca, but at the same time as a space where numerous smaller languages assert their existence and compete with each other, the majority of them being of Indo-European origin. Malcolm Waters assigns to English the role of "lingua franca of the global communication system", which can be taken as true at a world level, but in terms of the European multilingual mosaic, we must always bear in mind the balancing and amortizing influence of that dominance with the existence of strong local linguistic traditions incarnated in smaller linguistic identities (Waters, 2003: 240). This is particularly important if we take into consideration the fact that in a great part of Eastern Europe, the nexus global-local in the part of the process of globalization is achieved as a global-tribal relation, which, in the sense of linguistic diversity means the emphasizing, assertion and strengthening of local linguistic identities in the European space parallel to the strengthening of the position of the English language.

This globalizing, and rather postmodern, linguistic reality presupposes celebration of linguistic pluralities and linguistic diversity in terms of the stressed dominant presence of the English language in speech and writing. The question which most often arises from this specific linguistic situation is very easily reduced to the dichotomy influence-risk, namely, the influence of the dominant English language is perceived as an inherent and axiomatic danger for the existence of European linguistic diversity. However, the situation is far too complex to be simplified in that way. We could rather talk about the creation of linguistic hybrids and the increase of linguistic diversity, than the tendency for moving towards linguistic unification. This is supported by the fact that language is a living substance, which means that even English language is not the same as it used to be in the past, and is not pure enough to be called absolutely English. It would be more

correct to say that in the time of globalization the possibility for inter-lingual influences and borrowings is increased, although the leading role of English in this aspect is more than evident. Yet, on the example of smaller and younger European languages in terms of their codification and standardization, as is the case of Macedonian language, we can also talk about influences from other languages, complex postmodern hybrid linguistic forms and neologisms. Thus, for instance, if we take a glance at the borrowings and neologisms in contemporary Macedonian language, we could notice influences primarily from English, but also from other European languages (French, Spanish, Italian, German etc.) This is particularly evident in company names, like bars, restaurants, night clubs, trade and industrial capacities etc (for example Havana-Cuba Libre, Hard Rock, Paradiso, Vincinni, Victor Shevignon, Ti Amo, Ciao, Barcelona, Aquarius, Play, Cosa Nostra etc.)¹ The same tendency is evident in everyday direct use of words from other languages, particularly those related to social communication among young people, primarily through the medium of modern mobile and computer technologies (for example “po difolt” (by default), “lajknuva” (to like), “tagnuva” (to tag), “sejvnuva” (to save), “ednuva” (to add), “resetira” (to reset), “logira” (to log in), “benčmark” (benchmark) etc.) Here it is more interesting to analyze the comparison between the historical Macedonian interculturalism and creative borrowing with today’s postmodern and glocal linguistic reality in Macedonian sociocultural environment, which, in essence, is an incredible continuity in the identical sense of the word and is a unique Macedonian cultural experience (Gerasimoski, 2007: 100-101)

Can we talk about European multilingual mosaic as a two-way process where the simultaneous strengthening of the position of the English language and the affirmation of local languages occur under the umbrella of globalization (i.e. glocalization)? It seems that the current tendencies in this sphere could be viewed from the aspects of cultural and linguistic pluralism and interculturalism which ensure a democratic and dynamic environment for the development of languages. Actually, European cultural identity could basically be understood primarily through this prism, not through the prism of the English as the dominant language. Finally, the separate cultural and linguistic traditions are so strong in the European cultural space, so it is questionable to what extent the dominance of the English language in particular spheres of European cultural reality can actually lead to European linguistic unification. Let us take, for example, the anglicisms in other languages and the comparison with balkanisms, especially turcisms in the lexical corpus of Balkanic languages as a parallel (Velkovska, 2006: 463-471). In both cases, the great number of lexemes borrowed from the then dominant languages are not presupposition for the disappearance of local languages- a phenomenon that can also be analyzed at the level of individual countries and sociocultural environments as is the case of Macedonian, where multiculturalism is actually a model of intercultural and intracultural communication where linguistic identities play a significant role (Stojanov, 2009:119). Nor can linguistic identities, on the other hand, remain pure despite their influence. The truth is

¹ According to a research carried out in Macedonia ten years ago by the Institute of Sociology within the Faculty of Philosophy Skopje, 85% of company names written in a foreign language in the central part of Skopje are of English origin, while the remaining 15% are written in Italian or French. For more details, see: Јован Корубин (2005) *Социолошки теми за јазикот*. Скопје: Филозофски факултет, с. 68

always somewhere in the middle, and it implies that such influences are constantly being integrated in what is referred to as development of language and linguistic identity as a relatively stable creation. The same is also true for current tendencies, and the two-way process of globalization (glocalization) fits into the situation in which the dominant presence of the English language does not lead to the creation of a single linguistic identity in the European cultural space, neither does it bring into question the survival of the local linguistic identities, which, through glocalization get a chance for their affirmation, even a greater one than in modern societies. Thus, the English as a lingua franca in the contemporary globalised world should, above all, be perceived within a systemic and functionalistic framework, as a general language which facilitates the communication among various European nations.

Dominance of the English language and possible consequences for other languages

The numerous examples of the spread of a single language which occur simultaneously with the narrowing or subordination of other languages, logically impose the question of the long-term consequences for the future of smaller languages when they come in contact with a dominant language. These questions are of great interest for sociolinguistics, which, *inter alia*, is interested in linguistic changes and their implications for the structures of the very languages in immediate contact. The immediate contact between two languages which have a different function for their speakers, and which, at a broader level, bring with themselves a various degree of power depending on the power of their speakers at a world level, undoubtedly leads to certain changes in the ways of use by their speakers. In such situations often occur a situation of the so called “language shift” which refers to the change of the language by its speaker, a group of speakers or a speech community from the dominant use of a single language in almost all spheres of life towards the dominant use of another language in almost all spheres of life (Powels, 2004: 719-737). The speakers consciously shift from the use of one language towards the use of another, depending on the contexts in which the speech act occurs, or the domains in which it is preferable to use one language at the expense of the other one. This type of language shift occurs, *inter alia*, as a result of a combination of economic, demographic and social factors which can contribute to a great extent to the maintenance of subordinated or minority languages.

The influence of the economic factor is most apparent in those situations when the use of a particular language is connected to the achievement of particular economic benefits. This is the reason why this factor influences the increased shift from the use of the local language towards the use of the dominant language, so that at national level minority groups use the dominant language, while at a broader level speakers of smaller languages turn towards the use of English in those environments where it brings greater prospects for getting a job position and gaining economic profit. The demographic factor can best be understood through the intensified migration processes which are particularly typical for urban areas, as opposed to rural areas which mainly keep their homogeneity in terms

of their demographic composition. Therefore, we should not be surprised by the fact that shifts in the use of language are far more present in cities than in villages. The best argumentation for this tendency is the drastically increased use of the English language in big urban centres, where different ethnic groups get in contact, as well as members of different cultures who are using it for their mutual understanding.

Surely, the shift towards the use of English depends on the size of the particular group, so that certain communities as is the case with the Spanish community in the USA succeed in their efforts for language maintenance which is defined as a situation in which a speaker, a group of speakers or a speech community continues to use their language in some or in all spheres of life in spite of the competition with the dominant or majority language for the position of the leading language in these spheres (Ibid), but the smaller the group the greater the probability for a shift towards the use of the dominant language. Also important is the value of the language for its speakers. For instance, the speakers of French, Greek or some other languages see their language as an important segment of their national identity, and as a result these changes occur at a slower pace². This process could not be considered dangerous until it evolves into the critical stadium of language loss – a process which occurs at the moment when the language starts losing its internal function, and through the reduction of the domains of its use, it gradually limits its use within the family, and is finally reduced to personal use in thoughts, prayers, dreams... (Holmes, 2001: 51-72)

At this point of human history, the dominance of the English language is mainly incarnated in the state of language shift, which has so far been benign, but if this dynamics continues with the same intensity, then we can aptly express our concern over the future of other languages in a few centuries, but not in the sense of their complete loss but the addition of elements from the dominant languages which contributes to the modification of the distinctive linguistic identity of smaller languages although it keeps its linguistic distinctiveness. Our concern refers particularly to the languages with a smaller number of speakers, whose survival, on the long term, could really be brought into question. (Trajkovska, 2008: 100).

Conclusion

The European multilingual mosaic exists in terms of a growing dominance of the English language in a systemic and functional sense and the assertion of the uniqueness, distinctiveness and the individual linguistic identity of all other languages on the European continent. This state of affairs on the language map of Europe is influenced by two factors: the process of globalization (glocalization) and the strong linguistic tradition of European nations. The authors share the opinion that European linguistic diversity is not endangered on the short term, but the expansion of the domains of linguistic influence of the English language on other languages, particularly the smaller languages in Europe,

2 Language shift can also be analysed at a macro level, i.e. within the family, in cases when the shift towards the dominant language eventually results in its dominance in communication among family members as well. The research of the language shift among immigrant communities in Australia carried out by Michael Clyne showed that the intergenerational shift towards the dominant English language also depends on the linguistic background of the immigrants, so the shift rates are significantly low among Spanish and French communities, as a result of the internationally recognized high status of these languages. (Clyne, 2003: 27)

on a long term, may lead to the danger of significant modification and linguistic hybridization, which may threaten their identity, although historical experiences show that the probability for such an outcome of this process is rather low.

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE FAR-RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS IN SERBIA TOWARDS THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY¹

Abstract

The paper presents several standpoints dealing with the relation between language and national identity adopted by the organizations typically labelled far-right in the Serbian society. Based on a research of the internet sites of those organizations, some of the standpoints examined are the following ones: a) that language, nation and the national state are tightly intertwined (one national language – one nation – one national state), b) that language and ethno-national consciousness are also closely connected (i.e. that ethno-national consciousness cannot develop without the existence of a national language), c) that children should not be taught foreign languages before they have mastered their mother tongue, and similar ones. Each of such standpoints is then approached from the perspective of linguistic theory, which not only undermines the validity of such attitudes from a scientific point of view, but also offers such an alternative to the given standpoints that affirms tolerance, the culture of peace and better understanding among members of different nations and the languages they speak.

Key words: far-right organizations in Serbia, national language, ethno-national consciousness, ethno-national identity.

Introduction

This paper has the following goals: a) to present the views that Serbian organizations typically labelled far-right in Serbian society have towards the relation between language and (ethno)national identity, b) to approach those views from the perspective of (socio-) linguistic theory, and c) to draw the relevant conclusions.

In that sense, the websites of two Serbian organizations have been consulted, namely the website <http://www.obraz.rs/index1.htm> belonging to the organization called *Otačastveni pokret Obraz*, and <http://www.snp1389.rs/>, belonging to the organization called *Srpski narodni pokret 1389*. Both of those websites were accessed in September 2011, with special attention thereby being paid to their views regarding the relationship between language on the one hand, and various aspects of ethno-national identity and ethno-national consciousness, on the other hand.

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On the basis of such research of the given websites, the following standpoints have been excerpted:

1. Ethno-national consciousness cannot develop without the existence of a national language; the national language is "the embodiment of the very soul, the past, the entire spiritual system and creative potential of a nation and a guarantee of prosperity of a nation";
2. The purity and richness of the mother tongue should be protected from change and pernicious influence of other languages;
3. Children should not be taught foreign languages in either their oral or written forms until they have logically and fluently mastered their mother tongue; the cult of the mother tongue should dominate in the family;
4. The Cyrillic alphabet should be the exclusive one in which the Serbian language should be written;
5. The adjective *srpski* should be written as *srbski* (to underline belonging to the Serbian nation)

The given standpoints in this paper will be approached on the basis of the following theoretical background: Bugarski, 2009, 2002, 1996; Jackendoff, 1994 and Meje, 1965.

Before we proceed to proper analysis, we would first like to define the key terms used in the paper, namely the concepts of *identity*, *nation*, *ethnicity* and *ethno-national consciousness*.

Identity can be taken to mean a group of traits a particular group of people or an individual use to define themselves/itself with respect to the others. It is made up of a number of component parts (one can talk about ethnic, confessional, professional, social, territorial, cultural, political, national identity, etc). Each of us, both as individuals and members of broader groups, possess several identities whose strength can vary in degree and which can change over time (Bugarski, 2005:67/68).

Nation can be taken to represent a modern political community (established during the last two centuries through the processes of modernization and integration of civil society), i.e. it can be taken to represent a group of people that is at a high economic, cultural and political level of development, and that is characterized by awareness of a collective identity and continuity, with strong elements of civilizational (rather than only traditional) culture (Bugarski, 1996: 123-125).

Ethnicity can be defined as a group of traits characterizing an ethnic community (a nation, a tribe, etc.). It has a social/cultural basis (not a biological one) and can change over time (*ibid.*).

Eventually, *ethno-national consciousness* may be taken to mean a form of self identification, the consciousness of belonging to a nation and of the ways in which that nation is different from other nations. It is mostly acquired and manifests itself through a will to live together with other members of that nation and through acceptance of the rules and obligations imposed by that nation on its members. The ethnic and the national need do not coincide (Bugarski, 1996: 124-125).

Analysis

In this part of the paper each of the standpoints presented above will be approached from the perspective of (socio)linguistic theory.

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According to standpoint 1, as we have seen, ethno-national consciousness cannot develop without a national language. In addition, the national language is seen as a guarantee of prosperity of a nation, and the "the embodiment of the very soul, the past, the entire spiritual system and creative potential of a nation".

These particular views have been present in the European cultural and historical tradition ever since the late 18th century, i.e. since the time of the French Revolution and of the authors such as Herder and Rousseau. Such views can sometimes indeed be true, especially when it comes to various ethnic groups in the process of their national constitution and affirmation. In that sense, first of all, they are indeed applicable to the peoples, modern nations today, that were under foreign domination or occupation, which used to be the case with quite a lot of ethnic groups at the time of the existence of the Ottoman Empire, Habsburg monarchy, or the Russian Empire. In that sense, the given standpoint might indeed be said to be valid for Serbs. And secondly, this also holds true for very small nations, such as the Basque people or the Bretons.

There are, however, quite a lot of cases that testify to the contrary, i.e. those that can considerably relativize the existence of such a strong link postulated to exist between language, on the one hand, and ethno-national identity and ethno-national consciousness, on the other hand.

First of all, nations can form without a national language. That holds for the American, Canadian or Australian nation, all of which use the English language (with the Canadians also using French). Along the same lines, quite a lot of nations in Latin America today use Spanish language, with yet another language – Portuguese, being used by the Brazilian nation (similar observations hold for modern nations that use German language, such as the Austrian nation, or French language, such as the various nations in the Caribbean). Far from such a situation preventing those nations from their actual constitution as nations, it has opened them up to the cultures, economies and other aspects of social life of the nations also using English, Spanish, Portuguese, German or French, respectively.

Secondly, whereas one and the same language can be very important when it comes to one's ethnic identity, it can lose that importance when it comes to national identity. For example, the francophone Canadians find the French language very important when it comes to their *ethnic* consciousness and their differentiation from the English-speaking Canadians. Contrary, the same language (namely French) loses such importance when it comes to their *national* identity, because the French-speaking Canadians (as well as the English-speaking Canadians) do not consider themselves members of the French or the English nation respectively, but of the Canadian one.

Thirdly, there are nations that use several languages. For example, there are four languages used in Switzerland (German, French, Italian and Romansh), two in Canada (English and French), three in Luxembourg (German, French and Luxembourgish), in which the members of such nations can consider their *bi/multilingualism* an important part of their ethno-national consciousness and national identity. In addition and along the same lines, at individual and collective levels, individuals or groups of people can use one language reaffirming their ethnic identity (e.g. Italians using Italian in the USA, Hungarians using Hungarian in Vojvodina), another language affirming their national identity (e.g. Italians using English in the USA, thereby affirming their belonging to the American nation), yet another language affirming their confessional identity, a foreign language affirming their professional identity, and so on.

Fourthly, a national language can indeed exist (sometimes as a revived language) but is used by a (very) small percentage of the nation, while it is a foreign/non-national language that predominates in that nation. That is valid for the Welsh language among the members of the Welsh nation, or for the Irish language in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the latter, the Irish language has official status and is a symbol of state sovereignty, despite the fact that no significant percentage of the population uses it natively, wherefore it has to be taught in schools practically as a foreign language. At the same time, most of the nation uses English language, proving the fact that strong ethno-national consciousness that the Irish have can be preserved despite the fact that they primarily use the language which has actually represented a major threat to their national and ethnic identity in the past.

Fifthly, ethnic consciousness can exist without any national language, for which the Roma people can be taken as an example.

Sixthly, a part of a nation can start losing its ethno-national consciousness and national language, which holds true especially of immigration groups in the process of their assimilation. This, in turn, and despite popular opinion, can prove the fact that ethno-national consciousness and the mother tongue can change over time. In addition, the increase of bilingual and multilingual people in today's globalized world all the more testifies to how tenuous and relativized the relation between language, on the one hand, and ethno-national identity and consciousness, on the other hand, can be in view of this and all the other data listed above.

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The second standpoint mentioned above puts forward the idea that children should not be taught foreign languages in either their oral or written forms until they have logically and fluently mastered their mother tongue, and that the cult of the mother tongue should dominate in the family. In other words, learning a foreign language or simply being exposed to it is here practically seen as a hindrance to the development of ethno-national identity and ethno-national consciousness and should consequently be avoided.

The given views are, to put it bluntly, absurd. Namely, linguistics as a science offers plenty of evidence that all children are capable of acquiring whichever language is spoken in the community where they grow up and if more than one language is spoken regularly, they will end up speaking all of them. This fact, coupled with an increasing number

of cases of children that are bilingual/multilingual especially in today's ever more globalized world, all the more relativizes insistence on a single national language that a child should concentrate on, and makes any such attempts quite unjustifiable, to say the least.

In addition to that, we would like to draw attention to the so-called critical period hypothesis, present in linguistic literature ever since the 1950s. According to this hypothesis, there is an ideal period in children's development in which they have the ability to acquire, i.e. to unconsciously and effortlessly pick up any language(s) they are exposed to, whereby this particular ability diminishes in the early teen years (for details on the hypothesis, the authors who suggested it and evidence that may corroborate it, the reader is referred to Jackendoff, 1994). Although the given hypothesis is actually quite controversial and does remain an object of a long-standing debate, it may seriously undermine the above insistence on children being prevented from exposure to a language apart from their mother tongue, as such insistence can do children nothing but harm. Namely, if children, deprived of exposure to a foreign language in their early youth, start learning a foreign language in their teens, they would be doing just that – *learning* it rather than *acquiring* it. In other words, once that window of opportunity for a child to unconsciously and effortlessly pick up a foreign language (i.e. for language *acquisition*) has diminished or has even shut down completely, those children will have to be exposed to a much more demanding and conscious task of getting formal education in the given language to achieve the same (or - usually worse) level of language proficiency that they would have done unconsciously in their early youth. In addition, there is no evidence at all, as far as the author of this paper is aware, that deprivation from exposure to a foreign language is indeed beneficial for the development of ethno-national consciousness and identity, unless such evidence is dogmatic and utterly ungrounded in science.

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According to the abovementioned standpoint, the purity and richness of the mother tongue should be protected from change and pernicious influence of other languages.

A possible reply to such a standpoint can, among other, be the fact that purity and richness are not criteria that linguistics as a science can seriously operate with.

Let us, in that sense, first concentrate on purity. One of the meanings of this word to be found in any dictionary is that it represents a state of being clean or a state of not being mixed with anything else. When applied to a specific language, and for example, to its vocabulary, this word would probably imply absence of foreign words in that language, or at least making a conscious effort to reduce the number of such words as much as possible.

From the linguistic point of view, such an attitude is entirely ungrounded. To give a single example for this, even words that denote the most common everyday things and concepts in Serbian are not of Serbian origin. This can be proved by the following groups of words (the words in each of the groups of examples come from Serbian, English, German, Spanish and French respectively): *majka, mother, Mutter, madre, mère; sunce, sun, Sonne, sol, soleil; škola, school, Schule, escuela, école; tri, three, drei, tres, trois; ja, I, ich, yo, je, etc.* The obvious similarities that can be found in each of the given groups of examples is a result of the fact that Serbian is an Indo-European language (alongside

Germanic, Romance, Celtic, Baltic, Indo-Iranian, and other Slavic languages, and alongside languages such as Greek, Albanian and Armenian). In that sense, not even the words referring to basic kin relations and everyday objects (*mother, sun, school*) and concepts (numbers, personal pronouns) in Serbian do *not* come from Serbian (or from English, or from French etc.) but actually from common Indo-European stock that Serbian has inherited alongside several dozen other Indo-European languages (for details on the Indo-European language family see: (Meillet, 1965), whereupon no linguist can probably insist on any form of "purity" in language seriously.

The concept of richness is essentially also a part of folk linguistics. It is on a par with the following value judgments of languages and their varieties, and through them, to the users of those languages/language varieties: a) the pragmatic value judgments, for example that Italian is good for singing, that French is good for courting and diplomacy, that German is good for science and philosophy, that Indian languages are insufficient for communication, wherefore Indians must use smoke signals and gestures (!), or that African languages have few words and even less grammar (!); b) the aesthetic value judgments, for example that Romance languages are mellifluous, that Germanic languages are guttural, and very unpleasant to listen to, etc. As it can be seen, some such judgments can be quite harmless, whereas others (such as the above ones pertaining to the Indian and African languages) are heavily biased, if not downright racist. Whereas views of the given sort may be important for the development of linguistics and potentially valuable in cultural anthropology, philosophy of language, sociology of language and social psychology, they can hardly claim any scientific support. In addition, it can be seen from the above examples that languages (and language varieties) tend to get evaluated not on the basis of what they *are* but on the basis of what they *represent*, i.e. on the basis of social and not linguistic reasons, whereupon the above value judgements (including the one pertaining to the supposed richness of the Serbian or any other language) are nothing more but stereotypes.

In conclusion, the concepts of purity or richness of the Serbian, or of any other language for that matter, cannot be held under scrutiny, and represent nothing else but stereotypes. What is more, insistence on such concepts is often inspired by demagogy and can easily transform the love of one's language and nation into hatred for and inspire conflict with the people using another language and belonging to a different nation.

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According to standpoint 4, the Cyrillic alphabet should be the exclusive one in which Serbian language should be written.

Namely, as it is well-known, Serbian language makes use of two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin, which is the result of Serbia having been exposed to different cultural and civilizational influences in the past.

The use of the Latin alphabet has recently grown in banking, commerce, advertising, tourism, the new media, and other areas, especially through the influence of English in the processes of globalization and modernization. Such a state of affairs often provokes advocating prohibition of the Latin alphabet as something mondial, Croatian, communist, coming from the Vatican, etc., so as to preserve the Serbian language and Serbian nation.

In addition, the latest constitution of Serbia, adopted in 2006, made the Cyrillic alphabet obligatory in official use, whereby the Latin alphabet was not explicitly cited as either an alternative or secondary alphabet of Serbian (but its use was indeed then regulated by the relevant law).

The actual state of affairs is that both Cyrillic and Latin alphabet are used, with, for example, quite a lot of literature in Serbian actually being written in the Latin alphabet. In that sense, insistence on one alphabet in favour of the other is conspicuously at odds with cultivating the values of diversity and multiculturalism. In other words, there is no scientific reason why both alphabets should not be embraced as a source of (actual rather than stereotypical) richness rather than be eliminated by administrative measures. In still other words, there is no reason to believe that one will become less of a Serb if one used Latin alphabet, and there is still less logic in labelling those members of the Serbian nation who use the Cyrillic alphabet national patriots and those who use the Latin one national betrayers, as it is commonly done in Serbia when it comes both to the given issue as well as to many other similar ones.

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Eventually, the last standpoint that we will focus on here is standpoint 5, according to which the adjective *srpski* should be written as *srbski* (and according to which one should talk about *Srbstvo*, *Srbkinja* etc., rather than *srpstvo*, *Srpkinja* etc.).

Namely, in standard Serbian orthography the given adjective is to be written as *srpski* rather than **srbski*. That is a result of the application of the principle of language economy, i.e. the principle of least effort or tending towards the minimum amount of effort that is necessary to achieve the maximum result, so that nothing is wasted. In other words, the letter “b” both in speaking and in writing gets obligatorily devoiced and becomes “p” as it is easier to pronounce two unvoiced consonants in a sequence (in this case “ps”) than a sequence of a voiced and an unvoiced one (the case of the proscribed “bs”). This sound change, known as assimilation of voicing, is to be found in thousands of Serbian words (e.g. *vrabac* / *vrapci* / **vrabci*; *redak* / *retka* / **redka*; *poručiti* / *porudžbina* / **poručbina*) (the same sound change occurs in the pronunciation of the English plural forming suffix “-s” – compare, for example, *books* - /s/ and *dogs* - /z/, with the difference that in the given case such changes do not occur in writing in English).

The point is that in the view of the given organizations the word *srpski* does not underline belonging to the Serbian nation well enough, the argument behind that being that “we are not *Serps* but *Serbs*, and this is not *Serpia* but *Serbia*“. Such a standpoint, labelled orthographic or phonological nationalism (cf. Bugarski, 2009) is, as far as linguistics is concerned, entirely ungrounded.

Conclusions

Insistence on national language and on its importance in the preservation of national identity can sometimes indeed be fruitful. Namely, such insistence has produced some great works of art especially in the 18th and 19th centuries, and has brought about con-

siderable interest in the folk heritage of different nations in the same given period (one can simply recall the great importance of collaboration of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić with Goethe and the Grimm brothers for Serbian culture, i.e. for acquainting Europe with the Serbian folk heritage through the national language of the Serbs).

Still, such insistence, to be seen in the given standpoints, can sometimes become destructive, aggressive, exclusive, and a fertile ground for manipulation and political demagogy. In that sense and (mis)led by such standpoints, one might start proposing that all those who speak a particular language should get unified in a single national state, that people should get divided into 'good' and 'bad' members of the given nation, i.e. into national patriots and national betrayers, that one's love of one's national language necessarily implies intolerance towards other languages and through them – to their users.

In that sense, all such standpoints, should be countered with scientific arguments, some of which have been presented above, and by trying to develop such views that will be more in touch with the modern world, rather than those that reiterate the views that are more in the spirit of the 18th and 19th centuries. Some such views can be the following ones: a) that ethno-national consciousness is not crucially dependent on a national language/mother tongue and ethnic background; b) that one should actively oppose negative stereotypes and prejudice with respect to the relation between language and (ethno-national) identity and consciousness; c) that one should encourage learning foreign language(s) from as an early period as possible; d) that one should not force language change through administrative measures; e) that multilingualism and multiculturalism should be accepted as a natural state of most of mankind and a source of cultural richness, rather than as a threat for the ethno-national identity, and f) that one should try and accept Europe, its variety and values as a broad cultural, spiritual and language homeland.

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UPON THE "INVASION" OF ANGLICISMS IN THE ROMANIAN LANGUAGE

Abstract

The last two decades of Romania's history, characterised by the transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic one, from dictatorship to democracy, from a planned economy to a free market economy, from a single party system to a multiparty one, from censorship to freedom of speech and expression, marked the political, social, economic, technological, scientific, cultural life of the country. All these profound transformations are well illustrated by the Romanian vocabulary - the most unstable compartment of the language. Language by its increased dynamism reflects, particularly in its lexical compartment, the current Romanian realities and transformations.

The paper tackles the issue of Anglicisms and Americanisms in Romanian and emphasises matters concerning the causes and justifications that determined their use to such a great extent during the past decades.

Key words: globalization, linguistic globalization, Anglicisms, Americanisms, loans.

First used in relation to the economic field and subsequently spread rapidly to other spheres of the social life, the term *globalization* came into use rather recently in Romanian (*globalizare*), by derivation from the root words *glob* <Latin *globus* and *global* + the suffix *-izare* following the French, English, German patterns (*globalisation*, *globalization*, *globalisierung*).

Globalization - as a process generated by the spread of capitalism - was defined, among others, as: *the idea that the world is developing a single economy and culture as a result of improved technology and communications and the influence of very large multinational corporations* (<http://www.macmillandictionary.com>), as the situation *when available goods and services, or social and cultural influences, gradually become similar in all parts of the world* (<http://dictionary.cambridge.org>) or simply as *rendering universal* (DEX, 1998).

In the field of linguistics, the phenomenon of globalization illustrates the relationship between the dynamics of society and of the communication needs, the phrase *linguistic globalization* referring to the transformations that national languages have met in recent decades due to the more or less deliberate acceptance of a common means of communication - English - in the framework of economic, political, cultural international relationships (Călărășu, 2003: 323).

The unprecedented achievements in the fields of science, technique, economy occurred in the U.S. and thus represented the reasons that imposed the use of English worldwide. Accepting English as the only communication tool in major domains such as inter-

national banking, economic affairs and trade, advertising for global brands, international law and safety, technology transfer, internet communication, international organizations and conferences, scientific publications, audio-visual cultural products, tourism, interpretation and translation (Graddol, 2000: 8) represented an objective necessity of the contemporary reality. A good command of English became a *must have* for those who wanted to gain quick access to the latest information of science and technology, or to develop business with partners coming from the land of all possibilities.

National and cultural vanities alongside with obsolete competitive mentalities involving the idea of linguistic supremacy have been overcome (Călărașu, 2003: 324) and even the major economic authorities of the world - Japan, Israel - finally complied with the yield of times, accepted the *linguistic imperialism* of English and established national educational programs to facilitate the learning of English from an early age. There were, of course, exceptions such as China, France, the Canadian province of Quebec that counterbalanced this phenomenon by imposing laws restricting the use of English in the media and public places.

The expansion and exacerbation of linguistic globalization in Central and South-Eastern European countries was favoured under the political and economic changes determined by the collapse of communism.

The Romanian educational system quickly synchronized with the contemporary realities and adapted itself to the new needs and objectives - transition to a market economy and privatization of banking sector, transnationalization of economic and technological environment, occurrence of foreign investors who mainly recruited staff with English communication skills, increase of the emerging nature of markets, access to computer technology. The weight the English classes acquired in elementary and high school education placed, after 1989, at least in urban areas, this language among the first options of the students, and curricula were changed under the pressure of market requirements, of the language globalization phenomenon. English, which began to be perceived as a tool to accelerate the timing and participation in the global economy (Călărașu, 2003: 324) began to be studied intensively in Romanian schools as early as elementary school.

Romania's opening to the west brought about an enrichment of the vocabulary with new words - predominantly English and American loans - belonging to various fields: economy, administration, finance, trade, computer science and internet communication. Many of these terms have no equivalent in Romanian, being borrowed concurrently with the realities they used to designate. Nevertheless there were cases where the loans were doublets of existing terms or phrases. There was noticed (with the speakers, but the linguists alike) a minimum tendency to adjust these words to the national language system, probably due to the phenomenon of globalization which, at linguistic level, means, among others, the creation of an international vocabulary and the imposition of some unique rules. This is obvious with words belonging to the field of economics, where globalization initially manifested itself visibly and where they started to use English loans for job designations as such: *auditor, (senior) manager, market developer, sales manager, sales person, salesman, broker, chief copywriter, executive coach, head hunter, program officer, body-guard, hair-stylist, hostess, staff, babysitter* and so on.

The tendency towards linguistic globalization - unlike the economic one - generated in Romania an attitude of protest and lamentation (Avram, 1997: 7) regarding the influence of English perceived sometimes as an invasive phenomenon that could endanger the national character, the very existence of the language. However, the phenomenon of borrowing words of foreign origin is not a new one at least in Romanian. Romanian linguistics recorded English loans - entered into circulation indirectly mainly via French, German and Italian - as early as the second half of the XVIII century. The process, with its outstanding effects especially in the field of scientific terminology, intensified during the XIX century and continues nowadays.

Works published after the first half of the XIX century (Pușcariu, 1940; Jordan, 1943) as well as those printed before the fall of communism (Marcu and Maneca, 1978; Dimitrescu, 1982; Graur, 1987) show that, after the Second World War, despite the restrictive measures of the totalitarian regime Romanian borrowed numerous English terms used in financial environment, sports, film and even fashionable life.

English loans in Romanian fall under two categories:

a) terms that were adapted, “naturalized” and acquired “Romanian citizenship”, namely Romanian form and pronunciation (Pruteanu, 2006) being subject to phonetic or graphic change:

ENGLISH WORD	ROMANIAN SPELLING FOR THE LOAN	ROMANIAN PRONUNCIATION FOR THE LOAN
<i>audit</i>	<i>Audit</i>	/audit/
<i>auditor</i>	<i>Auditor</i>	/auditor/
<i>blender</i>	<i>Blender</i>	/blender/
<i>bluejeans</i>	<i>Blugi</i>	/blud3i/
<i>cocktail</i>	<i>Cocteil</i>	/kokteil/
<i>clown</i>	<i>Clovn</i>	/clovn/
<i>clearing</i>	<i>Cliring</i>	/cliring/
<i>computer</i>	<i>Computer</i>	/kɔmpiuter/
<i>football</i>	<i>Fotbal</i>	/fotbal/
<i>hamburger</i>	<i>Hamburger</i>	/hamburgɔr/
<i>hypermarket</i>	<i>Hypermarket</i>	/hipermarket/
<i>interview</i>	<i>Interviu</i>	/interviu/
<i>leader</i>	<i>Lider</i>	/lider/
<i>match</i>	<i>Meci</i>	/metʃi/
<i>meeting</i>	<i>Miting</i>	/miting/
<i>pullover</i>	<i>pullover, pulovăr</i>	/pullover, pulovɔr/
<i>sandwich</i>	<i>Sendviș</i>	/senviʃ/
<i>scanner</i>	<i>Scanner</i>	/skenɔr/
<i>ski</i>	<i>Schi</i>	/ski/
<i>stress</i>	<i>Stres</i>	/stres/
<i>tennis</i>	<i>Tenis</i>	/tenis/
<i>volleyball</i>	<i>Volei</i>	/volei/

b) terms that came into use without any phonetic or graphic changes: *advertising, aftershave, airbag, all right, babysitter, background, bacon, banking, banner, bestseller, blues, body building, body, bodyguard, box-office, broker, blues, bluejeans* (but also *blugi*) (DOOM, 2005: 92), *by-pass, cash, catering, chat, cheeseburger, chips, cool, copywriter, consulting, curry, cutter, dealer, desktop, discount, dividend, dumping, duty-free, e-mail, exit-poll, fast-food, fairplay, fashion, feedback, fitness, full-time, hamburger, hard-disk, hacker, horror, hotdog, hotline, ice tea, job, jogging, ketchup, laptop, link, leasing, live, look, mall, make-up (artist), marker, modeling, mouse, management, manager, marketing, mini-market, part-time, pager, play-back, pole-position, prime-time, rent, roaming, science-fiction, service, second-hand, show, showbiz, showroom, shopping, site, soft, skateboard, snack-bar, staff, summit, supermarket, sticks, talk-show, training, T-shirt, walkman, web.*

In both cases the loans are mentioned in Romanian dictionaries. (DEX, 1998; DOOM, 2005; Marcu and Maneca, 1978; Dimitrescu, 1982)

What caused some linguists' and ordinary people's backlash was the unrestrained tendency, noticeable mainly in the media but also with ordinary speakers, to use Anglicisms and Americanisms to define notions for which Romanian had its own words.

"From newspapers, advertising, radio and television there pours upon us a torrent of variegated, ugly, corrupt language where one may find almost anything: ...Anglicisms (very popular in circles with no real education) by the use of which the issuers want to seem informed and aware of what is fancy in the West...so, they say, full of importance, middle class, not as any bumpkin, clasa de mijloc. An Anglo-Romanian jargon is in fashion ..." (Paler, 1997)

What is considered as damaging is that most of those who introduced in use several Anglicisms - and continue to introduce, use and disseminate them - can hardly speak English correctly. (Slama-Cazacu, 2005: 502)

Of course, some words were not rebuffed, words that the language lacked, that render the reality of the new social, political, economic, cultural contexts (*sponsor, broker, duty-free, futures, non-profit, telebanking, electronic banking, voucher, cash & carry, fast-food, marketing, management, joint-venture, leasing*) or facilitated communication by their international character and concision as was the case with the phrases *community acquis (acquis comunitar)* (Pruteanu, 2006) or *mass-media (mijloace de comunicare în masă)*.

By borrowing terms like these the Romanian vocabulary enriched or, even more, some common Romanian words acquired new meanings: the verb *a aplica* - to use, put in practice to overlay two things uniting them (DEX, 1998) is now in use with the meaning borrowed from English - to apply: to make an official request for a job or a place to study at a college or university; as a noun, the word *aplicație* - use, implementation, talent, inclination (DEX, 1998) has the additional meaning of the English *application* - a written request for a job or a place at a college, university and so on.

Some Romanian linguists, who as a matter of fact advocated the importance and necessity of loans, have campaigned to prevent the use of the so-called *luxury anglicisms* (Stoichițoiu, 2008: 115; Pruteanu, 2006) or *cultivated loans (cultisme in Romanian)* (Guțu-Romalo, 1972: 161) - useless words that duplicate Romanian equivalents: *adver-*

tising, agreement, band, board, brand, business, businessman, businesswoman, cake, chairman, cool, dealer, drink, fashion, food, happy-end, horror, happy end, job, jogging, live, living-room, look, make-up, old fashion, part-time/full-time job, party, sales, sales manager, sales person, salesman, second hand, shopping (centre), showroom, staff, summit, talk-show, toast, trend, week-end. Scarcely bringing any additional cognitive or expressive piece of information, these loans most often betray insufficient knowledge of the language (English/Romanian), false intellectual pretence, lack of naturalness, snuggness, hurry, linguistic snobbishness.

The *imposition of the Romanian language norms* in order to favour the phonetic and graphic accommodation of xenisms was vehemently supported by specialists who disavowed their entering in dictionaries with their original spelling (DOOM, 2005).

As useful tools in the process of adjusting the foreign words to the Romanian language rules, by the norms they enforce, dictionaries should help to minimize, if possible, a phenomenon already quite naturalized among Romanian speakers, that of borrowing and using Anglicisms and Americanisms without the slightest attempt to adapt them to the Romanian phonetic orthographic, morphological system. One might avoid spelling inconsistencies: *bodyguard, bodigard*, or the ironical *badigard* (reference is made to the word *gard* the Romanian for *fence*) or pronunciation mistakes such as that of the word *management* uttered [*'menidʒimənt*], [*ma'nadʒement*] or even [*'meniʒmənt*].

As there still are people unfamiliar with English, linguists (Pruteanu, 2006) called for prudence in using loans that were not phonetically tailored to Romanian.

In fact, in 2004 the Romanian Parliament passed a Bill (no.500/2004) - concerning the use of Romanian in public places, institutions relationships - that states that English words must be translated if they appear in commercials or promotional texts. This law initiated by Professor George Pruteanu encountered "violent rejection of specialists, half-learned, ignorant people who do not speak foreign languages and they themselves do not understand the foreign words that *bombard* them, of journalists, politicians, or *VIPs* who *commit* and disseminate terrible mistakes... I add to this *snobbery, desire to shock* ("I can speak English" - even if I do not know it), reckless *imitation* of some persons *promoted* by the media" (Slama-Cazacu, 2005: 502)

They replied with various reasons one of which was that the language itself being a *living organism* will eliminate what is not good, right or useful. Those who advocated this reason overlooked the power of example - which may be questionable - and, unless penalized by experts, language errors become common place.

Others (Avram, 1997: 10; Stoichițoiu-Ichim, 2008: 110) consider that „paradoxically, the danger of current English influence comes from the fact that it takes place by cultivated people and that these people act as factors that *prevent* or even *delay* the loans naturalization, under the umbrella of dictionaries that maintain their foreign aspect. Many words show that without *the hindrance that normative works should impose* and without consummate connoisseurs of English, recent Anglicisms would accommodate to the Romanian language as easy as the loans of other foreign etymologies.”

Necessary or not, used with more or less justification, Anglicisms and Americanisms invaded the vocabulary of the native speakers who, especially in urban areas, have enthusiastically acquired a series of loans without which communication seems impossible

today: it is *trendy* or *cool* for everybody to have a *hair stylist* or *make-up artist* that helps them get a new *look*, everybody goes *jogging* or *shopping* - in a *supermarket*, *hypermarket* or a *mall*, everybody runs after *sales* or the best *brands*, eats *hotdogs*, *hamburgers*, *cheeseburgers*, drinks *milkshake*, attends a *casting* or an *interview* for a new *show*, *talk-show*, or *workshop*, everybody wants to be a *businessman*, *businesswoman*, a *VIP*, or a *star*.

But the natural question arises: why are Romanians so inclined to overuse Anglicisms and Americanisms? There are several reasons for such an attitude.

Firstly, it was the unexpected contact people could have with a completely new world for them - the free world of western Europe, and other remote continents to which most of them couldn't have even dreamt about before the fall of communism. Not only that they began to travel abroad, to see this world, but this very world began to come into their houses, through the sundry television channels where movies, banned for decades, were broadcasted, through the new means of communication, through newspapers, magazines, books, internet. Later they traded and did business with foreign partners. All this contact was achieved through the instrumentality of a rather new language for most of them, the language that was common to a world they had been isolated from for generations. Everyone was animated by the desire to break completely from what meant articulation in the insipid language reminiscent of the communist era, the wooden language. There started to appear new political and social phenomena, economic processes, business organisations, institutions, banks, goods that Romanian hadn't known before 1989. All these brought about in vocabulary new lexical units able to properly serve the communication process.

Last but not least, it was the speakers' wish to speak more *carefully*, in a more *literary style*, urge that favoured the overuse of Anglicisms and Americanisms considered more *cultivated* more *elegant* to the detriment of ordinary, *banal* words, even if the lack of full synonymy distorted the semantic meaning of the statement or led to incorrect or unnatural combinations of words. (Guțu Romalo, 1972: 158)

Because of the nature of their profession, journalists and television people were among the first to have access to unlimited and unconditional contact with English. By the authority of the printed or broadcasted word, the media *contributed to the linguistic education* of the readers or viewers, who voluntarily accepted this language globalization, enriching, and diversifying, *rendering European* the Romanian language vocabulary.

Finally, some Romanian speakers, not only ordinary people - we certainly exclude from this category the snobs who use the English *job* instead of its Romanian equivalent - choose to sprinkle their communication with English neologisms, - *lost images* the analysis of which leads without denial to Latin (Tohăneanu, 1995: 55) - because they can be more exact, more eloquent, more emotional.

Conclusions

Linguistic globalization - a consequence of economic globalisation - manifested itself by the coming into the use of all national languages of a large number of English loans.

Due to their international character, Anglicisms and Americanisms are well preserved in Romanian and the fact that they continue to be used is a clear indication that some of them were needed or became necessary through semantic specialization in comparison with the Romanian synonyms which they duplicated.

Although an old phenomenon in the history of the Romanian language, loans of English origin are widely and sometimes inexcusably used by native speakers instead of Romanian words.

It can be asserted that the use of Anglicisms and Americanisms - regardless of the causes - was generally an inner urge of Romanians and not necessarily something imposed from outside, the media having an important role in the process of linguistic globalisation.

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THE HOLLY GRAIL AND THE ALTER EGO: BALKANS AS A SOURCE OF THE RUSSIAN EXCEPTIONALITY IN THE LATE SOVIET AND EARLY RUSSIAN DISCOURSE

Abstract

The paper is based on the inter-disciplinary research project, which studies the process of relational identity construction and the Russian foreign policy. Following the constructivist epistemology and methodology of intertextuality, the paper will study main texts that defined the Russia's Great Power identity: school and university textbooks, major history works, most popular history novels and media discourse. The author looks into the concept of identity as expressed by the term of Russia's Great Powerhood linked to the idea of Europe. The working hypothesis of the research project is that Russia's idea of Great Powerhood was always exercised/implemented in/through Russia's interaction with Europe.

The Balkans take special role in the role of the Russian identity construction. Departing from the facts of certain historical borrowings the Balkans the discourse evolves to reconstruct the Balkans as the source of the Russian Greatness. Embedded in the Soviet discourse through the textbooks and fiction literature in the 1960s, the discourses penetrates numerous texts in the media discourse in the late 1980s. The paper further analyzes evolution of the discourse in the Russian period. It identifies certain deconstruction of the Holy Grail that take place, introduction of orientalist elements and adjustment of the discourse to new realities.

Introduction

The Balkans have drawn the attention of international community as troubled European periphery. European identity was reproduced and sustained in dealing with the problems coming from the Balkans. Post-modernity and European values were reproduced in the juxtaposition with pre-modernity, embodied in underdevelopment, traditionalism and hatreds persistent in the region. As much as Europe used the region to construct its own identity Russia has long used the Balkans and the Black Sea region to sustain its own specific identity. The present paper sets out to look at the question what role was attributed to the both regions in the Russian identity, how it was constructed and how it was related to Europe. The paper employs the methodology of discourse analysis in the study of the main texts, which define Russia's self-perception as an international actor. The paper will particularly look into the question what role is attributed in this discourse to the Black Sea region and the Balkans.

In order to identify the pool of ideas on which the Russian people drew their understanding about the international affairs, this chapter focuses on the intellectual trajectory,

which an average Russian citizen and elite member would go through. The reconstruction of these ideas will be done through the inter-textual analysis of school and university text books on Russian and Soviet foreign policy and world history, and historical novels that were highly popular in the USSR in the period of the 1980s. The specific time periods is selected because it was in this period when, in the aftermath of Brezhnev's stagnation on the peak of Gorbachev's perestroika, Russian literature and history undertook an attempt to reconsider its past and new books on the history of Russia and the Soviet Union were written.

The chapter analyses two strands of textbooks – those with indicative title *The History of the USSR*¹ and those titled *World History* for the concluding 7th-10th grades of schools. The textbooks on the History of the USSR were now prepared by two groups led by M. Nechnkina and Y. Kukushkin, senior academicians from Moscow University and various institutes of Soviet Academy of Sciences². State publishing houses translated his books into a number of foreign languages, including English, French and Spanish. The groups of Professors I. M. Krivoguz and V. K. Furaev prepared textbooks on Modern period of the World History³ and Contemporary World History⁴. They also produced university textbooks. These textbooks represented a new generation of textbooks which, despite certain liberalisation of education in the 1980s, were charged with ideological interpretations. The key historical actors are ideological systems rather than states, classes rather than personalities. Although these textbooks are overburdened with quotations from Marx and Lenin, the concepts of Great Powerhood protrude through the thick ideological smokescreen.

In 1980s, another authoritative source of information about Russia became a republished edition by one of the founders of Russian historiography – Nikolay Karamzin. His standard voluminous work *History of the Russian State* written in the early 19th century and reprinted in the mid-late 1980s became an alternative source of information in the late Soviet period. The chapter will also use Karamzin in order to identify to what extent this alternative source with considerable authority could generate an anti-hegemonic discourse. In the present chapter I will refer to the electronic version of this fundamental work widely available and frequently quoted among the Russian reading audience.

Another important source of information became new popular novels by Valentin Pikul, who was at the peak of his popularity and authority in the late 1980s. Over the period 1979-1989, Pikul wrote at least 10 major non-fiction history⁵ novels, which were all published and widely-read in the Soviet audience. One can judge his impact on the Soviet elite by the fact that Pikul was decorated with two important Soviet orders and was also awarded a special prize. Even several military vessels of the Baltic and the Black Sea Fleet of Russia were named after him. No other writer has received such an honour. In addition, several civilian ships, streets, libraries and even a planet bear Valentin Pikul's name. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that he was a passionate reader of Pikul and quoted some excerpts from him. On 17 May 1987 the Central Soviet Communist newspaper Pravda ran an interview with Pikul with the eloquent title "*I like strong personalities*"⁶. Some researchers, acknowledging his controversial character, had to admit Pikul was the most popular novelist in the USSR⁷.

In 1989 Pikul published his novel *I have the honour...* (Pikul, 1989). The novel, which claims to be based on real events and memoirs of an intelligence officer of the Russian and Soviet General Staff, describes the life of a True Russian hero, Oladiev⁸, who is an offspring of intercultural marriage between a Russian man and a Serb woman. The chapter analyzes Oladiev's Balkan odyssey and the career which constitutes an important site of identity construction.

Last, but not the least, the present chapter will analyze the late Soviet media discourse as it was articulated in the most popular and less ideologized Soviet newspaper *Izvestia*, which became an outlet for free public debate in the USSR in the late 1980s. This chapter will analyse how these discourses are reproduced in the rhetoric of politicians, diplomats and policy-makers in the media. The media discourse is supposed to be the output of those inputs which they received in the early 1960s.

Balkans as a Holy Grail

In the late 1980s any Russian would be first introduced to the Balkans as early as primary school. In the history textbooks, any description of creation of the Russian culture and history would inevitably state that the Balkans and the Mediterranean were the gate of Russia to the European history. World history comes to the Black Sea from the Balkans which is described in individual chapters⁹. The culture and civilization comes to medieval Scythians from the Greek colonies in ancient times; writing and nobility titles arrive to Eastern Slav from Byzantine and Southern Slavs.

Karamzin's work comes to add special mystical essentialism to this discourse. The Balkans is constructed now as a kind of Holy Grail for Russia. They are not merely the source of cultural borrowings, but a spring of intellectual enrichment, inspiration and spiritual growth. This attribute occurs in numerous descriptions of conversion to Eastern Christianity, important dynastic marriages and cultural borrowings. (Karamzin, Vol.6: 16, 19-22). Even the Varangians before coming to the Slavic principalities had benefited from the knowledge of Greece and Rome. (Karamzin, Vol.1: 37). Pikul's novel "*Chest Imeyu*" takes this discourse even further. For example, when describing shady gardens of Dubrovnik, General Oladiev describes it as cradle of Russian greatness:

Here the learned Serb Marko Martinovich was teaching "the birds of Peter's nest"¹⁰ to sail and fight in the seas; the Serbs of Dubrovnik, being excellent sailors and extraordinary navigators, fought many times under the banner of the Russian fleet. Small Dubrovnik (Ragusa) was a republic once upon a time and Catherine the Great sent them friendly letters. Local residents were also sending their Ambassadors to Saint Petersburg...I have spent many hours delving into the stacks of books of a local bibliopole and came across "The Life of Peter the Great" in Serb, works by Lomonosov, odes by Derzhavin, poems of Pushkin and even "The History [of the Russian State]" by Karamzin...(Pikul V, p. 41)

The Balkans as the Holy Grail plays a crucial role in the personal formation and transformation of Oladiev. Drinking from the Holy Grail of the Balkans, represented by his mother, Oladiev learns only extreme human emotions: he mourns the fallen Serb heroes together with his mother when she commemorates Saint Vitus day of Kosovo

battle on 28 June 1389. It is through the Balkans that little Oladiev first learns to love the freedom-loving revolutionary pro-Russian and nationalist royal families of Kara-georgevich of Serbia¹¹; and to hate murderers from the corrupt pro-Austrian dynasty of Obrenovic¹². Years later, after the separation of parents, the Balkans transform Oladiev's quiet life. Looking through a newspaper, he finds the name of his mother in the lists of the Serbs arrested for protests against King Obrenovic. Oladiev rushes to Belgrade where he immediately joins the nationalist leader Dragutin Dimitrievich Apis and participates in the coup against Obrenovic. This journey establishes one more link between the True Russian hero and the Balkans. Upon his return to Russia he joins the intelligence service of the Russian army, not because he likes risks¹³, but because he wanted to fulfil the tasks that would benefit the people and which except for him could not be carried out by even the bravest soldiers – restore the Great Russia (Pikul, 1989: 137). In the years to come, Oladiev will regularly visit the Balkans at the crucial junctures of their history. On one of these visits, on the 27 June 1914, Oladiev finds his mother. Next day, after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, his mother saves him from the Austrian counter-intelligence which is chasing Oladiev in Bosnia and Austria. His newly found mother again grants Oladiev chance to live whilst sacrificing her own life (Pikul, 1989: 81, 137). This episode establishes the bonds of personal indebtedness between Oladiev and the Serb woman, which he will later pay off.

Alter Ego and Even More: Self-Sacrifice, Ethics and Competence

Another important modification of late Soviet discourse, which was directly linked to the Balkans, is the fact in the late Soviet texts Serbia is constructed as an *Alter Ego* of Russia, and Yugoslavia as an *Alter Ego* of the Soviet Union. The True Serb - Alter Ego shares a lot of similar features with genuine, self-sacrificing Russia, but it also bears an element of difference. The difference is constructed through when Serbia and Yugoslavia are described as sometimes inferior and sometimes even superior to the Soviet Union. Serbia is superior to Russia in terms of self-sacrifice because all the texts stress the heroic fight of the Balkan nations against the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires over half a millennium. General Oladiev eventually has to explicitly admit this Serb superiority several times (Pikul, 1989: 123-124, 127-128). Although it would be natural to expect that the Russian victory should place Russians higher than Serbs, in reality the greatness (magnitude) of Serb suffering makes their fight more heroic. In the early 20th century Russia has to face the emergent threat of False Europe (Germany under Prussian militarism) whereas Serbia fights against a much stronger, more corrupt and monstrous Sinful Europe (Austro-Hungarian Empire) (Pikul, 1989: 28, 65). In this combat Russia provides valuable assistance to Serbia, but the Serbs are constructed as implicitly superior to Russians as they have been through much worse torture and were still able to win their independence.

The greater the suffering and self-sacrifice, the greater is the eventual triumph of Serbia in the 20th century. The half a millennium of slavery becomes a dark background to be contrasted against the glory of Serb victories in the 20th century. This quality of Yugoslavia to rise like a Phoenix from the ashes ranks it even higher than the Soviet

Union which had been defeated just once by Tartars. Yugoslavia's cycle of self-sacrifice and supernatural abilities stretches through the centuries and this is why in some regard it is even more unique than Russia. When describing WWII, all the late Soviet texts stress that the Serbs did not merely organize their anti-Fascist resistance, but fought the entire war for their liberation and, eventually, became the only South-East European nation that made a significant contribution to the victory over Nazism (Furaev, 1989: 23, 28; Pikul, 1989: 136). They were even strong enough to firmly stand up in the conflict against Stalin (Furaev, 1989: 51). This discourse reaches its apogee during Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia when Gorbachev constructs the Serb people as Great True Russia in comparison to Europe:

*"When many European states were devastated by the Nazi military machine..., a guerrilla fight was unfolding in the mountains of Yugoslavia against the conquerors, which grew into a real **people's war**. The defenders of our Motherland were inspired by the thought that they were not alone, that here in the South of Europe, thousand kilometres away from the Soviet-German front, our Yugoslav brethren were giving their fight..."¹⁴.*

The newspaper campaign during Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia was more intense than coverage of Gorbachev's meetings with the US presidents¹⁵. And the reporters did not miss the opportunity to stress the side-by-side fight of Yugoslav and Soviet warriors¹⁶; to refer to the fact that Belgrade and Moscow have *the same* long history *filled with heroic fight*¹⁷. The Dalmatian sea resort city of Dubrovnik has the same long democratic tradition as the early medieval democratic republics in the Russian city of Novgorod; the harbours of Split and Dubrovnik on the Adriatic coast established twin relations with the Black Sea ports and resorts of Odessa and Yalta¹⁸.

Although a close ally, Yugoslavia is constructed as a separate actor from the Socialist camp. Not only because it launched its own Non-Alignment movement, but also because it preceded the USSR in conducting the correct foreign policy aimed at diffusing tensions in international affairs¹⁹, launching regional cooperation and starting a dialogue on turning the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone of peace and collaboration. The late Soviet discourse acknowledges Yugoslavia as a friendly, competent, but again a separate and independent country that had gained wide international respect and authority²⁰. All these resulted in mutual and equal recognition of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Also both countries received simultaneous invitations to join the Council of Europe²¹. The tough and swift reforms of Ante Markovich to curb high inflation made the Serbs even superior to Russians because they were ready to pay an even higher price to achieve their goals. And again *no other foreign leader* or his policies received so much attention in *Izvestia* as the successful reforms of Ante Markovich²².

If judged along temporal and intellectual assessment axes, Serbs again are presented as superior to Russia in terms of progressivity and competence. Pikul constructs this superiority from the first pages when his hero Oladiev meets Apis and his associates. Unlike Oladiev, who is from a poor but aristocratic family, Apis and his associates are described as self-made and professional people:

Former ploughmen who after their tough rural work grew into officers, stocky and tanned, they were wearing uniforms very similar to the Russian. They smell of cheap sheep cheese, strong tobacco and sweat. They were very much like Russians, but they were different. Their guttural and gurgling speech, as that of the high-flying eagles, was brief and up to the point... (Pikul, p.14)

This superiority of Serbs should not be reduced to authentic barbarity of the Balkans as they were perceived from Europe. Pikul states that centuries of their heroic fight and self-sacrifice against the Ottoman Empire, made the Serbs even nobler and more Truly European than the Austro-Hungarian Empire and even Russia. Oladiev contrasts patrols and document checks in Vienna with the liberal, atmosphere of Belgrade where 150 streets were policed by only 150 policemen, where nobody would get drunk, cause scandals or fights, nobody locks their house or shop and where there were no paupers (Pikul: 41). *Izvestia* reinforced the perception of the Serbs as closer to Europe when it described the ability to provide more freedom and more consumer goods as an important point for comparison because in this the failure of the Soviet Union was more or less obvious. The rush of the Soviet shuttle-traders into Yugoslavia reinforced this perception²³.

Pikul stresses that nobody would gape at European celebrities or even the ageing King of Serbia Peter Karageorgievich when he was strolling around the city and having a pint of beer without personal guards, and compares it to the situation in Russia where the Tsar would not be able to make a single step in the Russian capital without being gaped at (Pikul: 41). Belgrade students knew Russian democratic pro-European writers much better than their Russian colleagues²⁴. The discourse was reinforced in *Izvestia* by reports about the painful but successful reforms of Yugoslav Premier Ante Markovich and his successful trips to European capitals and to Washington²⁵, about the Soviet debt to Yugoslavia as well as about the wave of Soviet shuttle traders coming to Belgrade. Yugoslavia is superior to Russia because it succeeds in conducting an independent socialist revolution, carries out economic reforms²⁶ and even provides considerable financial credit to the Soviet Union²⁷.

The construction of Alter Ego takes shape in the description of parallel reforms in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Unlike Poland and Hungary, where the Communist regimes were overthrown, or China, where the Communist Party suppressed any change, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were constructed as “two countries and people united by the fact that both Communist Parties go through the process of renewal and try to modernize their countries”²⁸, trying to reform their communism and taking brave steps to liberalise religious and political life²⁹, making some mistakes but also correcting them; fighting against corrupt and conservative bureaucracies in Moscow³⁰ and Belgrade³¹ which resisted reforms in both countries.³²

But even in these descriptions of parallel reforms an superiority of Yugoslavia is constructed when *Izvestia* editorial stresses “Self-management, as the history proved³³, is a notion of the same type as perestroika and glasnost³⁴. The inflow of the Soviet shuttle-traders who rushed into Yugoslavia reinforced this perception³⁵. The last point stressed that Yugoslavia, although being a Soviet Alter Ego, was closer to Europe than the Soviet Union. The ability to provide more freedom and more consumer goods was an important

point for comparison because the failure of the Soviet Union in this regard was fairly obvious.

To balance against the full superiority of Serbs over the Russians some elements of inferiority are introduced. The inferiority of Yugoslavia is asserted when the Soviet Union/Russia are depicted as saviours of the Balkan nations from being exterminated by Western powers either in the 19th or in the 20th century (Furaev, 1989: 236-237.), and is amplified through the description of the Soviet diplomatic and financial support to help Yugoslavia's socialist modernisation, which helped to strengthen its international standing in the first post-war years (V. K. Furaev, 1989: 36-82.)³⁶. Pikul demonstrates that the Serbs' excessive self-sacrifice can lead to a lack of understanding of deep societal processes, especially of such a complex issue as national liberation. In June 1914, General Oladiev tries to dissuade his hot-blooded friend Colonel Apis from individual terrorist acts against Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Failing to convince his friend, Oladiev concludes that although the time of the Habsburgs on the Austrian throne has almost run out, Apis still shouldn't push them forward, because *history does not like violent pushing and one bullet can turn into a small stone which provokes an entire avalanche in the mountains* (Pikul, 1989: 75).

So sometimes the hot-headedness of Serbs serves them badly because they lack sufficient humbleness to accept the inevitability of historical processes. The textbooks reproduce this hot-headedness when they describe mistakes of leadership in national policies (V. K. Furaev, 1989: 46, 48, 54, 62, 79-80). Eventually, the national question (national liberation, multinational state-building and inter-ethnic peace) becomes the site where the Russian-Soviet Self is linked to Serbia-Yugoslavia. The relations of equivalence are established when the earlier inter-ethnic peace started to deteriorate in both countries.³⁷

During his 1988 visit to Belgrade, Gorbachev drew a parallel between the national questions in the two countries when commenting on the events in Caucasus and Kosovo. Although Gorbachev refused to consider them as a threat to Communism or to the territorial integrity of the state³⁸, this thesis and the link between the two countries was further fixed in subsequent reports of the analogues phenomena in similar republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Rich Northern republics with a strong Western European historical background such as Slovenia³⁹ and Croatia, and their analogues in the Soviet Union – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania⁴⁰ – simultaneously introduced amendments to the constitution of the SFRY and USSR respectively, and raised the issue of a reconfiguration of the Yugoslav/Soviet federation into a confederation with some hints of further possible independence.

The national question also becomes the site where the web of the Balkan identities achieves the peak of its antagonism. Pikul demonstrates the extreme character of the Balkans in the lives of his two heroes. Oladiev as a representative of True Russia is dreaming about something achievable – the restoration of True Russia's Greatness after the defeat in the Russia-Japan war. In his turn, Apis fights for a greater mission similar to the one that Russia achieved centuries ago, the unification of South Slavic lands in a new Yugoslavia – a union of nations for which Apis is ready to walk over piles of corpses (Pikul, 1989: 124, 128). His main opponent is False Serbia represented by the

reactionary-unethical-nationalist prince regent Alexander Karageorgievich, *who dreams about conservative Great Royal Serbia* and who hates Apis as only *a weak person can hate a man strong in body and spirit*. (Pikul, 1989: 128) The extreme character of the mission defines the difference in the destiny of the heroes. Oladiev's antagonism to False megalomaniac and incompetent Russia causes him some career problems coming from the Tsar's senior officers (Pikul, 1989: 21) or, at most, one arrest during the toughest time of Stalin's repressions when Oladiev is openly criticizing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the incompetence and servility of the top Soviet commanders ((Pikul, 1989: 70). Apis' antagonism to False Serbia ends with open fight and death and disgrace for him and his associates. It is only later on that Tito (True hero of Yugoslav brotherhood) demands that Apis is reinstalled as hero (Pikul, 1989: 133, 136).

Both True Russia and True Serbia fall victims of Sinful and Civilizing Europe which mistreats them when it does not want to give them independence in the 19th century (Krivoguz, 1989: 117.); or manipulates the two countries to enter into WWI and does not share equally the hardship of WWI at the Eastern front (Pikul, 1989: 76, 94, 122, 126, 128-130, 136). Both True Russia and True Serbia become victims of False Europe (England, France) which uses the Ottoman Empire and Sinful Europe in order to check Russia in the Black Sea and does not allow Serbia to become an independent state. Both True Russia and True Serbia suffer from similar manipulations when Sinful Europe (Austro-Hungary, Italy) manipulate the militant nationalism of Croats and Bosnians in the 19th and late 20th century that could not win Russia and Serbia in an honest encounter (Pikul, 1989: 40). Both fall prey to militant nationalism (Western Non-Europe) and Civilizing incompetent Europe when the European Economic Community and the US Congress adopted several resolutions about human rights violations in Yugoslavia. Construction of nationalism as something alien and non-European, and opposing European development of Yugoslavia, took place when *Izvestia* stressed that the riots in the republic were allegedly provoked during the official visit of the delegation of the European Parliament to the republic⁴¹. Almost simultaneously, the paper also reported an analogous resolution adopted by the US Senate in relation to the conflict between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic states⁴². Eventually, a link was established when Ruslan Khasbulatov, speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, spoke about the centrifugal tendencies in Russia and accused some regional leaders of trying to "*balkanize Russia and destroy the state with a thousand-year glorious history and its unprecedented culture in world civilization?*"⁴³.

Conclusions

Obviously, the two countries saw the storm looming over them. What was to be done? The answer was given in the conclusion of Pikul's novel. The ageing Major General Oladiev of the Soviet intelligence, who had benefitted from the unique spiritual guidance and help of the Balkans which transformed him from False Russia into True Russia, had benefitted from the self-sacrifice of his mother who had saved his life, could do

nothing better than sacrifice his life in order to repay the Balkans for those unique gifts, services and experiences that the Peninsula granted him over these several decades. As happened to many of Pikul's heroes, the Balkans became Oladiev's last mission. In 1944, he is dispatched to Bosnia to train Tito's guerrilla forces. In May 1944, together with his Yugoslav comrades, he is encircled by SS-forces during their raid on Drvar that aimed to destroy their headquarters and to capture their commander Marshal Tito.

Once more Pikul constructs the Alter Ego through lengthy descriptions of the Red Army sending armours, medicines and clothes to their Slav brethren; descriptions of Soviet doctors and officers working in the mountains of Montenegro and Macedonia; stories about overloaded airplanes landing in impossible conditions on tiny plots of the Bosnian plateau to drop their loads and then taking off over deep gorges to evacuate the wounded guerrillas. In order to claim the additional authority of objective historic knowledge, Pikul, as always, resorts to describing individual cases from the point of view of an eye-witness whereas the account of the last fight of Oladiev is narrated to him by his daughter :

The pilot of the last Soviet airplane was tasked to evacuate my father. Fighting was taking place almost next to the plane and boarding was taking place under intense fire. The pilot called my father's name many times and asked him to board. But he never answered back. Instead he took the machine gun and joined the ranks of the last of the fighters, yielding his place in the airplane to a young Serb woman-partisan with her newly-born child.... (Pikul, 1989, pp. 154-155).

Having given his place to a Serb mother, Oladiev found his place in the ranks of Yugoslav guerrillas, and they all ended up in a common grave. At the end of his narration he once more fixes the link between True Soviet Great Russia and True Serb Yugoslav Alter Ego. When describing the photo of the battlefield of Kupresko Polje where most of the warriors fell covering the retreat of the main troops of the Yugoslav army, Pikul writes:

*Here is that grave! Yugoslavia has kept its ancient Serb traditions. Every day in the twilight a black-dressed elderly woman comes to this place. She is the embodiment of **our common Slav mother**. Every evening, already stooping of her age, she adds some oil to the icon-lamp and places fresh fragrant roses over the grave. *Lakonochi*⁴⁴ – she wishes to all deceased ones. Looking at this picture I suddenly thought that this old Serb woman is that very Serb mother to whom my hero yielded his place on the plane. I wanted to cry – this is the end of my novel. I have said all I knew. I have the honor... (Pikul, 1989, pp. 154-155).*

The skilful narrator Pikul laid the foundation for how Russian society would see the role of Moscow in the Balkans. It was waiting to come and save the Serbs, if possible aspiring to eternal glory through self-sacrifice. The Serbs deserved it. They were the equals of Russians, but also more authentic, more ancient and sometimes even superior to them. A new emerging Russia was dreaming about saving internationalist Serbs and Yugoslavs, or share their fate. As it happens, the subsequent events provided plenty of opportunities for repeating this discourse.

The importance of the Balkans for Russia's Great Power identity has been reproduced in numerous textbooks, popular literature and fiction. Given the fact that in the Soviet system of production of knowledge there was little space for competing discourses, which could challenge the hegemonic discourse of heroic self-sacrificing Russia and the Balkans, the discourse of Holy Grail had developed into Alter Ego. The quality of the Balkans as that of the ancient source of spiritual and intellectual enrichment, integrity and courage has been extrapolated to the present time. These qualities were reproduced and taken further in media and public speeches. They have created the context in which anything which would happen to Yugoslavia were considered as preliminary scenario of Russia.

Notes

- 1 These textbooks focus on the history of Russia, in particular all its states which existed in this territory over the last three millennia.
- 2 Nechkina M.V. and Leibengrub P.S. (1984), *Istoria SSSR: Uchebnik dlia 7-ogo klassa*, (*History of the USSR: Textbook for the 7th grade*), Moscow: Prosveshchenie; Nechkina M.V., Fadeev A.V. and Leibengrub P.S. (1968), *Istoria SSSR: Uchebnoe posobie dlia 8-ogo klassa*, (*History of the USSR: Textbook for the 7th grade*), Moscow: Prosveshchenie; Kukushkin Y.S. (1986), *Istoria SSSR: Uchebnik dlia 9-ogo klassa*, (*History of the USSR: Textbook for the 9th grade*), Moscow: Prosveshchenie; Kukushkin Y.S. (1988), *Istoria SSSR: Uchebnik dlia 10-ogo klassa srednei shkoly* (*History of the USSR: Textbook for the 10th grade of secondary school*), 3rd edition, Moscow: Prosveshchenie
- 3 Krivoguz I.M. (1989), *Novaya Istoria: 1871-1918: Uchebnik dlia 10-ogo klassa srednei shkoly* (*Modern History: 1871-1918: Textbook for the 10th grade of secondary school*), 2nd edition, Moscow: Prosveshchenie
- 4 In fact these textbooks were written by less senior academics Manusevich A.Y., Orlov V.A. and Stetskevich S.M., but it was the name of Furaev V.K. that featured on the first page of the textbook. V. K. Furaev (1989), *Noveysyaia Istoria (Contemporary History), 1917-1939: Textbook for the 9th grade of the secondary school*, Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1987; V.K. Furaev (ed), *Noveysyaia Istoria (Contemporary History), 1939-1988: Textbook for the 11th grade of the secondary school*, Moscow: Prosveshchenie.
- 5 It should be noted that Pikul was an extremely skilful manipulator in claiming authority of objectivity and historical accuracy. In writing his books he heavily relied on, and provided quotes from, archival materials, contemporaneous media reports, memoirs of significant personalities of the times described, etc. This more or less accurate historical information was interwoven with numerous instances of the author's creative fantasy, e.g. dialogues between the main characters and/or descriptions of the doubts and thoughts of the main heroes, which could hardly have been recorded and documented. In conclusion, Pikul frequently took the role of prophet and describes the events to come, a rhetorical device which allowed him to claim the status of longitudinal observer. He was simultaneously eye witness of all events and an unbiased researcher who observed history from a distance and from above. The composition of his books and specific style of narration allowed Pikul to present his books as credible historical accounts and, with the background of scarcity of really "popular history" works and heavily-ideologized, extremely boring official history textbooks, made his novels important identity-shaping texts, in particular with regard to the Balkans and the Black Sea region. For example, in his novel "I have the honour" (*Chest Imeyu*), speaking from the name of his hero, he openly claims this right because for authority because his hero is not writing memoirs as commander in the war and he does need to demonstrate that his decisions were correct. He is not a historian, who is usually preoccupied with big processes and abstract figures, he has first-hand experience from the trenches and still his vision is not limited to that of the soldier, because he was an intelligence officer with sharp analytic skills and great outlook. Pikul V., *Chest Imeyu...*, p.93-94, 109.
- 6 Quoted in Yuri Afanasiev, We are only beginners, *Sovietskaya Kultura*, 21 March 1987, [interviews Yuri Afanasyev, Rector of the Moscow State Historical Archive Institute].
- 7 Olcott A., *Glasnost' and Soviet Culture* in Maurice F. and Heyward I. () (eds), *Soviet society under Gorbachev: current trends and the prospects for reform*, New York: Sharpe, 1987 p.109; Walter Laqueur, *Soviet realities: culture and politics from Stalin to Gorbachev*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990, p.41. It should be noted that some of the Russian critics, e.g. Nikolai Gubinskiy stressed that some authors, like Pikul, "deal with historical themes, in order to substantiate their own ideas, ideas which have nothing whatsoever to do with history or, for that matter, with literature", quoted in William Korey, *Russian antisemitism, Pamyat, and the demonology of Zionism*, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers p. 154.
- 8 Although Pikul narrates the story from the name of his hero using the first person, stressing that the memoirs of the hero are anonymous because he is an intelligence officer of the Russian/Soviet General Staff, other sources claim that the name of the officer is Oladiev (Aladin) and he is an offspring of an old Russian aristocratic house. Some other sources claim that the author of the memoirs was Russian/Soviet officer Alexandr Samoilo. There is no clarity about the hero's personality. Most likely it is a collective hero. For the purpose of brevity we will use the name Oladiev.
- 9 Krivoguz's *Modern History* textbook focuses on the history of Europe. The non-European history constitutes less than a sixth of the book. The bulk of the book analyses developments in major European states. In general, the structure of the book demonstrates that Modern History consists of the history of the Marxist movement, Western European states, South-East and Central Europe, WWI and imperialist rivalry. It is still noteworthy that the "Liberation Fight of the people of the South-East and Central Europe" is described in a short but separate chapter. Thus the Balkans retain their important role of link between Russian and European history. Krivoguz I. M. 1989, p. 116-131.
- 10 "The birds of Peter's nest" – close associates of the Russian Tsar Peter the Great who were assigned to recruit, modernize and command his new army.
- 11 It is remarkable how the concept of True Serbia becomes prototype for the formation of a True Russia. All the positive features (according to temporal, ethical, power, self-sacrificing criteria) are fused in the personalities of the pro-Russian Serb Kings Karageorgievich whereas pro-Austrian dynasty of Obrenovich

- is represented as the epicentre of negative features.
- 12 The author gives a detailed account of the debauchery, filth, and decay at the royal court of Obrenovic in the late 19th-early 20th century. V. Pikul, *Chest Imeyu...*, p.6-8
 - 13 The element of humbleness is always present in the description of the Russian hero. He is not a superman, but a simple person who is not looking for glory, but due to chain of events has to face numerous challenges and having met them becomes a hero.
 - 14 Na osnove polnogo ravnopraviya, samostoiatelnosti i vzaimnogo uvazheniya: Vystuplenie, M.S. Gorbacheva, *Izvestia*, 18 March 1988.
 - 15 The reports about Yugoslavia described the same troubles that the Soviet leadership was trying to tackle in its own country, e.g. obsolete equipment and inefficient enterprises, unfavourable weather conditions for farmers, increase of import, export-dominated economy, heavy dependency on the external market, inflation, disintegration of economic life of the country, and excessive consumption. On its front pages *Izvestia* covered the preparation for and the course of Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia. See e.g. Nakanune vizita, *Izvestia*, 5 March, 1988; N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia: Vremiya Resheniy, *Izvestia*, 12 March 1988; Pribytie M. S. Gorbacheva v Belgrad, *Izvestia*, 15 March 1988, N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia Vstrechaet Vysokogo Gostiya, *Izvestia*, 15 March 1988.
 - 16 Na osnove polnogo ravnopraviya, samostoiatelnosti i vzaimnogo uvazheniya: Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva, *Izvestia*, 18 March 1988; The correspondents accompanying the Soviet leader stressed that there were more than 30 military units staffed by Soviet people who fought in the ranks of the Yugoslav National Liberation army. One of the most outstanding fighters in the Yugoslav Army was the commander of the reconnaissance group Mekhti Ganifa Ogly Gusein Zade, a Soviet citizen of Azeri origin; N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Buduschemu Mirnoe Nebo, *Izvestia* 19 March 1988.
 - 17 N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia Vstrechaet Vysokogo Gostiya, *Izvestia*, 15 March 1988.
 - 18 Obogoshchat' sotrudnichestvo vo vsekhn sferakh, *Izvestia*, 19 March 1988.
 - 19 Sotrudnichestvo: Novye Podkhody, *Izvestia*, 28 January 1989, p.4
 - 20 V. K. Furaev, (1989), p. 81; See e.g. Dan start venskimi peregovoram: Vystuplenie E. A. Shevardnadze, *Izvestia*, 7 March 1989; Sovetsko-Yugoslavskie Peregovory, *Izvestia*, 15 March 1988; Rech tovarishcha Gorbacheva M. S., *Izvestia*, 17 March 1988; My navsegda zapomnim eti vstrechi, *Izvestia*, 18 March 1988; Na osnove polnogo ravnopraviya, samostoiatelnosti i vzaimnogo uvazheniya: Vystuplenie M.S.Gorbacheva, *Izvestia*, 18 March 1988; E. Vostrukhov, S. Skosyrev, Konferentsiya zakonchila svoyu rabotu, *Izvestia*, 8 September 1989.
 - 21 N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia: Vremiya Resheniy, *Izvestia*, 12 March 1988; At the same time the Yugoslav side demonstrated its interest in the visit. Gorbachev "Perestroika and New Thinking for our country and the entire world" and collection of his articles were translated into Serb-Croat and published ahead of his visit to Belgrade, See e.g. Izdany v Yugoslavii, *Izvestia*, 13 March 1988; N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Buduschemu Mirnoe Nebo, *Izvestia* 19 March 1988; There was also a series of follow-up reports by *Izvestia*, see e.g. Otkrytyy dialog: Yugoslavskie Rukovoditeli o visite M. S. Gorbacheva v SFRYu, *Izvestia*, 20 March 1988; SSSR-SFRYu: Novye Rubezhy, *Izvestia*, 22 March 1988; Vysokaya otsenka, *Izvestia*, 25 March 1988; See also V. Volodin, Balkany vybirayut sotrudnichestvo, 12 June 1989; Yu. Kovalenko, Mosty na Vostochniy Bereg, *Izvestia*, 21 June 1989.
 - 22 L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia Ishchet Premiera, *Izvestia*, 12 January 1989; L. Kolosov, Trudnye Dni Yugoslavii, *Izvestia*, 27 January 1989; E. Vostrukhov, Yugoslavia, Kabinet proiavlial karakter, *Izvestia*, 28 July 1989; E. Vostrukhov, Strasti vokrug inflatsii, *Izvestia*, 25 August 1989; E. Vostrukhov, Po komande k novoi valiute, *Izvestia*, 2 January; A. Pushkov, V gordom odinochestve, *Izvestia*, 25 April 1990; See also a long series of articles by *Izvestia* correspondent in Belgrade E. Vostrukhov, Kak dinar stal konvertiruemy, *Izvestia*, 7-11 August 1990; E. Vostrukhov, Smozhet li Soyuz Pomoch Yugoslavskim Reformam, *Izvestia*, 3 November 1990.
 - 23 Barier bezdenezhia ili meshochniki v centre Belgrada, *Izvestia*, 16 April 1990.
 - 24 More numerous scenes about the self-sacrifice of Serbs, their knowledge of the V. Pikul, *Chest Imeyu...*, p. 60, 75.
 - 25 E. Vostrukhov, SFRY: Milliard dlia reform, *Izvestia*, 20 October 1989.
 - 26 N. Ermolovich, L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia: Vremiya Resheniy, *Izvestia*, 12 March 1988; See also Speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze delivered on the occasion of the visit of his Yugoslav homologue V. Lonchar. Shevardnadze also stressed that the USSR and SFRY follow similar directions in reforming socialism and expressed Soviet gratitude to Yugoslavia for their support of Soviet initiatives in the international arena: SSSR-Yugoslavia: Dinamizm Otnosheniy, *Izvestia*, 1 November 1989.
 - 27 For example, Prime Minister Aleksandr Vlasov of the Russian Federative Socialist Republic paid a five-day trip to the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. He proposed ways to eliminate the Soviet debt to Yugoslavia which amounted to some 2 billion dollars. In Serbia Vlasov proposed Soviet participation in the construction of new and the re-building of old pipelines. In Montenegro, he discussed the possibility of joint ventures in construction, the aluminium industry and ship-building. Whereas relations between USSR and Bulgaria or USSR and Hungary were characterised by numerous episodes of Soviet development assistance or by mutually beneficial trade, the Soviet indebtedness to Yugoslavia raised her status in the

- Soviet international perception. The Soviet Union paid off the debt through joint and heavy infrastructural projects that balanced the debt-based inferiority of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Yugoslavia; L. Kolosov, Dolg, *Izvestia*, 7 April 1989; Na Zemle Yugoslavii, *Izvestia*, 28 September 1989; Vizit v Yugoslaviu, *Izvestia*, 30 September 1989; also Reported by Radio Moscow-1, 30 September 1989 quoted in V. Tolz (ed.), *The USSR in 1989: A Record of Events*, Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco& Oxford, 1990, p. 524. See ibd. p. 125.
- 28 SSSR-SFRY: Krepnet Doverie, *Izvestia*, 30 January 1989; See also proceedings of the round-table between Soviet and Yugoslav economists held in Moscow under the aegis of the Soviet Council of Ministers; Tolko ne polumery: Sovietskie i Yugoslavskie uchenye o putiakh obnovleniia ekonomiki, *Izvestia*, 23 July 1990
- 29 L. Kolosov, Kto ostanovit inflatsiyu, *Izvestia*, 11 January 1989; Otkryt put' k demokratizatsii, *Izvestia*, 16 April 1989. About the same time *Izvestia* published reports about Gorbachev's visits to the Ukraine and Milosevic's visit to Kosovo. There was also a detailed and lengthy piece on the alternative military service introduced in Yugoslavia which echoed the debate in Soviet society, E. Vostrukhov, Bez oruzh'ia, no vdvoe bolshe, *Izvestia*, 30 April 1989; E. Vostrukhov, Voznesenie raschital computer, *Izvestia*, 27 June 1989.
- 30 *Izvestia*, 1 January 1989.
- 31 S. Kolosov, Yugoslavia bez Pravitelstva, *Izvestia*, 3 January 1989.
- 32 Unter v lampasah, *Izvestia*, 2 January 1989; S. Kolosov, Yugoslavia bez Pravitelstva, *Izvestia*, 3 January 1989, No. 2 (22540); "Nam po silam pobedit burokratiu!", *Izvestia*, 2 February 1989; Ob usilenii borby s organizovannoi presupnostiyu, *Izvestia*, 23 December 1989; Vtoroi siezd narodnykh deputatov, *Izvestia*, 25 December 1989; V Press-Tsentre MVD, *Izvestia*, 6 May 1990; V. Romaniuk, Na shto natknulsia shprints: kak riadovoi burokrat otmencil reshenie prezidenta SSSR, *Izvestia*, 5 July 1990.
- 33 Frequent use of expression "as history proved" is one more indicator that the Russian analysts perceived the reality in terms of inevitable judgemental processes.
- 34 S. Kolosov, Yugoslavia bez Pravitelstva, *Izvestia*, 3 January 1989; See also L. Kolosov, Yugoslavia: Plenum TsK: SKYu zavershyl svoiu rabotu, *Izvestia*, 17 February 1989.
- 35 Barrier bezdenezh'ia ili meshochniki v centre Belgrada, *Izvestia*, 16 April 1990.
- 36 References to the Balkans become scarce now because the authors want to stress the Soviet-led modernisation and distance the USSR from other Balkan signifiers – Great Power, imperialism, interethnic conflicts, etc.
- 37 K sobytiam v Nagornom Karabakhe, *Izvestia*, 14 July 1989, Chitateli "Izvestiy" o mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniakh, *Izvestia*, 15 July 1989.
- 38 Vstrechi M. S. Gorbacheva na Yugoslavskoi Zemle, *Izvestia* 17 March 1988.
- 39 See e.g. E. Vostrukhov, Federatsiya ili konfederatsiya, *Izvestia*, 22 September 1989; E. Vostrukhov, Ugroza navisshaya nad federatsiyey: Nochnoi plenum TsK SKYu, *Izvestia*, 27 September 1989.
- 40 See e.g. Obrashchenie Prezidenta Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR k narodu Litovskoi SSSR, *Izvestia*, 1 January 1990 and subsequent issues.
- 41 E. Vostrukhov, Snova vystrely v Kosovo, *Izvestia*, 2 June 1989, E. Vostrukhov, Otmneny osobye mery, *Izvestia*, 3 September 1989.
- 42 V MID SSSR, *Izvestia*, 21 November 1989; In subsequent material the Soviet MFA also criticized Bush for supporting those who try to destabilize the situation in Latvia and other Baltic states. O. Alexandrov, Nelovko, no govorit' pridetsiya, *Izvestia*, 24 November 1989; O zaiavlenii chlenov kongressa SShA, *Izvestia*, 6 January 1990.
- 43 The term "balkanization" was also used in the 1960s in the Soviet press. But in that period it mostly referred to the "imperial powers trying to split anti-imperialist movements", whereas this was the first time that Khasbulatov applied it to Russia. See e.g. V. Maevskiy, Posledniaya stavka: pismo iz Afriki, *Pravda*, 25 August 1960; Ruslan Khasbulatov, Pod flagom edinstva mozhet i dolzhno prohodit' vozrozhdenie Rossii, *Izvestia*, 24 September 1990.
- 44 Lakonochi (Serb) - Good night.

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EUROPEANIZATION EFFECTS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC ACTORS IN WESTERN BALKANS

Abstract

The economic sustainability as well as the EU accession process requires flexible and efficient institutions, policy frameworks and knowledge-based economy that can exploit new opportunities that emerge from rapid change such as globalization and EU Enlargement.

The main questions to be addressed in this paper are: do international actors ensure the long term progress and reforms or does their functioning ensure stability and emergent solutions for these countries? Do local actors have an active role in the process and create a sustainable development.

The paper identifies that in many of the Western Balkan countries international and domestic actors achieved to create a political stability but not a sustainable development and effective institutions. First, international actors faced many challenges in promoting effective policies due to their standard function in all of these countries. With regard to domestic actors, they failed in creating their own capacities due to high level of dependence on the international community.

The current EU financial crisis has shown that candidate countries should fulfill EU criteria and develop local ownership in order to sustain economically and reduce negative spillover effects coming from globalization and Europeanization.

Key words: EU Accession, sustainable institutions, international, domestic actors

Introduction

The integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade has shown that enlargement benefits the EU as a whole and allows it to be better positioned to address global challenges. The enlargement policy has proven to be a powerful tool for societal transformation. Countries that have already acceded to the EU and those on the road to join have undergone impressive changes through accession-driven democratic, politic and economic reforms.¹ Commitment, conditionality and credibility have been situated at the core of the accession process and its success.

Furthermore the recent global financial crisis and the present difficulties in the Eurozone have highlighted the interdependence of national economies both within and beyond the EU. These events underline the importance of further consolidating economic and financial stability and fostering growth, also in the enlargement countries.

What about globalization?

With regard to globalization, Thomas Friedman postulates that due to globalization the world economy has entered a new era where global competition has increased

¹ Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012

enormously. National economies can isolate themselves only to a minor extent; therefore these countries will be affected by globalization effects continuously.

What about small economies? Who are winners of globalization? They are knowledge economies with high research intensive industries for which the global market offers enormous sales opportunities. The same applies with regard to highly developed industrial goods.

Generally speaking, countries with a high level of education and training have been globalization winners. Not everyone has profited from globalization to the same extent. Economic growth worldwide in the two decades since 1990 has been greater than ever before. However, the distribution of prosperity is more unequal than ever before in particular in the developing countries. This could be the case of the Western Balkans also due to the transition process.

Recent developments in the EU Integration process

Most of the Western Balkan countries are facing the same challenges in their path towards the EU, which can be classified mainly in two groups: economic and institutional challenges. By fulfilling the economic criteria, a country will ensure that it has reached sustainable development that enables it to function in the European competitive environment. By strengthening local institutions, a country will provide higher absorption capacities and better allocation of funds, which will support these sustainable development.

In May 1999, the EU proposed the Stabilization and Association Process for the countries of South-eastern Europe. Further progress toward European agenda was achieved at the European Council in Feira, which was held in 2000, where it was stated that all the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process - SAP are potential candidates for EU integration. At the Zagreb Summit on 14 November 2000, the Stabilization and Association Process – SAP was promoted. The European Council that convened in Copenhagen in December 2002 confirmed the European perspective of the countries of Western Balkans as potential candidates for EU membership.

The European Council that convened in Thessalonica on 19 and 20 June 2003 adopted the “Thessalonica Agenda for Western Balkans: Towards European Integration” where a series of instruments including the European Partnership were promoted to intensify the Stabilization and Association Process in the region. On 22 March 2004, the European Council adopted the Regulation on the establishment of European partnerships in the context of the Stabilization and Association Process.

In April 2005, the Commission prepared a Communiqué for the European Council and European Parliament on the European Future for SEE. In June 2005, the European Council reaffirmed its commitment to the implementation of Thessalonica agenda by emphasizing that the progress of each country towards European integration is dependent on their efforts to implement the Copenhagen criteria and conditions set forth by the Stabilization and Association Process framework. In November 2005 the Second European Partnership was adopted. In 2006 the EU adopted the Pre-Accession Instrument IPA 2007- 2013 for the countries of the Western Balkans.

Since the adoption of the last enlargement package, further positive developments have taken place in the SEE. Progress in EU-related reforms can be reported in most enlargement countries. Visa-free travel has been granted to the citizens of two more Western Balkan countries, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, in a number of countries important reforms were delayed, often as a result of internal political developments and conflicts.

Good governance, the rule of law, administrative capacity, unemployment, economic reform and social inclusion remain major challenges in most of the countries of the SEE, according to the Enlargement Strategy of the EU for 2011-2012.


Economic challenges

According to the Progress Report (2011), all EU candidate countries have now embarked on a path of recovery, though Turkey has emerged from the crisis with a bigger economy and its growth continues to be impressive, but there are increasing signs of overheating.

However, the enlargement countries are confronted with important socio-economic challenges. Most enlargement countries have maintained overall prudent macroeconomic policies. Fiscal consolidation and the reform of labor markets remain the most urgent short-term priorities, reflecting largely similar challenges to those presently faced in the EU. More structural reforms are needed to boost competitiveness and improve the investment climate, thus attracting foreign direct investment, fostering job creation and ensuring the sustainability of growth.

In the Western Balkans, improving the capacity of public administration, and strengthening the rule of law, including reforming the judiciary and combating widespread corruption present particular challenges. Progress in these areas would also be conducive to the business environment. Public services in business and investment in infrastructure remain scarce.

Labor market reforms, including a review of transfer-benefit systems, taxation issues and overhauls of education systems, should contribute to addressing a major structural weakness in the Western Balkans and an impediment to achieving stronger, sustainable, and inclusive growth.



Source: IMF (September 2011)

With regards to global financial crisis there are clear indications that that the growth slowdown in the world and in particular in the regions, the main trading EU partners affected the economies of the Western Balkans. The GDP growth came down in the third quarter due to weak external and internal domestic demand. Countries which had a strong trade and investment link with the EU were affected earlier and the affect has been more pronounced. The countries of Western Balkans which have been less integrated with the EU seem to have more resilient so far, such as Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

How was the crisis transferred to the Western Balkan countries?

According to the European Commission (2009), the SEE countries started to be affected from the crisis from the trade and financial transmission channels. The countries of the region had over the past few years benefited from relatively easy access to external financing while domestic saving rates were low. Surges in net capital inflows helped finance saving-investment gaps in those economies, in some cases increasing current account deficits. Capital imports consisted to a large extent of lending from abroad, fuelling high domestic consumption. With tightening credit conditions on international capital markets and re-pricing the risk, the foreign savings did not supported the growth as before.

What was a policy response of the SEE countries to financial crises? How about domestic actors?

It was a challenge for the Western Balkan countries to design an adequate policy response to the financial and economic crisis. Significant constraints in monetary and fiscal policy leave only limited scope for the active policy response. These countries accelerated structural reforms in labor and product markets to support this adjustment. The monetary policy of the countries was limited by the frequent use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and high degree of Euroisation, affecting financial and non financial sectors. The widespread of the Euro as a financial currency has further reduced the possibilities of the independent monetary policy.

Central banks continued to make use of instruments such as reserve requirements, remuneration of reserves and administrative measures that influenced the quantity of the lending. The fiscal policy also varies from country to country and depends on the available fiscal rooms for activities. All of these countries are burdened by significant external imbalances and current account deficits. In general while the limited adjustment was made with monetary and fiscal policy, the policy response was focused on flexibility of labor and product markets so that prices were allowed to adjust more freely. The international financial crisis, which implied external financing constraints, were partially restored by adjustment of wages and product prices and therefore it supported the economic recovery.

Euro zone crises

The EU set four conditions for membership at the Copenhagen Criteria council in 1993: membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions, guarantying the democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the existence of a functioning a market economy as well as capacity to cope with the pressures within the Union. These conditions were designed to minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically.

With the EU authorities preoccupied with the Euro-zone Debt crisis, the SEE countries could be left behind the corner. The Western Balkan countries are also among the countries that could suffer most from the Greek crisis or in the future, the possible Italy crisis. According to Gligorov (2011), while the Central European countries invested in manufacturing, serving the Western Europe, the Western Balkan countries investments were directed to construction and tourism. Furthermore, he stated that the countries like Greece borrowed heavily from abroad without improving competitiveness, whereby they are much more exposed to the EU financial crisis.

Institutional Challenges and Absorption capacities

The importance of institutions for economic growth has long been understood – emphasized from Smith, David Landes (1998) and recognized in the 1993 Noble Prize awarded to Douglas North, who saw “good institutions” as establishing an incentive structure that reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency- hence contributing to stronger economic performance.

The interest group approach sees the state as an arena within which economic interest groups contended or allied with one another group to shape the making of public policy decisions about the allocations of benefits among demanding groups’ (Skocpol, 1985), the case of some of the Western Balkan countries.

The experience of the Central European countries showed that the countries involved in the EU Integration process should create capacities in order to absorb the EU funds for Pre -accession assistance. The EU introduced the new financial framework 2007-2013, a new Instrument *for Pre-accession Assistance* (IPA) which will replace CARDS. Based on the CEE countries experience, we will have to make an analysis. Are Western Balkan

countries able to create efficient institutions in order to be ready to absorb these funds and allocate towards sustainable development?

Table1. Pre-Accession Assistance envelopes for 2007- 2009

<u>Country</u>	2006	2007	2008	2009
<u>Croatia</u>	140	138.5	146.0	151.2
<u>Macedonia</u>	43.6	59.5	70.2	81.8
<u>Turkey</u>	500	497.2	538.7	566.4
<u>Albania</u>	45.5	61.0	70.7	81.2
<u>Bosnia Herzegovina</u>	51.0	62.1	74.8	89.1
<u>Montenegro</u>	59.3	31.4	32.6	33.8
<u>Serbia</u>	195	186.7	190.9	194.8
<u>Kosovo</u>	167	63.3	64.7	66.1
<u>Total</u>	1201.4	1099.7	1188.6	1263.9

Source: The European Commission and EU Policy towards South-East Europe

Since 2010, the Commission has been gradually shifting financial assistance from individual projects to a more global, sector-wide approach, focusing on key areas of the reform agenda of the beneficiary countries. Governments in the enlargement countries are encouraged to adopt comprehensive and sustainable policies in priority sectors such as justice and home affairs, public administration, private sector development, transport, energy, environment and climate change, social development, agriculture and rural development.

Increasing Competitive Capacities

Improving and sustaining growth potential over the longer term remains a major challenge for the transition region. It is now widely accepted that the ability to innovate, whether by imitating existing technologies or inventing new ones, is central to this objective.

Following 2000, the Western Balkan region witnessed a significant economic growth, up to the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. Despite the improvement of the economic performance, growth rates were lower compared to other fast growing countries such as East Asia and many of the EU 10 countries. According to the World Bank report (2010), domestic demand stimulated by rise in credit, wages and remittances was the main source of the growth for the most of the Western Balkan countries. In addition, Kathuria (2008) analyzed that exports have not played a significant role in the region's growth, but on the contrary, have been a weak link despite the preferential trade regimes with the EU and within the region. This is one of the facts that describe the

limited potential of SEE countries to penetrate on EU markets. What should be undertaken, in order for changes to take place in these trade patterns?

Western Balkan countries should provide development of a legal and policy framework for trade and trade-related policies based on EU and WTO compatibility, including the preparation and implementation of a Law on External Trade. It will set out measures for improving the functioning of the Investment Promotion Agencies and strengthening the cooperation with MIGA. These countries should propose measures to establish effective institutions able to control and supervise public expenditure, according to best international standards; initiatives able to strengthen the institutional arrangements for managing international borrowings – and will seek to promote the effectiveness of the financial institutions generally.

The Western Balkan countries should contribute to the achievement of European Partnership priorities related to the economic situation by strengthening the transparency and sustainability of public finances—and taking steps to ensure consistency between public expenditure and the consolidated Medium Term Expenditure Framework. It will be consistent with agreed macro-economic principles and priorities. They should introduce measures to reduce dependency from custom revenues towards more comprehensive and effective tax generation methods consistent with a modern market economy.

Furthermore Western Balkan countries should stimulate the private sector, in particular, the small and medium sized enterprises in conformity with the SME European Charter. There is a need for the implementation of an Employment Strategy, which will enable the progressive transfer of employment to the private sector. These institutions or authorities also should introduce comprehensive social policies to promote employment and social cohesion and to address poverty and social exclusion, paying particular attention to youth unemployment.

Finally, it's very important to increase the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures of European integration by putting forward a coherent strategic programme for strengthening human capital adapted to the needs of a changing labour market in the country – by improving the quality of primary and secondary education, higher education, vocational and educational training, including life-long learning.

Domestic actors in the Western Balkans

Realism, the dominant theory of international relations, fits very well with the Great Power interventions in the region of SEE (Rakipi, 2004). In the case of transition countries, the role of international institutions is to influence and assist the transition from the authoritarian to liberal regimes.

Diplomatic, economic and international aid has been tied to international reforms aimed at strengthening the democracy. In addition, the liberal perspective may serve well as a theoretical background of explaining the local developments and the contemporary international interventions. According to this school of thought, international institutions promote cooperation, facilitate communication, provide common rules, constraint aggressive behaviour and provide basis for joint actions and conflict prevention (Preve-

house, 2002). Furthermore, Prevehouse (2002) points out that the EU is needed to prevent us falling back into the bad old days of the war which stalked the Western Balkans in the very last year of the last century. Contrary, by using similar standards in different countries, the international community in most of the cases couldn't provide in these countries long term development and growth.

Du to this fact, Western Balkan countries must create a partnership with the European Commission and establish local ownership of the process, as Mrak (2007) states: the central point of the EU is not "to get the job done", but to transfer know-how and experience to candidate and potential candidate countries. This component highlights the weaknesses of the domestic institutions to use EU funds and other EU assistance. If we analyze the financial support of the EU to candidate countries we can conclude that higher amount of financial support is delivered to technical assistance instead of being delivered to capital investments and other value added activities. The question is: how this will be achieved in the future? This will be achieved by encouraging interaction and co-operation among universities, government, research organisations so as to enable them to be much better prepared in their co-operation with foreign counterparts, otherwise the SEE countries target will find an emergent solution but not long term growth and sustainable economic development.

Conclusions

In order to ensure a sustainable economy that could be well prepared to absorb the shocks of the globalization as well as EU accession, the Western Balkan countries should undertake a wide range of structural and institutional reforms.

These reforms should aim at creating conditions to increase investment, as required for sustainable growth and higher employment, increase international competitiveness in economy by improving the efficiency of factor markets and third designing a policies and measures that will make a transition process sustainable.

A very complex issue is capacity building. Institution building is by its nature a gradual process because institutions, however well designed, take time to mature. Some of the countries adopted a gradualist approach to institution building, but in the course of the EU accession process, the gradualist approach should be replaced by rapid changes in order to address the challenges coming from globalization and EU enlargement.

EU enlargement is considered to be the most suitable option for the Western Balkan countries because it ensures a greater external security, legal harmonization and stability, access to a single European market as well as prospect of involvement in European decision-making process. At the same time, it also offers to these countries an opportunity to become active partners in European and global developments, but only if these countries could increase their local ownership during these process.

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EMBODIED 'ETHNICITY' AND INFORMAL SANCTIONING MECHANISMS: SANCTIONING OF EMBODIED MACEDONIANNES IN AUSTRALIA

Abstract

Over two decades ago, G. Carter Bentley recognised the fact that up until that time, not one of the discussions on ethno-identity had explained 'how people come to recognise their commonalities in the first place'; that is, how 'symbolic construal of sensations of likeness and difference' (Bentley, 1987: 27) may be accounted for. Building on Bourdieu's *Theory of Practice* (formulated in Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977)), Bentley developed an approach which came to be known as the *Practice Theory of Ethnicity*. The proponents of this approach (Bentley 1987, 1991; Eriksen 1991, 1992, 1993; Dunn, 2005, 2009) have performance (practice) at the core of the construction of collective ethno-identities in common.

A recent study by Veljanova (2010), which investigated how the *emic* quality of Macedonianness developed in Australia, indicated the strong relevance of the practice (performance) theory of ethnicity. As Veljanova suggests, 'practice is considered at the core of Macedonianness in Australia; in other words, it is an enacted Macedonianness' (2010: 78).

It may be argued that a long-standing challenge to the distinctness of anything imagined as ethno-Macedonian, that is, the substance of enacted and imagined Macedonian-ness, when internalised, poses a threat to a people's collective existence; as a result, tacit and strategic 'defensive' mechanisms are developed and redeveloped. Drawing on the results of Veljanova's study (Veljanova, 2006-2010), this paper focuses upon (1) whether the survey respondents (N=764 valid survey responses) believed (or did not believe) in functional informal sanctioning mechanisms; and, (2) the informal sanctioning mechanisms that operate within the Macedonian ethno-community in Australia in the 'service' of ethno-cultural continuity. Apropos of the former (1), the study indicated that out of 764 valid survey responses, 36.1% of interviewees believe in their existence, 30.8% do not believe in their existence, and 32.7% are undecided. As regards the latter (2), drawing on the findings of the study, and with particular focus on Macedonian cuisine as an embodied Macedonian-ness, the following informal sanctioning mechanisms will be discussed: gossip, ostracism, loss of respect, unwelcomeness and loss of support.

Key words: Ethnicity, embodied Macedonianness, informal sanctions, practice theory of ethnicity, Macedonians in Australia

Over two decades ago, G. Carter Bentley recognised the fact that up until that time, not one of the discussions on ethno-identity had explained 'how people come to recognise their commonalities in the first place'; that is, how 'symbolic construal of sensations of likeness and difference' (Bentley, 1987: 27) may be accounted for. Building on Bourdieu's *Theory of Practice* (formulated in Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1977)), Bentley developed an approach which came to be known as *Practice Theory*

of *Ethnicity*. The proponents of this theory (Bentley 1987, 1991; Eriksen 1991, 1992, 1993; Dunn 2005, 2009, Veljanova 2010) argue that practice/performance accounts for the symbolic construal[s] of sensations of likeness and difference that are at the core of all ethno-cultural identity claims. This suggests that ethno-cultural identities, such as ethno-Macedonian identity, for example, are constructed through practice.

In order to demonstrate the relevance of practice/performance in relation to ethno-cultural identities, I will draw upon my recent study (2006-2010) which explored the case of Macedonians in Australia in the context of identity, health and health capital. While the overall focus of this study was much wider, the focus of this paper will be upon two specific aspects only: [1] the relevance of practice for the experience of being Macedonian in Australia; and, [2] the relationships between the practiced Macedonian-ness, with specific focus on Macedonian cuisine and ethno-sanctioning mechanisms. Before I discuss these specificities in more depth, I will first focus on the research methodology of the study.

Methodology¹

The research took the form of community participatory research. The field work was conducted in collaboration with the following five non-government organisations: The Macedonian Australian Welfare Association of Sydney Inc. (MAWA), the Macedonian Community Welfare Association of Melbourne (MCWA), the Port Kembla Macedonian Welfare Association Inc. (PKMWA), the Queanbeyan Multilingual Centre Inc. (QMC) and the Macedonian Literary Association of Australia ‘Grigor Prlichev’ of Sydney.

A national survey of Macedonians undertaken in Australia 2007/2008 ($N=817$), together with five focus group sessions (details below), explored the attitudes of Macedonians in Australia regarding Macedonian-specific health capital accumulation practices such as spiritual healing, traditional medicine, familial and housing security, building social networks, and belief in ‘God’s foreknowledge’. Five focus groups were conducted in five different locations throughout Australia, locations with sizable concentrations of ethno-Macedonians; e.g., Sydney, Port Kembla, Melbourne, Perth and Canberra/ Queanbeyan. All five focus groups were conducted during the period 10 July 2006 to 23 October 2006. The task of recruiting focus group participants included distributing information booklets containing the information sheet, consent forms and the focus group interview schedule among visitors to the various Macedonian-specific communal sites in Sydney, Perth, Port Kembla, Melbourne and Queanbeyan/Canberra. As well, it included inviting them to become participants in the proposed study. In accordance with the nature of the project, the information booklet was designed in both the Macedonian and English languages. The snowballing effect was a welcome outcome of the public campaign to recruit participants. Thirty-eight ethno-Macedonians participated in the focus group discussions: Sydney (11), Melbourne (8), Canberra/Queanbeyan (7), Port Kembla (7) and Perth (5).

¹ I would like to acknowledge that the section ‘Methodology’ in this form was first published in Veljanova, I., 2011, “From Ethno-cultural Capital to Health Capital: Ethno-specific Health Capital Accumulation Practices among Macedonians in Australia”, *The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations*, Vol. 10 (5): 117-132.

The data from the focus groups were analysed during 2006 and 2007. The main themes and conclusions which emerged from the qualitative data analysis were included in the survey questionnaire, along with general questions about the participants such as age, gender and health status.

The survey questionnaires were widely distributed courtesy of collaborating NGOs, at various communal premises and via the Macedonian print media in Australia: *Today-Denes*, *Australian Macedonian Weekly*, *Shilo* and *Kompas*. On many occasions, I personally handed out survey questionnaires. In the period between December 2007 and July 2008, some 4,000 survey questionnaires were distributed and 817 responded to. The data were further entered and analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software application. The findings of the survey demonstrated support for the practiced theory of ethnicity.

Relevance of practice for the experience of being a Macedonian in Australia

With reference to the experience of being a Macedonian in Australia, I now pose the question: "What makes one feel and identify as Macedonian in Australia?" which was twice explored in the study, first as a question for open discussion by focus groups and second as a multiple choice question in a survey questionnaire. In response to the answers provided by the focus group participants, a 'list of ethno-identity attributes [were] devised for the survey questionnaire', all of which were categorised as 'either performance, passive or symbolic attributes' (Veljanova, 2010: 68). I stated as follows:

The everyday practices such as communal activity and engagement, cooking, enjoying music, conversations, traditional customary behaviours and church attendances, which are symbolically and affectively differentiated as Macedonian, are considered as performance ethno-identity attributes. Macedonian history has a symbolic value, and, in light of Connors' (2004) argument, is a "felt history"; hence, it acquires an affective value as well. The same may be extended to Macedonia Orthodoxy as an ethno-identity attribute. When it comes to ancestry and place of birth, although symbolic value is attached to these attributes, they are, in the main, passive attributes symbolically differentiated vis-a-vis a single event - birth of an individual - that may or may not have relevance to the individual's socialization and self-identification. Given their "factual nature", the latter are over-used and over-depend upon as measure for belonging to a people (Veljanova 2010: 69-70).

This study indicated that all of the aforementioned ethno-identity attributes were relevant to the Macedonian identity of the surveyed participants ($N=817$) as 'all attributes are reported to be relevant ... by a qualified majority (+50%)' and most relevant of all attributes are the performance attributes, which indicates that Macedonianness in Australia is in the main embodied' (Veljanova 2010: 70). This paper will focus more closely upon Macedonian cuisine as a performance ethno-identity attribute.

As regards to Macedonian cuisine as an ethno-identity attribute, in my paper *Conceptualisation and Construction of a People: Enacted Macedonianness in Australia*, I wrote:

Out of the overall surveyed population N=817, 511 respondents (62.5%) considered Macedonian cuisine a relevant ethno-identity attribute. In 47 cases, while this attribute was selected as important, it was not ranked. It was ranked in the top three attributes of ethno-identity by 21.8% of the valid number of responses, 32.3% ranked it in the middle three (4-6), and the majority (37.2%) ranked it in the last three (7-9) attributes of ethno-identity. Thirty-three respondents ranked this attribute first, that is, of most importance when it came to their Macedonian identity. In its own right, Macedonian cuisine was most frequently ranked as an eight defining element....[...]

Explaining the sentimental value of the symbolic differentiation of foods as Macedonian, a Queenbeyan focus group participant stated:

Participant F5: *I migrated to [Australia] when I was young. I had my children here ... now I have grandchildren. My sons-in-law are Australians. When they ask: 'What's for dinner?' I reply 'Mandja'. They know that that will involve a pot. In the pot, there can be a lot of things. And all of that is Mandja. The difference is that we don't use steamed vegetables; rather, the vegetables are contained in our mandja. In the very beginning they might have not been as keen on eating stuffed capsicum, the stuffing... the stuffed cabbage leaf, but now they are keen. ... I think the [Macedonian] cuisine is very important for us (Veljanova, 2010: 71-72).*


Foods and Sanctioning Mechanisms

Social relations of difference (gender, class, status and ethnicity) are also symbolised by foods and eating practices (Caplan 1997). In this paper, focus is upon ethnocultural distinctiveness as an area of difference. More than a decade after Caplan (1997:13) observed the axiomatic approach in the available literature on national, geographic, religious and linguistic distinctions being complemented by culinary distinctiveness, it remains the case that little of the empirical evidence gathered in Australia² explores the issues of foods and eating practices as a defining element of ethnocultural distinctiveness. This paucity of literature extends to the relevance of ethnic belonging and food choices. In an attempt to make a contribution to the knowledge, I explored the relevance of food and eating practices to defining Macedonian identity in Australia. I then explored the degree to which eating practices are embedded in Macedonian customs. Finally, I examined the attitudes of Macedonians towards ethno-sanctioning mechanisms; that is, their utilisation and effectiveness vis-a-vis Macedonian foods and eating practices. The two last mentioned are discussed below.

As an embodied form of Macedonianness, Macedonian-specific cuisine and eating practices embedded in tradition and habitual practices become both individual and collective identity matters. The dynamic of this relationship can be best understood using the gear analogy that appears in *Diagram 1*. Each of the following cultural markers, i.e., Macedonian cuisine, Macedonian tradition and Macedonian identity, is a driving force behind the rest. Changes in Macedonian cuisine may be perceived as challenges to the collective identity; in this case, challenges to Macedonianness. Informal ethno-sanctioning mechanisms are one way of dealing with said challenges. I will now discuss the degree to which eating practices are embedded in Macedonian customs.

² Almost none in Britain and some in USA (Caplan 1997: 13)

Diagram 1. Gear-like Relationship Distinguishing Macedonian Identity, Tradition and Cuisine



Embeddedness of eating practices in Macedonian Customs

Out of the overall surveyed population $N=817$, 766 participants (93.8%) responded to the question ‘To what degree are your eating habits embedded in Macedonian ethnic customs?’ (in the later text survey question 5). Out of the valid number of responses, an overwhelmingly large number, $n=617$ (80.5%), indicated a high degree, 114 (14.9%) indicated a medium degree, and 35 (4.6%) indicated a low degree. Out of the 617 high degree responses, 33.5% indicated 100% customs adherence, 31.1% indicated 90% customs adherence, 20.6% indicated 80% adherence and 14.3% indicated 70% adherence (See *Table 1*).

EATING HABITS EMBEDDED IN MACEDONIAN CUSTOMS. $N(eh)=766$.								
Degree to which eating habits are embedded in Macedonian ethnic customs	0-30%	40-60%	70-100% $n=617$					
			Degree to which eating habits are embedded in Macedonian ethnic customs	70%	80%	90%	100%	Miscellaneous
Valid number of respondents (n^i)	35	114	Valid number of respondents	88	127	192	207	3
			Valid percentage of respondents	14.3	20.6	31.1	33.5	0.5
Valid percentage of respondents	4.6	14.9	80.5					

Out of the total number of respondents ($N=511$) allocating relevance to Macedonian cuisine as an ethno-identity attribute (survey question 1, see **Figure 1**), 485 answered the aforementioned question (survey question 5). Out of the total number of responses ($N=551$) allocating relevance to respecting and following Macedonian customs (survey question 1), 524 answered survey question 5. A Pearson's chi-square test revealed no significant statistical relationship between the ranking of Macedonian cuisine, the respecting and following of Macedonian customs as ethno-identity attributes, and the degree to which respondents' eating habits are embedded in Macedonian customs. This means that the ranking of ethno-identity attributes is not associated with the reported degree to which respondents' eating habits are embedded in Macedonian customs.

Figure 1. Survey question 1.

General [Општи прашања]	
<p>Choose as many answers as you feel appropriate. Please rank your answers by placing numbers in the squares starting from 1 (most important) to 2, 3, 4 and so on, as less and less important (please see the sample question given above).</p> <p>Одбележи ги твоите одговори ставајќи бројче во квадратчињата. Бројчињата го покажуваат редоследот на важност на одговорите. Број 1 значи најважно, број 2, 3, 4 и така натаму, помалку и помалку важно (те молам погледни го примерот даден погоре).</p> <p>Question 1.</p> <p>What defines your ethnicity as Macedonian?</p> <p><i>Што те прави да се чувствуваш Македонец/ка?</i></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Communal activities [Активностите во заедницата]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Language [Јазикот]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Macedonian cuisine [Македонската кујна и храна]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Place of birth [Родното место]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Ancestry [Предците]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Orthodoxy [Македонската Православна вера]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Respecting and following Macedonian customs [Почитувањето и следењето на македонските обичаи]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Macedonian music [Македонска музика]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Macedonian history [Македонската историја]</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) Или нешто друго (кажи ни што) _____</p>

Sanctioning of embodied Macedonianness

The role of informal sanctioning mechanisms (such as gossip, ostracism, loss of respect, not being welcomed by the family, and loss of support) as forms of social control was identified in the service of maintenance and continuity of Macedonianness. Invoking Bourdieu's reasoning, it may be argued that informal social control mechanisms operate within both the individual and collective *habitus*es of ethno-Macedonians and the Macedonian ethno-collective. As regards their function of social control, informal sanctioning mechanisms, as tacit mechanisms, 'structure' Macedonianness. They operate at a level that is at least partly unconscious and take a particular form vis-à-vis the influences exerted by the individual trajectories of ethno-Macedonians and the collective cultural trajectories of the Macedonian ethno-collective. It may be argued that the durable contesta-

tion of the distinctness of the Macedonian ethno-collective functions as a determinant of the degree to which the above sanctioning mechanisms are used and effective. Bearing in mind that these mechanisms operate (at least partly) at the unconscious level, in this study I have inquired into the Macedonians' conscious beliefs regarding their existence among the Macedonian ethno-collective in Australia. One question in the survey questionnaire asked: 'Do you believe in the existence of informal Macedonian-specific sanctioning mechanisms that operate and can successfully affect behavioural [change]?'³ Out of the overall number surveyed $N=817$, 764 respondents (93.5%) responded to this question. Out of the valid number of responses, 235 (30.8%) stated that they did not believe in the existence of Macedonian-specific informal sanctioning mechanisms: 250 (32.7%) were undecided; and 276 (36.1%) believed in their existence. Three of the survey participants expressed the view that they believed in the existence of informal sanctioning mechanisms but emphasised that such mechanisms cannot successfully affect their behavioural changes (*Table 2*).

BELIEF IN EXISTENCE OF INFORMAL SANCTIONING MECHANISMS $N(ism)=764$				
Macedonians' position	I do not believe in their existence	Undecided	I do believe in their existence	I do believe in their existence, but they cannot affect my behavioural change.
Valid number of respondents ⁱ	235	250	276	3
Valid percentage of respondents	30.8	32.7	36.1	0.4

Table 2. Belief in Existence of Informal Sanctioning Mechanisms

ⁱ $N(ism)=764$, accounts for 93.5% of the total number of survey respondents $N=817$. The missing percentage equals 6.5%, i.e., 53 non-responses.

When confronted with the survey question regarding ethno-specific informal sanctioning mechanisms, there was an almost even percentage distribution among respondents not believing in, believing in, and being undecided about the existence of effective informal sanctioning mechanisms within the Macedonian ethnocultural field. It is worth noting that a significant percentage (32.7%) was undecided regarding these mechanisms. A possible explanation for the above percentage distribution may lie in the fact that the informal sanctioning mechanisms are in the main a tacit practice with its own practical logic that may be different from mediated, conscious, individual or collective action.

3 Survey participants were reminded that this question should be answered 'in reference to the Macedonian ethnic community in Australia'. Also, they were reminded that the concept of 'behavioural change' is used broadly, inclusive of various forms of behavioural change, such as 'health behavioural change'.

As stated earlier, in this paper, ethno-sanctioning of the symbolically and affectively differentiated Macedonian cuisine as an embodied form of Macedonianness is explored. Another question from the survey questionnaire, formulated as a scenario question, asked: ‘If you completely stop cooking or abandon the types of foods that you have customarily cooked and eaten as part of your Macedonian cuisine because your doctor has advised you to do so, do you think any of the following will happen: (1) gossip; (2) exclusion or banning by the community (ostracism); (3) loss of the Macedonian community’s respect; (4) you will no longer be welcomed by the extended family; and, (5) loss of support of other Macedonians’. In addition to direct question-oriented answers, survey participants were invited to provide alternative answers. The scenario question was formulated to assume a ‘justified’ change of cooking and eating practices for health reasons – on doctor’s advice - resulting in cooking and eating practices inconsistent with the customarily practiced Macedonian cuisine.

As evident in the **Table 3**, in the hypothetical scenario, gossip is the most widely anticipated informal sanctioning mechanism (36.2%), followed by loss of respect (17%), unwelcomeness (14.7%), loss of support (9.5%), and ostracism (2.6%).

SANCTIONING OF EMBODIED MACEDONIANNES: MACEDONIAN CUISINE $N(sanc)=719^i$					
Sanction	Gossip	Ostracism (exclusion/ban)	Loss of respect	Unwelcomeness	Loss of support
Valid number of affirmative responses	260	19	122	106	68
Valid percentage of affirmative responses	36.2	2.6	17	14.7	9.5
Other $n=365$					

Table 3. Sanctioning of Embodied Macedonianness: Macedonian Cuisine.

ⁱ $N(sanc)=719$, accounts for 88% of the total number of survey respondents $N=817$. The missing percentage equals 12%, i.e., 98 non-responses.

The data reveal that the informal sanctioning mechanism exclusion/banning, the most rigid of all of the mechanisms, is the least likely to sanction Macedonian cuisine as an embodied form of Macedonianness. Again, it is worth noting that 115 respondents (16%) of the total number of respondents ($N(sanc)=719$) who answered question 18 stated that as far as the hypothetical scenario is concerned, they anticipate no consequences. A further 50 respondents (7%) stated that none of the listed optional informal sanctioning mechanisms are anticipated. This indicates that a significant percentage of ethno-Macedonians were of the belief that no informal sanctioning would occur, irrespective of the hypothetical scenario.

It is also evident from **Table 3**, that this question has generated a considerable amount of qualitative data (analysed and categorised as presented in the above Table). While some Macedonians ($n=25$) believed that informal sanctions may occur, they were convinced of their ineffectiveness: ‘It is possible and I expect some of the aforementioned to happen, but it wouldn’t concern me’. Others ($n=12$) maintained that informal sanctions are of lit-

the relevance to Macedonian cuisine and eating practices: 'These [sanctions] have no role when it comes to Macedonian cuisine'. Six respondents were convinced that Macedonian cuisine and eating practices are not ethno-identity attributes, contrary to the conceptual understanding of Macedonian cuisine as an embodied form of Macedonianness employed in this section: 'This question is totally irrelevant. How I cook and prepare food does not distinguish who I am'. For others, the change suggested in the scenario question was not acceptable, even if recommended in the form of a doctor's advice: 'I'll not accept the doctor's advice'; 'I cannot live without Macedonian foods'. Nine respondents emphasised that Macedonian foods were the healthiest. Hence, 'if [one] eats Macedonian [cuisine] foods, there will be no [need] for a doctor'. In cases where changes to eating practices are necessary, six respondents suggested that there are always alternative Macedonian foods that can be prepared and eaten: 'There is always other Macedonian food to cook'; and, given that Macedonian cuisine is 'versatile and exquisite', one can continue to eat 'dishes that will be [suited]' to one's taste. Some respondents ($n=11$) emphasised that the choice of foods is a personal matter. Others ($n=10$) expressed the belief that the wider community will support any changes: 'I believe they will be [open-minded] and supportive'.

In conclusion, the results suggest that Macedonian identity is an enacted identity; that is, an identity that is mostly recognised as such through practice. It may also be concluded that the threat to Macedonian ethno-collective distinctness as inscribed on the individuals invoked a tacit and strategised defensiveness. It also became clear that any 'rigidity' of the collective imposition over the individual is not widely expected. Regarding the informal ethno-sanctioning mechanisms in the service of cultural continuity and maintenance, explored through Macedonian cuisine as an embodied form of Macedonian-ness, gossip was the most widely acknowledged mechanism, followed by loss of respect, unwelcomeness, loss of support, and, lastly, ostracism by fellow-Macedonians. Regarding Macedonians' belief in the existence of informal sanctioning mechanisms and their effectiveness within the Macedonian ethnocultural field, there was almost equal distribution of responses indicating belief, non-belief and undecided.

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INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

Abstract

Increasing crime and proliferation on plenary level, after the end of World War I, expanding forms of organized crime on the territory of several states, with express reference to drug trafficking, person trafficking, counterfeit currency, forgery of credit cards and information fraud, terrorism acts and so on, have caused a reaction of solidarity to combat this dangerous phenomenon.

International cooperation in legal matters, in the sense of cooperation and assistance in various areas of legal activity, is necessary for the purpose of fighting crime.

The current paper focuses upon one special law Romania adopted to strengthen international judicial cooperation.

Key words: globalization, legal assistance, extradition, special law.

The modern world is confronted with a whole process of globalization on all levels: political - the appearance of Community institutions, for example, social - there already exist non-governmental organizations claiming to represent “global civil society”, economic - emergence of multinational companies, cultural. One of the political level issues is the legal aspect.

Globalization changed the contour of jurisprudence and led to the creation of new global legal institutions, norms and regulations, international criminal justice mechanisms that apply universal jurisdiction and inter-governmental cooperation, continually bringing to court international offences, crimes and criminals irrespective of their more or less official position.

Justice is a means of maintaining peace in any society and, in the course of time, special courts have been established as global institutions (Dicker and Keppler, 2004) from the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to International criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court, the most prominent symbol of worldwide cooperation in this particular field. As long as international justice mechanisms are a vitally necessary alternative to impunity (Dicker and Keppler, 2004) there are reasons to believe that future will inevitably bring legal globalization. Such a conclusion is easily reached by observing the increased judicial cooperation between states in the last half-century: the exchange of legal instruments that had taken and still take place, the international rogatory commissions, the training and expertise sharing seminars targeting lawyers in different countries, the establishment of international associations of magistrates, joint basis of jurisprudence and international jurisdictions and, more recently, the emergence of European institu-

tions such as the European arrest warrant and direct recognition of foreign judgments, sentences or decisions.

It was the political environment that paved the way for this (re)launching of the juridical by the fact that sovereign states ratified instruments that allowed the emergence of international legal institutions that facilitated judicial cooperation at international level.

The European different national legal systems are oriented either towards the Common Law system or towards the Roman-Germanic legal system, known as the Civil Law system - characteristic for the continental states. Nevertheless Europe's political and legal world perceives an acute tendency to approximate the two systems and to embrace a single, common legal model. The most obvious aspect of the desire to approximate the legal systems, the contact between judges from different countries is the very creation and functioning of international (International Court in The Hague), supranational (Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg) and even transnational jurisdictions (the one in Kosovo for instance). Within them, judges from different countries and legal systems meet and solve cases following common procedures.

Integration in the European Union of more and more states, the desire to have a joint European Constitution, the birth or strengthening of European institutions are among the first signs of the globalization process. Europeanization of law is measurable by the extent to which European Union has become a primary source of law for its member states. Although difficult to quantify, despite the fact that there are no statistics, the most conservative estimations indicate that the European Union is responsible for 50% of all new legislation applicable in the European states. Europeanization is already visible at the level of litigation as every year there are hundreds of references from different courts to the European Court of Justice.

Under such a difficult international environment where many national courts still remain unable and unwilling to prosecute serious crimes the challenge is to work effectively. The gains engendered by international justice institutions need to be preserved and the international system strengthened until many more national courts assume their front-line role in combating impunity (Dicker and Keppler, 2004).

The concept of *international legal assistance*¹ in criminal matters has, in legal literature, two meanings.

In the broad sense, it generally refers to the assistance provided in the fight against criminality (Stănoiu, 1975, p. 16). One can include here: the judicial police cooperation, international rogatory commissions in criminal matters, recognition of criminal court decisions, extradition and so on.

In the narrow sense, international legal assistance concerns legal assistance of judicial or procedural character, which means the assistance the judicial bodies of a state grants, in the course of a criminal trial, to the judicial bodies in the state where the judicial activity takes place and which consists in performing, rendition and communication of some procedural acts necessary to solve that cause (Dongoroz, 1976: 405).

¹ It must not be mistaken for the concept of *legal assistance* - that component of the right to be defended that represents the complex activity carried out under the law, by lawyer, to promote and defend the legitimate interests of the parties in procedural criminal proceedings. (Nistorescu, Apetrei, and Nae, 1993)

Collaborating closely with other countries Romania actively participates in solving problems that concern the whole world and in this regard it adjusts its legal system which relates to international cooperation. Romanian Constitution gives priority to international treaties and conventions ratified by our country when there is a conflict between them and the domestic legislation on human rights (Danileț, 2007). In order to harmonize the Romanian legal system with the international one, the Romanian legislator has drafted a special bill, Law no. 302/2004 (Official Gazette, 2004) - amended by Law no. 224/2006 (Official Gazette, 2006) that governs international judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As a consequence of the international commitments, the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure does not establish any more the special procedures by which international legal assistance is granted, reference being made to this by the aforementioned special law. On the other hand, the provisions on cooperation with European Union Member States in enforcing the EU Council's Decision (no. 2002/584) on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States came into force once Romania entered the European Union.

Extradition is one of the oldest forms of international cooperation in criminal matters, the procedure by which a sovereign state (requested state) agrees to surrender to another state (the requesting state) a person living within its territory and who is accused or prosecuted for a crime or is wanted for carrying out a sentence on the territory of the requesting State (Radu, 2006: 199).

A criminal or convict's extradition, transfer or rendition under a European arrest warrant, the transfer of criminal proceedings, acknowledgement and enforcement of other court's resolutions or sentences, judicial assistance in Criminal Matters are all forms of international judicial cooperation in criminal matters to which the provisions of the present Law no. 302/2004 applies.

The text of the law at first defines the terms and specific phrases related to international judicial cooperation among which:

- *requesting state* - the state which makes a request in the field covered by the special Law;
- *requested state* - the state to which an application is made;
- *central authority* - the authority designated by the requesting or requested state to apply the provisions of international conventions;
- *judicial authority* - the law courts and prosecutors' offices attached to them, established according to Romanian law, as well as the authorities that have this capacity on the territory of the requesting state, pursuant to the latter's statements to the applicable international instruments;
- *extraditable person* - the person that is subject, or liable to extradition procedure;
- *extradited person* - the person whose extradition has been authorized;
- *active extradition* - the procedure under which Romania acts as the requesting state;
- *passive extradition* - the procedure under which Romania acts as the requested state;

- *executing state* - the state where the convict may be transferred or has been transferred in order to serve the sentence or with the purpose of security measure;
- *issuing judicial authority* is that of a European Union member state apt to issue a European arrest warrant under the law of that state;
- *executing judicial authority* - a European Union member state apt to execute a European arrest warrant, according to the law of that state;
- *issuing member state* - a European Union member state on whose territory a European arrest warrant is issued;
- *member state of execution* - a European Union member state to which a European arrest warrant is addressed.

This law is enforced on the basis of and for the observance of the rules of interest for judicial cooperation in criminal matters included in international instruments to which Romania is party, and it supplements these instruments in case there are unregulated situations [Article 4 (1) from Law 302/2004]. On the other hand the enforcement of this law is subject to the protection of the sovereignty, security, public order and other interests of Romania, defined in its Constitution (article 3 of Law 302/2004).

Cooperation with an international criminal court or a public international organization in accordance with the provisions of special international instruments - such as the regulations of international criminal courts - is examined by means of separate legal proceedings, the provisions of this law being liable to proper additional enforcement, if necessary [Article 4 paragraph (2) from Law 302/2004]. In the absence of an international convention, judicial cooperation can be carried out under *international comity*, upon request transmitted through diplomatic channels by the requesting state and with the written assurance of reciprocity from the competent authority of that state. [Art. 5 paragraph (1) from Law no. 302/2004]. Under these circumstances, this *law is common law in the field for the Romanian judicial authorities* [Article 5. (2) from Law 302/2004].

Lack of reciprocity does not impede to grant a request for international judicial assistance in criminal matters, if it:

- a. is necessary because of the nature of the offence or of the need to fight against certain forms of serious crime;
- b. can contribute to improving the defendant's or convict's condition or his social reintegration;
- c. can help to clarify the legal situation of a Romanian citizen [Article 5 paragraph (3) Law 302/2004].

In case Romania makes a request under this law on the basis of international committee, reciprocity will be provided by the Minister of Justice - for each case and whenever necessary - upon the reasoned request of the competent Romanian judicial authority (Art. 6 of Law no. 302/2004). Requests addressed to Romanian authorities, in areas covered by the special law are fulfilled according to Romanian national procedural law, unless the special law specifies otherwise (Article 7 Law no. 302/2004).

Article 10 of Law 302/2004 stipulates the principle of *non bis in idem*, international judicial cooperation not being admissible if a criminal trial was held for the same offence in Romania or in any other state and if:

- a) acquittal or termination of criminal proceedings has been ordered by means of a final judgment;
- b) the sentence imposed by means of a final judgment has been served or made the subject of a pardon or amnesty, for the whole period or for the part not served. These provisions do not apply if:
 - assistance is requested to review the final judgment for one of the reasons that justify the promotion of one of the extraordinary appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code of Romania;
 - an international treaty to which Romania is party contains provisions which are more favourable in terms of *non bis in idem* principle.

The Romanian state has the obligation to ensure as far as possible - at the request of the requesting state - *confidentiality of requests addressed in the areas regulated by this special law and their attached documents*. If the condition of confidentiality could not be ensured, *the Romanian state will notify the foreign state, which will decide*. (Article 12 of Law no. 302/2004).

Requests for international judicial assistance in criminal matters will be addressed through the following *central authorities*:

- a) Ministry of Justice, in case the object of the request is the extradition and transfer of sentenced persons or if the court refers to the trial activity or the stage/phase of enforcement of criminal judgments;
- b) Prosecutor of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, in case the request relates to investigation activities and prosecution phase;
- c) Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, if it relates to criminal records (Article 13 of Law 302/2004).

Requests for international judicial assistance *can be sent directly by the requesting judicial authorities to the judicial authorities required* in those cases:

- where the international legal instrument applicable in the relationship between the requesting and requested state regulates this mode of transmitting [Article 14 paragraph (1) of Law no. 302/2004]. *Appropriate electronic devices*, especially the fax, may be used when available, if the authenticity and confidentiality demand and reliability of data transmitted is guaranteed (Article 15 of Law no. 302/2004);
- of emergency *but a copy will urgently be sent simultaneously to the Ministry of Justice or to the Prosecutor of the High Court of Cassation and Justice*, as appropriate [Article 14 paragraph (2) of Law no. 302/2004].

The same procedures are followed to transmit responses to urgent requests for judicial assistance in criminal matters. Direct submissions will be made through the *International Criminal Police* [Article 14 paragraph (4) of Law no. 302/2004].

The stipulation that requests for international judicial assistance in criminal matters addressed to Romania and the documents attached must be formulated either in Roma-

nian or in English or French is proof of accepting globalization at another level - the linguistic one, but this is another issue.

The latest event - the European Council Summit of December 8th and 9th - emphasizes the tendency towards globalization in all fields including that of legal system, and justifies the definition of law globalization: "the degree to which the whole world lives under a single set of legal rules. Such a single set of rules might be imposed by a single coercive actor, adopted by global consensus, or arrived at by parallel development in all parts of the globe" (Shapiro, 1993). The European Union member states except Britain, agreed, in Brussels, to conclude a new treaty to strengthen fiscal governance and economic policy coordination, an intergovernmental agreement within the Union, an agreement of fiscal governance. Under the agreement, the balancing of the budget must be stipulated in the constitution of each state that participates in the new treaty and according to Romania's president, the country will accede to this agreement, the obligation assumed in Brussels following to be stipulated in Constitution by 31 December 2012.

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THE FUTURE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

The structure of the system of nation-states, established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, as a new political order in Europe which rests upon sovereign and independent states, constantly evolves and changes.

Today's trend of globalization, as a complex process that involves not only a commercial process which includes exchange of goods, capital and services across national borders, but also an increased number of interconnections in politics and culture, has a serious influence on the traditional concept of the world order and the international relations, according to which the basic unit that determines the way we act globally is the nation-state.

Namely, globalization, as a concept, contradicts the traditional understanding of the primacy of the nation-state in the world order and introduces a possibility for parallel existence of various non-state subjects, which would have equal or even superior role to the nation-state. Moreover, globalization seriously affects the classical concept of sovereignty that explains the nature of the nation-state and represents one of the basic conditions for its existence.

This paper has placed its focus on the future of the nation-state in the era of globalization. The question whether it is going to succeed to survive under the pressure of globalization, or what would its eventual further transformation and adaptation look like, as a response to the challenges of globalization, is the theme which is equally important for everybody, as a member of one of the almost 200 nation-states which exist in the world today.

Key words: nation-state, globalization, sovereignty, international relations

Introduction

According to the traditional study of international relations, the nation-state is the primary unit of the international system. The modern system of nation-states was established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 as a new political order in Europe, composed of sovereign and independent states.

The nation-state managed to emerge as a dominant actor on the international scene by suppressing several other political and social organizations such as the city-state, the empire and feudalism. There are three basic elements which constitute the notion of the nation-state: jurisdiction over territory, a political and administrative apparatus and the acknowledgement by others that it is a sovereign entity. The concept of sovereignty means that the state recognizes no higher constitutional authority than itself. It is often

considered a synonymous with independence, although there is an important difference between the two concepts: sovereignty is mainly a legal concept, while independence is a political one. Namely, a state can be formally sovereign although in reality it depends vastly on others. Moreover, the concept of sovereignty is essential to the existence of the system of states and the maintenance of international order. This is because the recognition of a state as a sovereign entity imposes an obligation for others to refrain from intervention in its affairs (William, Goldstein and Shafritz, 1994).

On the other hand, we are now living in the era of globalization. "Virtually all nation-states become part of a larger pattern of global transformations and global flows. Goods, capital, people, knowledge, communications and weapons, as well as crime, pollutants, fashions and beliefs, rapidly move across territorial boundaries. It has become a fully interconnected global order..." (Held and McGrew in Karacasulu Goksel, 2004, p.2). Having in mind this age of total war, instant global communications and fast, cheap travel, many see the nation-state as an obsolete entity and even consider it a dangerous anachronism. Even Hans Morgenthau, a strict realist, stated that "modern technology has rendered the nation-state obsolete as a principle of political organization; for the nation-state is no longer able to perform what is the elementary function of any political organization: to protect the lives of its members and their way of life... Modern technologies of transportation, communications and welfare, and the resultant feasibility of all-out atomic war, have completely destroyed this protective function of the nation state" (Hans Morgenthau in Dhanapala, 2002: 4).

The ongoing complex process of globalization, as a concept, is seriously affecting the traditional conception of the world order. Namely, the concept of globalization totally contradicts the traditional understanding of the nation-state as a primary unit in the international organization and at the same time introduces the possibility of the parallel existence of non-state actors on the international scene, such as businesses, IGOs and INGOs.

Understandably, globalization is also having a serious influence on the concept of sovereignty, as one of the basic elements upon which the existence of the nation-state depends on. The concept of sovereignty represents an essential link between globalization and the nation-state.

This paper will place its focus on the future of the nation-state in the era of globalization. The first section will outline the main implications of globalization on the state. As it was previously stated, globalization seriously affects the state sovereignty, which is going to be examined through economic, political and security globalization. The second section will progress to an examination of what could be the future of the nation-state as a consequence of the challenges imposed by globalization. In conclusion, it is argued that the most likely outcome will be that the nation-state will survive the globalization, although in a new form necessary to accommodate the changes that globalization brings. This paper has reached its conclusion through literature review and conducting analysis of the relationship between the nation-state and globalization.

The main implications of globalization on the nation-state

As Thomas Friedman concludes, globalization is “the overarching international system shaping the domestic politics and foreign relations of virtually every country” (Friedman in Kupchan, 2002: 85). It is a process which includes not only economic, but also political and cultural interconnections that transcend the borders of the nation-state, as a primary unit of the international system. Consequently, under the pressure of globalization, the nation-state suffers serious implications on its traditional characteristics, which seem to “become dysfunctional in serving the needs of a global world” (Khan, 1992: 197). At the same time, it jeopardises its primacy as a basic unit of the international system. No matter whether globalization will take its full form and realize its tendency to create a global-state with global institutions, or not, the very existence of any form of globalization represents a challenge to the Westphalia system of nation-states, based on the concept of sovereignty, due to the inability of the nation-state to practise its sovereign power over the global stage.

There are three main implications of globalization on the nation-states and their sovereignty identified in this paper: The first one is examined through the economic globalization, under which the state has a decreased ability to control its economy. The second implication is identified through political globalization, which affects the sovereignty of the state through the increased number of transnational bodies as well as the occurrence of supranational and subnational centres of power. The third implication is examined through security globalization, under which the notion of national security is completely redefined (Coughlan, 2003 and Karacasulu Goksel, 2004).

Economic globalization - A reduced ability of the state to regulate the economy

Economic globalization implies the flows of profit, investment, production, technology and communications across the national borders. The main effect of the economic globalization is the decreased ability of the state to control the national economic policies as well as their own economic future. Namely, the existence of global actors, such as multinational corporations accelerates the integration of the global economy. The financial markets have also gone through transformation. Financial flows have increased, while the national capital has become integrated with the international capital. At the same time, it is impossible to control the flow of information, which also accelerates the financial globalization. Moreover, the growth of international trade and globalization in trade due to the emergence of various global markets and global competition has also reduced the state control of the economy. Namely, the economic globalization has put the state not only in a position of having a reduced sovereign control over the national economy and the national markets, but also in a position where the market has the increased ability to influence the nation-state, through global actors and global interconnections and flows. This clearly jeopardises the sovereignty of the nation-state and its position as a primary

unit of the international system and transforms it into “being a provider of public goods and infrastructure to global businesses” (Coughlan, 2003: 6).

Political globalization- An increase of transnational bodies and occurrence of supranational and subnational centres of power

Political globalization involves the shifting of the governing power of the state to various new forms of institutions or bodies. As it was stated before, the process of globalization and the necessity for international cooperation among the states, reduces the sovereignty of the nation-states and creates a suitable ground for the emergence of transnational or non-state bodies, such as IGOs, INGOs and businesses. IGOs include bodies like the UN, the EU, the ILO and the IMF. The common feature for this form of bodies is that they all possess a certain degree of legislative or coercive power through which they present a challenge to the traditional nation-state sovereignty. INGOs, like Amnesty International and Catholic Relief Services, are transnational bodies that also have the effect of influencing the sovereignty of the state, due to their ability to have global financial and political influence through uniting people from different states based on their common causes and interests and forming powerful lobby groups. Businesses, such as transnational corporations, are also affecting the sovereignty of the nation-state. In many cases, they are more powerful than many governments and states. Some authors even suggest that there will come a time when the power will shift from states to companies. All this implies that the exclusivity of the nation-state as the basic unit of the international system will be seriously diminished and undermined and it will become just one of the several international actors, with limited power and resources. Moreover, the shifting of the governing power of the state is not only on an international level, towards the supranational centres of power, but also on a local or subnational level. This is due to the fact that under the pressure of globalization the state is not only becoming unable to control and solve global problems, but at the same time it is becoming incapable to solve its local problems, such as regional education, regional social matters and regional governance, which leads to decentralization through various subnational bodies, such as regional governments. “What makes this process part of globalization even though localized in national, indeed subnational settings, is that they involve transboundary networks and formations connecting or articulating multiple local or “national” processes and actors. Among these processes I include particular work of states. These include specific monetary and fiscal policies critical to the constitution of global markets that are hence being implemented in a growing number of countries as these become integrated into global markets” (Sassen, 2006: 5). This is the biggest paradox of globalization: on one hand it is headed towards creating one global world with one global economy, but on the other hand it also divides and fragments. Moreover, the newly emerged situation where the international arena consists of several forms of subjects, also results in the emergence of regional and global law that limits the traditional sovereignty of the nation-state.

Security globalization- Redefining national security

Globalization has given a new or at least a broader meaning to the concept of national security. Traditionally, “the concept of ‘national security’ has been centred upon organized violence. In short, ‘national security’ is the pursuit by a state of security from violence organized by another state or states. States predominantly organize this pursuit through military means” (Deudney in Fidler, 1990). However, the age of globalization brings many transnational threats, such as terrorism, environmental issues, organized crime, drug trafficking and infectious diseases. These threats go way beyond the traditional concept of national security and they are not only limited to interstate violence and protection against such violence. Consequently, under the influence of globalization, the traditional concept of national security is redefined as international security. The concept of international security includes also the transnational threats produced by globalization. Moreover, the existence of organizations such as NATO, additionally limits the nation-state traditional sovereignty. However, the emergence of transnational threats that go way beyond the state borders undermines one of the main functions of the nation-state: its protective function or the capability to provide security for its citizens.

Is there a future for the nation-state?

Having in mind the aforementioned, it is obvious that the nation-state faces many challenges in the era of globalization. Moreover, many of them have significant influence on its existence as a sovereign and independent entity within the international structure and at the same time seriously undermine its position as a basic unit of the international relations.

There are various theories by various authors and scientist regarding the future of the nation-state under the pressure of the ongoing globalization process. They vary from foreseeing the extinction of the nation-state in the era of globalization on one side to predicting that the nation-state will remain to be the basic unit of the international structure despite the challenges globalization presents to it, on the other side. Consequently, all these different theories can be summarized in three main concepts as regards the possible future of the nation-state in the era of globalization and its the eventual influence or non influence on the traditional concept of the nation-state: the extinct nation-state, the unchanged nation-state and the transformed nation-state.

The extinct nation-state

The proponents of this theory argue that the nation-state is destined to dissolve in the face of globalization. The emergence of various non-state actors, or “sovereignty-free actors” (Rosenau in William, Goldstein and Shafritz, 1994: 498), such as IGOs, INGOs and businesses, and their increased activity contributes to gradual extinction of the nation-state, due to their ability to affect the global economic and political movements, which affects the sovereignty of the nation-state. At the same time there is also an emergence of

various subnational bodies due to increased demand for participation. Given the circumstances, the nation-state has suffered “a loss in sovereignty from above (to transnational actors) and below (to subnational actors)” (Howison, 2006: 3). “Thereby, globalization entails complex decision-making processes, which take place at different levels, namely subnational, national and international, paving the way to a growing multilayered system of governance. The fact that cooperation and regulation are required on many levels as a consequence of the complexities and transnational nature of present world issues has led a number of scholars to predict the “end” of national state power” (Bertucci and Alberti, 2001: 9). Namely, the nation-state has a significantly reduced sovereignty in view of its own economy and politics and none or very little influence on the global market and global politics. “The logic of the global market dictates interdependence, not independence” (Khan, 1992: 199). Moreover, borders are becoming meaningful due to the fact that “the lifting of trade barriers, liberalization of world capital markets and swift technological progress, especially in the fields of information technology, transportation and telecommunications, have vastly increased and accelerated the movement of people, information, commodities and capital” (Bertucci and Alberti, 2001, p.9). Furthermore, the transnational threats created by globalization, such as terrorism and environmental issues are additionally undermining the sovereignty of the nation-states as they make the states incapable to practise one of their main functions, which is to provide the security of their citizens. Unambiguously, the aforementioned brings the traditional nation-state in the position of being incompetent to satisfy the needs of the global aspirations, which makes it worthless and obsolete and hence leads to its gradual extinction. This standpoint brings up the question what is going to replace the nation-state. The most widespread opinion of the proponents of the *extinct nation-state* theory, regarding the future replacement of the nation-state, is the concept of “neo-medievalism”. “This is an analogy to medieval Europe, which had multiple overarching structures – including religious, ethnic and feudal – along with a highly decentralized system of feudal lords and landowners, many with private militia, and the common use of mercenaries. The concept evokes the complexity associated with a decentralized, hyper polar world, with various co-existing political structures and a broad range of actors” (Howison, 2006: 9).

The unchanged nation-state

The opponents of the theory about the extinction of the nation-state in the era of globalization present many counter-arguments in favour of the continuity of the nation-states despite the ongoing process of globalization. According to them, the nation-state will remain the primary unaltered unit of international relations. Namely, they argue that the nation-state is far from finished and even that the importance of the state has actually increased in some areas. These counter-arguments mainly explore the contradictory processes involved in globalization. Moreover, the most sceptical responses do not accept the globalization as containing anything essentially new. For example, according to Hirst and Thompson, “there is no strong tendency toward a globalized economy and the major advanced nations continue to be dominant” (Karaculus Goksel, 2004: 7). They sup-

port this assertion through several arguments which resulted from their research. Namely, they have reached the conclusion that the present international economy is not unique in history and that according to statistical evidence it is rather less open now than it was between 1870 and 1914. Furthermore, they concluded that genuinely transnational corporations appear relatively rare and that capital mobility is exaggerated, while foreign direct investment is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial countries. Their further arguments are that trade, investment and financial flows are concentrated in the triad Europe, Japan and North America as well as that major economic powers have the capacity, if they coordinate policy, to exert powerful governance over financial markets and economic tendencies. Moreover, the proponents of *the unchanged nation-state* concept, argue that globalization will not replace *internationalization* of the world economy. In this regard, Hirst and Thompson argue that the concepts of strictly global economy and highly internationalized economy are not synonyms, but there is a difference between the two. Namely, within a strictly global economy the national policies are worthless, while in a highly internationalized economy the national policies are significant. In the internationalized economy, nation-states, together with the various forms of international regulation they create and support, are fundamental in providing economy governance, which strengthens the importance of the nation-state in the process of internationalization. In the environment of existence of various types and levels of governance, the role of the nation-state is crucial because “it integrates the governing powers and forms a structure where power is distributed upwards to the international level and downwards to subnational agencies” (Karacusulu Goksel, 2004: 8).

Consequently, the supporters of the theory for survival of the nation-state in the era of globalization, argue that the nation-state will remain to be the main actor both in domestic and international relations, despite the challenges globalization presents to it. According to them, the predictions about the possible loss of sovereignty and hence gradual extinction of the nation-state are not true. On the contrary, the acts of intensifying cooperation and joint action among states are actually a result of exercising states’ sovereignty. Moreover, the conduction of such actions regarding the establishment of closer cooperation among states, makes the state even stronger because it creates a stable international environment and at the same time it gives the states space to expand their activities and exchanges in various domains. Furthermore, the states themselves are the creators and the driving forces of the overall system for global governance. They still have a fundamental role in the regulation of multilateral and inter-governmental arrangements, which shapes both national and global activities. At the same time, the need of the state still persists in view of solving various socioeconomic problems and protecting various freedoms and rights of citizens on national and local level. Namely, the guarantee of human rights and rule of law can be provided only by states, through independent courts, as well as the national welfare, which can also be provided and promoted by the state (Bertucci and Alberti, 2001).

The transformed nation-state

The third concept regarding the eventual influence or non influence of globalization on the main traditional characteristics that constitute the nation-state or regarding the future of the nation-state in the era of globalization is the assertion about the transformed or modified nation-state as a response to the challenges presented by the process of globalization. *The transformed nation-state* concept is very similar with *the unchanged nation-state* concept presented before in regard with the assertion of survival of the nation-state despite the implications of globalization on it. Namely, the main postulate of both concepts is the continuity of the nation-state in the era of globalization as a main unit of the international relations. The difference between the two concepts is regarding the form in which the state is going to survive globalization. In this respect, unlike *the unchanged nation-state* concept, which suggest that the state will remain not only unchanged, but even that its importance will be increased in some areas, the concept of *the transformed nation-state* assumes that the nation-state will change its form and evolve in comply with the ongoing globalization trends and needs, rather than suggesting that the nation-state is fated to disappear in the era of globalization, or that it will remain the primary unaltered unit of international relations.

The proponents of *the transformed nation-state* assume that the form of the nation-state as it exists today will gradually transform or evolve into a different one in the sense that the role of the state will become more or less influential in various fields. The degree and the field of the changed influence of the state will depend on the usefulness of that influence. There are many different predictions by various authors regarding the new form the state will acquire as a result of the trends of globalization. For example, Cerny suggests that the nation-state will survive the globalization, but in a relatively changed form. Namely, he envisages that the nation-state will evolve from “welfare state” to “competition state”. According to him, the role of the nation-state will change due to *the increased flows of profit, investment, production and technology as well as fragmentation and polarization, as the main challenges globalization implies. Namely, as a result of these challenges of globalization, the nation-state will be no longer concentrated on providing public services, but on providing private services or industry. Having in mind these characteristics, the competition state will be modified in a form of both civil and business organization or in a form of an enterprise association, although it will keep its fundamental civic, public and constitutional functions. Panitch suggests another form of the transformed state. Namely, he argues that the role of the state will not be diminished and will not suffer a loss in sovereignty, although it will be changed, given that globalization will have influence on the structural power relation even within developed industrial states. According to him, the change of the state’s role will consist in increasing the capacity of the state to secure global and domestic rights of capital, while the role of the states regarding collecting taxes, providing security and having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its borders will remain unchanged* (Coughlan, 2003). Another author that represents the standpoint of *the transformed nation-state* theory in the era of globalization is Drucker. “In all probability,” says Drucker, “the nation-states will outlive

the globalization of the economy, as well as the information revolution accompanying it. What survives, however, will be a substantially altered nation-state with different powers in fiscal, currency and foreign economic policy, as well as in such areas as the control of national enterprises” (Drucker in Zwass, 2002: 29).

Conclusion

It is not easy nor simple to make predictions about the future of the nation-state in the era of globalization, especially in a situation where it is obvious that the proponents of all three concepts presented above, regarding the future of the nation-state under the pressure of globalization, are trying to prove their validity by withdrawing the relevant evidence from the same reality. However, in order the decline of the nation-state to take place, globalization has to reach its full form. On the other hand, the crucial condition needed in order to see the survival of the nation-states in an unchanged form is the absence of any international and regional bodies. Neither of these situations is likely to happen in the future. This leads us to the conclusion that the nation-state survives in the era of globalization, although it will most likely transform and adapt to globalization needs. Namely, it is evident that the ongoing globalization process has a significant influence on states and challenges them in numerous ways, which has been previously examined through economic, political and security globalization. However, despite the fact that globalization challenges the state sovereignty and autonomy, states often seem reluctant to pass its sovereignty to other forces. Moreover, it seems that national interests are still very important. States are proud of their history and their achievements. People in states continue to speak their language and cherish their national symbols. For example, the US decided to conduct a military intervention in Iraq in 2003. Regarding this issue, the EU didn't react as a collective vote, but its member states expressed their individual attitudes: Germany, France and Belgium were against the US policy in Iraq, while England supported it. This means that each country still has its own interests to promote and that nationalism still plays a significant role and defies the trends of globalization.

At the same time, it is undisputed that states have decreased ability to control various activities on their own territory, including their own economic policies, while they are completely unable to control the global market and the global economies. Furthermore, the emergence of the various transnational bodies as a result of the need for cooperation among states also affects the sovereignty of nation-states, mainly through the multilateral arrangements and shifting of the governing power. Moreover, the state is not able to face the transnational threats created by globalization on state security. However, although nation-states are seriously challenged by globalization trends, they still remain the only agencies with sovereign legislative ability. Laws have evolved through essentially national frameworks, as the outcome of democratic political processes within nation-states.

It can be summarized that while globalization puts its pressure on the concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction, the nation-state can work symbiotically with, rather than against these forces. For example, big multinational enterprises are based on and seek support from the legal systems of nation-states. Businesses and consumers also depend

on nation-state in similar way in order to support commerce by providing mechanisms for enforcing contracts and bringing legal certainty to the market. They need the nation-states legal systems to facilitate and protect business operations. Nation-states will cede certain sovereign rights in order to defend and advance their own interests and secure mutual advantages for their citizens. In that manner, the nation-state will manage to secure the continuity of its influence and its role in a globalized world. “Therefore, despite the pressures created by globalization and new technologies, it is argued that the nation-state will emerge as the enduring custodian of jurisdiction and sovereignty, both of which have undergone necessary changes and evolutions along the way” (Pinto, 2000: 151).

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GLOBALIZATION, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NATION-STATE

Abstract

Worldwide, a more mature understanding of the globalization process, understood as connecting people, nations and countries, the poor and the rich, the weak and powerful civilizations and cultural development, is inevitable spreading. Increased awareness of the forces causing globalization raises different arguments and considerations. While on the one hand there are clearly expressed tendencies and practices of regional association among nations and states, on the other hand there are quite strong aspirations of nations and their national communities to regulate their own lives in “their own house”, to be politically independent and sovereign states within their territory.

Today most of the ideologists and promoters of globalization consider absolute national sovereignty as one category and there is exceeded willing invocation to identify sovereignty with nationalism. Supporters of globalization argue that technological determinism sentenced them to decline sovereignty and globalized financing and industry, fleeing from state control, considering that national regulation is outdated and national sovereignty is senseless. Also undisputed is the fact that the sovereign state remains the main actor in world politics, but its central position in the future looks quite weak. However, states remain important actors in world politics and the myth of sovereignty strongly affects the way the international system functions. There are small chances that the nation-state in the near future will not survive, but it is certain that transnational forces and institutions will continue to erode the importance of territoriality and global politics that revolves around the state.

Key words: sovereignty, nation-state, democratic legitimacy, globalization

Introduction

In the last century, especially the last decades due to the enormous development of scientific-technological revolution and the expansion of capital with the logic of its power, all state boundaries and national barriers collapsed but there is a connection among people, nations and countries in many areas of our planet. The notion of globalization understood in the broadest sense includes the notion of a world on planet Earth, a world that is interconnected, whose parts are interdependent and networked into a global system of economic, cultural, political, scientific, technological and other aspects of modern life of people. Globalization means a world without conflict, without conflicting interests, perfectly safe, in which all people and nations will be free to decide their own future and destiny of relations with other nations. The ideal world excludes any form of discrimination on ethnic, religious or racial grounds, prevents any form of exploitation, humiliation and intolerance. The ideal world should enable all people and nations to be available to modern trends and achievements of science, culture and other forms of human creativity.

According to Beck, globalization is a process of economic, social, cultural and political action that transcends the boundaries of national states. Globalisation is the ideology of the world market, and ideology of neo-liberalism.

Today's time is a time of globalization in which due to liberalization, trade and movement (mobility) and due to the development of transnational phenomena, and institutions have brought into question everything, even national sovereignty. It is natural tendency of people and nations to communicate with each other, to connect economically and culturally, to negotiate together for expansion of space for its freedom and progress. This fact throughout human history was the driving force that has enabled man to win the struggle with nature and to create conditions for steady progress in raising achievement and quality of life. Those examples and ideas have created and developed various forms of connection and association for nations and states sometimes in their interest, and sometimes against it. So the problem of globalization is the idea as such, however after a certain time inevitable connection and unification of the world and the ground will follow.

State and national sovereignty and globalization

There are many disputes concerning globalization and its harmful consequences for sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state, but despite this, the sovereign nation-state still exists and is a major actor in the world political scene, although its central position is much more volatile than in the recent past. Territorial nation-state is a typical modern form found worldwide. Historically, the nation-state has long been part of world politics and as a political form has occurred since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. While in Europe and America it was stronger in the century after the French revolution, in other parts of the world this notion is "imported" mainly during the XX century. It is true that nation-states and national societies are distinctive political forms in which the world became contemporary, modern, but we should not fall into the trap of the assumption that their central place is given once and forever or that there are unique ways that can be imagined for leading political life and governance. Today we are witnessing the power of independence and nation-state disintegrates more, and constantly reveals new forms of what some call a de-specialized or non-territorial politics and government. The creation of the new policy takes on a new dimension with the emergence of new actors such as transnational corporations and interest groups, transnational institutions and economic management supranational organizations etc.

The national state is a form of political organization that dominates the XIX and XX century in Europe and the U.S. and is a basic political unit in international relations. The national state is a territory with boundaries determined precisely, characterized by national sovereignty, which every state has implemented over the entire population and throughout the state. Sovereignty is the power that belongs to the state, has monopoly of legitimate force and positive law on the entire territory and in terms of the population. After the liberal revolutions in the world, the state identified more with the monarch but to the nation and national sovereignty with national sovereignty. National sovereignty is the sovereignty of the state, sovereignty means the nation is incarnated in the state. National

sovereignty is a state whose sovereignty is the source of legitimate nation. It's about state sovereignty with democratic legitimacy.

The sovereignty of the nation state has internal and external aspects. The internal aspect of the sovereignty of the nation-state is autonomy, and the external aspects is its independence. The external aspect consists in the ability of nation states to defend their independence in relation to other national leaders. The national state is not sovereign if you do not recognize other states, especially the strongest ones. The sovereign state is bound by law to use force to protect its political independence and its territorial integrity. Nobody has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Warring parties often invoke sovereignty to justify their requests, whether requirements relating to territory, the independence of the nation or the unity of a country. But, despite this, today we can witness how some countries intervene and use military force in the territory of other states and such actions are considered legitimate. Today a number of national states in order to ensure peace, security and economic prosperity unite and accept certain common law principles and norms that are above the national level. These principles condemn the use of military force as means for settling disputes between nation states, but still allow certain military interventions without the consent of the State in which they intervene. One should examine whether there is a contradiction between national sovereignty and the right of intervention and interference in internal affairs or in other words examine the question of sovereignty of the limits in terms of national and transnational phenomena. One should consider whether the national sovereignty of states that are associated and dependent of each other, slowly disappears, restricts or persists.

Today, on the one hand, we have representation and knowledge on international stage on which nation-states exist besides one another and each is ready with its own resources to defend its rights and interests. On the other hand we are witnessing the creation and development of supranational and transnational structures exceeding the national state and national sovereignty and the same question.

Globalism in its base is immanent to the interests of people, nations and states, but in its interpretation, especially in its practical application, there are a lot of disagreements, deformations and collisions with reality, and most express global-national relations. Considering the problem of global relations (International) - national, some analysts say that free nations want a free country, free trade, free press and information, open market, and thus national identity and sovereignty. The idea of globalists and their full denial of the nation-state has openly transformed into a theory of unlimited power and the rule of the powerful over the weak.

Some theoretical considerations on the crisis of the nation-state

In their attempts to define globalization, some scholars go as far as to say that it is a radical response to the tradition, that globalization is an attempt to break the tradition. They break down or disrupt the relations in traditional families, school and undermine the traditional understanding of traditional cultural forms, economy, politics, ethics, religious beliefs and others. This establishes the priority of supranational law over national law,

which greatly undermines national sovereignty. Realizing it on its way to globalization, they also rightly raise the question whether globalization contributes to the withering away of the nation state as such. In response to this critical issue, there are serious theoretical divergences.

A respectable group that includes Beck, Giddens, Held, advocates the idea of the process of globalization and, world global society “believes that the nation loses its state based on the existence and credibility, so actually weakens sovereignty” (Lozina, 2006). Another group of authors thinks that globalization really seriously undermines national sovereignty and state, but they exist and this does not denote their definitive end because in this new social environment that has occurred appears a new system of power that marks plurality of new sources of power and government, where the nation-state is just one of many actors. A third group of authors including E. Grande say that the new transnational regimes and systems do not compensate the nation state as their functionality depends primarily on the ability of the cooperative action of national states that possess great freedom of action such as social, economic and environmental policy. And according to Eugen Pusic, entrusted nation state in the form in which it has occurred in the global information society loses the basic features of state sovereignty, although the entire organization of the wider public service and regulatory mechanisms remains essential in today’s society. According to this, the nation-state loses its power but not its impact (Grande, 2002).

Hirst and Thompson are among the most important critics of the concept of globalization, and they are very suspicious when it comes to the disappearance of the national state. Both agree that the political and civic identity at national level remain necessary in the future. They say that the main role of the democratic state as the owner of the territory will be to take care of the population and give us a definite and unique international legitimacy to represent. In future, the role of the state as the source of the rule of law will be even more important (Hirst and Thompson, 2001). D. Matić believes that if there is indeed a crisis of nation-state it should be manifested in the centre, not the periphery of the world order. The author specifically mentions and concludes that while the most powerful countries in the world begin to show signs and signals of disintegration or loss of sovereignty, there is no real basis for the thesis of extinction of the nation-state under globalization (Matic, 2005). (Although there is quite a widespread view that globalization seriously conceives the concept of nation state, some authors go further to argue that states today do not need this concept. Sovereignty exists, but is transferred to new entities.

Indisputable are the basic ideas of globalization when the needs and pursuit of peoples and states for their own independence, for their own independent political position are respected, when the national identity and sovereignty are respected, and when any integration on regional or global level have full equality and higher degree of security and freedom of communications with other nations and states. If there are such assumptions it can be said that globalization and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. However, much of the ideologists and promoters of globalization consider absolute national sovereignty as one category, with exceeded willing invocation to identify sovereignty with nationalism. Ideologues of globalization believe that sovereignty of the people and the state is exceeded, it is redundant and an obstacle for realizing their ideas.

According to them, it is an external, foreign body that gets in the way of economic, political and military integration. In this context, it is worth mentioning the opinion of former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin who said: “Globalization is a reality and it is no longer questioned. But there should be rules of the game, strong international institutions and a greater role of national states. Democratic legitimacy remains in the national state”. Today, practically most theorists agree that the global crisis in particular contributed to the crisis of modern nation-state based. In all countries there are acute processes that undermine the nation state. On the one hand, it is globalization, and on the other hand, it is the process of regionalization. Nation-state is in crisis primarily because it became powerless to integrate the process of globalization, to control capital flows and to regulate social reality.

Answer to some unanswered questions

The state of international relations and the process of globalization today seek answers to the question: What is the essence of national sovereignty today? What did evolution experienced in the last decades of the last century and what are its prospects in the coming future? First of all, one needs to remember that sovereignty is an expression of the will of the people and that the source of that faith is much older than the idea globalists are trying to deny and do deny. National and state sovereignty throughout history suffered historical development of humanity and its evolution, but today it passes through various stages, changes and adaptations in the process of connecting loose or stronger integration of peoples and states. It still appears in various forms:

- a. States voluntarily limit their sovereignty or part of that sovereignty is transferred to supranational organizations and institutions through which they connect with other states. In such organizations, most states have found their common interest with others, but also retain its internationalism and subjectivity.
- b. Under the guise of free alienation arises the suspension of the essence of sovereignty and its absorption into supra-structures as are the European Union and NATO pact, military-political alliance.
- c. A situation comes up, which is literally the impelling force for the withdrawal of national and state sovereignty. They appear, unfortunately, today it is increasingly present, in the form of political subjugation of countries, which are partly or wholly dependent on economically powerful states or groups of countries. They are exposed to relentless exploitation and there is full suspension of any sovereignty through the creation of various forms of protectorate and military occupation of the territories of individual countries.

All that remained until recently in the history behind us, while development in the modern world gave us only the basis to claim, that the process of globalization does not include the positive trends of integration but moves towards establishing a global hegemony, the use of force above natural laws and brutal use of physical force and diverse spiritual torture that despite concerns and anxiety causes different types of resistance, passive and more active, even on the territories of the most powerful forces, leaders of the

new division of the world and its submission to neo-colonialism, to the new rulers who claim to have taken the throne of the world.

Concluding observations

After all it was said and written before about globalization, one could simply conclude that it is quite a contradictory priori phenomenon which is neither good nor bad. There are equally enough reasons to believe in the arguments made by supporters of globalization and in the arguments made by those who oppose it. The main objective of this paper is to review the relationship between the globalization and the nation-state sovereignty. When it comes to this relationship in the theory and ideas of scholars and in everyday life, one can still not extract a single conclusion that there is a large discrepancy. So-called globalists see in globalization a process that destroys the nation state as *condicio sine qua non* for its future existence, while the so-called, traditionalists “equally the same but also quite convincing evidence that the nation state remains the reference point and guarantor for the regulation of processes the current social level and in the future”. But regardless of all these objective and subjective considerations, one still has to be realistic and agree that sovereignty in the modern world has really lost its former importance and role that it had. Today practically most theorists agree that the global crisis in particular contributed to the crisis of modern nation-state based. In all countries there are acute processes that undermine the nation state. On the one hand, it is globalization, and on the other hand it is the process of regionalization.

The wish and need for integration of the world and EU integration inevitably entails serious departure or serious deviations from an ideal sovereignty, which must be definitely limited. This limitation of sovereignty is the result of the liberal ideology supremacy, the liberal political thought and the convergence of political views, and their organic connection to the development of sophisticated technologies, insisting on respect and guarantee of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, the spread of international rules for regulation and other. How could cohabitation of different modern political systems succeed? Countries today find that they have to convey part of their sovereignty to the broader associations due to increased international pressure by major powers or the influence of large multinational companies, the interest of big equity, international institutions and organizations such as United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank (WB), European Union (EU), International war crimes court in The Hague and more. The supreme rule of international, supra-national right over the rights of nation states should certainly not be forgotten and should be deeply embedded.

While on the one hand there are clearly expressed trends and practices in the regional association of nations and states, on the other hand there are quite strong aspirations of nations and their national communities themselves to regulate their lives in “their house”, to be politically independent and sovereign state within its territory. This is especially apparent when there is coercion of the natural laws of nations and the efforts of states to live collectively, in cooperation and understanding, but without limitation of their freedom.

However, today one can witness levied as well as grossly violated natural laws of connecting people and imposing coercive ways and forms of their cooperation and association in the broader community.

In conclusion, the world increasingly believes that the future of the nation-state seems rather weak. However, states remain important actors in world politics and the myth of sovereignty continues strongly to affect the manner in which the international system functions. States are still crucial in the definition of national society and culture and there is a focus on what is called the imagined community of the nation. So many small nation-states will not prosper in the near future, but it is certain that transnational forces and institutions will continue to erode the importance of territoriality and the global politics that revolves around the state. Nation state, despite the many temptations, seems that will play a major role in the future and be an instrument for regulating many relationships, because it is unlikely that the uniformity can beat the different, which is immanent to man and society.

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THE ADMINISTRATIONAL ASPECT OF THE STATE AND THE LOCAL SELF – GOVERNMENT IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION

Abstract

In the era of globalisation, the development of local communities should be favoured, but also the traditional forms of local democracy should be preserved from dying. There is necessity for modernisation of the local self-government with the help of informatics technologies and the internet. The local administration should be in function of the needs of the population, highly professional and out of political party influence. From this material a lot of project themes could derive, based on different approaches (theoretical, historical-juridical, comparative and other approaches). Thereat, the basic leading idea is that any reorganization should be in function of the needs of the local population, legal entities, central government and so on. Withal, the rigorous redefinition, especially in the view of decreasing the numbers of the local self-government units (LSGU) and the bureaucracy, should be in correlation with the percentage of the population of each state and of the LSGU. The village self-government should be organized in a modern manner, especially bearing in mind the necessities of the local population. Each reorganization, especially in context of increasing the space of LSGU should be scientifically founded. The city of Skopje as a major city should be reformed in the spirit of the organization of the capital European cities.

Key words: state, local self-government, globalization.

Introduction

Globalization has various goals, especially in the frames of the European continent that is in process of Euro-integration on the principles of the European law and euro-standards. EU tends to convert itself in an appropriate state-law form. But, there are opponents to the establishment of the classical type of Union which would be a predecessor of corresponding confederation. EU, just as all creations, has its own mission, and that is, among other things, the creation of unique political and social system for all countries of the one-party system (led by the Communist Party) after the fall of the Berlin wall (personal opinion). The European Union is attractive for all countries from East Europe, as is for the countries of the West Balkan, for it offers economical support of the impoverished and also better concept of the social state. According to the postulates of the European law and European standards, the state will have as before, mainly, two meanings (as an administrative instrument and as society).

The aim of the globalism is establishment of the polycentrism (Scholte, 2005: 233) in each view, so also and in the view of supremacy of international and European law in relation of the law of the national states.

The administrative aspect of the state as a creation of the class society, in the era of the globalization, should be studied as an implementation of the various principles of the process law, but also as an openness of the institutions towards the citizens-inhabitants of the local collectivities.

According to the current research experience, the most inspirational for research are the issues regarding the administrative aspects of the state in the era of globalization: 1. Wide and narrow meaning of the state; and, 2. the changes in the system of local self-government.

Wider and narrower meaning of the state

Every modern European state has mainly two meanings: wider and more narrow meaning. The administrative space of EU is still not unique, independent from the member states. However, EU has common apparatus and bodies with special regime. EU has its own standards that protect the implementation among its own member states.

Some institutions, for example, particularly the local self-government is protected by the European Charter of Local Self-Government adopted by The Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 1985), which in many European countries became a component of the constitutional order in domestic law as well. The wider meaning is with shorter history. According to this meaning, the state is comprehended as a social state. Actually, the state, independent from its classic functions, exerts a row of social functions established by positive law (in the areas of: education, sanitary, social protection, culture, and so on).

For now, globalization like an idea cannot be connoted negatively in connection with the EU. It is based on the concept of the social state, which in time will probably sustain some changes like every social creation, under the pressure of labor power and social partners.

Considering the constitutional basis of the social state in the Republic of Macedonia, there is a need for optimality (in every view).

In the more narrow meaning, under a state is considered the state's apparatus, i.e. hierarchy organization composed from individual and collective authority holders and all officials, as a part of its different organs. This apparatus can directly be opposed to society. The administrative aspect of the state is of special meaning, particularly in the realization of the rights and obligations of legal subjects by the administrative – process norms.

EU is not involved in the organization and in the functioning of the administration of the members, because every state has its own tradition, especially regarding administrative-legal control and protection (with or without administrative court). But it has made its own organization, unique by the principles of European law. EU protects the status of public services. They are separated from the state administration and are based,

above all, on the principles of professionalism, (without command hierarchy) and on service (users) orientation.

Contrary to the efforts of the EU to change the status of public services and of employees – emitters of services, the Republic of Macedonia with the new Law on Civil Servants sanctioned the different status of employers-professionals, but also the status of public services as well.

On the level of EU they have now the status of services of common interest, and their employers-specialists- status of public administrators or administrators who work at the services of common interest (Mirjana Slaninka-Dineva, 2010: 209).

Undoubtedly, these services evolved regarding the status of employers and they have a different status, especially unlike the former states of the real-socialism. Their organization, managing and connection with the state should overcome the etatism and decrease its influence, except regarding the standards which refer closely to the users (for example, substandard office conditions, old apparatus, unhygienic conditions and same). Regarding the organization of the state administration and its functioning, the EU stands for the following attributes: small administration (regarding the number of the organs and personnel), highly professional, service oriented and depoliticized administration.

The agencies and the agreements with legal entities often can quite professionally and effectively accomplish the functions of state administration.

For illustration, with the Frame's employment rapidly increases the number of state administrators in our country. Probably something should be changed in that aspect.

Also, it is necessary to review the number of ministries, for their better effectiveness and competency (no parallelism).

It is necessary to decrease the number of ULSG (Units of local self-government) as well as the number of local administration, especially according to the percentage of the population (Peters GB, 2009: 154).

This matter is expected to be reviewed, especially according to the different territorial organization of the ULSG and their decrease according to the criteria of common principles of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (subjective and objective criteria).

The changes in the system of local self-government

Essentials changes in the system of local self-government are based on constitutional changes (from 2001), initiated by the pressure of the Framework Agreement or the so-called Ohrid Agreement (adopted on 13.08.2001). The Republic of Macedonia according to the changed Preamble and the normative part of the constitutional amendments is constituted as a state of communities, (among which there are the so-called NLO communities). The constitutional changes present the basic of decentralization and application of the principle of fair representation in the structures of public-legal subjects. In the view of progressiveness, nothing has been changed since 1965.

The city of Skopje is not organized in a modern way as a capital of the state, like all European capital cities. It should become a modern, organized administrative centre,

and possibly be closed for new migrations. Villages in the frames of the city should be organized in a different way, i.e. they should be included in current village municipalities.

There is no unique European approach to the village. With globalization in the frames of EU, villages should be renewed according to the established concept (according to the euro-standards), especially among the new member states from East Europe.

The way of accepting political decisions should be changed, and the new rules of the game should be accepted. The wide participation in the process of decision-making brings with itself not just responsibility and risk, but appropriate dividedness of the authority as well.

Mutual planning occurs as common society and scientific process, with which all the subjects of interested population, local politicians, planners, representatives of administration are comprised. This innovative learning demands time, training, persistence, and perseverance. Nothing can be accelerated artificially or limited by time, nor can initiatives be held at distance, especially from the interested population from villages, which should have the sense that their presence is vital. A movement for renewing the village is necessary. That movement should surpass the interest borders of the current groups, parties, associations.

Politics toward the village and agriculture should be national and state, not politics of the parties (in the states that aren't members of EU).

On which basics should the solving of the problem be?

The village must be and can be recovered and renewed not only with architectonic-landscape view, but should develop itself as a form of social life, regarding the old and new necessities of its population.

Sociologists, who are interested in the appearance of villages as a place of living, indicate that time has come for changes in how values are perceived in the attitude of the inhabitants of the village. Inhabitants should be aware of the common action and responsibility for development of village. Actually, animation of the village is the basic task for present and future generations.

Villages had their own past, and in a final line, their future depends of the will of the inhabitants. The obligations are difficult, but the problems can be solved.

They should be understood as a calling from the epoch for all who want to live in a village, and thereat to feel responsible for it. How should the so-called global village be defined, especially in the era of the globalization? It appears that the model of the global village has utopian premises, or to favour the village as a desirable place for living contrary to the city (with its negativities).

Local administration, as a part of state administration, should be service oriented and respect the principles of LCAP (Law for Common Administrative Procedure) and in general the principles of Administrative Process Law (Trajkovski, 2006: 229).

In the institutions of common social interest on local level and significance, the functional self-government should be developing, especially by the users.

The comparative approach has especial importance during the creation of the changes, but also during their implementation, thereat it should respect the tradition and the customs of our milieu.

Globalization in the system of local self-government should firstly occur with the establishing of euro-regions. A local-global can be inexhaustible source, especially of various scientific debates. Of course, the local is older than the global. But, the local is vital for the global, especially in regards to cheaper labor power, whereupon profit is easily made (among other things).

* * *

Historically looking, globalization is an ancient category. It is not an invention of 21st century. Actually, it dates from the imperial states (from Roman Empire, Macedonian Empire, etc), from the empires of the middle century (Ottomans Empire, Austro-Hungary Empire, etc), as well as the new and the newest century (colonial empires).

Actually, globalization represents a renewal of the new imperialistic powers, of the neocolonialism and neo-liberalism (as a newer goal).

Today, there is a difference regarding the previous eras in informing the population (but in misinforming them as well). It is so due to internet-technology and the new inventions (robotics, spaces, biology, etc). Experience shows that in this historical period, THE STATES which constitute the forms of globalization mainly offer to the smaller states (depending of the historical moment) different types of help, and then exploitation, poverty, and similar. Mainly, everyone is hostage of modern globalization. Undoubtedly, the load of negotiations and coordination is not easy, not for the mammoth's states or for the Lilliputian's states. It is undoubtedly that the identities of any kind (respecting tradition and the past) should be kept. The paradigms should be imposed, only if the local population and progressive forces accept them as universal. The European Union, as an expression of voluntary association with certain aims, tends to the process of globalization, but by now in the frames of the European continent. After the falling of the Berlin wall and withdrawal of the forces from East Germany, the European Union promoted the common-human principles of the social state. It developed its own administrative instruments, without supremacy over 15 state members, but with the task to modernize the countries of East Europe (new members). The instruments of EU dictate the changes of the states in West Balkan which are preparing for Euro integration, as one of the forms of globalization of the European continent. Not one change in the regime of administrative aspect of the state (of the national states) has significance for the big states with capitalistic constitution. That is relevant only for newer members, like for those who are waiting to enter the EU. Actually, it is these countries that have yet to reform their economical and political constitution.

So, the EU has its own institutions, but the member states have unchanged administrative system. EU like association have its own administrative system, but the first fifteen have autonomic administrative system. Mutual communication of the two systems is based on the norms of European Law.

But, from applicant states, EU demands appropriate reforms in the administrative system and in the system of local self-government as well. The changes are needful in the juridical system as well. This derives from the fact that all states-applicants were organized according to the principle of unity of the authority led by CP (Communist Party) and not on the principle of division of authority (legislative, executive-administrative and

juridical authority), as in West Europe, with presence of multi-party organization, regardless that they are monarchies or are with a republican constitution. In some states-non-members of EU (as for example Switzerland and the Kingdom of Norway), are the most developed systems of local democracy, especially with direct civil participation.

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GLOBALIZATION, IDENTITY, CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MACEDONIA IN THAT MATTER

Abstract

Today identity is placed under question mark, but why? Globalization and Europeanization are questioning identity, but again why? In light of these changes the paper aims to place the question of the identity vis-a-vis globalization and Europeanization and tries to identify and explain the consequences of globalization and cultural imperialism for the cultural identity of Macedonia. Additionally, the paper explores the sociological dimension of the aforementioned phenomena.

Key words: globalization, identity, culture, R. Macedonia

Sociological dimension

Classic Marxists are refusing to accept, empirically or theoretically, the fact that the state is the most important actor in the global system. For Marxists, the global system is capitalistic global system, while the most important actors are the capitalistic classes in the most powerful states. In the recent circumstances in the world, the world on a large scale is structured by global capitalism, and each of these transnational practices typically, but not exclusively are characterized by its main institutions. Transnational corporations are the main locus of the transnational economic practices, that is, also the main locus of the transnational political practice and the main locus of the transnational ideological practices, which are the foundation of the culture-ideology of consumerism. Consumerism in the global system can be completely conceived as cultural ideological practice. When we shop for something which is imported we put ourselves in typical economic transnational practice. When we are under influence to vote or to support causes of the ones whose interests are transnational, we are involved in a typical political transnational practice. When we experience the need for a global product, we are involved in a typical cultural ideological transnational practice.

In “Sociology of the global system” Sklair (Sklair, 1991) states that the use of evocative term hegemon to describe asymmetry of the global system is inopportune. Hegemon is the advocate of the crucial cross-national practices, and it can be represented as individual, organization, state or a class whose interests prevail in the battle for global resources. While there is only one state, USA, which advocates, organizations or classes are hegemonic in all spheres, other states and advocates, organizations and classes are hegemonic or in reality they claim that they share hegemony in each sphere. Nation-states, according to this thesis, are the special reference point for the major part of the crucial transnational practices which aim to create, to make up the structures of the global system in a way

that transnational practices are cancelled in some states and are put under the jurisdiction of certain nation-states. But they are not the only reference point. The most important is that the global capitalistic system is based on the global capitalistic class, which dictates the economic cross-national practices, the most important single power in a battle to dominate political and cultural practices, such as the ideological transnational practices.

The success of the system is often connected with the success of the state, which is its own proposer. Britain in the 19th century was and the USA in 20th century was hegemon of the global capitalism, although in different versions than the present ones. A transnational capitalistic class is a class of the global capitalistic system and it is constituted by people who want that their interests or interests of the nation serve them best through identification with the interests of the capitalistic global system and separately with the interests of the states of capitalistic kind and with transnational corporations which are connected to those ones.

The hegemonic ideology of the global system is under constant challenge, partially from the first world. The theory of how transnational corporations employ transnational capitalistic control over consumption culture and ideology is a side with many battles for the global system. A capitalistic imperialistic centre in making the rest of the world less developed. The approach to the world system whose roots can be found in the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), who developed an analysis for the division of labour between centre, peripheral and semiperipheral states inside the orbit of the capitalistic world system. The approach of the world system encounters a huge difficulty in managing development or at least industrialization of non hegemonic states. A cultural ideological project of global capitalism is people spending above their needs, so the profit is there or with other words insuring that global capitalism will last forever.

Culture– ideology of global capitalism

Culture- ideology of consumerism is a fuel which empowers the engine of global capitalism. The driving force is the transnational capitalistic class, but the vehicle is the almighty transnational corporation. Transnational corporations date from the 1960s, and they share the same basic function of accumulation of capital on a global level. The history of transnational corporation is connected with the history of foreign direct investments. Many of the biggest transnational corporations have annual incomes way above the GDP of the half of the states in a world. The global system at the end of 20th century was not synonymous with the global capitalistic system, but the economic driving forces behind the global capitalism are dominant even though are not the only one. Still, the primary advocate and institutional representative of the economic transnational practices is a transnational corporation. The World Bank, IMF, the exchange of goods etc. are mainly driven by the interests of the transnational corporations. According to the theory of the global system the primary agent in the political sphere still includes the transnational capitalistic class. The institutions of culture- ideology of consumerism are seen through transnational mass mediums and they are the primary agent in the cultural ideological sphere. Maybe it is good to explain this in terms of which each of these three primary agents typically

produce, i.e. the results of these practices. Transnational corporations produce goods and services needed to sell and to produce, but the transnational capitalistic classes are the ones which produce political circumstances in which the products of one country can be successfully marketed to other countries. The culture-ideology of consumerism produces values and behaviours which generate and sustain the need for products.

Globalization and Sociology

Albrow (1996) stated that we can identify five stadiums in the history of sociology, having in consideration the recent concerns about globalization: universalism, national sociologies, internationalism, indigenization and globalization. However, the goal of the “indigenization” in sociology is to enlarge and to reconstruct the prevailing discourse, that is to make “local” sociology definitely present on the global arena. Universal discourse has many rivals, based in different regions and cultures, stated Albrow (1996), and he suggested that globalization does not mean that sociologists can communicate openly, but that they are confronted with entire diversity of sociological dialectics and special visions and secondly, that they are limited to focus on globalization as a process on a new level of social reality. Albrow stated that new reality is best described with the terms of “global society”.

Globalization includes comparative interaction of different forms of life. Globalization conceived in this sense is often in problems at its conjuncture of different forms of life. This does not mean that globalization is a “consequence of modernity” (Giddens, 1991). Recent concerns from globality and globalization can not formally be considered just as an aspect of income of the western projection of modernity or just, in wider terms, of “enlightenment”. In the increasingly globalized world there is reinforcement of civilizational, societal, ethical, regional and indeed of the individual self-consciousness. There are limitations for social entities to locate themselves inside world history in the global future. But, globalization inside itself and out included diffusion of expectations of those identity’s declarations.

Globalization as a topic is the conceptual entrance in the problem about “world order” in the widest sense, but entrance in which there is no achievement without certain disruption of historical and comparative importance. It is a phenomenon which demands what conventionally is called interdisciplinary treatment. Traditionally, the research of the world as whole is approached from the discipline of international relationships (international studies).

Robertson (1992) stated that globalization intimately is connected with modernity and modernization, as well as with post-modernity and post-modernization. Predomination of the national society in the 20th century is an aspect of globalization also. Because of harsh acceleration in a sense of global communications, the society is increasingly facing problems of multiculturalism and polyethnicity. To save the world from extreme complexity means to constitute global community in which the local tradition and cultural diversity are highly respected.

Nowadays the conditions on representing identity suggest that we should take in account the ways in which the representation of identity is narrowly connected first with cultural aspects and answers according to which they can be identified globally in their extent and meaning; and, second, with ethnicity. To speak about culture in a global perspective always inevitably includes participation in a play of free turning of cultural politics in which culture counts is inevitably connected with “power” and “resistance” (or liberation). Wordism as opposed is firmly based. It is based on the assumption that it is possible to build a world as a whole, analytically to that level at which virtually everything that is from socio- cultural or political interest emerges in the world including, representation of identity which can be explained or be interpreted in a sense of the dynamics of the entire world system. Appadurai (2000) stated that he advocates for a chaotic theoretical approach to global culture which is seen as “disjunctive series” and “escapes” (ethno, techno, financial, media and idea escapes). This includes rejecting the idea of global institutionalization of the relationships between universal particularism and particular universalism. The discourse of globality is a global component of recent global culture. Global culture is made in circumstances of specific interactions between national societies. In a nutshell, globalization includes universalization of particularism, not just particularization of universalism.

Giddens’ ideas (1991) are advocating for cultural variation, competition here and now. While maybe he claimed that globalization does not include defeating of western culture, it seems that he does not conceive that this kind of statement requests from him to theorize the item of “other cultures”. We participate and we witness the third major phase of modern globalization, which is clearly connected with growth, emerging from post modern ways of thinking. Giddens’ claims that modernity leads directly to globalization (or globality) and that post-modernity is just “high modernity” without saying that some aspects of modernity increasingly are an articulated process of globalization. However, globalization of recent type was put in an engine long time ago, before we were even thinking of modernity.

Globalization itself produces diversity and in different views diversity is the basic aspect of globalization. Considering the fact that until recently comparative social science relatively was surprised with the discovery of communities with diversity, which aren’t conceived seriously, globalization has brought complete turnover of the cognitive situation. That is, glocalization means global localization, in simpler terms. There are two main tendencies. In the first one, globalization is used to address diffusely the increasing interdependence across the world in a number of different dimensions, from which economics are at least the most stressed and the other term most frequently used in the sense of globalization of institutions, communities and practices, where we have “globalization of science”, “globalization of education” etc. Internationalization of curriculum is a strong step concerning the global circumstances, as we must understand that in the main part, that step is predicted by the recommendation that states which do not promote “international education” will suffer in economical and in political sense in the increasingly inter-dependant world. In other words, internationalization of the curriculum is based, or at least it is legitimized in the advance of national or regional, political and economic self - interest.

Sociology, notwithstanding its strong “national” tendencies, plays a main role in the theoretization of globality and globalization in the disciplinary front. The task of sociology students is that now they must include understanding of bases and pressure of movements in the field of education in globalization, not the least because such movements are the main parts of socialization in their increasingly compressed world. Those movements are the main arena of study of what is considered as the process of relativization on a global field as whole. In any case, universities are becoming the main “players” on the global scene. Traditionally they have contributed a lot in the cross-national communication of cross-national communities of scientists and other academics. But, universities are starting to act in more dynamic way with respect to global field and the spaces in it. Recent globalization means a significant increase in the global inclusion of the “local” complexity and density. Robertson (1992) promoted a fluid perspective concentrated on global difference. Does globalization present abruptness or continuity? Post-modernity or late modernity? Americanization or glocalization? Globalization otherwise discovers pre-histories of our present hyper consciousness of relations between local and global interactions, histories among which some are dating from the expansion of the West, others from the Middle Ages, and others from the early civilizations and even earlier. Globalization has produced new flows which have opened a potential for new imaginations and understandings. Also these tendencies must be put in correlation with the new tendencies in the cultural consumption, with more cosmopolitan tastes and predominance of communication industries over local culture. These events give to the cities a new international profile, while they relativize their economies and local cultures.

Economic globalization means summations of practices which destabilize other summations of practices, which constitute national state sovereignty. With their global practices which were put in law, they produce distinctive and complex spaciness, which just cannot be included or measured under the item national. Regionalism is an essential constituent of globalization rather than the systematic effect. Globalization and regionalism are complementary processes.

Globalization of sociology

Globalism in sociology must resist these elements. First, there must be a relationship of material finality of the earth resources connected with reality. The depressed spirit of ironic idealism cannot be the future majority of humankind, out of which at least some of them keep an eye on the existence of humankind. Second, if postmodernism reinforces the ability to tolerate measureless, it is the demolition collapsing efforts of international sociology which are translated from different cultures, intelligible one to other while they are able to exchange ideas. This is a stadium of global discipline, conceived in three meanings: a) carried forward from renowned community of scientists and academics; b) with focus on the inclusive process of social change- globalization; c) in the educational role of raising international and global consciousness. Globalization is in the final phase, but in the last one we can predict or experience it. The principle lying in globalization is not national or international, but it is a product of interaction of both, and also product of

previous phases. It results from freedom of individual sociologists who must work with other individuals all over the world and respect world-known processes with which they work. In that sense the research committee is the one which represents the principle of globalization as a simple opposition to internationalism. Globalization of sociology is an aspect which has never been called globalization of consciousness. For sociologists individually globalization means not just that they as scientists can communicate freely, but also that their subject of research has transformed in both ways, first they are confronted with complete diversity, while noise was raised up in sociological dialectics and special visions. Second, globalization itself is a process on new level of social reality. Global society is a new phenomenon. Global has become a modern adjective. But, fashion is also part of reality and there is true sense in which it is o.k. to stress that we are experiencing creation of global society of such kind and range which humankind never ever has experienced before. We are looking at human kind rising as a collective actor. In making of such huge demands, the references for history are necessary. Sociology today is in the middle of globalization.

Until now we were in a position to admit a third dimension of globalization of sociology, namely in its educational function. Sociologists experience global perspective because globalization means that they no more can explain the process inside their own countries with reference of just the internal conditions. We can add that it never is really impossible, globalization effectually means that societies now cannot be seen as systems in environments of other systems, but as sub-systems in a bigger inclusive world society. New way of thinking and acting means new ethics of responsibility and new practice of self-determination and solidarity,

Conclusion

Identity is not something which a person has for one event, one place, etc, a person cannot take out a new identity and wear it, it is something more permanent, which a person acquires with birth till the very end. It is something which a person carries with its DNA, in its gens, inherited from grandparents, parents and imparted to the children. Identity includes (identity of the Republic of Macedonia in this matter) language, culture in the widest sense, as topics and as processes if you prefer. A person has it or does not, tertum non datur. A person does not negotiate with it nor has the right from its grandparents or its parents or in the name of future generations to negotiate. Maybe the process of globalization questions “small identities, small cultures and small languages” (if there are such ones at all in the world) but there is no way for them to be destroyed, to be wiped out from the face of the world, the map of languages and cultures. With the process of globalization, one culture can get out stronger than before, but the unity is the key word (for example, the Macedonian basketball players showed that not long ago). Simply, Macedonian identity, Macedonian culture and Macedonian language continuity 24 centuries ago which is simply for respect, the biggest respect and they cannot (Europe) sweep away or erase, over night, simply they cannot, it cannot. The Macedonian identity, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian culture have future and today are the biggest world presence.

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